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1.1. Interactive Model of Research Design 
My research connects to three main disciplines: Family Business Management, Organizational 
Behaviour Management, and Human Resource Management. Specifically, in my thesis 
proposal, I study the Performance Management System and its effects on perceived justice at 
family businesses.   
For identifying the research focus and questions and developing the research design, I apply the 
Interactive Model  (Maxwell & Loomis, 2003), which has five main components: Purposes, 
Conceptual Framework, Research Questions, Methods, and Validity. In this interactive model, 
these five components form an integrated, interacting whole. The research questions play a 
central role. The components are closely tied to each other, and each element can influence and 
be influenced by the others, rather than being linked in a linear or cyclic sequence. The critical 
relationships among the components are displayed in Figure 1 (Maxwell & Loomis, 2003).  
Figure 1 - A Model for Qualitative Research 
 
 
Source: Maxwell et al. (2003, p. 3) 
 
1.2. Research problem 
Researchers indicate that we are at the beginning of the Fourth Industrial Revolution 
(Geissbauer et al., 2016; Heynitz et al., 2016; Monostori, 2014). The importance of the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution is that the former production systems can no longer be sustained because 
they have led to long-term effects of global environmental damage (climate change), consumed 
too many nonrenewable energy resources. Furthermore, societies have to prepare for a 
shrinking workforce due to aging societies. The impact of Industry 4.0 will span over every 
industry, economies, and society by redefining work and the way companies produce values 
based on digital transformation, i.e., blockchain, artificial intelligence (AI), cloud- and 
biotechnology, and the Internet of Things. Industry 4.0 provides the opportunity to integrate a 
company’s value-creating activities and the entire value chain through digitization. That is why 
there is a need for industry-level leading 4.0 industry companies that supply products and 
services that drive the fourth industrial revolution and integrate all stakeholder groups and 




Family-owned businesses play a significant role in the economy and society in the world 
(Gagné et al., 2014). The majority of all companies are family firms, and as a result: they 
account for more than half of the GDP in the US (Astrachan & Shanker, 2003) and in Germany 
(Wieszt & Drótos, 2018). Family businesses have a significant contribution to employment 
(Neckebrouck et al., 2018; Shepherd & Zacharakis, 2000). In Hungary, the majority of 
enterprises are also family businesses, which contribute considerably to the GDP and have a 
key role in employment. Thus, the expansion and successful operation of family businesses can 
strengthen society’s resilience and the economy in the new time of Industry 4.0. To support 
Hungary in taking advantage of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, it is key that Hungarian-
owned family firms transition from small and medium-sized businesses to large companies 
(Wieszt & Drótos, 2018). According to survey results (Wieszt & Drótos, 2018), family 
businesses can develop from a micro business into a strong small and medium business. 
However, when they strive to increase the efficiency of their processes and expand their 
businesses, they are less capable of reaching the next development stage of becoming a large 
enterprise through professionalization (Wieszt & Drótos, 2018). 
Professionalization means that as the organization increases in size and activities and new 
employees are hired, including non-family managers and employees, family firms may also 
professionalize by incorporating formalized management practices, such as Human Resources 
Management (hereinafter HR or HRM) practices (Madison et al., 2018; Verbeke & Kano, 
2012). One of the main criteria of formalized human resources practices is having Performance 
Management Systems (hereinafter PM or PMS) and Performance Appraisal Systems 
(hereinafter PA or PAS). Performance Appraisal as an integral part of PMS has been considered 
as one of the most important HR processes because it provides the best chance to establish a 
link between individual performance improvement and firm performance improvement (A. S. 
DeNisi & Murphy, 2017). An effective PA is an “engine” of HRM, providing essential 
information to all other HR systems to support decisions on compensation, succession planning, 
talent management, career development, learning, and development planning (Biron et al., 
2011). The aim of enhancing the effectiveness of the PM system is to improve employees’ 
performance, that is why justice perception as one of the employees’ reactions to PMS is a 
crucial criterion for effectiveness, and it is linked to the success of the system (Ikramullah et 
al., 2016).  
However, professionalization may create two distinct groups of employees, such as family and 
nonfamily employee groups (Cruz et al., 2011). Perceptions and responses of the two distinct 
groups to HR practices are both essential and may differ from each other (Combs et al., 2018; 
Gagné et al., 2014; Hoon et al., 2019) 
Consequently, family involvement and influence in family firms have unique effects on PM 
practices’ perceived justice (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006). However, in family business 
research, there is a lack of conceptual and empirical studies about specific HRM subsystems 
and practices, including PM and PA systems, and their effect on perceived justice in the family 
business working environment.    
 
 
1.3. Research goals 




Regarding my personal goals: First, I would like to conduct research based on my previous 
work experience in the field of corporate HR. Before my Ph.D. studies, I had worked as an HR 
professional at several multinational companies for eight years. Although I had participated in 
creating, implementing, and maintaining Performance Management Systems many times, I 
could not name any of the implemented ones, which were well-received by their users (e.g., top 
management, direct managers, and their team members). My intention is to give something 
back through my research to the field of HR. Second, it is important to me that my research 
help bridge the gap between research and practice. I would like to research in an organizational 
setting in a real business context. I would like to work closely with enterprises and understand 
their business problems related to PMS to find answers to those questions relevant to them. 
Third, as a scholar of Corvinus Center of Family Business, I had the opportunity to get to know 
more and more controlling families of family businesses, and I have become interested in their 
particular leadership characteristics and challenges related to human resource management.    
My research’s practical goal is to provide practical examples and support for family business 
owners, managers, and HR consultants, how to implement an effective PM perceived as fair by 
family and non-family managers and employees alike to foster organizational performance 
through individual performance. I would like to conduct research that results in specific 
recommendations to support family businesses in promoting their expansion and increasing 
their performance by retaining high-performing family and nonfamily employees. 
The intellectual goal of my research is to understand the relationship between family influence 
and perceived justice regarding the Performance Management System at family firms based on 
a systematic literature review and explore and clarify my assumptions through case study 
research. With my research, I would like to narrow the gap between research and practice in 
both family business and HR management. I hope my research can also contribute to the 
academic discussions on whether improvements in individual performance can somehow 
translate into improvements in firm performance. 
 
1.4. Paradigmatic stance 
Burrell and Morgan (1985) argue that all “organizational theories are based on the philosophy 
of science and a theory of society” (Burrell & Morgan, 1985, p. 1), and each researcher has a 
set of assumptions that shape their approach to research. The authors described four paradigms, 
which are formed by horizontal and vertical axes in their taxonomy. The horizontal axis 
represents the assumptions about the nature of science related to ontology, epistemology, 
human nature, and methodology in terms of the subjective-objective dimension. The vertical 
axis represents the assumptions about society’s nature in terms of a regulation - radical change 
dimension. The four paradigms include the interpretive (subjectivist - regulation), the 
functionalist (objectivist - regulation), the radical humanist (subjectivist - radical change), and 
the radical structuralist (objectivist - radical change) paradigm.  
Below, I describe my assumptions about the nature of science and the nature of society and my 
standpoint in the Burrell-Morgan matrix.   
From the ontology point of view, my subjectivist approach to social science is normalist. I 
argue that a performance management system is considered to be “fair” because of the 




epistemology point of view, based on my scope of research and my arguments related to this 
topic, even my stance is not that extreme, I’d rather define myself as positivist. I want to explain 
and predict what happens in the workplace environment related to the PM’s perceived fairness 
and possible consequences by searching for possible regularities and causal relationships 
between the elements. Regarding human nature based on the contingency theory (Lawrence 
& Lorsch, 1967), I’d like to analyze how environmental factors, such as family influence and 
perceived justice of the PM system, can induce consequences for PM (determinist). I have a 
strong belief that in every circumstance, every human being has his/her own free will to choose 
his/her reaction to these factors (voluntarist). I have an intermediate standpoint, which allows 
for the influence of both situational and voluntary factors in accounting for human activities 
(Burrell & Morgan, 1985). The assumptions in ontology, epistemology and human nature 
indicate my methodological standpoint in the ideographic vs. nomothetic debate. I apply case 
study research in line with the ideographic approach. I aim to get close to 4 family businesses, 
explore their specific situations and unfold how performance management is used and perceived 
by the participants and how performance management systems affect perceived justice at each 
family businesses? However, I also apply questionnaires for examining perceived justice, which 
comprises nomothetic methodology.    
Regarding my assumptions about the nature of society in the regulation – radical change 
dimension, I accept the sociology of regulation, which is concerned with the status quo, social 
order, consensus, social integration and cohesion, solidarity, and need satisfaction (Burrell & 
Morgan, 1985, p. 18).    
My research standpoint lies in the functionalist paradigm to a large extent, but slightly also in 
the interpretive paradigm. My research topic is related to a problem-oriented approach that is 
concerned with providing practical solutions to a problem. However, in line with the 
interpretive paradigm, I also seek explanation within the realm of individual consciousness and 
subjectivity, in the belief that reality is in our subjective perceptions, which are collectively 
shared to some extent. 
In the Family Business literature, the positivistic approach is used widely in case of study 
research, while two alternative approaches of critical realism and interpretivism are applied to 
a lesser degree (Micelotta et al., 2020). Leppäaho et al. (2016) argue that this trend will 
continue, and the positivistic approach will be applied widely in the future as well. Therefore, 
my positivistic research approach with multiple embedded case study methodology fits well 
with international publication and research trends. 
 
1.5. Relevance of research 
I aim to bridge the gap between research and practice in family business and organizational 
behavior studies (Gagné et al., 2014).  
Although the effect of performance management on perceived justice is highly crucial in family 
businesses to foster professionalization, there is a lack of research both in HRM and Family 
Business literature. Moreover, the theoretical models are developed in a few papers. Therefore, 
I chose the following central studies introducing leading models that the theoretical framework 
will be banked on. First, the model of Barnett and Kellermans (2006) proposed the relationships 




family businesses (see in Figure 2). Barnett and Kellermans (2006) focused only on non-family 
employees in their model and generalized their assumptions on HR practices as a whole. They 
also have not clarified how family influence occurs during a specific HR process. Furthermore, 
in their model, they represent family influence as a sole effect without considering the 
mediating and moderating effect of different types of family influences.  
Figure 2 - HR effects on the perceived justice at family businesses 
 
Source: (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006, p. 841) 
The Process Model of Strategic Human Resources Management (hereinafter SHRM) 
framework by Nishii and Wright (2008) was extended to the Process of Performance 
Management by Farndale, Hope-Hailey, and Kelliher (2011). That can emphasize the three 
lenses (intended, enacted, and experienced) of formal and informal HR practices (see in Figure 
3). However, this model missed discussing the effect of the controlling family in the case of 
family businesses and said little about the dynamics of perceived justice during the HR process 
and practices.   
Figure 3 - Simplified Process Model of SHRM 
 
Source: A revised Process Model of SHRM by Nishii and Wright (2008, p. 7) 
 
Erdogan’s model (2002) emphasizes the antecedents and consequences of formal PA practices, 
including distributional, procedural, and interactional justice (see in Figure 4). However, 
Erdogan only focuses on formal processes of performance appraisal practice, and it does not 
discuss informal processes or other PM elements. It does not consider the presence of the 






Figure 4 – Simplified Model of Antecedents and consequences of justice perceptions in 
performance appraisals 
 
Source: The revised figure of Erdogan’s model (2002, p. 559) 
Moreover, beyond the unexplored theoretical parts of the three models mentioned above, the 
general assumptions of these models also need empirical validation. Based on the above-
discussed models, I provide a simplified figure of my conceptual framework, which I will 
introduce and explain in more detail in Chapter 3.3.7. In sum, I aim to focus on both formal and 
informal Performance Management practices. I highlight Performance Appraisal practices in 
the view of the three lenses (intended, enacted, and experienced) at family businesses, in which 
both family and nonfamily employees are the recipients of these practices, and their 
performances are subjects to them. Scholars argue that family firms are less formalized 
compared to their non-family counterparts (Pittino et al., 2016; Stewart & Hitt, 2012; Tabor et 
al., 2018). Therefore, I believe my research can contribute to understanding more why and how 
family businesses can apply more informal processes than nonfamily businesses by focusing 
on the performance management process. The simplified conceptual framework can be seen in 
Figure 5.  
Figure 5 - Simplified figure of my conceptual framework 
 




As indicated in Figure 1, the research question is formulated as an interplay of several non-
independent factors of the models represented in Chapter 1.5. Since there are many 
interpretations possible in determining the cause and effect relations of these factors, I 
conducted extended literature research and combined the insight gained through that with my 
prior work experiences. In conclusion, the research question of my investigation is thus the 
following: 
How does Performance Management Systems affect perceived justice at Family 
Businesses?  
And subsequently formulated a subset research question too, how does familiness influence 
perceived justice during the PM process? 
After this, I summarize my propositions generated from my literature review as follows:  
Proposition 1 
The presence of family has an impact on the antecedents and consequences of perceived 
justice of performance management practice of family and nonfamily employees in four 
ways: planning, implementation, communication, and coordination.  
Proposition 1a  
The presence of family affects planned PM in terms of the level of bifurcation and 
formalization.  
Proposition 1b 
The presence of family influences the actual performance management practice through 
line-managers’ implementation, leading to more efficient informal PM practices. 
 
Proposition 1c 
The presence of family influences the experienced/perceived PM practice through its 




The presence of family influences the possible outcome of perceived justice of PM 
through coordination, such as defining organizational structure (a division of tasks, 
scope of authority, types of coordination, and configuration).  
 
Proposition 2 
By differentiating between the two concepts of justice and fairness, family firm leaders 
pursue to achieve a high level of fairness rather than a high level of justice among family 
and nonfamily employees in the PM processes.      
 
Proposition 3 
Family Influence has an effect on the perceived justice of Performance Management. 
 
Proposition 3a  





The various sources of family influence may interact with each other so that one source 
of family influence may have a moderator effect in the relationship between another 
source of family influence and perceived justice of Performance Management. 
 
Proposition 3c 
The various sources of family influence may interact with each other so that one source 
of family influence may have a mediator effect in the relationship between another 
source of family influence and perceived justice of Performance Management. 
 
Proposition 4 
A family business system has an impact on the family system as a consequence of family 
employees’ and managers’ perception of fairness through the PM and PA processes 
directly and later on indirectly by the modification of coordination mechanisms. 
 
Proposition 4a 
A family business system has an impact on the family system as a consequence of family 
employees’ and managers’ perception of fairness of the PM and PA processes. 
 
Proposition 4b 
A family business system has an impact on the family system as a consequence of family 
employees’ and managers’ perception of fairness through the PM and PA processes 
indirectly by modification of coordination mechanisms (e.g., modifying division of tasks 
and scope of authority by appointing family or nonfamily managers). 
 
1.7. A general overview of the thesis proposal  
After this, I provide a general overview of the structure of the thesis proposal. In Chapter 1, 
after introducing the research design, the research problem, the research goals, the paradigmatic 
stance, and the relevance of the research, I identified the research questions and the assumptions 
generated from the literature review. In Chapter 1.5., I have already discussed briefly the 
underlying theoretical models related to the research. These three theoretical models are related 
to three disciplines, such as Human Resource Management, Organizational Justice, and Family 
Business. The Process Model of Strategic Human Resources Management (hereinafter SHRM) 
framework by Nishii and Wright (2008), which was extended to the sole Process of 
Performance Management by Farndale, Hope-Hailey, and Kelliher (2011) related to the HRM 
and its subsystem of Performance Management. In the Performance Management literature, 
Erdogan’s model (2002) highlights the antecedents and consequences of justice perceptions in 
detail related to the Organizational Justice literature. By exhibiting the relationships among 
family influence, HR practices, and justice perceptions, Barnett and Kellermans’s (2006) model 
provides the opportunity to understand PM and Organizational Justice in the Family Business 
literature. Accordingly, in Chapter 2, I introduce the Theoretical Framework of the thesis 
proposal. First, I describe the field of Family Business research while underlining the 
definitional problems of family businesses and identifying my definition applied in this research 
(see in Chapter 2.1.) Second, I give a brief overview of the theoretical background of HRM and 
its PM subsystem (see in Chapter 2.2.) Third, I present the concept of Organizational Justice 
theorized in terms of three constructs: distributive justice, procedural justice, and interactional 
justice, later I also highlight the perceived justice of PM (see in Chapter 2.3.). After the 
theoretical framework, I present the findings of my systematic literature review in Chapter 0. 
By the end of this chapter, I introduce my conceptual framework generated from the literature. 
In Chapter 0, I discuss the methodology of my empirical research. In Chapter 5, I present the 




2. Theoretical Framework 
 
In this chapter, firstly, I describe the field of Family Business research (see in Chapter 2.1.). 
Secondly, I overview the theoretical background of HRM and its Performance Management 
subsystem (see in Chapter 2.2.); thirdly, I describe the concept of Organizational Justice and 
the perceived justice of performance management in detail (see in Chapter 2.3.). 
 
2.1. Family Businesses 
 
2.1.1.  Definition of family businesses 
There is no single definition of “family business,” which is generally applied to every country, 
such as to public and policy discussions or legal regulations and the provision of statistical data 
and academic research (Astrachan et al., 2002; Zellweger, 2017b). The reason behind that is if 
we accept the axiom that family businesses differ in how the family affects the management of 
the business, then two questions arise: Firstly, in what dimension the family affects, secondly 
what should be the threshold in each dimension to be considered as a family effect. Conversely, 
there is no single definition of family businesses because we cannot clearly define the main 
dimensions and the thresholds for these dimensions.   
There are three main reasons why there is no consensus about the dimensions and their 
thresholds. Firstly, family firms are very heterogeneous. They range from micro and small 
businesses with a few employees to large multinationals with thousands of international 
presence. We cannot characterize family businesses with a specific legal form, a certain size in 
terms of employees or turnover, and they operate in almost every industry. Secondly, there are 
cultural differences in the meaning of the family around the world. The definition of a family 
and who belongs in it may differ widely across cultures, and family structures may also change 
over time because of changing social norms. Additionally, many people think of family as a 
social unit, which is essentially distinct from the market. However, families are not social 
systems that are incapable of dealing with finances. Thirdly, the ways and processes of 
controlling family impact on the business vary significantly among family firms (Zellweger, 
2017b).  
Hereinafter, I display some attempts in the family business research field to define family firms, 
such as F-PEC Scale (Astrachan et al., 2002), bull’s eye model (A. R. Anderson et al., 2005; 
Astrachan & Shanker, 2003), and the definition of EU (European Commission 2009), which 
were unable to provide a consensual definition due to the problems mentioned above. 
 
Astrachan, Klein, and Smyrnios established the F-PEC Scale (2002), which positions family 
firms based on three key variables:  power,  experience,  and culture. The F-PEC Scale allowed 
comparisons across studies and samples and a more detailed examination of the relationship 
between family and business. However, the scale was considered inadequate and criticized 
mainly for its inaccuracy among scholars (Chua et al., 2012), thereby later, the F-PEC Scale 
was improved by Rau, Astrachan, and Smyrnios (2018). 
Astrachan and Shanker (2003) created a range of three possible family business definitions 
from a broad, inclusive definition through the middle to a narrow and more exclusive one. The 
level of inclusiveness relies on the degree of family involvement and participation in the 
business. Their broad definition contains those businesses in which a family controls the 




a founder or descendant runs the business, and they intend to keep it in the hand of the family. 
The narrow definition includes additional criteria of multiple-generation participation in 
business and at least two members of the controlling family with management responsibility. 
The authors depicted these three definitions in a target-like format of concentric circles, with 
the narrowest definition at the center of the target, called the “bull’s-eye model.” Anderson, 
Jack, and Dodd  (2005) extend this bull’s-eye model with a new dimension of the 
interrelationship between family and entrepreneurship by incorporating Birley, Ng, and 
Godrey’s (1999) typology. In their extended bull’s-eye model, the “Family Rules” group 
includes Astrachan and Shanker’s (2003) three circles, namely the narrow, medium, and broad 
definition, which are the first three circles of the extended model. The fourth circle contains the 
“Family-Business Jugglers” group, which cannot be classified as family firms anymore; 
however, the role of family for these businesses may remain significant. This group can even 
comprise about a third of all entrepreneurs based on Birley et al.’s assumption. Finally, the 
“Family Out” group refuses all connections between family and business and cannot be placed 
onto the bull’s-eye model (also see in Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6 - A Continuum of Family Enterprise Interactions – Extending Astrachan & 
Shanker’s Bull’s Eye Model 
 
 
Source: (A. R. Anderson et al., 2005, p. 138) 
 
From the practical aspect, the European Commission also attempted to define family businesses 
and come up with the following definition of family businesses. 
A firm concerned as a family business regardless of its size if: 
• Most of the decision-making rights are in possession of the natural person(s) who 
established the firm, or in possession of the natural person(s) who has/have acquired the 
share capital of the firm, or in possession of their spouses, parents, child or children’s 
direct heirs. 
• Most of the decision-making rights are indirect or direct. 
• At least one representative of the family is formally involved in the family business 
governance. 
• Listed companies are concerned as a family enterprise if the individual who established 
or acquired the company or their families or descendants own 25% of the decision-





Until the 2010s, the focus of the family business research was about defining family businesses 
compared to nonfamily businesses. Studies were published about this comparison in Germany 
(Klein, 2000), in Switzerland (Frey et al., 2004), and the US (P. D. Olson et al., 2003). Relying 
on the findings of the rich decades-old research string (R. C. Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Chrisman 
et al., 2004; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Holt et al., 2017; Jaskiewicz et al., 2005), the overall 
positive effect of the family on firm performance is widely accepted (Pindado & Requejo, 
2015). Conversely, the ways and processes of how this family influence can be broken down to 
actual positive impact are complex (Audretsch et al., 2013) and yet to be fully understood (De 
Massis & Foss, 2018).  
Exploring how specific family context and direct family influence affect the operation and 
performance of the family firm is one of the main concerns of family business research (Dibrell 
& Memili, 2019). That is why besides the overall difficulties of defining family business, I 
focus on family influence and its dimensions in more detail in this chapter in order to be able 
to create the definition of family businesses for my research later.  
   
Based on the F-PEC model and drawing from current research on the channels through which 
families influence their businesses, Zellweger (2017b) distinguishes five dimensions of family 
involvement: 1) amount of family control, 2) complexity of family control, 3) setup of business 
activities, 4) family owner’s philosophy and goals, 5) stage of control in terms of family’s 
history with the firm. 
1) The amount of family control dimension describes the current degree of family 
involvement in ownership, management, and governance functions.   
2) The complexity of family control increases with the number of family owners and 
managers and depends on governance constellation regarding ownership and 
management. 
3) The setup of the business activities dimension shows that family businesses may vary 
in their approach to conducting business. Firstly, the family may identify itself as an 
entrepreneurial actor that strives to nurture the family business. When this business 
becomes successful and expands its business to other industries, the family often shifts 
its self-understanding from the “Family Business” to the “Business Family” approach 
and acts more and more as an investor. However, the family’s self-understanding and 
approach are both related to the number of firms controlled by the family and the degree 
of business diversification.    
4) The family owner’s “philosophy and goals” dimension describes that family business 
varies in prioritizing family-related goals over business-related. Therefore they range 
from identifying with a family-first to a business-first philosophy. A family-first 
approach prioritizes emotional attachment to the firm, nurturing the firm, its public 
image, and its benevolent social ties to stakeholders. In contrast, a business-first 
approach prioritizes innovation, growth, and profit over these nonfinancial goals. 
Furthermore, this dimension also shows the level of identity overlap between the family 
and the business. Family firm owners with a high identity overlap with the enterprise 
are more concerned with the firm’s public image and reputation than family firm owners 




5) Stage of control in terms of the family’s history with the firm dimension assesses the 
historical aspect of the family’s relationship to the firm through generations. The time 
horizon of the stage of control defines two directions. It reflects the past (duration) and 
projects forward into the future (vision). The duration means the history of the firm is 
controlled by the owning family, which also suggests a higher level of emotional 
attachment to the business and less entrepreneurial spirit. The vision for the future 
reflects the transgenerational intentions of the family. (Zellweger, 2017b)  
The categorization of Zellweger (2017b) shows that there are many ways by which a family 
may influence its business. However, concisely, we can identify family influence based on two 
main traditional dimensions of family involvement: components of involvement and the 
essence of involvement. These approaches make it also possible to make a distinction between 
family and nonfamily business. Nevertheless, while the “components of involvement” can be 
operationalized in nature and has two dimensions by which it measures the degree of 
distinctiveness of a company caused by the family: the ownership and its impact on 
management and control, and the governance and the level of family involvement (Chrisman 
et al. 2005, Sharma 2006). The “essence of involvement” approach is more theoretical and 
challenging to operationalize than the components of the involvement approach (Sharma, 
2006). The “essence of involvement” focuses on the family members’ behavior targeting the 
transgenerational outlook as the primary source of the distinctiveness of family businesses 
(Chrisman et al., 2003; Chua et al., 1999). 
According to this, Zellweger (2017b) suggests the definition of family business based on these 
two elements: 1) the family’s dominant control over the firm; 2) the transgenerational intention, 
including succession and long-term value creation.  In line with the two main dimensions of 
family involvement, the first element of Zellweger’s definition reflects the criterion of 
components of involvement, and the second element reflects the criterion of the essence of 
involvement.  
The last three representative Hungarian studies have also operationalized the definition based 
on the mix of these two dimensions. Wieszt and Drótos (2018) and Kása et al. (2017) applied 
three factors as prerequisites for selection to the family business database: 1) a self-perception 
of being a family business, 2) presence of dominant family control at the firm, and 3) at least 
50% family ownership of the firm. If the given firm met the first two criteria or at least the third 
criterion, they considered it a family firm and involved them in the database. 
Additionally, besides these threshold conditions, in the study of Wieszt and Drótos (2018), there 
were also more and more restricting and complementary conditions to create the exact family 
profile of the examined enterprises. The first additional condition was that at least two family 
members involved as employees in the company. An even stricter version of this condition was 
that at least two generations were involved as employees in the company. The last additional 
condition referred to the long-time family ownership aspiration that is intrafamily succession, 
which is either „highly probable” or „rather probable.” 
According to the above, for my research, I apply the operationalized form of family businesses 
as follows I inspect all the three factors as a filtering criterion for selecting family businesses 
for my research with no exception: 1) a self-perception of being a family business, 2) presence 
of dominant family control at the firm, or 3) at least 50% family ownership of the firm. I apply 
this narrower definition since the 1) and 3) criteria refer to the component of involvement, while 
the 2) criterion instead refers to the essence of involvement. Since I try to understand the family 
influence on management processes, it is essential for the research that the essence of 




2.1.2.  Three-circle model of family business systems 
In 1983 Taguiri and Davis created the three-circle model describing the ownership, 
management, and family subsystems at family businesses (Tagiuri & Davis, 1996). The model 
provides a systemic view of family businesses that shows the role-related complexities that 
individuals can experience in family businesses. Overall, the model identifies seven types of 
roles that an individual can play in a family business model (see also in Figure 7).  
Figure 7  - Three-circle model of family influence 
 
Source: Tagiuri and Davis (1996) in Zellweger (2017b, p. 18)  
 
Table 1 shows the roles and their related motives. In my study, I will focus on the roles in the 
management subsystem and its overlap with the other two subsystems, namely roles 3,5,6, and 
7.    





Source: Tagiuri and Davis (1996) in Zellweger (2017b, p. 18) 
The three-circle model is one of the most commonly applied models when analyzing family 
influence and governance. However, there are advantages and disadvantages to its application.  
On the one hand, the model helps disentangle the three subsystems’ underlying logic, enables 
discussions about roles and related interests of different stakeholders, and improves the 
understanding of role complexity at family businesses. On the other hand, it relies on flawed 
subsystem prototype and functionality assumptions while overlooking synergies between 
family and business. Furthermore, it also simplifies the view of roles and communication. That 
means, while actors of family business simultaneously have multiple roles and wear several 
hats (see roles 4,5,6, and 7 in Figure 7), the circle model tends to underestimate the complexity 
of communication and decision making (Zellweger, 2017b).  
Because of the systems theory approach, I examine the family influence in my model from the 
side of the corporate/organization system and the family and ownership system in order to 
understand which family member plays what role in certain situations. 
 
2.1.3.  Family businesses in Hungary  
The role of the family businesses in the Hungarian economy and society is similar to the role 
they play in other countries. The majority of enterprises are also family businesses, which 
contribute considerably to the GDP and have a crucial role in employment (Wieszt & Drótos, 
2018).  
However, the family business population in Hungary differs from its counterparts in Western 
Europe and North America in both significance and characteristics.  
For historical reasons, the majority of family firms established in the decade following 1990 
have to face the challenges of succession for the first time.  The Hungarian “semi-peripheral” 
economy with its small market also led to a lack of strong entrepreneurship and family 
businesses characterized by professional management practices, which can be an “engine” of 
the Hungarian economic growth as well (Wieszt & Drótos, 2019) 
Although approx. 83% of the businesses are family businesses, as for firm size, the proportion 
of family-controlled businesses is decreasing, i.e., 86% for small businesses, 69% for medium 
enterprises, and 64% for large enterprises (Drótos et al., 2018; Wieszt & Drótos, 2018).  
According to the survey results (Wieszt & Drótos, 2018), Hungarian family businesses are 
capable of developing from a micro business into a robust small business. However, when they 
are striving to increase the efficiency of their processes and expand their businesses, they are 
less capable of reaching the next development stage by becoming a medium or large enterprise: 
involve external experts in management as well or even instead of family members and develop 
formal processes and systems (Drótos et al., 2018). Conversely, the governance system’s 
development constitutes a research gap in the FB and governance literature  (Wieszt & Drótos, 
2018).  
Regarding succession at the majority of family firms, family succession is planned. Two 
generations work together in the majority of companies, with two or three family members 
employed on average. Out of these, approximately two family members are involved in the 
management. The number of family employees is the lowest at small businesses and the highest 
at medium-sized firms, while the number is again lower at large enterprises. However, the value 
is higher compared to small businesses. The proportion of family members involved in 
management is rising consistently. Regarding succession at the majority of firms, family 




Several significant articles have been published related to succession (Filep & Szirmai, 2006; 
Makó et al., 2016; Noszkay, 2017; Mosolygó-Kiss et al., 2018; Bogdány et al., 2019). Some 
authors argue that most owner-managers have professional knowledge, but they do not have 
management and business development skills (Mosolygó et al., 2018), and the lack of 
management culture also makes succession difficult (Noszkay, 2017). Makó et al. (2016) 
highlighted that transferring tangible assets in the succession process seems less important than 
the transfer of the intangible one embedded in the culture. Mosolygó et al. (2018) found that 
controlling families may transfer values through generations such as the family itself as 
cohesion, power, transparency, and trust among family members, honor, respect of people and 
hard work, trustfulness, persistence, and fairness.  
Málovics (2018) also pointed out that family businesses may have conditions and strategies that 
help resolve conflicts such as open communication, low power distance, role sharing, economic 
orientation, mutual trust, respect and cohesion, and common interests in less complex family 
companies.  
In another qualitative case study of small and medium-sized enterprises, Bogdányi et al. (2019) 
found that during or before the succession, the leader is critical in the business's operation. The 
family business is mainly characterized by centralized decision making, flat hierarchy, 
unregulated or only partially regulated workflows, and the dominance of personal coordination. 
That causes the management overloaded since the founder/leaders’ information processing 
capacity, knowledge, time constraints. The leaders play a key role in the corporate culture, and 
the business is managed through informal communication channels. The loyalty of workers is 
also often connected to the leader/founder primarily. The authors also pointed out that 
compensation between siblings is challenging. Furthermore, the continuous evaluation of 
performance strengthens the offspring and increases his/her self-confidence and competence.  
 
In Hungary, 40-50 % of employees work at family-owned companies (Bogdány et al., 2019; A. 
Sz. Nagy & Tobak, 2017). According to a qualitative study of Csillag et al. (2019), in recent 
years, the labor shortage characterizing the Hungarian employment market has also strongly 
influenced Hungarian SMEs, including family businesses. Besides this, family business SMEs 
also need to manage and counterbalance the wage competition, the lack of an adequately skilled 
workforce, the movement of young employees abroad, and the effects of the public work 
scheme in attracting and engaging the workforce. To manage these challenges, they try to 
engage three special groups: employees with disabilities; women returning to work after giving 
birth; mothers with three or more children; and pensioners who used to work for the same 
business before retirement. Regarding their human resource management systems, even if 
SMEs tend to apply formal HR practices, they also strongly rely on informal channels and 
solutions. In the case of recruitment and selection, while they use formal recruitment practices, 
they also strongly rely on informal channels. The probation periods are also part of their 
selection of future employees. In the case of training development, while the examined SMEs 
also relied on innovative formal methods, such as launching their traineeship programs or 
establishing links with vocational training programs, the majority of learning took place through 
informal means, such as on-the-job work experience. (Csillag et al., 2019)Based on a Hungarian 
study, which mainly consists of small and medium-sized companies, HR-related issues are less 
frequently discussed at management meetings compared to other topics, which indicate a lower 
level of professionalization and formalization of processes. Because of their size, these 
companies may have not been able to build more sophisticated HR processes associated with 
the operative routines of the top management teams. Furthermore, the majority of family 
businesses are led by family CEOs; and the degree of family ownership and family involvement 





2.2. HRM and Performance management 
I bank the research on the contingency theory according to which there is no universal or best 
way to manage all organizations; instead, each organization as an open system should fit with 
its situation created by its internal and external environment to achieve effectiveness and 
efficiency. The design of an organization and its subsystems must have a proper fit with the 
environment, and its subsystems should also be consistent with one another (Lawrence & 
Lorsch, 1967).  
CEOs and company owners aim to increase organizational performance that is effective and 
efficient. In order to achieve organizational goals, management needs to coordinate the work of 
employees. Coordination, which is the essence of the management task, can be achieved 
through four managerial functions: 1) strategy and goal setting, 2) organization, 3) leadership, 
and 4) control. Within the leadership function, we define motivation, leadership styles, 
leadership roles, communication, and the creation and management of groups (Antal & Dobák, 
2016; Dobák, 1999). 
The main question of Human Resource Management as a support function to leadership is how 
to make an employee as effective as possible in achieving organizational goals while 
individuals meet their personal needs and reach their goals as well (Bakacsi, 2004). HRM 
should make sure that processes are running along with the same principles and standards across 
the company while providing efficient support to the top and middle management (Vajda, 
2019).   
Some scholars argue that in order to establish a link between individual-level performance and 
organization-level performance, researchers should focus on “bundles” of HR practice called 
High-Performance Work Practices (hereinafter HPWSs) and how they could lead to a 
transformation from individual-level to firm-level performance (Boon et al., 2019; A. DeNisi 
& Smith, 2014). HPWS can also be referred to as high-performance work systems, high-
commitment work systems, high-involvement work systems, and high-performance human 
resource management in HRM literature. An HPWS can be defined as a configuration of 
coherent HR practices designed to improve employees’ abilities, motivation, and participation 
to improve the value of their common contributions (Sun et al., 2007). Scholars categorize 
HPWS into three main domains of practice. According to the main goal they pursue:  
1) practices, which are mainly ability-enhancing (e.g., rigorous selection, extensive training);  
2) practices, which are motivation-enhancing (e.g., performance management and appraisal 
systems, incentive-based compensation system); and  
3) practices, which are opportunity-enhancing (e.g., formal participation programs, more 
autonomy in decision-making) (Han et al., 2019).  
 
After this, I focus on Performance Management and Performance Appraisal Systems, which 
are part of the motivation-enhancing practices of HPWS. Performance Appraisal as an integral 
part of the Performance Management System has been considered an essential HR process since 
it provides the best chance to establish a link between individual performance improvement and 
firm performance improvement (A. S. DeNisi & Murphy, 2017). Based on contingency theory 
and the managerial functions, HRM strives for developing adequate Performance Management 
and Performance Appraisal Systems in line with the organization’s business model. At the same 
time, the PM system should also be consistent with other HR subsystems, such as 
compensation, succession, talent management, career development, learning and development, 
and with other systems, such as strategy, business planning, and controlling (Boon et al., 2019; 




In my thesis proposal, I argue that fairness perception as one of the employees’ reactions to the 
PM system has been identified as an important criterion in judging the effectiveness and 
usefulness of performance appraisal. Since employees eventually are also the recipients of it 
and their performances are subjects to the PM systems (Farndale et al., 2011), so that is why 
not the validity and the reliability of the measurement tools but the individual justice 
perceptions of these tools and practices influence employees’ attitudes and behavior 
(Ikramullah et al., 2016). 
After this, in Chapter 2.2.1, I discuss the Performance Management and Appraisal System. In 
Chapter 2.3, I introduce the general concept of organizational justice, and in chapter 2.3.4, I 
discuss in detail the perceived justice of performance management and appraisal system.   
 
2.2.1. Performance management and appraisal system  
The relevance of performance management and appraisal system 
Current discourse among scholars and practitioners indicates that performance management 
practices are not satisfactory and effective (Barrier, 1998; Bokor, 2011; Tseng & Levy, 2019). 
In the World at Work Survey, even though most of the US professionals reported having formal 
PM practices in place at their companies, few of them argued that the system actually helped 
them to achieve their strategic goals, and they mainly considered PM rather as an “HR process” 
instead of a business-critical process. While more than half invested in PM training, only less 
than a third of the companies felt that their managers focus on having effective performance 
dialogues rather than just completing forms while having a lack of trust in the system 
(WorldatWork and Sibson Consulting, 2010). By examining the HR function in Hungary, 
Bokor (2011) also found that although managers considered PM important, they were strongly 
dissatisfied. 
In the past few years, the topic of performance management has also received much attention 
from researchers and HR practitioners. Popular management presses published articles with 
provocative headlines about the end of “traditional PM.” World’s leading multinational 
companies announced getting rid of their PM systems and started to reinvent the way how they 
conducted their procedures (Buckingham & Goodall, 2015; Cappelli & Tavis, 2016; Ewenstein 
et al., 2016; Gorman et al., 2017; Kinley, 2016; Rock & Jones, 2015). In the US, 12% of the 
companies were not planning to rethink their PM system, while in the UK, two-thirds of large 
companies were in the process of changing their systems (Cappelli & Tavis, 2016). However, 
managers consider PM one of the most critical HR systems, and they assume that PM’s use and 
importance will increase in the future (Goodman et al., 2015; Hays & Kearney, 2001). 
Defining performance management and appraisal system 
Performance Management is to provide efficient support to the management to fulfill its 
coordination task. To coordinate, it is management’s duty to set strategic goals and objectives, 
cascade organizational goals into individual goals, control past and present achievements and 
give feedback accordingly to foster present and future performance in line with organizational 
goals. Within the leadership function, managers convey goals to the employees, motivate them 
by compensation, future career opportunities, and development. Formal PM is the result of the 
organizing function of management.   
PM can be determined as “identifying, measuring, and developing the performance of 
individuals and teams and aligning performance with the strategic goals of the organization” 




and enables managers to cascade the strategic targets into a team and individual performance 
objectives and development plans; to reinforce a sense of accountability and performance-
oriented culture; to enhance employees’ motivation and commitment, and to evaluate the 
capabilities of people for future business challenges. From the individual’s point of view, the 
PM system is essential to make clear job responsibilities, priorities and expectations; to provide 
feedback and coaching; and enable systematic dialogue about longer-term career aspirations 
and personal development (Bakacsi et al., 1999, pp. 186–187). The main aim of PM-related HR 
practices is to foster organizational performance through individual and group performance by 
improving performance-related behavioral characteristics, such as motivation, job satisfaction, 
organizational commitment and trust, cooperation, compliance, and acceptance of decisions and 
by decreasing “bad” behavior outcomes, such as silence, absenteeism, fluctuation, and conflict. 
(Conlon et al., 2005)  
Performance Appraisal (PA) as part of the PM system refers to the whole procedure, including 
the establishment of performance standards, appraisal-related behaviors, the determination of 
performance ratings, and the communication of the rating to the ratee (Erdogan, 2002).  The 
goal of PA is to provide information that will best enable managers to improve individual 
performance  (A. S. DeNisi & Pritchard, 2006). Furthermore, an effective PA is an “engine” of 
the HRM, providing essential information to all other HR systems in order to support decisions 
of compensation, succession planning, talent management, career development, learning and 
development planning (Bakacsi et al., 1999; Biron et al., 2011). Since PA is an integral part of 
PM, hereinafter whether I refer to PA as PM, or I make a clear distinction between the two 
concepts, only when I find it necessary.  
 
Conceptualization of Performance Management  
After this, I discuss the evolution of PM research in detail, which is partly based upon my 
previous article on Performance Management (Vajda, 2019). 
While the interest in the evaluation of performance at work can be traced back to ancient China, 
and there were also efforts to establishing merit ratings as far back as the 19th century (Murphy 
& Cleveland, 1995), psychological research on performance rating started only in the 1920s., 
with Thorndike’s article (Thorndike, 1920), in which he identified what later became known as 
“halo effect.”  
There were two important trends, which defined performance appraisal practices in the Anglo-
Saxon and Western European cultures. First, the evaluation methods have been shifted 
gradually towards behavioral and outcome-based approaches from personality characteristics 
and informal evaluation. Second, the application of the performance appraisal system has 
become more and more numerous. The number of goals that formal evaluation systems have to 
achieve was also growing, such as dismissal and salary raise, administrative goals for promotion 
later training and development on the individual and organizational level, then finally 
organizational planning, legal documentation, and guidance for the evaluation and development 
of the personnel system. Owing to this central role, to the multifaceted goals, and the frequently 
changing performance criteria in changing environments, performance assessments are 
surrounded by numerous conflicts (Takács, 2001). 
In spite of the fact that PM has been subject to many criticisms, it seems that economic and 
historical context has played a leading role in the evolution of PM practices and research over 
the decades. The organizational and managerial needs served as driving forces in developing 




In their literature review in the Journal of Applied Psychology, DeNisi and Murphy (2017) 
defined nine substantive subareas that dominate performance management and appraisal 
research:  
(1) rating scales, (2) evaluating the quality of rating data, (3) training, (4) reactions to appraisal, 
(5) the purpose for appraisal, (6) rating sources, (7) demographic effects, (8) cognitive 
processes, (9) PM research.  
The rating scales and evaluating the quality of rating data research - that is, assessing the 
reliability, validity, or accuracy of performance ratings -, stressed the problems with more 
traditional criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of PA systems. These research directions 
made a substantial influence by shifting the attention from traditional error measures to 
accuracy measures and eventually to measures that reflected ratee perceptions of fairness and 
accuracy.  After a 50-year dominance of rating research, the reactions to appraisal research 
started in the 1970s by concentrating on ratee satisfaction and perceptions of fairness. This 
research direction has been especially vital because “it helped move the field to consider other 
types of outcome measures that could be used to evaluate appraisals systems” (A. S. DeNisi & 
Murphy, 2017, p. 425). The concept of justice perceptions has become an important part of later 
models of PM, for instance, the work of DeNisi and Smith (2014), and many researchers suggest 
that justice perception remains a critical research line in the future, too (A. S. DeNisi & Murphy, 
2017).  
Regarding PM research (subarea No. 9), we can define two main categories.  
First, various studies attempt to describe the entire performance management process and make 
suggestions on how to improve it. They investigate how comprehensive organizational 
practices improving individual performance lead to organizational performance improvement. 
Den Hartog et al. (2004) suggested a model for performance management that integrates 
multilevel (i.e., individual, group, and organization level) elements and completes previous 
models by incorporating employee perceptions, the role of direct managers, and “reversed 
causality.” According to the latter, experts often assume that enhancing individual-level 
performance would lead to improvements in firm-level performance, but the researchers have 
failed to show clear evidence to prove this correlation (DeNisi - Murphy, 2017; Den Hartog et 
al., 2004). Den Hartog et al. (2004a) argued that in the case of “reversed causality,” 
organizational success (e.g., profitability) may increase the willingness of top management to 
invest in HR practices rather than vice versa. High organizational performance may also affect 
employees’ commitment, trust, and motivation as much as the other way around. DeNisi and 
Smith (2014) suggested that the assumed link between individual-level performance and 
organization-level performance had never really been established directly. They rather found 
significant support for relating “bundles” of human resource (HR) practices to firm-level 
performance and models for how these bundles of HR practices could lead to a transformation 
from individual-level to firm-level performance. Based on this, they developed a model by 
which bundles of HR practices aligned with the organization’s strategic goals can be applied to 
generate a climate for performance that could transform generic knowledge, skills, and abilities 
(KSAs) into specific KSAs needed to improve firm-level performance. Other studies that had 
focused on the effectiveness of PA systems analyzed its effectiveness along with four criteria: 
utilization, qualitative, quantitative, and outcome criterion (e.g., Iqbal, Akbar, and Budhwar 
2015). Based on this, Ikramullah et al. (2016) suggested a conceptual framework for the 
performance appraisal system’s effectiveness by using a competing values approach (Quinn & 
Rohrbaugh, 1983). Recent frameworks highlight the PM process’s complexity in a system-
based approach (Schleicher et al., 2018) and the importance of social processes and the 
manager-employee interactions embedded in the PM process based on a multilevel leadership 





Second, several studies deal with specific aspects of the performance management process. 
These publications often focus on improving individual performance and address one type of 
performance management intervention in isolation without taking into account the wider 
perspective of the whole process. DeNisi and Pritchard (2006) adopted a motivational 
framework to highlight appraisals’ main goal, which is improving performance. Some studies 
also aimed to specify how performance feedback can cause individual performance 
improvement (e.g., London and Smither 2002; Gruman and Saks 2011). London et al. (2002) 
concern feedback as part of a longitudinal performance management process influenced by, and 
contributing to, the individual’s feedback orientation and the organization’s feedback culture. 
Gruman et al. (2011) argue that performance improvements can preferably be achieved by 
orienting the performance management system to promote employee engagement. 
 
A Systems-Based Model of Performance Management 
In the research, I based on the system-based model of performance management of Schleicher 
et al. (2018), which is relied on the congruence systems model (Nadler & Tushman, 1980, 
1984). According to Schleicher et al. (2018)’s conceptual model, the PM system consists of six 
components: the inputs and the outputs of PM and the four interdependent elements. These 
interdependent elements construct the process components of PM: tasks of PM, individuals 
involved in PM, formal processes, and informal processes of PM tasks (see also in Figure 8).  
Schleicher et al. (2018) identified seven key PM tasks: setting performance expectations, 
observing employee performance, integrating performance information, rendering of formal 
summative performance evaluation, generating and delivering performance feedback, formal 
performance review meeting, and performance coaching. 
Individuals involved in the context of PM are raters (e.g., direct managers and leaders) and 
ratees (employees). Thus, the individual factor refers to their characteristics, such as their 
knowledge, skills, needs, as well as their demographics. 
In contrast to many other publications, Schleicher et al.’s (2018) system-based model 
distinguish formal and informal processes of PM as two separate elements of the system since 
PM processes can simultaneously exist in both forms (formal and informal) in a real workplace 
context.  
 






Source: (Schleicher et al., 2018, p. 2215) 
 
Formal processes are defined as structures, processes, and procedures in written that are 
explicitly established to get both raters and ratees to perform (PM) tasks in line with (PM) 
strategy (Nadler & Tushman, 1980). By contrast, informal processes are unwritten, implicit, 
and occurs over time. Informal processes also reflect PM-related processes themselves (e.g., 
informal feedback) and contextual factors that affect processes (e.g., political climate 
surrounding PM).  
Studies suggest that the different formal and informal process factors in the case of PM vary in 
how consistently they influence PM effectiveness. However, individual participation is one 
element that seems unambiguously beneficial, displaying positive effects in the case of both 
formal and informal forms of participation and connection with multiple different PM tasks. 
Besides, this rater training also consistently provides positive outcomes. 
 
Farndale, Hope-Hailey, and Kelliher (2011) applied a Strategic Human Resources Management 
(hereinafter SHRM) framework of three lenses by Nishii and Wright (2008)through which HR 
practices, such as PM, can be viewed (see also in Figure 9):  
(a) PM practice intended by HR as embedded in written procedures and documents,  
(b) PM practice as enacted by different line managers at the company, and  
(c) employee’s experience of the practice regardless of the intentions of their line and 
top management.  
 
Figure 9 - Process Model of SHRM 
 
 
Source: Revised Process Model of SHRM by Nishii and Wright (2008, p. 7) 
 
As you can see in the model, HR practices are associated with performance through their 
influence on employee skills, attitudes, and motivation in SHRM literature.  
Regarding the formalization level in the model, the first lens characterizes the formal processes 
(policies and formal procedures) while the second and third lenses characterize the more 
informal ones.  
Two key points of the model are the possible differences between the intended and the actual 
PM practices and the employee perceptions of those PM practices.  
Firstly, studies show that line managers act as interpreters of formal practices and influence the 
informal PM processes (Schleicher et al., 2018). Based on this, the implementation of PM 
practices by line managers offers the possibility that the execution may vary from what was 
intended by top management to what is experienced by employees (Nishii & Wright, 2008), 
since line managers themselves may form how they are implemented. This may be caused by 




competence in PM tasks, and an aversion to deal with conflicting contextual pressures, which 
lead to line managers prioritizing short-term operational or performance-related tasks, instead 
of long-term focus (Farndale & Kelliher, 2013). Thus, we can say that line managers play a 
crucial role as key enactors of PM (den Hartog et al., 2004; Schleicher et al., 2018). The study 
of Farndale and Kelliher (2013) also highlighted the significance of line managers in enacting 
performance appraisal practices to influence employee commitment. However, it also showed 
that the significance of the line manager-employee relationship does not appear alone. 
Organizational units with great trust in senior management have both higher levels of 
commitment and indicate a more reliable link between employee perceptions of fair treatment 
by their line managers during a performance appraisal and organizational commitment  
(Farndale & Kelliher, 2013). 
Secondly, employees’ perceptions of HR practices are likely antecedents of employee reactions 
(attitudes and behaviors). Employees have different information processing schemas, 
motivations, values, attitudes, experiences, personality, and demographic backgrounds to bear 
on their perceptions and interpretations of, as well as reactions to organizational situations and 
experiences, such as actual PM practices (Farndale et al., 2011; Farndale & Kelliher, 2013; 
Nishii & Wright, 2008).  
 
Finally, management coordination includes organization structure, defining teams, delegating 
team tasks, and division of responsibilities positively related to performance at the organization 
level.  
 
Inputs of PM 
Based on the contingency theory (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967), PM has to be designed and 
implemented in line with its internal and external situations and organizational structure to 
function effectively. In the model of Schleicher et al. (2018), inputs of PM are the so-called 
“givens” of the PM system: the materials, which the company has to deal with, and the context 
in which PM is implemented. Therefore, they impose both demands and constraints on multiple 
aspects of the PM system.  
Inputs consist of the environment (i.e., elements outside the PM system and the company itself), 
resources (i.e., human resources), and strategy (i.e., organizational strategy, HRM strategy, PM 
strategy). According to this, in many studies, several types of variables were classified as inputs, 
including ownership type and organizational structure (Abu-Doleh & Weir, 2007); technology 
in PM (Miller, 2003), national culture (Peretz & Fried, 2012); organizational culture 
(Ikramullah et al., 2016) and climate (Farndale et al., 2011) and organizational strategy and PM 
strategy (Ayers, 2013). Furthermore, PM was examined across multiple industries and sectors 
and in the context of other HR practices, which can also be considered as inputs. Macro inputs 
contain economic, legal, and institutional conditions. For example, economic crises seem to 
motivate an increasing interest in PM (Schleicher et al., 2018). All in all, these inputs influence 
PM’s other components (e.g., tasks, processes) and their ultimate effectiveness.  
 
Outputs of PM 
Outputs of PM refers to what the PM system produces, such as performance rating(s), the 
feedback generated and delivered, the making of a development plan or other performance 
individual improvement plan, career planning, recommendations regarding administrative 
decisions of consequences based on performance (including compensation and rewards, 
promotion, training, termination, etc.), and documentation for legal purposes.  




Fairness perception as one of the individuals’ reactions to PM is a crucial criterion for 
effectiveness, and it is related to the failure or the success of the system (A. S. DeNisi & 
Murphy, 2017; Erdogan et al., 2001; Ikramullah et al., 2016; Taylor et al., 1995). Erdogan 
(2002) found that justice perceptions in performance management influence organization-
related (i.e., commitment, turnover intentions), leader-related (i.e., prosocial behaviors 
targeting the supervisor, satisfaction with the leader), and performance-related outcomes (i.e., 
task performance, motivation to improve), through improved exchanges with the organization 
and the leader, and increased accountability pressure (Erdogan, 2002). 
 
Principles of System-based model of performance management 
The system-based model of performance management is grounded on the following principles: 
Congruence hypothesis, Internal interdependence, Capacity for feedback, Adaptation, and 
Equifinality. 
Congruence hypothesis. The assumption of the congruence hypothesis states that the higher the 
total degree of congruence or fit between elements of the PM system, the more effective the 
PM system operates. Schleicher et al. (2018) pointed out that these fit between PM purposes 
and other system elements are crucial.  
Internal interdependence. The principle of internal interdependence highlighted the 
interconnectedness and interdependence of system factors that any factor can have an effect on 
any other factors. Formal and informal practices are good examples of the internal 
interdependence of PM systems.  While Pulakos and O’Leary (2011) argue that informal 
aspects of PM are more important than formal aspects, Schleicher et al. (2018) suggest that 
formal and informal processes are likely to interact in many ways. Therefore, scholars should 
investigate both formal and informal processes within the same study simultaneously. Informal 
factors (e.g., culture) may serve to mitigate or impair the effects of formal factors (e.g., rating 
approach) on PM outcomes. The effectiveness of formal processes most probably differs based 
on informal elements and vice versa. 
Capacity for feedback. The principle of capacity for feedback suggests that outputs of the PM 
system are seen as providing key information (namely feedback) about how well the PM system 
operates, which then can be applied to monitor and correct the (PM) system. Identifying and 
evaluating specific PM outputs play an essential role in understanding how the different 
elements of the PM system are functioning. Schleicher et al. (2018) highlighted that the majority 
of research looking at outputs of PM other than performance ratings tends to link the existence 
of these various outputs with reactions or evaluations of the PM system. 
Adaptation. The principle of adaptation suggests that PM system inputs and outputs should be 
kept at balance and fit with the environment. Thus, PM systems should adapt to changing 
environmental conditions, such as economic crises (i.e., inputs), to maintain their effectiveness. 
Equifinality. The system’s principle of equifinality refers to the fact that various configurations 
of different system elements can result in the same output/outcome. That is in line with the 
assumption of contingency theory: there is no “one best” or universal way to make a PM system 
effective. Similarly, different configurations of formal and informal processes can result in 
similar outcomes as well as different combinations of various PM tasks.  
 
 
Effectiveness of performance appraisal system 
Hereinafter, I discuss in detail the evaluation of the effectiveness of performance appraisal 





The literature has drawn attention to a wide array of deficiencies related to many existing PM 
systems, such as failure to pursue and achieve PM purposes; lack of reliable, valid, and 
objective performance measures; appraisers’ dependency on human information processing and 
rating judgments; inability to meet expectations of the key stakeholders; weak interpersonal 
relationships between appraisers and appraises. In turn, the latter can generate interpersonal 
conflicts and dwindle trust and communication between the evaluators and appraises.  
Studies about PM suggest that there are four criteria of effectiveness, into which scholars can 
categorize each research: utilization, qualitative, quantitative, and outcome criterion. The 
utilization criterion refers to purpose achievement, which addresses the question of why 
companies conduct appraisals. The qualitative criterion indicates the justice perceptions of a 
performance appraisal system related to a set of rules and practices. The quantitative criterion 
refers to the psychometric soundness of rating formats, focusing on enhancing appraisal 
accuracy and minimizing rating errors and biases. The outcome criterion indicates appraisee 
reactions, in terms of both person- and organization-referenced outcomes reflect on appraisees’ 
attitudinal evaluations of and responses to the system (Ikramullah et al., 2016).  
According to Ikramullah et al. (2016), the effectiveness of performance appraisal system should 
be evaluated and judged not based on a single standard, but multiple criteria that also include 
values and preferences of all stakeholders, i.e., appraisers, appraisees, and the organization 
(including HR department and top management). In line with this, Ikramullah et al. (2016) 
proposed a comprehensive framework for the effectiveness of the performance appraisal 
system, which is built upon the competing values framework of Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983).   
After this, I discuss the effectiveness of competing value frameworks for an effective 
performance appraisal system in detail because of the following reasons: 
First, Ikramullah et al. (2016)’s framework is a useful tool to consider the effectiveness of a 
performance appraisal system based on organizational values as a PM input factor of Schleicher 
et al. (2018)’ model. Second, Ikramullah et al. (2016)’s framework also refers to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the performance appraisal system on all the four criteria, such as utilization, 
qualitative, quantitative, and outcome criteria, to take into account all the various important 
aspects of the system. In line with this, Ikramullah et al. (2016) argue that utilization, 
qualitative, and quantitative criteria are considered incomplete unless these three are linked to 
the fourth, outcome criterion which can also be associated with PM’s output in Schleicher et al. 
(2018)’ model. Third, by pre-evaluating PM of companies based on Ikramullah et al. (2016)’s 
framework, I can examine the selected cases for my research about the performance 
management system by which located in the same quadrant of the model. In line with this, one 
can control the effect of macro-environmental factors as inputs of PM as much as possible.    
 
The competing values framework represents the competition between stability and change and 
between internal organization and the external environment. According to these two competing 
dimensions, the comprehensive framework for the performance appraisal system’s 
effectiveness of consists of four quadrants: internal process model, rational goal model, human 
relations model, and open system model (see in Figure 10; Denison and Spreitzer 1991).   
 
The internal process model (control and internal focus) underlines control, stability, 
information management, communication, and continuity. Its core assumption is related to the 
process (e.g., clarity of responsibilities, measurement, documentation, and record-keeping) 
governed by clear rules strictly followed by its users. It embraces assigning qualified appraisers, 
giving regular feedback, appraising performance, and recording in on a psychometrically sound 





The rational goal model (control and external focus) comprises planning, goal setting, and 
efficiency. This model creates a link between clear and certain organizational goals and 
performance improvement. To increase effectiveness, firms set goals, develop plans, and then 
take action to accomplish these goals.  
 
The human relations model (flexibility and internal focus) points out employee development, 
morale, and group cohesion. Appraisers are encouraged to seek appraisees’ participation while 
making appraisal-related decisions. Appraisers need to coach their subordinates and underline 
employee development through training and development programs not only for improving 
their performance now but also to meet future workforce needs.  
 
The Open system model (flexibility and external focus) underscores flexibility, readiness, out-
spacing competition, growth, and acquiring resources. It concentrates on creative problem 
solving, innovation, adaptability, and management of change by defining flexible performance 
targets and role-definition purposes. Because of the development of technology, globalization, 
and workforce diversity, there are several differences in work settings and organizational 
structures. People have to develop new skills and have to perform different tasks.  
Each key stakeholder has different values and preferences. However, the PM system should be 
effective in all four areas. These models can be good representations of the four criteria of 
effectiveness of PM systems. (Ikramullah et al., 2016) 
 
Figure 10 - Competing value framework for an effective performance appraisal system 
 
Source: (Ikramullah et al., 2016, p. 341) 
Utilization, qualitative and quantitative criteria are incomplete unless these are linked to the 
outcome criterion. Regarding the qualitative criterion, without assessing a “fair process effect” 
(Folger et al., 1979), justice cannot be done. The literature highlighted that fairness perceptions 
are one of the employees’ reactions to the PM system and are related to the success or failure 




et al., 1995) since individuals’ attitudes and behaviors can be determined by their perceptions 
of reality, not reality per se (Lewin, 1936). 
 
Further Research Gaps and Research Directions 
In the last decade, conceptual articles and research papers based on self-reported surveys of HR 
practitioners and CEOs dominate the PM literature. However, scholars agree that there is a call 
for increased use of qualitative methods (Brown et al., 2019; A. S. DeNisi & Murphy, 2017; 
Schleicher et al., 2018), including case studies, interviews, and content analyses of PM policies 
and documents to get a better understanding of the complexity of PM systems. In other words, 
we need more research on actual functioning PM systems, including real performance data in a 
real work environment context.  
 
Firstly, by applying Nishii and Wright’s (2008) multiple-lens model, process research should 
examine line-managers as key respondents (den Hartog et al., 2004), since they play the primary 
role as interpreters of formal processes and an essential source of informal processes 
(Schleicher et al., 2018; Tseng & Levy, 2019). Thus managerial compliance should be taken 
into account as a variable in future research since it is expected to work as the primary linking 
mechanism between formal and informal processes. We also need to study both formal, 
informal processes simultaneously and how these two forms interact and have an influence on 
one another. Is there a trade-off between the two that a company may make, such as informal 
feedback might substitute for formal feedback of PM review (Schleicher et al., 2018)?    
 
Secondly, we should also conduct studies where we hear the voice and perspective of all 
stakeholders using the PM system, especially employees. Most of the studies suggest that 
positive employee reactions and outcomes occur when PM is perceived as fair (Brown et al., 
2019). Accordingly, fairness perception as one of the employees’ reactions to the PM system 
has been identified as an essential criterion in judging the effectiveness and usefulness of 
performance appraisal since it is not the validity and reliability of the measurement tools. 
However, the individual justice perceptions of these tools and practices affect employees’ 
attitudes and behavior (Vajda, 2019).  Little attention has been paid to the employee 
perspectives so far, although employees are eventually the recipients of PM, and their 
performances are subject to the PM systems (Farndale et al., 2011). The PM practices’ effect 
on employees’ commitment and performance depends on employees’ perception and evaluation 
of these practices. The perception and attitudes may mediate and moderate the relationship 
between PM practices and these employee performance-related behaviors. We often assume 
that different people perceive the employment practices offered by their company similarly, yet 
variation may exist in employees’ perceptions of PM practices or benefits even when, in 
objective terms, what is offered to different employees is similar (den Hartog et al., 2004).   
 
Third, scholars should clarify how the different elements of PM interact as substitutes and 
complement each other from a systematic point of view. PM should be examined in the context 
of other HR practices to understand better PM’s role on individual and organizational outcomes 
over and above other HR practices. Researchers should describe the context of their studies of 
PM along with contextual (input) variables, including national culture, industry, ownership and 
organizational type of firm, strategy and organizational culture (Schleicher et al., 2018), and 
virtual and collaborative workplaces (Brown et al., 2019). Regarding national culture, there are 
relatively few PM studies available in the Eastern European context (Brown et al., 2019) and 
even less in the Hungarian culture (Krasz, 2008; Takács, 2001, 2002a, 2002b). In the Hungarian 




appraisal practice (Takács, 2001). They examined organizational culture concerning 
performance appraisal practice (Takács, 2002a, 2002b) and its perceived fairness among 
employees (Krasz, 2008).  
 
 
2.3. Organizational justice  
The contemporary theories about justice mainly concentrate on how individuals perceive 
justice, how they consider and investigate the subjective and phenomenological appraisal of a 
given stimulus or situation. Within this approach, something is considered to be “fair” not 
because it should be (normative), but because some people perceive it to be (descriptive) 
(Cropanzano et al., 2005; Greenberg & Bies, 1992). Scholars tend to consider the terms 
“justice” and “fairness” as synonyms. However, these two concepts are distinct. Justice is 
defined as adherence to rules of conduct,  while fairness refers to the persons’ moral evaluations 
of this conduct (Goldman & Cropanzano, 2015a). Since I am examining a PM process and 
system, I apply and focus on the concept of perceived justice in general. However, when I would 
like to refer to the individuals’ moral judgment, I apply the concept of perceived fairness by 
making a clear distinction from justice.  
Cohen-Charash and Spector (2001) theorized organizational justice in three constructs: 
distributive, procedural, and interactional justice. In this case, interactional justice includes 
interpersonal justice and informational justice. Colquitt (2001) conceptualized organizational 
justice in terms of four dimensions: distributive justice, procedural justice, interpersonal justice, 
and informational justice. People’s perceptions of fairness in organizations can be called 
organizational justice (Colquitt et al., 2005).  
 
2.3.1. Distributive justice 
Distributive justice refers to an employee's subjective assessment of the fairness of an outcome 
distribution (Cropanzano et al., 2005). Researchers define three central distribution norms: 
equity, equality, and need. These norms define what people consider as fair in the allocation of 
scarce resources. Distributive justice has its origin in equity theory (Adams, 1965), which 
discusses that individuals tend to compare their input-output ratio to others in order to conclude 
the level of fairness. When individuals perceive inequity in order to reduce unfairness, they can 
change their effort or adjust their perception of contributions (or costs) or benefits (or rewards), 
or they can modify their reference, or they can leave the situation (e.g., quitting the 
organization). While equity norms can foster individual productivity, they can hinder 
interpersonal cooperation and socio-emotional relations. Because of that, Deutsch (1975) and 
Leventhal (Leventhal, 1976, 1976b) argued that every time when the primary goal of an 
exchange is the promotion of group solidarity and harmony, equality is an adequate allocation 
norm. Equality means an equal share of the distribution regardless of the contribution. The third 
principle of distribution is a need, which is seldomly used limitedly at work.    
Equity stands as the dominant conceptualization of distributive justice in the work environment. 
However, researchers agree that most allocation situations are managed by multiple allocation 
goals served by multiple allocation norms (Colquitt et al., 2005). Although people less accept 
equality, this is one of the most commonly used norms in everyday life because, in complex 
situations, it is easier to use heuristics rather than complicated rules in the decision-making. 
National and organizational culture and individual characteristics may also have an impact on 




individualist cultures instead apply the principle of equity, whereas collectivist cultures are 
more inclined to apply the principle of equality (Ramamoorthy & Flood, 2002). Deutsch (1982) 
argued that the nature of the relationship between the parties affects the application of the 
distribution norm as well. If the relationship is for profit, we tend to apply equity; if the 
relationship is for joy, we tend to apply equality, and if the relationship is for development and 
prosperity, the principle of need is more dominant. At the individual level, egocentric bias, 
profit maximization, fundamental attribution error (Harvey & Martinko, 2010), and 
individualism/collectivism orientations (Ramamoorthy & Flood, 2002, 2004) may also 
influence the preferred distribution principle.  
 
2.3.2. Procedural justice 
Procedural justice is defined as the perceived fairness of the process used to determine outcomes 
(Cropanzano et al., 2005). Individuals tend to react more constructively if they believe the 
procedures that resulted in the unfavorable outcome were fair (Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Tyler 
& Lind, 1992).  
 
2.3.2.1. Theoretical frameworks of procedural justice 
In their work, Blader and Tyler (2005) reviewed the major justice theories and research to 
consider why procedural justice has an impact on employee attitudes and behavior in the 
workplace. These major justice theories are the instrumental (i.e., control and social exchange) 
theories, the relational theories, the fairness heuristic theory, the fairness theory, the moral 
virtues theory, and the attributional model of procedural justice. These theoretical frameworks 
can offer a better understanding of the effect of procedural fairness on employee attitudes and 
behavior while adopting different viewpoints about why people care about and how they assess 
justice. Consequently, each viewpoint raises different psychological concerns and explains 
reactions to the PM processes differently.  
Instrumental models of justice: Control model and Social exchange theories 
Instrumental models of justice refer to the Control model and Social exchange theories about 
why people care about and react to justice perceptions based on the resource- and exchange-
based concerns that employees have. In the case of both theories, employees perceive 
procedural justice as instrumental in achieving their desired outcomes. 
On the one hand, the Control model of Thibaut and Walker (1975) explains that people tend to 
have a desire to control what happens to them. Since people have a lack of control over the 
outcomes they receive from decision-makers, people appreciate process control because it 
allows them to influence the outcomes they receive indirectly. On the other hand, Social 
exchange theories concentrate on the mutual give-and-take relationship that operates between 
the employee and either the supervisor or the organization.  These theories argue that the 
influence of justice perceptions on employee cooperation is mediated by social exchange 
variables, such as leader-member exchange and perceived organizational support (Masterson et 
al., 2000). These social exchange variables underline the reciprocal duties between two parties 
to a relationship (Blader & Tyler, 2005). 
Relational Models of Justice 
The relational model of justice is based on people’s reactions to procedures and the identity 




identities concerning their organizations (Blader & Tyler, 2005). This research stream 
originally stemmed from the group-value model of Lind and Tyler (1988) and the relational 
model of the authority of Tyler and Lind (1992), which has been then extended into an 
integrative model of how procedural justice promotes cooperation in groups (i.e., group 
engagement model) (Blader & Tyler, 2005). In the group-value model, Lind and Tyler (1988) 
argued that people also have a need to be valuable members of their groups. They stated that it 
is crucial for employees to obtain information about their relationships with others and their 
roles within the group, which they can learn firstly from the processes. The group engagement 
model argument consists of three main identity-related variables that are connected to 
procedural justice: perception of the status of the organization (pride), perceptions of one’s 
status within the organization (respect), and the extent to which people define themselves as 
members of the organization (identification). Contrary to instrumental theories, this model 
highlight that people become intrinsically motivated to cooperate and work for the company’s 
success, not for personal benefits. 
Fairness Theory 
Fairness theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001) explains the elements that determine whether 
individuals perceive a situation as fair or not are? This theory puts emphasis on the significant 
role of accountability judgments and counterfactual thinking as a fundamental cognitive 
procedure in the assessment of accountability and, thus, justice (Blader & Tyler, 2005). 
Employees are more likely to evaluate an experience as unfair when three types of 
counterfactual thoughts are met.  
First, the “would” judgments occur when the employee senses that he or she has experienced 
injustice and must also be able to imagine alternative situations that would be more positive. 
Second, the “could” judgments concern that the employee must define who is accountable for 
the situation in question and whether or not this responsible person or entity had the discretion 
to act differently. Third, the “should” judgments encompass the employee’s moral judgment of 
the situation; it raises the question of whether the things that should have happened differently 
than they were, based on one’s moral or other standards? All three components are needed for 
someone in order to evaluate the situation as unfair.   
Fairness Heuristic Theory 
Fairness heuristic theory focuses on exploring the cognitive processing of fairness information. 
The theory assumes that individuals often need to manage uncertainty while they are working 
in a group. This uncertainty refers to the individual’s fear of exploitation by authorities and to 
his or her fear of rejection (Lind, 2001). That is why group members tend to search for signals 
and hints about whether authorities can be trusted and whether they are included in the group. 
Procedural justice can be considered as one of these hints, and the evaluation of process fairness 
is a heuristic for defining whether authorities can be trusted or not (Blader & Tyler, 2005).  
Moral virtues model 
The moral virtues model describes why people value justice. Blader and Tyler (2005) argue that 
if employees regard justice as a moral issue, they will tend to be part of the organizations that 
they perceive as respecting this moral imperative.   
Attribution model 
Based on the attributional model, the perceived fairness of the performance appraisal process 
depends on what kind of attributions the employee possesses. Attribution is a „causal 




causal attributions is vital for adapting to changing environments, coping with difficulties, and 
overcoming the challenges which we are facing in our everyday lives. When an employee 
experiences desirable outcomes (e.g., promotion or positive feedback of the year-end 
performance review), attributions help him/her understand what caused those events so he/she 
can experience them again when the employee experience unpleasant outcomes (e.g., negative 
feedback of the year-end performance review), attributions help him/her to identify and avoid 
the behaviors and other factors that caused them to occur (Harvey & Martinko, 2010). 
The attribution model of procedural justice is built on the presumption that fair procedures 
imply that the outcomes are associated with the deserved procedure. That means that fair 
procedures are equal to internal causal attributions for outcomes because decision-making 
characteristics (e.g., neutrality) tend to foster distributions that reflect people’s inputs when 
equity is the distributive rule (Blader & Tyler, 2005). Individuals may value procedural fairness 
and react to it because it allows them to make self-serving causal attributions for their outcomes. 
Firstly, self-serving attributions can satisfy their distributive justice motives in a way that 
individuals feel that they deserve positive outcomes and they do not deserve adverse outcomes. 
Secondly, self-serving attributions may boost their self-esteem in a way that it fosters them to 
take credit for positive outcomes and to disassociate themselves from adverse outcomes, 
especially when information about the procedure is lacking (Blader & Tyler, 2005).   
In summary, these theories are not all mutually exclusive from one another. They can be true 
under certain conditions, where others may work under different conditions. Furthermore, 
multiple motives can be at work within the same judgmental context. In some cases, the theories 
may complement one another.  
Fairness theory’s emphasis on accountability may make an important contribution to 
determining leaders’ trustworthiness and their likelihood of exploiting group members, on 
which fairness heuristic theory focuses.  
2.3.2.2. Rules of procedural justice  
Procedurally, there are main rules that employees usually apply when considering the fairness 
of management decisions and administrative procedures. Accordingly, management should 
make decisions (a) based on accurate information (accuracy); (b) free of bias; (c) consistently 
across people and across time (consistency); (d) with a mechanism by which to correct errors 
(correctability); (e) with the concerns (voice) of all interested parties considered 
(representativeness); and (f) in a way that conforms to personal or prevailing ethical standards 
(ethicality) (Colquitt, 2001; Leventhal, 1980; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975).   
 
2.3.2.3. Procedural Justice Climate  
Procedural Justice Climate (PJC) is defined as a shared justice perception within an 
organizational collective. PJC is formed based on 1) group members’ perceptions about the 
fairness of decision processes and 2) social information processing about everyday experiences 
developing as group members communicate and engage in collective sense-making (Barnett et 
al., 2012; Naumann & Bennett, 2000).   
 
2.3.3. Interactional justice: interpersonal and informational justice  
Bies and Moag (1986) define interactional justice as the fairness of interpersonal treatment 
received during the execution of a procedure. They primarily focus on the relationship between 




importance of truthfulness, respect, and justification as fairness criteria of interpersonal 
communications. Colquitt (2001) argues that interactional justice comprises two components: 
informational justice and interpersonal justice. Informational justice refers to the quantity and 
quality of the information provided during the process (i.e., whether a manager shares timely 
and relevant information and explanation to employees). Interpersonal justice refers to the 
social aspects of distributive justice, and it describes the perception of respect in one’s treatment 
(i.e., how respectfully a manager treats employees). 
In general, all the elements of the justice dimensions have an influence on perceived justice, 
and they usually interact with each other. Mainly, there are strong correlations between 
procedural and distributive justice (Blader & Tyler, 2005).  Since employees have limited 
information about the results of the distribution of their coworkers, they cannot make a proper 
social comparison of their input/output rate. The significance of procedural justice is related to 
the assumption that people have better access to procedural elements than output information. 
Thus they can make justice judgments related to their impressions of the process, and they try 
to integrate their knowledge about the output into that.   
2.3.4. Perceived justice of performance management and appraisal  
Greenberg (1986) was the first scholar, who applied the theory of organizational justice in 
performance management, and after that Greenberg (1993a) developed a four-factor model: (a) 
systemic justice (structural-procedural), (b) informational justice (social- procedural), (c) 
configural justice (structural-distributive), (d) interpersonal justice (social-distributive) 
(Cropanzano et al., 2007). 
This model is comprised of two dimensions: distributive/procedural and structural/social 
dimension. The distributive justice perceptions focus on outcome allocations, while procedural 
justice perceptions focus on how allocation decisions are made. The structural components 
define the context of decision-making for processes and outcomes, while the social components 
imply the quality of interactions during the communication of processes and outcomes. In Table 
2, the concerns regarding the justice implication of the performance appraisal system are 




Table 2 - Taxonomy of Justice Perceptions Applied to Performance Appraisal 
 
Source: Edited based on Greenberg’s (1993b) Taxonomy of Justice Perceptions Applied to 
Performance Appraisal (Thurston, 2001 in Walsh 2003). 
Greenberg's (1993a) conceptualization of the four types of justice offers the opportunity to more 
comprehensively study and organize employees' perceptions of fairness concerning 
performance appraisal systems. Later Colquitt (2001) developed a questionnaire to assess the 
perceived organizational justice among employees. Greenberg’s description of the perceptions 
of fairness and the questionnaire of Colquitt (2001) have already provided practitioners with 
valuable insights to understand and examine organizational justice perceived by their 
colleagues at their companies and to manage the complex system of performance management 
better. 
In her article, Erdogan (2002) made one step further by proposing a conceptual model of 
antecedents and consequences of justice perceptions in the performance appraisal setting. 
Antecedents of justice perceptions consist of due process characteristics, organizational culture, 
pre-appraisal leader-member exchange (LMX), perceived organizational support (POS), 
impression management, behaviors of raters, the perceived basis of LMX, and perceived type 
of information raters apply. Social exchange and accountability theories are applied to link 
justice perceptions to organizational, leader-related, and performance-related outcomes. 
Erdogan (2002) categorized organizational justice into four dimensions: distributive justice, 
interactional justice, while procedural justice is conceptualized as two related but still distinct 
constructs reflecting system procedural justice and rater procedural justice. Rater procedural 
justice refers to the perceived fairness of procedures, which supervisors as raters use during 
performance evaluations. In contrast, system procedural justice refers to the perceived fairness 
of the performance appraisal procedures introduced by the organization.  Erdogan (2002) 
created a significant conceptual model of antecedents and consequences of justice perceptions 
in formal performance appraisals conducted by the supervisor. In her model, she defined 
performance appraisal as the “whole procedure, including the establishment of performance 




determination of performance rating, and communication of the rating to the ratee” (Erdogan, 
2002, p. 556).  
She also made several assumptions about the hidden mechanisms in the performance appraisal 
context that could form the basis of future research, including my research as well. That is why, 
in the following, I discuss Erdogan’s model and its propositions in detail. Erdogan’s model 
(2002) is depicted in Figure 11. 
Figure 11 - Antecedents and consequences of justice perceptions in performance appraisals 
 
Source: The revised figure of Erdogan (2002, p. 559) 
 
2.3.4.1. Antecedents of justice perception 
The author characterized the antecedents of justice perceptions into four categories, such as 1) 
due process characteristics, 2) contextual factors, 3) rater behaviors, and 4) ratings, but I   
discuss them in line with the four types of perceived justice.  
 
Antecedents of procedural justice 
Due process characteristic 
Fair system characteristics can be characterized under the name of ‘‘due process appraisals” 
(Folger et al., 1992), which are based on three basic components: adequate notice, fair hearing, 
and judgment based on evidence.  
 
Adequate Notice 
Components of adequate notice require that raters should provide performance appraisal goals 
and standards (i.e., appraisal criteria) to ratees, raters should let employees participate in 




Erdogan (2002) proposes that components of adequate notice will be differentially associated 
with system and rater procedural justice in a way that communication of appraisal criteria and 
involvement in the development of appraisal criteria will be positively associated with system 




Components of fair hearing require that raters are familiar with their ratee’s work, and ratees 
can give their explanations and provide input before the decision. 
Erdogan (2002) suggests that components of the fair hearing will be associated with system and 
rater procedural justice in different ways. Having a rater knowledgeable of ratee’s work will 
be positively linked to system procedural justice, while allowing ratee’s input in the decision-
making process will be positively linked to rater procedural justice (Proposition 1b).  
Since appointing a rater who is familiar with ratee’s work is more likely the responsibility of 
the company, and thus it rather anticipates system procedural justice. While allowing the ratees’ 
voice in the decision is often at the rater’s discretion. 
 
Judgment Based on Evidence 
Components of judgment based on evidence require that appraisal standards should be 
employed consistently across all employees, the rater should explain the decision after referring 
to evidence, and appeal mechanisms should be in a place that allows employees to challenge 
the decision which was made. Erdogan (2002) suggests that components of judgment based on 
evidence will be associated with system and rater procedural justice in different ways. The 
existence of effective appeal mechanisms will be positively associated with system procedural 
justice. At the same time, consistent application of standards and explaining the decision to the 
ratee will be positively linked to rater procedural justice (Proposition 1c). Since creating 
appraisal standards is the responsibility of the company, but employing them consistently across 
individuals and explaining the decision is the responsibility of raters.  
 
Contextual Factors 
Contextual factors consist of Perceived Organizational Support (hereinafter POS), 
organizational cultures, and leader-exchange quality (hereinafter LMX).  
Pre-Appraisal POS 
Perceived Organizational Support is defined as the global perception of employees that the 
company cares about them and their well-being. When an employee joins the company, he/she 
slowly develops POS on the basis of organizational practices and processes, which he/she 
experiences within the organization. Consequently, employees will already have shaped their 
POS before their first performance appraisal, which can be called pre-appraisal POS. Erdogan 
(2002) proposes that Pre-Appraisal POS will be positively related to system procedural justice 
perceptions during the appraisal (Proposition 2a). If employees have a positive exchange with 
the company, they may expect the procedures to be taken place as fair.  
 
Organizational Culture 
Performance appraisal systems should fit the culture of the organization (Ikramullah et al., 
2016) since organizational culture constructs the context in which performance appraisal takes 




organizational culture can be conceptualized in different ways, in her model Erdogan 
conceptualized organizational culture based on behavioral norms by Cooke and Rousseau 
(1988). According to this, it includes three behavioral styles such as constructive, passive-
defensive, and aggressive-defensive styles. In companies with more constructive cultures, 
achievement and individual development are more valued, and thus appraisal systems may be 
perceived as more useful and less imminent. In companies with more passive–defensive 
cultures, individuals attempt to diminish interpersonal conflict and maintain their status quo, 
thus raters may try not to conduct realistic appraisals in order to avoid confrontation. In 
companies with more aggressive–defensive cultures individuals focus on gaining or 
maintaining their power, thus performance appraisal may serve as a political tool. 
Consequently, the importance of procedural justice perceptions in constructive cultures may be 
higher. Therefore, Erdogan (2002) proposes that firm culture will be related to perceptions of 
rater procedural justice such that, in constructive cultures compared to passive–defensive or 
aggressive–defensive cultures, the highest levels of rater procedural justice may occur 
(Proposition 2b). 
 
Pre-Appraisal LMX quality 
PA happens within the context of an ongoing relationship between the leaders and their team 
members. A high-quality leader-member relationship is clarified by trust, respect, affection, 
and openness rather than just stated in the employment contract. As a result, subordinates may 
believe that they have more control over appraisal procedures because of their exchange quality 
with their supervisor. Therefore, Erdogan (2002) proposes that Pre-Appraisal LMX quality will 
be positively related to perceptions of rater procedural justice (Proposition 2c) 
 
Antecedents of interactional justice 
Being respectful and providing two-way communication may cause interactional justice 
perceptions among subordinates. In the process of performance evaluation, interactional justice 
refers to the fairness of communication and interaction, which may be determined by the 
Impression management as rater behavior during performance appraisal and Pre-Appraisal 
LMX quality as contextual factors.  
 
Impression management 
Impression management can be defined as behaviors that vary or preserve the rater’s image in 
the eyes of the subordinates. Erdogan (2002) categorized the impression management tactics of 
appraisers as supervisor-focused, subordinate-focused, and job-focused based on Wayne and 
Ferris (1990). Supervisor-focused tactics are behaviors trying to give the impression that the 
supervisor is likable by being polite and friendly during the review. Subordinate-focused tactics 
refer to behaviors that do favors or praise the subordinate by demanding personal reasons 
behind poor achievements or agreeing with the subordinate during the discussion. Job-focused 
tactics refer to behaviors that try to show an image that the manager is effective in his or her 
job as a supervisor and evaluator. That means the manager may take charge of an event 
positively influencing the employee, and he/she tries to diminish responsibility in an event 
negatively influencing the subordinate during the performance appraisal interview. Thus, 
Erdogan (2002) proposes that if appraisers apply job-focused impression management tactics, 
that will be negatively related to interactional justice perceptions. In contrast, the use of 
supervisor and subordinate-focused tactics will be positively related to interactional justice 





Pre-Appraisal LMX quality 
Regarding the high quality of Pre-Appraisal LMX relationships, leaders act in a less 
authoritarian way and apply formal authority less often. Thus, Erdogan (2002) proposes that 
Pre-appraisal LMX quality will positively affect interactional justice perceptions during 
performance appraisal (Proposition 4). 
 
Antecedents of distributional justice 
 
Performance ratings 
A positive relationship is likely between performance ratings and distributive justice because 
subordinates are expected to overvalue their contributions to the team. Thus they may perceive 
high ratings as fairer. Nevertheless, ratings need to reflect actual performance. In order to 
achieve both accuracy and fairness, distributive justice perceptions have to be measured with 
items that differentiate favorable inequity from equity and fairness from satisfaction with 
evaluation. 
 
Pre-Appraisal LMX quality 
Erdogan (2002) suggests that the relationship between ratings and the perceptions of 
distributive justice may be moderated by LMX quality in a way that, for high LMX employees, 
there will be a stronger positive relationship between the two of them (Proposition 4). 
 
Perceived basis of LMX 
Despite all the efforts of the companies, employees often make comparisons about their 
evaluations with their peers. They may compare their ratings by making an internal comparison 
based on their internal standards or past ratings. Furthermore, they may also make external 
comparisons by guessing the performance rating that will be given to other members of their 
teams. According to this, Erdogan (2002) suggests that when appraisees do not know the 
performance ratings of their colleagues, they will assume that those with higher LMXs are more 
probably to receive higher performance ratings (Proposition 6a). Furthermore, Erdogan (2002) 
also argues that distributive justice perceptions will be influenced by the perceived degree to 
which the manager forms high-quality LMXs based on work-related factors (Proposition 6b). 
 
Rater information use 
Williams et al. (1985) identify three types of information raters apply in performance appraisal 
settings: consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus. Consistency can be defined as how the 
individual as ratee behaves in the same setting across different occasions. Distinctiveness can 
be defined as how the ratee behaves in different settings. Consensus can be determined as to 
how other employees act in the same setting. According to Williams et al. (1985), which 
behaviors are mainly perceived depends on what types of information the rater searches.   
Based on this, Erdogan (2002) suggests that the perceived type of information used in 
performance appraisals will be associated with distributive justice perceptions, in a way that 
the rater’s application of consistency and distinctiveness of information will positively affect 
distributive justice perceptions and the rater’s application of consensus information will be 
negatively associated to it (Proposition 6c). 
 




Justice perceptions in performance appraisals influence organization-related (i.e., commitment, 
turnover intentions), leader-related (i.e., prosocial behaviors targeting the supervisor, 
satisfaction with the leader), and performance-related outcomes (i.e., task performance, 
motivation to improve), through improved exchanges with the organization and the leader, and 
increased accountability pressure (Erdogan, 2002). 
Organizational outcomes 
 
Procedural justice is referred to as the strongest predictor of organizational outcomes, such as 
commitment, turnover intentions, job satisfaction, and organizational citizenship behavior, 
which referred to the degree to which employees act in ways that are not in their job descriptions 
but are good for their company. In her model Erdogan (2002) highlights that system procedural 
justice will be positively associated with post-appraisal Perceived Organizational Support 
(POS) (Proposition 7a) while Post-appraisal POS will be a mediator of procedural justice– 




Leader-related outcomes are employees’ attitudes reflecting satisfaction with the supervisor and 
employees’ behaviors that are good for the supervisor, such as prosocial behaviors targeting the 
leader. Erdogan (2002) emphasizes that rater procedural justice and distributive justice 
perceptions would be positively associated with post-appraisal LMX (Proposition 8a), while 
the connection between rater procedural justice, interactional justice, distributive justice, and 
leader-related outcomes may be mediated by post-appraisal LMX (Proposition 8b). 
Performance-related outcomes 
 
Based on the study of Gerstner and Day (1997), procedural, interactional, and distributive 
justice perceptions may be indirectly linked to individual performance through their impacts on 
LMX quality. Moreover, justice perceptions can affect individual performance through 
perceived accountability, as well. Erdogan (2002) suggests that distributive justice perceptions 
will be positively associated with perceived accountability (Proposition 9a). In contrast, the 
relationship between distributive justice perceptions and performance-related outcomes will be 
mediated by perceived accountability (Proposition 9b). 
 
All in all, besides its significant contribution, there are some limitations of the model of Erdogan 
(2002) as well. First, the author defines performance appraisal as a formal process of assessing 
employees, in which formal appraisals are conducted periodically. However, informal 
evaluations and feedbacks on a daily basis can have a significant impact on the justice 
perception of performance appraisals. Second, the article only focuses on formal appraisals 
conducted by supervisors. The model might not be generalizable to a team member, 
subordinate, or complete 360° appraisals.  
PM systems are “signals” of the organization’s intentions towards its employees, and they may 
be interpreted as “fair” or “unfair” by employees separately. Thus, employees do not 
automatically perceive these practices similarly or react to them in a similar way (den Hartog 
et al., 2004). More research is required to focus on the employees’ reactions to PM practices 
since employees’ commitment and performance depends on their perception and evaluation of 




others (Guest, 1999 in den Hartog, Boselie, and Paauwe 2004) or their attributional styles 
(Harvey & Martinko, 2010). 
 
In the Hungarian literature, the HRM of family businesses is slightly dealt with in connection 
with succession, while the family business nature is not included in the PA research either. At 
the same time, several significant studies have been published on the perceived justice of PM. 
Takács examined the relationship between organizational culture and PA (Takács, 2002a, 
2002b), as well as the different goals of managers and subordinates during performance 
appraisal (Takács, 2001). Szilas studied the relationship between perceived organizational 
justice and work-stress in a multi-paradigmatic approach (Szilas, 2011, 2014). Gerákné Krasz 
emphasized the importance of organizational culture, trust between managers and subordinates, 







3. Systematic literature review 
 
After I introduced the general theoretical framework relevant to the research topic, I discuss the 
results and consequences of the systematic literature review explicitly conducted on the 
research question. First, I introduce the methodology of the systematic literature review. 
Second, I discuss the descriptive analysis of the review. Third, I highlight the main findings of 
content analysis, and I introduce the conceptual framework and the propositions.  
    
3.1. The methodology of systematic literature review 
In order to make the research systematic, explicit, comprehensive, and reproducible, the 
literature review follows the procedure and methods as recommended by Fink (2010), which 
comprises of seven stages: (1) selecting a research question (2) selecting bibliographic or article 
databases, (3) choosing search terms, (4) applying practical screening criteria, (5) applying 
methodical screening criteria, (6) doing the review and (7) synthesizing the results. 
Once I identified the research question, first, a search strategy, second, a selection criterion was 
defined based on the research question both for generating the sample and for selecting relevant 
articles from that sample.  
Peer-reviewed, English-language, scholarly journals are included in the search as they can 
provide a validated source of knowledge in contrast to other relevant sources of information, 
such as conference papers and working papers (Podsakoff et al., 2005). The timeframe was 
restricted to articles published (online) until December 2019. 
As a first step, a broad article search was conducted in the scientific database of EBSCO 
Business Source Complete, JSTOR - Essential Collection, and in the eight most influential 
journals in Family Business Research, such as the Family Business Review, Entrepreneurship: 
Theory & Practice, Journal of Small Business Management, Journal of Business Venturing, 
Academy of Management Journal, Journal of Family Business Strategy, Administrative 
Science Quarterly, and Journal of Family Business Management and two other journals related 
to Human Resource Management Research, the Human Resource Management Review and the 
Human Resource Management Journal.  
Search keywords were deduced from the literature and from the research question for ensuring 
the systematic and comprehensive nature of the search. However, I decided not to restrict the 
search by using too few keywords in the beginning. The list of the keywords and their applied 
combination can be seen in Table 3.  
 
Table 3 - Keywords applied for the search 
 Keywords applied for the search 
1 ("family business*" or "family firm*" or "family compan*” or “family 
enterprise*") and ("performance management" or “performance 
appraisal”) and (“justice” or “fairness” or “just” or “fair”)  
2 ("family business*" or "family firm*" or "family compan*” or “family 
enterprise*") and ("performance management" or “performance 
appraisal”) 
  
3 ("family business*" or "family firm*" or "family compan*” or “family 






As a second step, the resulting sample of the article search was further narrowed based on the 
following criteria. Articles were excluded if they did not even partially discuss the research 
question, as stated above in their abstract. Altogether, the article search resulted in 45 articles 
by excluding the duplications from different sources. As a third step, I examined the selected 
sample more closely and read the entire article to guarantee a sufficient level of rigor and 
relevance. Due to non-compliance with the following selection criteria, 15 other articles were 
excluded: (1) thematic focus on performance management practices or HR practices in general 
including PM, and/or perceived justice by family and nonfamily employees, (2) connection to 
family businesses, (3) empirical and conceptual articles, (4) methodical transparency and clarity 
in the presentation of results. To extend the scope of the search, I also viewed the reference lists 
of the remained 30 articles and additionally identified two articles and two book chapters that 




3.2. Descriptive analysis  
 
3.2.1. Distribution of papers over the years 
In Table 4, the timely distribution of the publication shows that there were two waves of 
publications about the topic over the last 20-year period. In the first wave, nine articles were 
disclosed between 2011 and 2014; in the second wave, 19 articles were published from 2016 
until 2019. In the early 2000s, studies were explicitly published in the Asian cultural context 
(Amba-Rao et al., 2000; Gatfield & Youseff, 2001). The paper of Van der Merwe (2009) was 
the only study, which I found based on the three keywords search, however theoretical 
operationalization of the construct is not precisely defined, and the novelty of the findings is 
scarce. The authors aim to provide practical recommendations for managers to improve the 
effectiveness of family employee work performance and compensation in family businesses. 
The most significant and cited publication in the field was written by Tim Barnett and Franz 
W. Kellermanns in 2006, which provided a theoretical background for other publications as 
well later. Thus, Tim Barnett and Franz W. Kellermanns’s paper (2006) also serves as a basis 
of my current research.  
 
Table 4 - Distribution of papers over the years 
 
 
3.2.2. Most targeted journals 
Human resource management is generally an unexplored area in family business research. 
Table 5 shows that altogether, the final database included 32 articles and two book chapters. 
The first third of the papers were published in Human Resource Management journals (11 
articles), the second third of the papers were published in Family Business journals (10 articles). 
In contrast, the third third was published in other general management journals (11 articles), in 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Number of 
publications




which few were partly related to the field of business ethics (2 articles) and small enterprises (1 
article). Only one article was published in the Academy of Management Journal, which also 
shows the under-representation of family business research in high prestige journals in 
management now. Most of the papers were published in Human Resource Management Review 
(6 articles). Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice and Family Business Review shared second 
place with three articles. In contrast, the Journal of Family Business Strategy, Journal of Family 
Business Management, and the South African Journal of Business Management shared the third 
place with two articles.  
 
Table 5 - Number of Papers on PM and perceived justice in Family Firms in each journal 
 
By analyzing the relevant empirical studies, the predominance of quantitative research (12 
papers) over qualitative research (3 papers) is salient in the family business research as well. 
Regarding the type of studies, I identify 19 conceptual and 15 empirical papers. Among the 
conceptual papers, I can also pinpoint literature reviews (Hoon et al., 2019; Marler et al., 2019; 
Tabor et al., 2018) and a country-specific paper about Chinese Family Businesses and Chinese 
Business Clan (Gatfield & Youseff, 2001).  
Samara et al. (2019) pointed out the importance of the relationship between the cultural 
embeddedness of bifurcated compensation practices. The authors draw on two cultural 
dimensions: individualism/collectivism and power distance (Hofstede, 1984). That is also in 
line with other cross-cultural studies about the difference between individualist and collectivist 
cultures related to the preferred application of different distribution principles (Ramamoorthy 
& Flood, 2002). However, the result of the systematic literature review shows that we have 





Academy of Management Journal 1
Business Ethics: A European Review 1
Business Horizons 2
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 3
European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology 1
Family Business Review 3
German Journal of Human Resource Management: 
Zeitschrift für Personalforschung
1
Human Resource Development International 1
Human Resource Management 1
Human Resource Management Review 6
International Journal of Global Management Studies 1
International Journal of Human Resource Management 1
Journal of Business Ethics 1
Journal of Business Research 1
Journal of Family Business Management 2
Journal of Family Business Strategy 2
Journal of Management Studies 1
Research in Personnel and Human Resources Management 
(book chapter)
1
Small Enterprise Research 1
South African Journal of Business Management 2







HR practices at family firms. Qualitative studies are interestingly conducted in Asian cultural 
context (Haslan et al., 2019; Mustafa et al., 2018; Yujie Cai & Mingtian Yu, 2013), while the 
majority of quantitative data generated from family firms operating in the US (Eddleston et al., 
2018; R. Kidwell et al., 2012; Madison et al., 2018; Memili et al., 2013) or Western European 
countries (Kotlar & Sieger, 2019; Neckebrouck et al., 2018; Sieger et al., 2011; Steijvers et al., 
2017). The other third of the quantitative data comes from Austria-Hungary (Pittino et al., 
2016), South Africa (van der Merwe, 2009; van der Merwe et al., 2012), and India (Amba-Rao 
et al., 2000).  
3.2.3. Most adoptive perspectives 
Theoretical perspectives 
The theoretical foundation of professionalization and HRM in a family business is stemmed 
from Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). However, it is discussed only by one article focusing 
on bounded rationality and bounded reliability in a study of Nonfamily Managers’ 
Entrepreneurial Behavior in Family Firms (Kotlar & Sieger, 2019). Regarding governmental 
mechanisms in family businesses, the most adopted theoretical perspectives are socio-
emotional wealth (Cruz et al., 2011; Firfiray et al., 2018; Memili et al., 2013; Samara et al., 
2019; Samara & Paul, 2019); agency theory (Lubatkin, Ling, et al., 2007; Madison et al., 2018; 
Neckebrouck et al., 2018), and stewardship theory (Neckebrouck et al., 2018).  
In the case of perceived justice, authors draw their conclusions based on organizational justice 
theory (Haslan et al., 2019; Lubatkin, Ling, et al., 2007; Madison et al., 2018; Mustafa et al., 
2018; Samara & Paul, 2019) fairness theory and fairness heuristic theory (Barnett & 
Kellermanns, 2006), equity theory (Samara et al., 2019) and social identity theory (Barnett & 
Kellermanns, 2006). Family influence can be seen as a source of informal HRM practices that 
are committed in the social exchange (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006; Pittino et al., 2016) and 
leader-member exchange (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006) process. 
Scholars discuss family presence and influence on HRM and PM practices in articles with the 
theory of relationships (Gagné et al., 2014), imprinting theory (R. E. Kidwell et al., 2018), 
contingency theory (Firfiray et al., 2018), family systems theory (Daspit et al., 2018), 
circumplex theory (Daspit et al., 2018), and normative-adaptive perspective on stepfamilies 
(Jennings et al., 2018).  
Unit of analysis 
There are only a handful of papers discussing specifically PM and PA in the literature review 
(Amba-Rao et al., 2000; Haslan et al., 2019; Sieger et al., 2011; van der Merwe, 2009). Only 
two papers are focusing on PM and providing some empirical evidence about performance 
management practices at family firms (Haslan et al., 2019; van der Merwe, 2009). The majority 
of the articles discuss PM indirectly and partly included in the broader field, such as HRM 
(Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006; Combs et al., 2018; Cruz et al., 2011; Daspit et al., 2018; Firfiray 
et al., 2018; Gatfield & Youseff, 2001; Hoon et al., 2019; Jennings et al., 2018; R. E. Kidwell 
et al., 2018; Madison et al., 2018; Steijvers et al., 2017; Yujie Cai & Mingtian Yu, 2013) or 
high-performance work systems (hereinafter HPWSs) (Pittino et al., 2016), or High 
Involvement HR practices (hereinafter HIHRPs) (Mustafa et al., 2018). I also included three 
articles with the main focus on compensation and performance-based payments  (Kotlar & 




prerequisite for performance-based payments. So the findings of these papers may also be 
relevant for the topic. 
  
Stakeholders 
The papers discuss different groups of stakeholders as subjects of their analysis: family 
employees (Eddleston et al., 2018; R. Kidwell et al., 2012; van der Merwe, 2009; van der Merwe 
et al., 2012), nonfamily employees (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006; Haslan et al., 2019; Mustafa 
et al., 2018; Sieger et al., 2011; Tabor et al., 2018) or nonfamily managers particularly (Barnett 
et al., 2012; Kotlar & Sieger, 2019; Memili et al., 2013); family and nonfamily CEOs 
(Eddleston et al., 2018; R. Kidwell et al., 2012; Pittino et al., 2016; Steijvers et al., 2017). Some 
papers focus on both family and nonfamily employees (Daspit et al., 2018; Jennings et al., 
2018; Lubatkin, Ling, et al., 2007; Madison et al., 2018; Neckebrouck et al., 2018; Pittino et 
al., 2016; Samara et al., 2019; Samara & Arenas, 2017; Samara & Paul, 2019; Steijvers et al., 
2017; Yujie Cai & Mingtian Yu, 2013).  
Cultural context 
Samara et al. (2019) pointed out the importance of the relationship between the cultural 
embeddedness of bifurcated compensation practices. The authors draw on two cultural 
dimensions: individualism/collectivism and power distance (Hofstede, 1984). That is also in 
line with other cross-cultural studies about the difference between individualist and collectivist 
cultures related to the preferred application of different distribution principles (Ramamoorthy 
& Flood, 2002). However, the result of the systematic literature review shows that we have 
limited knowledge and understanding of the effect of the different national culture contexts on 
HR practices at family firms. Qualitative studies are interestingly conducted in Asian cultural 
context (Haslan et al., 2019; Mustafa et al., 2018; Yujie Cai & Mingtian Yu, 2013), while the 
majority of quantitative data generated from family firms operating in the US (Eddleston et al., 
2018; R. Kidwell et al., 2012; Madison et al., 2018; Memili et al., 2013) or Western European 
countries (Kotlar & Sieger, 2019; Neckebrouck et al., 2018; Sieger et al., 2011; Steijvers et al., 
2017). The other third of the quantitative data comes from Austria-Hungary (Pittino et al., 
2016), South Africa (van der Merwe, 2009; van der Merwe et al., 2012), and India (Amba-Rao 
et al., 2000). Thus, the study of Pittino et al. (2016) is the only evidence related to my topic in 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
3.3. Content analysis 
Below first, I present the theories that emerged in the articles that frame the relationship 
between the family business and HRM (Chapter 3.3.1). Second, I provide an overview about 
the main topics of HRM in family businesses literature emphasizing the two distinct 
employment groups (family and nonfamily employees), the two central HR systems 
(compensation incentive and performance management system), the two main characteristics 
of HRM (formalization, bifurcation bias) and the presence of family influence on perceived 
justice of HRM based on the model of Barnett and Kellermanns (2006) (Chapter 3.3.2).  
By applying the framework of Barnett and Kellermanns (2006), I structure my content analysis 
based on the following dimensions: Family Influence on Performance management (Chapter 
3.3.3), the effect of Performance Management on perceived justice (Chapter 3.3.4), and the 




Finally, I pinpoint the possible research gaps that emerged from the literature (Chapter 3.3.6), 
and I introduce my conceptual framework with my propositions (Chapter3.3.7).  
 
  
3.3.1. Theoretical background  
The theoretical foundation of Human Resource Management in Family Businesses is stemmed 
from Transactional Cost Economics (hereinafter TCE). Transaction cost economics is a 
fundamental paradigm in management and organizational studies (Hill, 1990). Transaction cost 
economics suggests that the optimum organizational structure can achieve economic efficiency 
by minimizing the costs of exchange. Transaction causes coordination costs of monitoring, 
controlling, and managing transactions (Williamson, 1979). 
TCE has four main assumptions: asset specificity, opportunism, bounded rationality 
(Williamson, 1996), and bounded reliability (Verbeke & Greidanus, 2009). Asset specificity 
refers to particular assets, involved in a transaction, which is challenging to be redistributed 
elsewhere without substantial loss of economic value. Asset specificity includes physical, 
organizational, and human assets. Bounded rationality means decision-makers have a limited 
capacity to be rational and process information, address complexity, and make optimal choices. 
Opportunism describes that economic actors are prone to pursue their self-interest in 
opportunistic and mendacious ways.  Bounded reliability suggests that decision-makers are 
more likely to experience benevolent preference reversals and identity-based discordances, 
limiting their ability to comply with initial promises over time (Kotlar & Sieger, 2019; Verbeke 
& Greidanus, 2009).  
Family-based human asset specificity refers to a unique employee base of family businesses 
that then cause unusual employment contracting as compared to typical contracts between the 
family business and its non-family employees or between a nonfamily business and its 
employees (Verbeke & Kano, 2012).  
However, the quantity and quality of family firms’ resource base may be suboptimal. Thus, 
family firms have three options to address the above challenges: 
 
1) Focusing on increasing the family resulting in more options in quantity terms, which means 
that more family members can take specific tasks for the family business.  
2) Investing in the business-related professional education of family members, resulting in 
better quality instilled in family-based human assets. 
3) Professionalization of the firm by hiring and delegating more authority to nonfamily 
managers (Chua et al., 2003). Professionalization can reduce the limitations of family-based 
human asset specificity in terms of quality and quantity of firm resources. (Verbeke & Kano, 
2012) 
 
Professionalization consists of two main components. Firstly, when an organization increase 
in size and activities, new employees and managers need to be hired, including non-family 
managers and employees. Secondly, family firms may also professionalize by incorporating 
formalized human resources practices.   
 
The basis for HR professionalization as a governance mechanism is rooted in agency theory, 
which suggests that managers will follow self-interested goals rather than the owner's goals if 
their behavior is not monitored. In agency theory, an agency relationship is defined as a 




to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 308). When both parties are utility 
maximizers, agents will not always act in the best interests of the principal. In order to limit 
these divergences, the principal can use incentives for the agent, or he/she can expect an 
increase in monitoring costs designed to restrict the aberrant behaviors of the agent (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976).  
A moral hazard appears when it is difficult or costly for owners to observe or assume the 
amount of effort exerted by managers. To meet objectives set by the owner, managers might 
feel compelled to make an additional effort, which they might consider inequitable compared 
to the level of compensation and responsibility. These opposing interests give employees 
inevitable temptation and incentives to exploit the company’s resources. They take “extra” time 
off, seek other perquisites, withhold effort (e.g., shirk and free-ride) and information to obtain, 
which they believe to be appropriate compensation for the extra effort and risk that the owner 
expects them to take perquisites (Lubatkin, Ling, et al., 2007). Agency theory suggests that 
moral hazards should be either avoided or mitigated by governance mechanisms, such as 
contracting, monitoring, or an incentive system (Eisenhardt, 1989). The costs and the loss of 
welfare to the owner that appear due to delegation of responsibility are called the principal-
agent agency costs.  
 
The agency theory explains the competitiveness of family firms because of the lower agency 
costs in governance. This argument is grounded in two assumptions: first, in the case of owner-
manager family firms, owners are also managers, which means that the interest of owners 
(principles) and managers (agents) are aligned. The principle–agent agency cost (i.e., incentives 
and monitoring costs) are irrelevant. Second, even when owners and managers are not the same 
people but family members fill in both ownership and management positions, the interests are 
still aligned because of the high level of trust, benevolence, and information exchange among 
family members. That makes monitoring and incentive systems mainly irrelevant (Zellweger, 
2017b). If the first assumption is not met, a family firm faces the original principle-agent 
problem like its nonfamily counterpart. If the second assumption is not met, a family firm has 
to deal with the “principle-principle” problem. Chrisman et al. (2007) proved that family firm 
performance increases when family managers are monitored, which suggests that family 
managers' behaviors may also be a result of self-interest in spite of the fact that they are part of 
the family. 
The alignment of goals and incentives in the field of performance management, together with 
the compensation systems, were studied mainly through the lens of agency theory as a dominant 
paradigm underlying most governance research. Scholars argued that interest divergence could 
be managed either by a well-established governance controlling structure upon the agent or 
through a compensation system based on a performance appraisal system (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976).  
However, the assumption about the opposing interests between the principal and the agent may 
not be applied to all managers. Furthermore, the presence of kin relationships limits moral 
hazard among family members by reducing goal divergence and information asymmetry. From 
an HRM perspective, this suggests that the design of costly mechanisms to monitor and 
motivate employees and managers is redundant or even damaging to family firms’ performance 
(Cruz et al., 2011). 
In response to that, the stewardship theory argues that managers, as stewards of the family firm, 
will act in the best interests of the principals. Their motivation is based not on self-interest but 




performing their task effectively, and thus they achieve recognition from their coworkers and 
superiors (Donaldson & Davis, 1991).  
 
In summary, while both agency theory and stewardship theory examine the extent of family 
presence, i.e., under what conditions and to what extent the family effect occurs, the difference 
between the two theories is that they are rooted in two different assumptions about human 
nature. While principal-agent theory builds on people’s profit maximization and strengthens the 
control function to maintain efficiency, stewardship theory assumes that family members are 
driven by goodwill and put the interests of the family business before their own. (Gnan et al., 
2015)  
These two distinct viewpoints of human nature will be imprinted on the design and 
implementation of HR practices related to performance and performance-related reward 
systems as well. That can include decisions on paying market versus below-market rates, a 
portion of fix and variable payments, providing long- or short-term payments, monetary 
rewards involving cash or benefit payments or nonmonetary rewards of an intangible nature, 
such as employment security, recognition, increased responsibility; applying equity versus non-
equity-based incentives (Cruz et al., 2011).  
 
3.3.2. HRM in family businesses 
The traditional conceptualization of family business professionalization was defined as “hiring 
full-time, non-family employees, particularly with the delegation of managerial authority” 
(Stewart & Hitt, 2012, p. 59). However, the multidimensional perspective of professionalization 
broadens the previous concept. It includes the addition of more formalized systems, such as 
financial control systems, governance systems, and human resource control systems (Dekker et 
al., 2015; Madison et al., 2018). Dekker et al. (2015) discuss five dimensions of the 
professionalization of human resource control systems, such as compensation incentive 
systems, performance appraisal systems, formal recruitment systems, formal training systems, 
and formally scheduled staff meetings. While Maddison et al. (2018) consider three main 
criteria, such as 1) nonfamily employees or managers work at the family firm (i.e., recruiting 
and selection) and 2) compensation incentive system and 3) performance appraisal system in 
place since bifurcation bias would not exist theoretically without these practices (Madison et 
al., 2018; Verbeke & Kano, 2012). By following the conceptualization applied by Madison et 
al. (2018) I discuss the characteristics of 1) family employees and non-family employees; 2) 
compensation incentive system; 3) performance appraisal system; 4) formalization, and 5) 
bifurcation bias to explain different ways families can shape HRM and how HRM, in turn, can 
influence family firms’ key outcomes. 
 
3.3.2.1. Family employees and nonfamily employees 
As mentioned, professionalization leads to two employment groups: family and nonfamily 
employees at family businesses (Cruz et al., 2011). Family and nonfamily employees are HR 
recipients whose perceptions and responses to HR practices play a crucial role in understanding 
HR practices. (Combs et al., 2018; Gagné et al., 2014; Hoon et al., 2019). 
Based on the model of Tagiuri and Davis (1996), the systemic nature of the family businesses 
may lead to difficulties in the application of any distributive justice rule since family and 
nonfamily employees are likely to assess the fairness of particular outcomes with very different 
criteria. Whereas families and their members tend to allocate resources based on need, 
nonfamily managers and employees tend to allocate firm resources based on merit and 




nonfamily employees, but among family employees. Thus, it is challenging for the different 
stakeholder groups to reach an agreement on an entirely fair distributional outcome in family 
firms. That can cause many conflicts and disagreements, which are naturally built in the family 
business system (Van der Heyden et al., 2005). 
Additionally, Cruz et al. (2011) propose that because family-owned firms use Socio-Emotional 
Wealth (SEW) as a frame of reference, they may have poorer perceptions of all three justice 
dimensions among family and nonfamily employees mainly because of the negative effect of 
family altruism.    
However, Lubatkin et al. (2007) argue that those non-family employees, who willingly work 
for family-owned firms, somewhat possess different distributive justice expectations than those 
who work for nonfamily firms. Thereby, nonfamily employees do not expect to be treated as 
family members in allocating resources, promotions, and other perquisites. That indicates that 
family businesses are more likely to attract those nonfamily employees who are motivated by 
non-economic rewards, such as job security and an informal work environment. 
Tabor et al. (2018) also highlighted those ambitious individuals, who value flexibility, change, 
and career opportunities tend to choose nonfamily firms. In contrast, more socially oriented 
individuals who prefer more security, stability, and a family-like work environment may be 
attracted to family firms (Chrisman et al., 2017). However, Tabor et al. (2018) also underlined 
that even family bias had been a central topic of nonfamily member literature. It is not clear, 
yet, whether family bias or injustice is a concern that family firms address during employment 
(e.g., socialization) or their hiring practices that enable them to employ non-family members 
who tolerate family bias more. Lubatkin et al. (2007) argued that nonfamily members have a 
zone of indifference toward the preferential treatment of family members. However, there is 
little known about the size of this zone or how it is formed, changed, or managed. 
 
3.3.2.2. Compensation incentive system 
Tabor et al. (2018b) pinpoint that compensation receives significant attention due to the 
dominance of agency theory in the nonfamily literature. Scholars argue that conflicts of interest 
between family owners and non-family employees can be managed through compensation, and 
compensation is also one of the main determinants of job satisfaction. Some studies suggest 
that an increase in nonfamily incentive compensation benefits family firms more than 
nonfamily firms. That is not just because of the increased motivation, but also because it shows 
that the family firm is committed to improving firm performance and good governance 
(Chrisman et al., 2017; Jaskiewicz et al., 2017). 
Importance of Socio-Emotional Wealth (hereinafter SEW) preservation suggests that the firm 
aspires for other nonfinancial goals and gives them a high priority. Consequently, the reward 
system will vary a lot depending on what kind of frame of reference the family firm applies. 
Cruz et al. (2011) propose that because family businesses are more likely to use SEW as the 
frame of reference and they tend to adopt a below-market pay policy or, at best, ‘‘a matching 
market’’ pay policy. They may place a greater emphasis on nonmonetary rewards and internal 
equity (versus external market equity) in the design of compensation contracts. This is also in 
line with an argument of Lubatkin et al. (2007), that is that those non-family employees, who 
willingly work for family-owned firms, possess different distributive justice expectations than 
those who work for their non-family counterparts. Memili et al. (2013) examined how the level 
of family involvement reduces the propensity to use incentives based on some sort of PA 
practices to nonfamily managers in small to medium-sized (SME) family firms in the US. Their 
results underlined that family influence, control, and intra-family succession intentions are 
negatively related to the propensity to use incentives, such as bonus and profit sharing for 




diminishes the propensity to use incentives. Despite their potential economic benefits, family 
involvement decreases the probability that incentives will be offered to nonfamily managers 
because such incentives are perceived to be inconsistent with the preservation of the family’s 
SEW.  
Cruz et al. (2011) also proposed that family businesses will incline to place a lower emphasis 
on variable (versus fixed) payment, which is strongly related to performance measures. The 
reason behind this is that family business owners tend to shield family members’ payments 
from poor performance. Furthermore, the owners also tend to believe in the ability of family 
employees to work in the interest of the company, so accountability for past performance, which 
may result from factors beyond their control, may not be that important for them. However, 
Tabor et al. (2018b) provide a more nuanced view. According to them, a nonfamily employee 
of small family businesses tends to be paid less than employees of their non-family 
counterparts. While medium- or large-sized family firms, which are professionally managed, 
pay employees the same as nonfamily firms. Although they tend to do so by offering higher 
incentive pay, lower base pays as the degree of professionalization rises (Memili et al., 2013; 
Tabor et al., 2018). That indicates that performance management and appraisal systems play a 
more significant role at a later stage of the family firm’s professionalization.   
 
3.3.2.3. Performance management and appraisal system 
Cruz et al. (2011) propose that because family-owned firms apply SEW, they are less likely to 
use formal appraisal systems, and they will tend to place a greater emphasis on applying 
qualitative measures for assessing performance because of three reasons. Firstly, the culture of 
family firms is based on trust and rooted in the positive norms of reciprocity. For family firms, 
the employment contract is to reciprocate the employees for their loyalty, protect their interests, 
and refrain from the use of fear of losing their jobs. Thereby, family firms will not favor those 
performance appraisal practices, which are focusing on the accountability of past performances 
and extrinsic controls based on quantitative measures both to identify and dismiss poor 
performers and to retain and reward good performers.    
Secondly, family businesses that try to demonstrate altruistic behaviors toward family 
employees have a tendency to protect their kinship from the disapproval related to inadequate 
performance.  
Thirdly, family businesses tend to reward people for only being a family member or a close and 
loyal employee in order to preserve SEW. It can also mean that the performance of a family 
CEO or manager may also be evaluated based on the fulfillment of family obligations as well.   
Finally, according to Cruz et al. (2011), implementing a formal appraisal system could mean 
that the shortcomings of family and ingroup employees would be exposed. Thereby, it is a 
possibility that family businesses are apt to use formal practices less consistently than their 
nonfamily counterpart that can lead to a perception of injustice among employees.     
Regarding contextual factors other than size, Cruz et al. (2011) suggest that family businesses 
are more likely to compromise on the use of SEW as a determinant criterion for adopting HR 
practices under three conditions, such as in case of poor performance, generational change, or 
facing a main competitive threat. Controversially, when the family influence decreases, 
nonfamily investors are likely to initiate to implement more performance-oriented and formal 
HR practices, such as performance appraisal and compensation systems.  
Kotlar and Sieger (2019) applied transaction cost economics to describe the individual-level 
entrepreneurial behavior of family and nonfamily managers in family firms. They conclude that 
nonfamily managers exhibit lower entrepreneurial behavior than family managers, especially 
after the founder leaves the business. They proposed six factors through which family firms can 
facilitate nonfamily managers’ entrepreneurial behavior. These factors include monitoring, 




such as share ownership and performance-based pay. Kotlar and Sieger (2019) argue that 
nonfamily managers may possess a lower ability and willingness to engage in entrepreneurial 
behavior in contrast to family managers because of bounded rationality and bounded reliability. 
The authors admitted that performance-based pay might provide financial incentives for 
nonfamily managers to behave in ways that improve organizational performance. However, 
they could not guarantee that nonfamily managers will completely understand the complexity 
of the diversity of family business goals and maintain their commitment to them since these 
goals are often intangible, difficult to assess, and constantly changing over time (Kotlar & 
Sieger, 2019). This finding also shows that it may be better to focus on the performance 




There is a debate among scholars about whether family firms benefit from formalization when 
hiring non-family employees (Tabor et al., 2018).  
Based on agency theory, there is a sound argument that firm owners and nonfamily employees 
may have conflicts of interest because of divergent goals, and that is even intensified if there is 
a lack of formal structures to adequately monitor employees and reward performance equitably 
(Chua et al., 2009). However, family firms often fail to establish formalized governance 
structures, even when nonfamily employees are already hired. The only exception is when a 
family firm aims to do professionalization to improve its financial management by hiring a 
nonfamily CFO (Tabor et al., 2018).   
Even Madison et al. (2018) indicated that becoming more formalized and bureaucratic helps 
the inclusion of nonfamily members and improves firm performance. However, other studies 
suggest that family firms may choose not to formalize because of its potential costs.  
Firstly, studies argue that formalization depends on family firm circumstances. For example, 
small and medium-sized firms (de Kok et al., 2006) or family businesses operating in industries 
where monitoring is more difficult (Fang et al., 2017) or in countries with weak legal structures 
(Lien & Li, 2014) are less likely to employ non-family managers (Tabor et al., 2018). In line 
with this, Haslan et al. (2019) also found that a China-based family-SME applied both informal 
and formal PM practices to manage their nonfamily employees' performance. 
Secondly, it is possible that nonfamily members will also need less monitoring than is generally 
assumed. Family influence can be seen as a source of informal HRM practices that are 
committed in the social exchange process. The study of SMEs operating in Austria and Hungary 
provides indirect evidence that the pursuit of socioemotional goals at the family level fosters 
the quality of the social exchange with nonfamily employees. That means that family-owned 
businesses are more likely to create a more robust reciprocal stewardship culture compared to 
their non-family counterparts (Pittino et al., 2016). Nonfamily managers may have pro-
organizational behavior, and their goals are not as divergent from the family firm owner’s goals. 
They may also prefer less formal and bureaucratic structures that family firms can provide. 
Ironically, in the large-scale survey with responses of family SMEs, Steijvers et al. (2017) 
pinpointed that family firms with a family CEO have more formal HR practices than those 
managed by a nonfamily CEO owing to higher levels of goal alignment and intentional trust 
between the owning family and family CEO. Furthermore, family businesses managed by first-
generation family CEOs and family CEOs with a higher education implemented more formal 
HR practices. The findings indicate that family CEOs can be equally or even more able as 
nonfamily CEOs to run a family firm in a formalized and professionalized way. 
Family firms also tend to hire trusted nonfamily employees from their social network, which 
may mitigate the assumed conflicts of interest among the participants (Tabor et al., 2018). Thus, 




attract employees whose motivational profile is consistent with the culture and the value system 
of the family firm (Pittino et al., 2016). 
Finally, Stewart and Hitt (2012) proposed that it is possible that family firms may choose to 
live with conflicts of interest rather than formalize their governance because of the negative 
impact formalization might have on their organizational culture. 
 
3.3.2.5. Bifurcation bias 
Bifurcation bias can be seen as an effect of family firm professionalization.  
Professionalization constructs two separate classes of employees, such as family vs. nonfamily, 
that may result in potential asymmetries in each group of employees’ treatment by the family 
firm, as well as in each group’s perceptions of the leadership.  
Bifurcation bias is categorized as an “affect heuristic” in the applied psychology literature. 
According to Verbeke and Kano (2012), dysfunctionality appears when this affect heuristic 
develops in management practices and family firms as their standard practice uses asymmetric 
treatment. In this case, “family employees are treated by default as highly valuable, firm-
specific assets and as loyal stewards with a long-term commitment to the family business, while 
nonfamily employees are dealt with as easily substitutable, commodity-like, short-term assets, 
and as self-serving agents who ultimately remain “outsiders” even if used/internalized 
temporarily by the firm”(Verbeke & Kano, 2012, p. 1189). Bifurcation bias occurs when this 
kind of unequal treatment is economically inefficient for the family firm, and it remains 
uncorrected in the long run. Based on this, Verbeke and Kano (2012) defined bifurcation bias 
as the asymmetric treatment of family and nonfamily employees within the family firm that 
manifests through organizational-level managerial practices – particularly within HR practices 
systematically and by default. A family business is viewed as unbiased if it applies a visible 
and consistent effort toward unbiased practices throughout the organization. However, the 
presence or absence of bifurcation bias may not be absolute, but rather a matter of degree, and 
most probably, family businesses are on a continuum from biased to bias-free.  
In HR practices, bifurcation bias can manifest itself, particularly in performance appraisal 
systems, compensation systems, and recruitment and promotion (Verbeke & Kano, 2012).  
Verbeke and Greidanus (2009) pinpointed mechanisms for economizing on bounded reliability, 
such as setting realistic goals, reviewing these goals frequently and developing clear guidelines, 
planning strategy jointly by participating parties, etc., that is the basis of the family firms’ 
performance management and appraisal system.  
According to Verbeke and Kano (2012), asymmetric altruism and family members’ 
unwillingness to monitor and assess each other’s performances lead to biased performance 
monitoring. The absence of proper accountability mechanisms increases both bounded 
rationality problems and bounded reliability challenges.  
If a family employee is inclined to shirk, he/she may tend to take advantage of an inappropriate 
functioning of the monitoring system by engaging in free-riding behavior. On the other hand, a 
nonfamily employee may withdraw his/her effort as a result of perceived unfairness during 
performance appraisal. Even if we assume that every family and nonfamily employee acts as a 
loyal steward while possessing all the competencies necessary to perform their duties, Verbeke 
and Kano (2012) argue that effective monitoring systems are inevitable because of bounded 
rationality and bounded reliability still can occur. Since additional knowledge and experience 
may sometimes be required because of an unexpected event (bounded rationality), or and even 
well-meaning stewards may act in a way that is not the most beneficial to the firm due to 
benevolent preference reversal (bounded reliability). 
All in all, Verbeke and Kano (2012) proposed that the bifurcation bias affects the family firm’s 
ability to economize on both bounded rationality and bounded reliability and, therefore, 




bifurcation bias, they will be more able to grow and prosper while sustaining their family 
governance structure for the long term. Neckebrouck et al. (2018) also found that equal 
monitoring of family and nonfamily employees enhances the relationship between HR 
professionalization and family firm performance, whereas bifurcated monitoring diminishes the 
relationship. Moreover, harmful family influence on employment practices increases with both 
firm age and with heightened family involvement (Neckebrouck et al., 2018). 
 
Madison et al. (2018) also confirmed the above proposition of Verbeke and Kano (2012).  
Madison et al. (2018) conducted a primary survey and collected data from CEOs of 123 private 
family firms. Their focus was on the relationship between HR professionalization and family 
firm performance and how bifurcation bias can affect the relationship between them.  
Madison et al. (2018) suggested that the success of HR professionalization depends on how 
family and nonfamily employees are treated within the family business. They found that when 
bifurcation bias occurs in these three leading HR practices, the financial benefits of HR 
professionalization were reduced because of a perceived inequity of treatment within the firm. 
Their results support the positive relationship between HR professionalization and the financial 
performance of the firm. Moreover, they argue that while bifurcated monitoring of family and 
nonfamily employees diminishes the professionalization-performance relationship, equal 
monitoring strengthens the relationship. Madison et al. (2018) highlighted that HR 
professionalization and bifurcation bias serve as unique sources of heterogeneity in family 
firms. The study of Madison et al. (2018) is the first empirical investigation of bifurcation bias, 
which not only validates its existence but provides more understanding of the heterogeneity 
across family firms.  
However, there are some limitations to Madison et al. (2018)’s study. Firstly, the analysis fails 
to take into account the phenomenon of “reversed causality” (den Hartog et al., 2004), which 
means that organizational success (such as profitability) could increase the willingness of the 
management to invest in formalized HR practices rather than vice versa. Large firm 
performance can also affect employees’ commitment, trust, and motivation as much as the other 
way around. Secondly, in the study, the analysis was focused on the firm level; however, the 
supporting arguments suggest that bifurcation bias may affect the organizational justice 
perceptions of both family and nonfamily employees. Thus, the authors highlight that it is 
necessary for future research to empirically investigating the effects of bifurcation bias in multi-
level models or across different levels of analysis. That would require data from not just a single 
informant but multiple informants as well, preferably from both family and nonfamily 
employees, to understand their actual justice perceptions of their work environment.  
Finally, even the study also proved that family firms with bifurcated practices favoring 
nonfamily employees exist. The authors did not examine the direction of the bias to gain more 
insight into why and how bifurcated biases favoring nonfamily employees manifest. 
 
3.3.2.6. Family influence on perceived justice of HRM 
In their conceptual model, Barnett and Kellermanns (2006) applied three different levels of 
family influence (e.g., dormant, facilitating, and restrictive) in order to examine how the level 
of family influence affects HR practices and nonfamily employees’ justice perceptions in a 
family firm. The authors referred to three descriptive levels of family influence, depending on 
whether how many interactions occur between family and business systems. Dormant family 
influence (DFI) is defined as a low level of family influence in the family business when there 
are only a few interactions. Facilitating family influence (FFI) is defined as a moderate or 
moderately high level of family influence in the family business. Restrictive family influence 




Barnett and Kellermanns (2006) argue that the level of family influence affects nonfamily 
employees' justice perceptions in family businesses. They suggest that high levels of family 
influence may lead to unfair HR practices, while moderate levels of family influence may lead 
to fair HR practices. In the case of low levels of family influence, neither fair nor unfair HR 
practices can be predicted. The authors content the involvement of the family in the business 
may affect the non-family employees' perceptions of justice directly, but its effect may be 
largely mediated by family firms’ HR practices. They also highlight that HR practices directly 
have an impact on the justice perceptions of nonfamily employees (Barnett & Kellermanns, 
2006). That is in line with the HRM literature, which focuses on the employees as a whole 
(Erdogan, 2002).   
The conceptual model of justice in family firms of Barnett and Kellermanns (2006) is the first 
that integrates theories of justice and considers them in the family context. In their conceptual 
article, the authors discuss nonfamily employees’ justice perceptions based on fairness theory 
(Folger & Cropanzano, 2001) and fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001). From the fairness 
theory perspective, nonfamily employees in family firms suffer from bias, a lack of consistency, 
and inadequate explanations for why HR practices may favor family over non-family 
employees. That is more likely to cause the “would” judgments proposed by fairness theory. 
Furthermore, since members of the dominant coalition are probably family members, nonfamily 
employees are most likely to put the blame on the family member(s), coming to the conclusion 
that outcomes and processes “could” have been fairer. Finally, nonfamily employees probably 
come to the conclusion that the problems of nepotism, bias, and adverse selection disregard 
their own moral values and that is why decision makers “should” have acted otherwise in case 
of the implementation of HR practices. 
From the fairness heuristic theory perspective, nonfamily employees have to deal with a 
complex and uncertain situation within the family business since they are part of the business, 
but they do not belong to the family system. That can lead to strong “ingroup–outgroup” 
perceptions, where nonfamily employees can compare their treatment about HR policies and 
procedures with family employees in the “ingroup.” Nonfamily employees’ uncertainty about 
their status and identity probably makes them questioning the trustworthiness of the family firm 
and their family managers to implement HR processes and practices that are free from bias and 
favoritism. (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006) 
 
Figure 12 exhibits the relationships among family influence, HR practices, justice perceptions, 
and the employee’s value-creating behaviors regarding non-family employees. Solid arrows 
show the relationships proposed by Barnett and Kellermanns (2006), while the dotted arrows 





Figure 12 - Justice Perception of Nonfamily Employees 
 
Source: (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006, p. 841) 
The key contribution of this study is that this was the first conceptual paper, which explicitly 
considered the role of family influence as a critical antecedent of the fairness of family firms' 
HR practices. At that time, little research has been focused on non-family employees, generally, 
and their justice perceptions especially. Barnett and Kellermanns (2006) argued that their study 
for practitioners implies that the dominant coalition may have the possibility to manage the 
level of family involvement in order to foster HR practices, which are perceived as fair.  
The limitation of the concept is that it only focuses on nonfamily employees and does not 
consider other contingency variables, such as national culture, family firm size, industry, which 
may have a significant impact on the perceived justice of HR practices (Ikramullah et al., 2016).  
 
Based on a systematic literature review Barnett and Kellermanns (2006) were the first scholars 
who described the relationship among family influence, perceived justice, and HRM practices. 
Barnett and Kellermanns (2006) suggested that the level of family influence impacts the justice 
perceptions of nonfamily employees, mainly through its effect on human resource practices. 
According to the high levels of family, influence tends to lead to unfair HR practices, while 
moderate levels of family influence tend to lead to fair HR practices. In the case of low levels 
of family influence, neither fair nor unfair HR practices can be predicted. 
I argue that their modified model can be used not only for HRM but for its subsystems, such as 
PM as well, including both family and nonfamily employees.  According to this, my thinking 





Figure 13 - PMS effects on the perceived justice at family businesses 
 
 
In the following chapters, I describe family influence, the effect of family influence on 
perceived justice of PM, and the effect of Family Influence on PM. 
 
3.3.3. Family Influence on Performance management 
Kidwell et al. (2018) highlighted that the imprinting mechanism might play a primary role in 
the case of family influence on Performance Management. In the systematic review of 
imprinting research, Simsek et al. (2015) suggested a framework in which three processes form 
an imprint: “(a) genesis, whereby the characteristics of the imprinters (the sources of imprints) 
and the imprinted (the target entity that bears an imprint) interact in ways that culminate in the 
formation of an imprint;  
(b) metamorphosis, the evolutionary processes or dynamics by which imprints persist, amplify, 
decay, and/or transform; and  
(c) manifestations, the influence of the imprint on entity characteristics, and the direct and 
indirect effects of the imprint on entity survival and performance” (Simsek et al., 2015, p. 289). 
That means that an imprint of a family morphing into an element of the organizational culture 
may be manifested in HRM. Accordingly, first, I discuss the possible source of imprints (see in 
Chapter 3.3.3.1). Second, I review the way how these sources of imprints may be manifest in 
performance management systems (see in Chapter 3.3.3.2).   
3.3.3.1. Source of Family Influence 
Concerning the relationship between family influence and HRM, there are several conceptual 
studies published recently about the family influence on HRM at family firms in general 
(Barnett et al., 2012; Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006; Combs et al., 2018; Cruz et al., 2011; Daspit 
et al., 2018; Firfiray et al., 2018; Hoon et al., 2019; Jennings et al., 2018; R. Kidwell et al., 
2012; R. E. Kidwell et al., 2013, 2018). As a result, family business researchers could identify 
several sources of family influence, such as level of family involvement (Barnett & 
Kellermanns, 2006);  weak” and “strong” family vision (Barnett et al., 2012); nepotism (Firfiray 
et al., 2018); entitlement  (R. E. Kidwell et al., 2018), injustice based on different distribution 
norms (Van der Heyden et al., 2005)  parental altruism (R. E. Kidwell et al., 2013, 2013; 
Lubatkin, Ling, et al., 2007); parent-child relationship (R. E. Kidwell et al., 2013); flexibility 
and cohesion of family (Daspit et al., 2018); boundary permeability of family owners (Jennings 
et al., 2018); controlling owners’ self-control (Lubatkin, Ling, et al., 2007) and biological 




2012; R. E. Kidwell et al., 2013). In the following, I discuss the different sources of family 
influence in detail.   
 
Level of family involvement 
In their conceptual model, Barnett and Kellermanns (2006) identified three different levels of 
family influence, such as dormant, facilitating, and restrictive, in order to examine how the level 
of family influence affects HR practices and nonfamily employees’ justice perceptions in a 
family firm. The authors referred to three descriptive levels of family influence, depending on 
whether how many interactions occur between the family and the business systems. Dormant 
family influence (DFI) is defined as a low level of family influence in the family business when 
there are only a few interactions. Facilitating family influence (FFI) is defined as a moderate or 
moderately high level of family influence in the family business. Restrictive family influence 
(RFI) is defined as high or excessive levels of family influence in the family business.   
Family vision 
Barnett, Long, and Marler (2012) suggest two poles of the continuum of family influence, 
“weak” and “strong” family vision, in their conceptual work. The “weak family vision” defines 
a family firm whose dominant coalition does not have intentions for transgenerational 
sustainability, and that is not described by the commitment to the values, goals, and policies. In 
contrast, the “strong family vision” is captured as a family firm whose dominant coalition does 
possess both strong intentions and commitment.  
 
Nepotism  
Nepotism can be defined as an owner's or leader's preferential treatment of family members 
within an employment context by providing them positions based on kinship ties rather than 
merit or their abilities and skills abilities (Firfiray et al., 2018; Jaskiewicz et al., 2013). 
 
There are two types of nepotism based on how nepots are chosen: reciprocal and entitlement 
nepotism (Jaskiewicz et al., 2013).   
Reciprocal nepotism refers to three family conditions, such as interdependence, previous 
interactions, and norms that support obligations toward family members and lead to generalized 
trust-based exchanges that aim to strengthen the relationship between family members. 
Reciprocal nepotism could be a valuable resource in contexts where tacit knowledge is essential 
for the family business (Jaskiewicz et al., 2013).   
On the contrary, entitlement nepotism occurs without any consideration of family conditions. 
It may lead to restricted social exchanges among family members in family firms and thus 
disregard potential benefits associated with kinship ties (Jaskiewicz et al., 2013). In other 
words, it refers to familial altruism and can result in short-term focused family exchanges that 
may destabilize the family relationships as well (Long & Mathews, 2011). 
 
Some families are more likely to engage in nepotism than others. However, the drivers of 
nepotism are still uncertain (Jaskiewicz et al., 2013). However, Firfiray et al. (2018) suggest 
that nepotism occurs very often at family firms, where family employees are treated favorably 
compared with nonfamily employees in the case of human resources practices, including 




The consequences and the impact of nepotism on economic and non-economic goals are also 
very obscure. Regarding financial outcomes, family business researchers argue that there are 
both advantages and disadvantages of practicing nepotism. On the one hand, nepotism is 
associated with the employment of highly committed family talent and access to affordable 
family workforces. On the other hand, the preferential treatment of family members based on 
kinship rather than merit can increase the risk of damaging the long-term survival and economic 
viability of the family business (Firfiray et al., 2018). However, research evidence shows that 
there is an impact of nepotism not only on financial outcomes but on SEW as well. Some 
researchers argue that nepotism can foster SEW by strengthening family influence, supporting 
the transition of leadership onto the next generation. Others suggest the possible negative 
impacts of nepotism on family SEW, such as conflicts of interest between family members or 
between family members and other stakeholders, as well as identity conflicts and reputational 
concerns (Firfiray et al., 2018). Besides this, family owners often pursuit socioemotional 
utilities at the expense of financial gains. 
 
Entitlement 
Entitlement can be defined as an employee’s belief that he or she deserves benefits from the 
company based on the perception of contributions. Entitlements can be either positive or 
negative depending on whether they are based on fair contributions and aligned with business 
needs (Heath et al., 1993) or privileges that are not merited by performance (R. E. Kidwell et 
al., 2018).      
 
Different distributional norms to judge fairness 
According to Van der Heyden, Blondel, and Carlock (2005), entitlement is also rooted in the 
difficulty of any application of distributive justice to the family business system.  
The systemic nature of the family businesses may lead to various opportunities for the 
perception of injustice because of the overlap of the family, business, and ownership 
subsystems. This so-called “injustice” effect is rooted in different distributional norms among 
the various stakeholders. Family, shareholders, and employees will assess the fairness of 
particular outcomes with very different criteria (Gagné et al., 2014). Whereas families and their 
members allocate resources based on need, shareholders of the family firm allocate resources 
based on equality. Furthermore, managers and employees are meant to allocate company 
resources based on merit and performance. Thus, it is complicated for the different stakeholder 
groups to reach an agreement on an entirely fair distributional outcome in family firms. That 




Agency theory draws an overly optimistic view of the family influence on family firms. 
However,  Schulze and his colleague (Lubatkin et al., 2005; Schulze et al., 2001, 2002, 2003) 
replaced this overly optimistic view with an overly negative one suggesting that parental 
altruism, which describes the governance of family businesses, can increase agency costs by 
making them vulnerable to moral hazards. 
Parental altruism is defined as a characteristic or preference that is endogenous to a parent’s 
character and frame as a utility function that positively connects the welfare of parents to the 
welfare of their children (Stark, 1995). Parental altruism is also self-reinforcing because it 
simultaneously satisfies both the parent’s other-regarding and self-regarding interests (Lunati, 




because they feel obliged to do so; and otherwise, that would hurt their welfare (Becker, 1981). 
On the positive side, altruism compels parents to take good care of their children. It can foster 
trust, mutual support, communication, and reciprocity, which can help to align interests. 
However, on the negative side, Schulze et al. argue that controlling owners can be vulnerable 
to parental altruism. This trait makes parents generous to their children even to the point of 
spoiling them by providing them as family employees perquisites, promotional opportunities, 
higher salaries, and other benefits, regardless of their individual contribution to the firm’s 
performance. Parental altruism can biases perceptions of parents that their children are smart 
and work hard, that can also make parents evaluate their kin’s performances and contributions 
accordingly. However, altruism does not just hinder parents’ ability to effectively monitor and 
discipline their children (Lubatkin, Durand, et al., 2007). It can also encourage parents to limit 
any type of corrective action (Bernheim & Stark, 1988). 
Furthermore, family members, who benefit from parental altruism, might also feel entitled to 
the firm’s resources and privileges, and thus, that gives them the incentive to engage in moral 
hazard and to free ride and shirk their duties (Lubatkin, Ling, et al., 2007). 
 
Parent-child relationship 
Kidwell et al. (2013) suggest that negative parent-child relationships may lead to dysfunctional 
behavior outcomes, such as the Fredo effect. Thus, based on main dimensions of support and 
control, the family psychologist authors identified four styles of parenting (Baumrind, 1967): 
authoritarian (low support, high control); authoritative (high support, high control); permissive 
(high support, low control); and neglectful (low support, low control). 
Studies suggest that permissive parenting is considered dysfunctional, and it is more likely to 
lead to the Fredo effect later when the child enters the family business (R. E. Kidwell et al., 
2013). Parents have different relationships with each of their children, and they also treat them 
differently. These early family influences can also be imprinted on the firm later as the children 
become employees at the family firm. 
 
Characteristics of family 
Flexibility and cohesion 
Daspit et al. (2018) apply the circumplex model (D. H. Olson et al., 1979) created as a tool for 
diagnosing and treating dysfunctional family relationships to grasp the flexibility and cohesion 
component of family influence. The model of Daspit et al. (2018) can be seen in Figure 14, 





Figure 14 - Olson’s Circumplex Model of Marital and Family Systems 
 
 
Source: Model adapted from Olson (2000, p. 148) cited by Daspit et al. (2018, p. 20) 
 
 
The circumplex theory emphasizes two critical dimensions of family behavior, such as cohesion 
and flexibility. Family cohesion refers to “emotional bonding that family members have 
towards one another” (D. H. Olson, 2000, p. 145), while family flexibility refers to the “amount 
of change in the (family’s) leadership, role relationships and relationship rules” (D. H. Olson, 
2000, p. 147).   
The circumplex model integrates these two dimensions to predict how family systems work and 
form in their interactions. The model suggests that a balanced level of both cohesion and 
flexibility offers for the most functional family system, while the extreme levels of both 
dimensions most likely lead to dysfunctional family systems. 
There are four levels of family cohesion, which vary from disengaged (very low), separated 
(low to moderate), and connected (moderate to high) to enmeshed (very high) family systems.  
Disengaged family systems consist of highly independent family members who have 
insufficient or no attachment or commitment to the family. Family members tend to “do their 
own thing” without seeking support from each other (D. H. Olson, 2000, p. 147). In contrast, 
enmeshed family systems consist of highly dependent family members, who have too much 
consensus, insufficient independence, limited private time, external friends, or interests. Olson 
(2000) suggests that these extremes represent unbalanced family structures that can cause many 
problems for long-term family functioning. On the other hand, balanced family structures have 
moderate levels of separated or connected cohesion, with individuals, who are connected to, 
but also independent from, their families. 
There are four levels of family flexibility, which vary from rigid (very low), flexible (low to 
moderate), and structured (moderate to high) to chaotic (very high) family systems. The 
dimension of flexibility represents how the family system is able to balance stability and change 
in family leadership and roles (Olson, 2000). 
Rigid family systems are incredibly stable and characterized by the presence of a family leader 
who is highly controlling. Family members have strictly defined roles and limited negotiation 
ability. In contrast, chaotic family systems have limited or inconsistent leadership. Furthermore, 
their decision-making is impulsive, roles are not defined, and responsibility often shifts among 




structured flexibility with individuals, who work together in a democratic style, and roles are 
shared.  
Boundary permeability 
In their conceptual model, Jennings, Dempsey, and James (2018) also propose that HR practices 
are likely to design either “bivalent” or “no bifurcation” if the family owners collectively as a 
family have a more open than a closed view of the family's boundary (Jennings et al., 2018, p. 
75).  
 
Controlling owners’ self-control  
Lubatkin et al. (2007) pinpoint a contingent role played by self-control of the controlling owners 
at family businesses by examining what the differential effects of the controlling owners’ self-
control are on the justice perceptions of the family and nonfamily employees. By doing so, with 
an integrative view, the authors also offer a more realistic balance between the overly optimistic 
view about the governance of family businesses expressed by agency theorists and the overly 
pessimistic view expressed by Schulze and his colleagues (Lubatkin et al., 2005; Schulze et al., 
2001, 2002, 2003).  
According to behavioral economic theory, self-control refers to someone’s ability to control his 
or her impulses in ways that can maximize his or her long-term welfare, while self-control 
problems are the costs incurred when self-control is low (Lubatkin, Ling, et al., 2007; Thaler & 
Shefrin, 1981). The theory of self-control acknowledges that everybody tends to suffer from 
occasional losses of self-control, because of a lack of complete foresight and the fact that 
nobody is entirely rational or perfectly disciplined in most situations. That indicates that most 
losses of self-control are frequent and may have some consequences for both the doer and the 
others. Furthermore, while we intend to do what is best for ourselves, we may fail time to time 
against our best interests (Lubatkin, Ling, et al., 2007). 
Schulze and colleagues argue that because of parental altruism and owners’ altruism helps a 
loss of self-control. That is why moral hazards are a real danger for family firms. Controversy, 
based on the behavioral economic theory Lubatkin et al. (2007) highlight that while family firm 
owners are likely vulnerable to self-control problems, they are often conscious about it. 
Therefore they willingly adopt rules and implement governance mechanisms to guard against 
the harmful consequences of such behavior. Owners, who have the ability to have vision, self-
commitment, and the ability to establish and manage a firm, could also act as reliable, 
consistent, and fair. The only variable which deserves more attention is the degree to which the 
family firms’ owner achieves sufficient self-control. Lubatkin et al. (2007) propose that 
contingent on the owners’ level of self-control, their altruistic gestures and actions can either 
increase or lower the agency costs of the family firm. According to this, when the owners’ level 
of self-control is low, these gestures can provide employees incentive to engage in morally 
hazardous acts that lead to an increase in the firm’s agency costs. On the other hand, when the 
owners’ level of self-control is high, they are better able to lessen these incentives efficiently, 
and they are also more likely to gain some benefits from altruistic behavior  (e.g., stronger 
family bond, better communication, reciprocity, and trust), which could substitute for costly 
formal governance mechanisms to minimize employees’ morally hazardous behaviors 
(Lubatkin, Durand, et al., 2007, p. 959). 
Additionally, Jennings, Dempsey, and James (2018) also made propositions regarding the 
owning family characteristics that contribute to the various forms of bifurcation, namely 
biological discrimination of the family owners.  




In the systematic literature review, I have found three articles that dealt with the phenomena of 
the “Fredo” and its impact, called the “Fredo effect” (R. Kidwell et al., 2012; R. E. Kidwell et 
al., 2013; Samara et al., 2019).    
Fredo effect (R. Kidwell et al., 2012) refers to the incompetent brother Fredo Corleone from 
the novel titled “The Godfather” by Mario Puzo. According to this, the Fredo effect is defined 
as a negative effect in the firm that can appear due to the way parents relate to and interact with 
their children, and also the resulting damage to the firm that those children can cause regardless 
of any goodwill they might have had beforehand (R. E. Kidwell et al., 2013). 
By looking at the drivers of the Fredo effect, researchers conclude that Fredos can appear in 
family firms for many reasons under numerous circumstances and consequences of other types 
of family influence. Nepotism as a bias toward the hiring of a family member can set the stage 
for a Fredo to emerge, but it does not necessarily lead to that. Kidwell et al. (2013) also 
identified the Fredo effect as a dysfunctional behavioral outcome of the negative parent-child 
relationship and permissive parenting style, rivalry among siblings, parental altruism, and the 
differing norms between the family and business domain.    
When children join the family firm as employees, the favored children will fall into the leader’s 
in-group and the less-favored ones into the leader’s out-group (Eddleston & Kidwell, 2012). 
Being in the leader’s out-group can cause the development of dysfunctional behaviors by the 
children and the Fredo effect. Furthermore, the rivalry among siblings in terms of their roles 
and position in the family firm can also lead to the Fredo effect when Fredo tends to damage 
the business based on revenge (R. E. Kidwell et al., 2013). Because of parental altruism and 
guilt for past parental behavior (e.g., neglect), parents often reward their children without merit. 
However, not all children will respond similarly to the parent’s generosity, and support and not 
everyone will feel entitled to extra benefit and develop into Fredo. However, the dysfunctional 
behavior of a Fredo can create additional feelings of guilt on the part of the leader and thus can 
foster even more parental altruism (R. E. Kidwell et al., 2013). 
 
3.3.3.2. The manifestation of Family Influence on PM 
 
After this, first, I provide an overview of the imprinting mechanism and the family influence 
on PM systems in terms of the level of bifurcation and formalization.  
 
Imprinting mechanism  
Kidwell et al. (2018) examined how a negative manifestation of imprinting in the family 
subsystem then transfers to the family business to affect HRM practices? In their study, they 
discussed HRM practices, including selection, compensation, appraisal, and retention. They 
identified the effect of family influence, such as entitlement, injustice, and parental altruism, on 
those HRM practices and how the functioning of the HRM system might be distorted to favor 
family employees. There were six propositions discussed in the study, which are based on the 
framework of imprinting research. 
Kidwell et al. (2018) discussed how potentially negative behaviors and values, such as 
entitlement, injustice, and parental altruism, are imprinted on the family subsystem (genesis). 
They described how these learned behaviors and values transfer to the family firm subsystem 
and may permeate into a family firm culture in which the family values are imprinted on the 
organization and the employees connected to it (metamorphosis). Then, they suggested how 
specific imprints on a family firm's culture can cause problems in human resources, resulting 
in negative impacts on interpersonal relationships, firm financial performance, and the 




there is a need for re-imprinting in the family firm, and these bad habits can be broken and 
readjusted to positive practices in the family firm (R. E. Kidwell et al., 2018, p. 7). 
 
When a culture of entitlement imprints within the family firm, family members believe that 
they deserve more benefits, and they tend to focus more on what the company owes them 
instead of what they owe the company. Kidwell et al. (2018) proposed that “families imprinted 
with a sense of entitlement will be less likely to use formalized HRM practices (selection, 
compensation, appraisal, retention) for family employees than for nonfamily employees” (R. E. 
Kidwell et al., 2018, p. 11). They argued that family firms with an organizational culture of 
entitlement more probably have HRM practices that give privileges and opportunities to family 
employees over non-family employees. That means that while nonfamily employees are subject 
to the firm's compensation policies and performance appraisals, family employees hardly 
participated in these practices.  
 
Kidwell et al. (2018) also proposed that “families imprinted with strong parental altruism are 
likely to manipulate HRM practices (selection, compensation, appraisal, retention) to benefit 
their adult-children working in the family firm” (R. E. Kidwell et al., 2018, p. 12). The authors 
contended that there could be numerous adverse effects of parental altruism on HRM practices 
at family firms. They were focusing on performance appraisal practices altruistic parents rarely 
give constructive feedbacks and reviews about the work performance of their children. That 
may result that these children do not perceive their poor behavior as inappropriate. However, 
parental altruism does not just hinder parents’ ability to effectively monitor and discipline their 
children (Lubatkin, Durand, et al., 2007). It tends to limit any type of corrective actions children 
receive for their dysfunctional behaviors and underperformance (Eddleston & Kidwell, 2012). 
Kidwell et al. (2018) also suggested in their last proposition that the next generations of family 
firm leadership are more likely to initiate an effective re-imprinting process that can cause 
positive changes in HRM practices. That indicates that the change in management and 
ownership allows creating practices and behaviors that re-imprint the family firm with new 
cultural elements. That leads to more effective performance appraisal practices as well, which 
are more formalized, transparent, and less distorted and rejected by family and nonfamily 
employees.  
 
Bifurcated PM systems 
Some researchers emphasize that when bifurcation bias occurs in HR practices and monitoring, 
the financial benefits of HR professionalization are reduced because of a perceived inequity of 
treatment within the firm (Madison et al., 2018; Neckebrouck et al., 2018; Verbeke & Kano, 
2012). Findings also show that harmful family influence on employment practices increases 
with both firm age and with heightened family involvement (Neckebrouck et al., 2018). 
However, other researchers give a more sophisticated view on this topic (Daspit et al., 2018; 
Jennings et al., 2018; Samara et al., 2019).  
 
In their conceptual paper, Jennings, Dempsey, and James (2018) examine what is the nature, 
prevalence, origins, and consequences of the bifurcation bias and how can the typology of the 
different bifurcated HR practice bundles be extended in family businesses? To answer these 
questions, they reviewed the scholarly empirical articles relevant to bifurcation bias in the HR 





Firstly, as a result, the authors developed a typology of different bifurcated HR practice bundles 
in family firms based on interdisciplinary theory-building. The authors applied a normative-
adaptive perspective on stepfamilies, which has a more holistic and positive view of 
stepfamilies with the primary goal to explore the ways in which certain stepfamilies have been 
able to function well while meeting the needs of each stepfamily member as well as the need 
of the stepfamily as a whole.    
The model of  Jennings, Dempsey, and James (2018) enrich the conceptualization of Barnett 
and Kellermanns (2006) by providing a set of more specific constructs, such as the concepts of 
weak versus strong family-favored bifurcation, weak versus strong nonfamily-favored 
bifurcation, and bivalent bifurcation. The typology of bifurcated HR practice bundles in family 
firms can be seen in Figure 15.  
The strong family-favored bifurcation occurs within a family business if all of its HR practices 
favor family employees. That type of bifurcation bias is in line with the concept of Verbeke and 
Kano (2012). The weak family-favored bifurcation occurs if some of the HR practices favor 
family employees and none favors nonfamily employees. By contrast, strong nonfamily-
favored bifurcation occurs if all HR practices favor nonfamily employees. In contrast, weak 
nonfamily-favored bifurcation occurs if some of these practices favor nonfamily employees and 
none favors family employees. No bifurcation occurs if none of the HR practices favors either 
category of the employee at a family firm (Jennings et al., 2018), which is recommended by 
Verbeke and Kano (2012). However, Jennings, Dempsey, and James (2018) argue that there 
can also be another balanced state, which they call bivalent bifurcation. The bivalent bifurcation 
occurs if some HR practices favor family, and some favor nonfamily employees.  
 
Figure 15 - A typology of bifurcated HR practice bundles in family firms 
 
 
Source: (Jennings et al., 2018, p. 72) 
 
Secondly, Jennings, Dempsey, and James (2018) also made propositions regarding the owning 
family characteristics that contribute to the various forms of bifurcation. The model of 
contributing factors associated with bifurcation bias in the HR practices of family firms can be 










Source: (Jennings et al., 2018, pp. 73–74) 
 
There are two main contributing factors associated with bifurcation bias in HR practices, such 
as biological discrimination shown by the owner and family boundaries. 
Concerning biological discrimination, Jennings, Dempsey, and James (2018) propose firstly 
that the HR practices will be more likely to exhibit (strong or weak) family-favored bifurcation 
than no bifurcation, bivalent bifurcation, or (strong or weak) nonfamily-favored bifurcation 
(Jennings et al., 2018, p. 74). Secondly, they suggest that those family owners who exhibit 
greater selective attachment to their family employees will tend to establish stronger family-
favored bifurcated HR practices (Jennings et al., 2018, p. 74).  
Concerning family boundaries, Jennings, Dempsey, and James (2018) propose that HR 
practices are likely to show either bivalent or no bifurcation when the owners collectively have 
a more open than a closed view of the family boundary (Jennings et al., 2018, p. 75).  
  
Secondly, they propose an even stronger stance than Verbeke and Kano (2012) by questioning 
their conclusion that bifurcation bias is always damaging and should thus be eradicated from 
all HR practices. Jennings, Dempsey, and James (2018) argue that researches on stepfamilies 
imply that the elimination of asymmetric HR practices likely causes some degree of resentment 
on behalf of both family and nonfamily employees due to being treated in a non-differentiated 
way. All in all, the elimination of bifurcated HR practices will cause attitudinal and behavioral 
reactions from employees that are dysfunctional for the family business's performance. They 
also suggest that the bivalent bifurcation will be the most likely of the different types of 
bifurcated HR practices to elicit attitudinal and behavioral responses from family and nonfamily 
employees that are functional for firm performance. 
 
The strengths of the study are that Jennings, Dempsey, and James (2018) make a theoretical 
contribution by extending conceptualizations that deals with only the preferential treatment 
focused on mainly family members (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006; Jaskiewicz et al., 2013; 
Lubatkin, Ling, et al., 2007; Schulze et al., 2001). They also offer a set of more precise 
constructs. However, the study of Jennings, Dempsey, and James (2018) has several limitations 
as well.  Firstly, the authors use the stepfamily analogy. Stepfamilies create social contexts in 
which children are raised and nurtured, and they each usually have at least one biological parent. 
In contrast, family firms create business contexts in which individuals are employed to work 
for pay. Secondly, the authors claim that the concept of bivalent bifurcation is mainly applicable 






Many researchers emphasize the importance of formalization of both performance management 
practices (R. E. Kidwell et al., 2013; van der Merwe, 2009; van der Merwe et al., 2012) and 
those management coordination mechanisms. The latter includes organizational structure, 
defining teams, delegating manager and team tasks, the division of responsibilities, and defining 
job descriptions that are responsible for connecting individual work performance to 
performance at the organization level (R. Kidwell et al., 2012; van der Merwe, 2009). Pittino 
et al. (2016) argue that the interaction between formal and informal HRM practices could cause 
both additive and substitutive effects. Others argue that effective HR practices should be 
balanced between formal and informal HR practices (Haslan et al., 2019; Mustafa et al., 2018) 
and between instrumental governance mechanisms that reflect a monitoring approach and 
normative mechanisms that focus on collaborative efforts among family employees (Eddleston 
et al., 2018). Finally, the conceptualization of Daspit et al. (2018) gives more explanation of 
the family-related antecedents of formalization of HR practices. 
 
Chrisman et al. (2007) argued if family members are regularly monitored to guarantee 
appropriate behavior, the firm performance is improved. In line with this, in order to diminish 
the negative consequences, Kidwell et al. (2013) suggested that Fredos should be held to the 
same standards as nonfamily employees regarding performance appraisal practices. The work 
of family employees should be reviewed and monitored, and they should also be aware that 
detailed performance review records are kept. Leaders should not be the sole person to conduct 
performance appraisals. Instead, they should include nonfamily employees and consider 
anonymous 360-degree performance appraisals fostering objectivity in the review process. A 
formal appraisal process can foster a culture with merit and diminish any sense of entitlement 
that family members may feel. Transparent incentive systems based on performance appraisals 
can support family members to align their behavior and goals with the overall goal and interests 
of the family firm (Chrisman et al., 2007). Van der Merwe (2009) and Van der Merwe et al. 
(2012) also highlighted that the more family members perceive fair treatment, the more 
harmonious family relations and perceptions of business continuity will be. They also 
emphasized the importance of a well-defined performance management system to ensure fair 
treatment for all employees, including family members, by paying a competitive market-related 
salary based on individual efforts. 
 
Van der Merwe (2009) also emphasizes the importance of setting and making clear policies for 
family member employment, performance measurement, and discipline, as well as all types of 
compensation, including incentive or performance-based compensation before the family 
members join the family firm; furthermore discussing and reviewing these policies time to time. 
Kidwell et al. (2012) highlighted that the appraisal of Fredos should also be based on a formal 
job description, and rules and expectations should not be any different for family members.  
Kidwell et al. (2012) conducted survey research to examine how family harmony norms, 
fairness perceptions, and role ambiguity are related to family impediments and whether the 
relationship conflict mediates these connections. In their study, they proposed that a crucial role 
in developing the unethical behavior that can be associated with a Fredo effect is a family firm’s 
perceived norms of harmony, perceptions of fairness, perceived clarity of the family member’s 
role in the firm and family issues of relationship conflict. As they hypothesized, family harmony 
norms and fairness perceptions are negatively related to family impediment, while role 
ambiguity is positively related to the family impediment. However, they found that relationship 
conflict mediated these connections, emphasizing the potential damage this type of conflict can 
create in a family business, even if leaders make an effort to establish conditions that reflect a 





Pittino et al. (2016) also found that the implications of family businesses’ informal HR practices 
on retention depend on family involvement, regardless of the family status of the organization’s 
leader (i.e., family or nonfamily CEO). Nevertheless, the impact of the founding generation is 
positive. However, its extent is small, with a borderline significance level. There is a possible 
explanation, such as HRM practices interact either in an additive, synergistic, or substitutive 
effect, with one alternative excluding the other  (Delery, 1998). In this case, this means that 
interaction between formal and informal HRM practices could cause both additive and 
substitutive effects. From a practical managerial point of view, Pittino et al. (2016) also suggest 
that even there is a need to implement formal management practices to reduce the perception 
of procedural injustice and nepotism (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006), HPWPs investments 
beyond a certain level would be redundant. That is because there are informal mechanisms 
stemmed from the family influence that can act as substitutes for various formal ones. 
(Eddleston et al., 2018) 
In another study, Eddleston et al. (2018) investigated whether an integration of stewardship and 
agency theories (embodied through interactions between family harmony and adaptability with 
monitoring) can help describe the level of extra-role behavior exposed by family employees at 
family firms. The scholars proposed that family businesses underlining collaboration as 
encouraged by stewardship theory and monitoring, as encouraged by agency theory, may 
experience higher levels of extra-role behavior by family employees. In their study, extra-role 
behavior (ERB) is defined as “discretionary behavior that is (1) not specified in advance by the 
job role, (2) not recognized by a formal reward system, and (3) not a source of punishment if 
the job holder does not perform it”(Eddleston et al., 2018, p. 2). Their findings show that 
effective human resource practices should be balanced between instrumental governance 
mechanisms that reflect a monitoring approach and normative mechanisms that focus on 
collaborative efforts among family employees. When a family business is able to achieve this 
balance, the emphasis may be on fairness and accountability rather than distrust and forced 
compliance in the family firm context. 
 
Daspit et al. (2018) apply the family systems theory and the Circumplex Model of Marital and 
Family System (D. H. Olson et al., 1979) to describe that the structure of a family system has 
an impact on the structure and effectiveness of the family business system. The authors study 
the attributes of the controlling family that establish unbalanced HR practices between family 
and nonfamily employees in the family business. Specifically, they argue that an unbalanced 
family structure, which is characterized by two dimensions (i.e., cohesion and flexibility), can 
lead to unbalanced HR systems in the family business that might cause declining performance 
as well. In their study, Daspit et al. (2018) describe an unbalanced HR system as a form of an 
asymmetric treatment of family and nonfamily employees or bifurcation bias via HR practices. 
I discussed in detail the applied family system model of Daspit et al. (2018) in Chapter 0. 
Daspit et al. (2018) suggest that bifurcated HR practices are more likely to be implemented 
when the family system is unbalanced, such as chaotically enmeshed (System I), rigidly 
enmeshed (System II), chaotically disengaged (System III), or rigidly disengaged (System IV). 
When the family system is balanced (System V), they argue that bifurcated HR practices are 






Figure 17 - Presence of bifurcation bias & implications for HR practices and firm outcomes 
 
 
Source: (Daspit et al., 2018, p. 24) 
 
For each type of system, they describe not just examples of specific HR practices and make 
propositions about the resulting firm performance outcomes. The propositions related to the 
five systems are as follows:  
In the case of a chaotically enmeshed family system (System I), bifurcation bias exists in the 
HR practices of the family business system resulting in relatively low economic outcomes and 
high non-economic outcomes for the family business. 
In the case of a rigidly enmeshed family system (System II), bifurcation bias exists in the HR 
practices of the family business system resulting in relatively low economic outcomes and high 
non-economic outcomes for the family business. 
In the case of the chaotically disengaged family system (System III), bifurcation bias exists in 
the HR practices of the family business system resulting in relatively low economic outcomes 
and low noneconomic outcomes for the family business. 
In the case of a rigidly disengaged family system (System VI), bifurcation bias exists in the HR 
practices of the family business system resulting in relatively moderate economic outcomes and 
low noneconomic outcomes for the family business. 
In the case of the balanced family system (System V), bifurcation bias is mostly absent or 
nonexistent in the HR practices of the family business system resulting in relatively high 
economic outcomes and moderate noneconomic outcomes for the family business. 
After this, I focus on the main aspects of the five systems related to perceived justice and 
performance appraisal.  
Chaotically enmeshed (System I) family system has a lack of leadership and is characterized 
by constant change and high interdependence, and high loyalty among family members. That 
leads to bifurcated HR practice characterized based on nepotism. Nonfamily employees have 




The chaotic family structure also may result in a lack of formalized and consistently applied 
HR practices, such as performance appraisal.  
Rigidly enmeshed (System II) family system is characterized by authoritarian leadership, 
limited change, and high interdependence and loyalty among family members. The rigidly 
enmeshed family system leads to bifurcated HR practice mostly characterized by unbalanced 
career development. Whereas performance appraisals are more likely characterized by 
formalized evaluation focusing on past performances and accountability, which can foster 
procedural justice, nonfamily members may perceive injustice not receiving equal career 
opportunities at the family firm.  
Family firms governed by chaotically enmeshed (System I) and rigidly enmeshed (System II) 
families are likely characterized by not low economic but high non-economic outcomes.  
Chaotically disengaged (System III) family system has a lack of leadership and is characterized 
by constant change and high independence, and low loyalty among family members. The 
chaotically disengaged family system leads to bifurcated HR practice mostly characterized by 
an unbalanced performance evaluation resulting in not only low economic but low 
noneconomic outcomes. According to Daspit et al. (2018), these family businesses suffer from 
inconsistently applied HR practices as a result of the chaotic nature and “reverse-nepotism” 
(Daspit et al., 2018, p. 25). In this case, family members are held to a higher standard than other 
nonfamily employees. HR practices are not formalized nor consistent because of a lack of 
leadership. Thereby performance appraisals tend to be vague for employees, and assessments 
are conducted on an inconsistent basis. Reverse-favoritism behavior may be an attempt by the 
family firm to show values of fairness to its nonfamily employees (Verbeke & Kano, 2012). 
However, given the chaotic nature of the system, such measures with lack of formalization and 
inconsistency would, even more, reduce perceptions of fairness and results in 
underperformance and turnover. Therefore, family businesses governed by chaotically 
disengaged families are likely to suffer from not just low economic but low noneconomic 
outcomes as well.  
Rigidly disengaged (System IV) family system is characterized by authoritarian leadership, 
limited change, and high independence and loyalty among family members. The rigidly 
disengaged family system leads to bifurcated HR practices mostly characterized by unbalanced 
compensation practices. As in the case of System III, family members are subject to “reverse-
nepotism,” while nonfamily employees’ compensation is based on merit. In contrast to the HR 
system affected by chaotically disengaged family systems, perceived fairness among non-
family employees may exist. Since the amount of change in the leadership, role relationships, 
and relationship rules is rather low, which can provide more room for consistency and 
formalization of HR practices, such as performance appraisal and compensation. That is why 
Rigidly disengaged family systems are likely to be characterized by at least some moderate 
economic outcomes.  
According to Daspit et al. (2018), in the case of the balanced family system (System IV), there 
is limited or no bifurcated HR practices, wherein performance evaluations, practices are 
formalized (yet adaptive), both family and nonfamily employees are aware of expectations, 
evaluations are administered at regularly, and all employees are expected to meet similar 
standards. This kind of family system is balanced; bifurcation bias is absent or nonexistent in 
the HR practices resulting in mainly high economic outcomes and moderate noneconomic 
outcomes.  
The conceptualization of Daspit et al. (2018) is relevant because it gives more explanation of 
the family-related antecedents of HR formalization. However, the propositions of Daspit et al. 
(2018) fail to take into account other external environmental factors (high variability and high 
complexity) of the family firm as well, which can also lead to a lack of formalization of 




Context of individualist/collectivist national culture  
Samara et al. (2019) establish the link between individualist/collectivist national culture 
(Hofstede, 1984) and one particular bifurcated HR practice. In their conceptualization, Samara 
et al. (2019) focus on the antecedents and outcomes of one particular HR practice, namely 
bifurcated compensation, and investigate when bifurcated compensation favors family versus 
nonfamily employees. They also study how bifurcated compensation (either favoring family or 
nonfamily employees) influences the work outcomes of the underprivileged group.  
Based on this, Samara et al. (2019) suggest that under circumstances of meritocratic bifurcated 
compensation and when cultural preconditioned compensation expectations are met, bifurcated 
compensation in family firms will not necessarily have an effect on the work inputs of the 
underprivileged group; however, when bifurcated compensation is not meritocratic and when 
culturally compensation expectations are violated the negative impact of inequity on employees 
work inputs are magnified. In particular, the authors made the following propositions: In a 
collectivist culture context, family businesses will attribute high importance to achieving goals 
of sustaining influence and control and enriching family members, causing bifurcated 
compensation that prefers more family employees. In contrast, in an individualist culture 
context, family businesses will attribute less importance to achieving socioemotional wealth 
goals of family enrichment and influence and control and more importance to family 
prominence, causing bifurcated compensation that prefers more non-family employees. (See 
also in Figure 18.) 
 
Figure 18 - Effect of individualist/collectivist national culture on direction bifurcation bias 
 
 
Source: (Samara et al., 2019, p. 7) 
 
In line with the finding of  Samara et al. (2019) in my review, there is only one conceptual 
paper, which focuses on family businesses in Chinese culture rather than in western culture. 
The study of Gatfield and Youseff (2001) discusses the traditional Chinese Family Business 
(CFB) and the associated Chinese Business Clan (CBC). The study examines both 
organizations in the areas of human resource management, employee motivation, employee 
performance appraisal, besides organizational structure and control, and power and authority. 
The Chinese Family Business is built on the foundation of Confucian values regarding family, 
education, work, social ethics, group conformity, and centralized authoritarian values, in which 




Members of CFB share a common culture, values, and goals, having friendly relations and 
consideration for one another rather than being competitive towards each other. The extended 
family is the basic economic unit and is also concerned as a collectivistic, familial, capitalist 
unit. The divisions among traditional work, leisure, and home life are either unclear or do not 
even exist. The majority of CFBs are relatively small and simple and tend to be relatively low 
in capital intensity and infrastructure. When the CFB grows beyond direct familial control and 
grows in size, complexity, and capital intensity, then it tends to adopt a CBC structure. When 
this happens, the family structure changes, even it remains the founding clan leaders and elders 
(Gatfield & Youseff, 2001). Chinese Business Clan is defined as “commercially oriented social 
enclaves, incorporating individuals and business groups that are obliged by powerful, 
noncontractual ties” (Gatfield & Youseff, 2001, p. 154). In this case, the family gives up its 
absolute power, and the organization has to hire and trust outsiders, who are often informally 
adopted as clan family members with trusting them in the decision making. 
Within CFBs, job specialization is usually unnecessary. While job rotation and adaptability are 
highly appreciated, employees are required to do any job-related tasks. Within CBCs, the 
principle of human resources management guarantees loyalty through the fraternization of the 
workforce to foster dedication, trustworthiness, and diligence. Both types of organizations share 
a common set of principles regarding motivation. These organizations hide employment 
payments in the case of both family and nonfamily members. As part of their familial duty as 
employees, family members of the CFB are often expected to work for nonmonetary 
compensation. They get remuneration indirectly, such as medical and education expenses. The 
motivation is mainly based on intrinsic elements and driven by a collectivist norm of the 
family’s overall future success and longevity. In the case of CFB, the importance of retaining 
and saving face leads to avoid straightforward confrontation on poor performance. Poor 
performance is handled carefully through indirect hints by supervisors. As a result of bifurcation 
bias, underperforming nonfamily employees who fail to improve their performance based on 
these hints get degraded or dismissed.  However, when family employees are poor performers 
and do not read the signals correctly are unlikely to be dismissed. 
On the other hand, good performers are compensated individually with incentive bonuses. 
Faithful work and personal history play a key role in evaluating individual performance based 
on the long-term orientation of the culture. Accordingly, an individual’s success or 
accomplishments are secondary to the overall objectives of the clan within CBC. Since 
dismissal reduces the human resources of the clan organization, members are not dismissed 
easily. Unlike the CFBs, CBC trusts its members more and allows for more errors on the 
condition of improvement.  However, if a clan member cannot manage to follow the three Cs 
of communication, consensus, and commitment and neglects to include and advise others, the 
member could receive a punishment that may lead to dismissal too. 
 
In an early quantitative study, Amba-Rao et al. (2000) aimed to compare performance appraisal 
practices and management values by firm ownership in another collectivist country, namely 
India. They argued that while using performance appraisal results for evaluative purposes, 
family businesses are less likely to discuss PA results openly with their employees. The authors 
also explained the relative lack of effective use and relevance of PA in India by a cultural and 
structural argument. Firstly, the cultural argument is based on the Hindu belief that an 
individual’s fate (karma), based on past actions in past lives, limits achievement and controls 
the possible outcomes, which means proactive actions to foster performance are ineffective. 
Secondly, the structural argument is based on the contemporary PA system-deficiency 
argument, that is that subjectivity and injustice embedded in the current PA system leads to a 
lack of reliance and trust in it.  In a qualitative study, Yujie Cai and Mingtian Yu (2013) 




between family and nonfamily employees in the implementation of HR practices? The authors 
examined HR practices, CEO succession, and the implementation of these HR practices in three 
small-sized family firms that originated from Taiwan and are currently operating in Shanghai, 
Mainland China. The research was based on semi-structured interviews and non-participant 
observation. 
As a result, Yujie Cai and Mingtian Yu (2013) argue that there is a preference for the “insiders,” 
including Taiwan employees, usually acting in the management („Taigans”), relatives, and 
employees who have worked for the CEO for many years. These “insiders” always receive 
more tolerance, which means they are forgiven easier and never punished. Even in extreme 
cases, the “insiders” only have a family talk with the CEO. However, the employees did not 
perceive this process as extremely unfair. That may be because employees from the “outsider” 
group do not expect a promotion based on merit in this size of a company(Yujie Cai & Mingtian 
Yu, 2013).  
 
The findings of Jennings, Dempsey, and James (2018), Daspit et al. (2018), and Samara et al. 
(2019) emphasize the complexity of bifurcated HR practices in family businesses and the 
contingencies that need to be taken into account in order to have a better understanding of the 
sources, direction, and consequences of bifurcated HR practices in family businesses.  
   
Implementation and communication of PM 
By conducting a single descriptive case study in a China-based family SME, Haslan et al. 
(2019) concluded that the performance management system was implemented differently from 
what was planned. Based on the process model by Nishii and Wright (2008), there is a 
difference between PM practice intended by HR and PM practice implemented later on by 
different line managers. Consequently, I argue that the presence of the family can influence PM 
through its implementation and communication. Accordingly, in this section, I highlight the 
possible variations in judgments of justice and fairness in a family business workplace (Samara 
& Paul, 2019); the mediating factors between planned bifurcated HR practices and work-related 
attitudes and behaviors (Jennings et al., 2018; Samara et al., 2019). 
 
The conceptions of justice and fairness have been applied interchangeably in the business ethic 
and the family business literature. Scholars claim that the two concepts are highly overlapping 
or even substitute for the same basic concept. They assume that the increase of justice will 
automatically translate into fairness perceptions. These claims are based on the assumption that 
all employees have a similar frame of reference for judging actions. However, they fail to 
consider the role of biased expectations, emotions, and family relations influencing employees’ 
ethical perceptions and fairness judgments in the workplace.  
In fact, justice and fairness are characterized as two distinct ethical norms: while justice simply 
refers to “adherence to rules of conduct”; fairness refers to “individuals’ moral evaluations of 
this conduct” (Goldman & Cropanzano, 2015b, p. 313), and thus it is a subjective perception 
of whether rules of conduct are ethical and fair (Goldman & Cropanzano, 2015b). 
 
The business ethics framework takes utilitarian justice as a foundational ethical principle. 
Utilitarian justice refers to adherence to rules of conduct that encourage impartial treatment and 
to the avoidance of practices or policies that show favoritism or discrimination. Fairness 
contains the idea of justice, but it can also be times when impartiality leads to unfairness 
(Goldman & Cropanzano, 2015b). Adhering to rules and regulations set up to reward employees 
based on their economic contributions can only lead to justice and fairness simultaneously in 
two cases. If a distinct separation between ownership and management exists (Colquitt et al., 




From a socioemotional wealth perspective, family-owned firms pursue not only economic goals 
but also socio-emotional goals related to the family. That means if rules and regulations are 
implemented to reward employees who contribute to economic goals while discriminating 
against employees who contribute to socioemotional goals, then even adherence to these rules 
of conduct will improve justice, it will violate fairness perceptions among family business 
employees in the same time. Because of this, Samara and Paul (2019) argue that the utilitarian 
conceptualization of justice may come into direct conflict with fairness perceptions in family 
businesses since justice measures will not automatically lead to fairness if socioemotional goals 
are also important; and an employee or a manager can be a family member as well.  
Samara and Paul (2019) suggest that family firms should not apply professionalization 
processes based on what is applicable to their non‐family counterpart. Instead, controlling 
family owners have to acknowledge that a family business is subject to a significantly different 
context than a non‐family business, and thus, they must try to establish justice measures that 
take into account both economic and socio-emotional goals. 
 
Samara and Paul (2019) discuss how incorporating socioemotional goals (i.e., high level of 
trust, commitment, and reciprocity) into rules and regulations, considered to assure justice, can 
increase fairness perceptions to establish an ethical workplace. 
  
According to Samara and Paul (2019), there are four possible variations in judgments of justice 
(high/low) and fairness (high/low) in a family business workplace, which can be seen in Table 
6. 
 
Table 6 - Possible variations in judgments of justice and fairness 
 High in fairness Low in fairness 
High in utilitarian 
justice 
Well regarded in both family and 
non‐family businesses, but difficult 
to achieve in the family business 
context due to the pursuit of 
socioemotional goals 
Controlling owners may extend 
preferential treatment to certain 
employees who are contributing to 
economic goals. These practices 
are objectively just but can 
subjectively be perceived as unfair 
due to socioemotional and family 
pragmatic considerations 
Low in utilitarian 
justice 
Controlling owners reward 
employees for their contributions to 
both economic and socio-emotional 
goals. These rewards are objectively 
unjust but 
employees may accept these 
practices as fair due to 
socioemotional and family 
pragmatic considerations 
Poorly regarded in both family and 
non‐family businesses 
Source: (Samara and Paul 2019:3) 
 
Samara and Paul (2019) compared the utilitarian and SEW approach along three dimensions, 
such as conceptualizing justice, fairness among family employees, and fairness between family 
and nonfamily employees.  
In the utilitarian approach, there is the assumption of justice that family members involved in 
the family business are simply employees. Family-owned businesses should be professionalized 
like their nonfamily-owned counterparts in a way that they implement practices without any 




and unfair. Ethical behavior involves establishing rules and regulations that honor contributions 
to simply economic goals. Only employees’ contributions to the inside company are taken into 
consideration. Kinship relations do not have an impact on how fairness is perceived among 
family employees. Fairness perceptions are interpreted based on who contributes more to 
achieving economic goals. Furthermore, family and non‐family employees with the same set of 
skills have to be rewarded equally.  
In contrast, in the socioemotional wealth approach, preferential treatment may be acceptable 
toward some employees who have more needs than others or who contribute to the family’s 
socio-emotional goals. Ethical behavior involves establishing rules and regulations that honor 
contributions either to socioemotional goals or to economic goals. Employees' contributions 
inside and outside the company are taken into consideration. Fairness perceptions are 
interpreted according to what the family considers as morally honorable. If a family member 
contributes more to socioemotional goals, he or she will also be rewarded for that.  
Controlling owners should communicate the family’s socioemotional goals openly and 
transparently. Besides this, they should extend privileged treatment to qualified family 
employees who contribute to the family’s socioemotional and economic goals. That can ease 
the information asymmetry between family and non‐family employees since all employees 
become conscious of the family’s socioemotional desires and of the rewards associated with 
fulfilling these desires. 
The authors emphasize that family businesses can incorporate socio-emotional goals in rules 
implemented to achieve justice among family employees. So that formal rules should focus on 
the following: communication and voice, clarity of process and information, consistency across 
people, and over time, changeability of decisions in case of unjust, and commitment to fairness. 
 
On the other hand, family businesses can also incorporate socio-emotional goals in rules 
designed to achieve justice between family and nonfamily employees. So that the fair process 
should consist of a pre‐requisite that family members must be committed to fairness and include 
four steps, such as 1) clearly explaining the expectations for entitlement; 2) giving equal 
opportunities to have a voice; 3) considering the correctability of the unfair decision; 4) 
consistently applying decisions over time and across people. 
 
The significance of Samara and Paul (2019)’s study is that it explains why family businesses 
operate based on many informal rules, procedures, and norms that form a fairness perception 
of their employees (Lansberg, 1989). 
 
In the study of a different form of bifurcated HR practices, Jennings, Dempsey, and James 
(2018) also made propositions regarding conditions under which the assumed dysfunctional 
consequences of asymmetric treatment of employees could be reduced. 
Jennings, Dempsey, and James (2018) extend Verbeke and Kano’s (2012) views on the 
outcomes of bifurcation bias by proposing that the dysfunctional implications for the work-
related attitudes and behaviors of family and nonfamily employees can be diminished through 
open communication and flexible negotiation by the family owners about the nature and 





Figure 19 - Contributing factors associated with bifurcation bias in the HR practices 
 
 
Source: (Jennings et al., 2018, pp. 73–74) 
 
In relation to performance appraisal practices of their review Jennings, Dempsey, and James 
(2018) highlight that family employees tend to receive less strict performance evaluations than 
non-family employees, while family employees found this kind of differential treatment 
unfavorable. Specifically, while performance appraisals of family CEOs are decoupled from 
business performance and risk (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001), family employees felt nonfamily 
executives were given more information in their appraisals. Thus nonfamily executives were 
more satisfied with the amount of feedback provided in appraisals (Poza et al., 1997). 
According to Kidwell et al. (2013), it is also crucial that family members are informed when 
they are not complying with the performance standards, and the next steps and clear 
expectations for further improvement should be set. If family members cannot be held 
accountable for their underperformance, the family firm leader will lose credibility. 
These findings were also in line with the evidence of the compensation practices, which were 
also mixed with respect to whether family or nonfamily employees tend to be treated 
preferentially in terms of compensation (Jennings et al., 2018) and also highlight the 
significance of open communication and flexible negotiation in the implementation phase of 
PM practices.  
 
Samara et al. (2019) focus on the antecedents and outcomes of bifurcated compensation and 
investigate when it favors family or nonfamily employees. Furthermore, they discuss how 
bifurcated compensation influences the work outcomes of the underprivileged group. They 
argue that types of nepotism and power distance of the national culture (Hofstede, 1984), which 
is one of the most studied dimensions in cultural research (Erez, 2011), have a moderating effect 
on the relationship between bifurcated compensation and the work inputs of the underprivileged 
group. 
Samara et al. (2019) suggest that if entitlement nepotism prevails, bifurcated compensation that 
treats family employees better will diminish nonfamily employees' contributions. Conversely, 
if reciprocal nepotism prevails, bifurcated compensation that treats nonfamily employees better 





Figure 20 - Moderating effect of nepotism types on the relationship of bifurcated HR 
compensation and employees’ work input 
 
 
Source: (Samara et al., 2019, p. 7) 
 
Furthermore, power distance moderates the negative relationship between bifurcated 
compensation practices preferring Fredos and nonfamily employees' work inputs, such that this 
relationship will be stronger in countries with low power distance cultures. On the other hand, 
power distance moderates the negative relationship between bifurcated compensation 
preferring nonfamily employees and qualified family employees' work outcomes, such that this 
relationship will be stronger in countries with high power distance cultures. (See in Figure 21) 
 
Figure 21 - Moderating effect of power distance on the relationship of bifurcated HR 
compensation and employees’ work input 
 
 
Source: (Samara et al., 2019, p. 7) 
 
The study of Sieger et al. (2011) gives more insight into the inner cognitive process of 




interaction of their line managers during the performance appraisal interview. Sieger et al. 
(2011) are the first scholars to both theoretically and empirically link nonfamily employees’ 
justice perceptions and ownership feelings in the family business context. They studied whether 
psychological ownership acts as a mediator in the relationships between justice perceptions 
(distributive and procedural) and common work attitudes, such as affective commitment and 
job satisfaction? The authors examined nonfamily employees’ justice perceptions in the 
appraisal interview context in family firms based on an analysis of a sample of 310 nonfamily 
employees from Germany and German-speaking Switzerland. As a result of their analysis, 
Sieger et al. (2011) pointed out that psychological ownership of nonfamily employees toward 
the family business mediates the relationships between distributive justice and affective 
commitment as well as job satisfaction. On the other hand, a fair process in the context of 
appraisal interviews is not able to generate ownership feelings, shows that nonfamily employees 
rather regard the superior responsible for justice and that this evaluation is not transmitted to 
the family firm organization overall. In line with the proposition of Erdogan (2002), rater 
procedural justice rather leads to Post-Appraisal LMX, which is less likely to have an effect on 
leader-related outcomes and performance-related behaviors than organizational outcomes. (See 
also in Figure 22). 
 




3.3.4. The effect of Performance Management on Perceived Justice  
As discussed earlier in Chapter 3.3.2 and Chapter 3.3.3, the systemic nature of the family firm 
- with its three spheres of family, business, and ownership - creates many opportunities for 
injustice. Van der Heyden, Blondel, and Carlock (2005) argue that there is the difficulty of any 
use of distributive justice to the family business system since different stakeholders will judge 
the fairness of particular results with very different criteria. Families and their members allocate 
resources based on need, shareholders of the family firm allocate resources based on equality, 
while managers and employees allocate resources based on merit. The different stakeholders 
will hardly come to an agreement on an entirely fair distributional outcome in a family business 
system. One solution may derive from principles of procedural justice that is from the degree 
of fairness of the process applied to resolve conflicting claims from various stakeholders in the 
family business system. Van der Heyden, Blondel, and Carlock (2005) developed a Dual 





Figure 23 - A Dual Characterization of Fair Process 
 
 
Source: (Van der Heyden et al., 2005, p. 8) 
 
According to this, the authors describe a fair process in family firms as a dual construct, 
including both a description of the steps explaining a decision-making process perceived as fair 
and five characteristics these steps must include. 
Firstly, the decision-making process consists of five iterative steps: (1) Framing and engaging, 
(2) Exploring and eliminating, (3) Deciding and explaining, (4) Implementing and executing, 
(5) Evaluating and learning. Below I introduce all the five steps in detail:  
(1) Framing and engaging: Framing the issue means that it should be examined what 
aspects are essential and what criteria along which outcomes can be measured. 
Furthermore, proper engagement of those involved is also essential early in the process 
in order to frame the decision and commit people to the resolution and the 
implementation of the outcome.  
(2) Exploring and eliminating: This second step refers to generating a list of available 
options and evaluating the implications. Relevant facts and uncertainties and their 
possible effects on the decision outcome should also be considered.  
(3) Deciding and explaining: The decision should be selected at some point that ends the 
exploration phase. If the stakeholders are kept informed, they are more likely to become 
satisfied. Expectations are also set regarding the effective execution of the decisions 
made. 
(4) Implementing and executing: after the decision was made, it is crucial how decisions 
were implemented.   
(5) Evaluating and learning: The evaluation is an integral part of the decision-making 
process since learning cannot be over time, improvement will be limited, and it is more 
likely that mistakes may be repeated otherwise  (Van der Heyden et al., 2005).  
Secondly, there are five main criteria, which are essential to the effectiveness of the fair process 
in family firms, such as (1) communication and voice, (2) clarity of information, process, and 
expectations, (3) consistency across people, over time, and with agreed values and norms, (4) 
changeability of decisions, process, goals, and principles, (5) commitment to fairness. 
(1) Communication and voice: As the first principle of fairness in decision-making 
processes includes giving voice to those concerned in order that their views are 
represented (Leventhal, 1980). In the case of family businesses, the involvement of the 
younger generations is essential. Members evolve from a parent-child relationship to a 
family of adults. As a result, the younger generation should be allowed to express their 
ideas freely and experience family interactions based on fairness and mutual respect. 




(2) Clarity of information, process, and expectations: Fair process requires clarity, and 
clarity fosters fairness. Clarity does not only mean the accuracy of information 
(Leventhal, 1980) but includes explanations and expectations (Kim & Mauborgne, 
2003), as well as clarification of entitlement (Lansberg, 1989). There is a need to clarify 
individual, family, and management expectations in a way that includes every 
participant in the family business system to establish a shared understanding of goals 
and potential areas of conflict.  
(3) Consistency across people, over time, and with agreed values and norms: Consistency 
is not just an ethical requirement of the procedure across people and across time with 
values and norms, but the suppression of bias by decision-makers and the participants. 
In other words, in management, “walking the talk” needs actions to be in line with 
espoused intent. In the family business context, there is a strong need for consistency 
across individuals within the family and within the business (e.g., family vs. non-family 
employees) in line with the family-firm principles. Talented family members from the 
younger generations hope that their careers be developed due to their competence and 
achievement evaluated by the same performance standards and reviews applied with 
nonfamily members.  
(4) The changeability of decisions, processes, goals, and principles: Changeability refers 
to the family’s need to change previous agreements to reflect existing family values and 
interests better and current business needs. A unique challenge of a family business is 
that family lifecycle events (e.g., birth, death, or divorce) can lead to discontinuities for 
the firm all of a sudden. Examining and changing ownership or employment 
agreements, as well as past rules made by older generations, is a critical need for the 
new generations to perceive fairness.  
(5) Commitment to fairness: Fair process can be seen as a relative concept rather than 
absolute since, in practice, fairness can only be aimed at, never fully achieved. A 
systemic commitment to the practice of a fair process is the most effective way to 
prevent any tendency toward a mechanical application of the requirements. Moreover, 
family culture foster a strong sense of ethicality and family identity that is also 
consistent with the value of fairness (Van der Heyden, Blondel, and Carlock 2005).  
 
Van der Heyden, Blondel, and Carlock (2005) underline that improved performance derived 
from fair process practices justify these practices, making stakeholders demand even more 
procedural justice in the future. That establishes the positively reinforcing cycle of a fair 
process. In contrast, an absence of fair process has precisely the opposite effect: In contrast, 
violations in the long-term can lead to retributive justice, where employees take revenge on 
those they hold responsible for their perceptions of unfairness. This revenge may far surpass 
the degree of the original unfairness. 
 
Samara et al. (2017) suggest that a combination of equality and equity should be in place in the 
family business in order to ensure fairness between family and nonfamily employees. 
Accordingly, they propose four steps and a prerequisite as a possible solution. In contrast to 
Van der Heyden et al. (2005), the authors pointed out that they understand the commitment to 
fairness to be a prerequisite rather than a final step. Table 7 shows the steps by which a family 





Table 7 - A fair process in the family business 
 
Source: (Samara & Arenas, 2017, p. 651) 
Furthermore, Samara et al. (2017) also argue that promoting fairness does not require equal 
treatment of family and nonfamily employees regardless of their contributions. Instead, equal 
opportunities and equitable practices should be established. 
In an integrative review about justice in the family firms, Marler et al. (2019) pointed out 
methodological difficulties of distinguishing reliable and valid measures for justice-related 
constructs and also family influence. Firstly, scholars still need to define what constitutes family 
membership and how family members should be identified the best. Defining justice often 
includes comparisons of treatment between individuals (Colquitt, 2001). In the family firm 
context, nonfamily employees may make these comparisons with individuals in the family 
group. However, it is difficult to determine which “family” is the reference group for a non-
family employee. Family members’ perceptions of justice are affected by two systems, such as 
the family and the firm systems, but nonfamily employees are only affected by one system, 
which is the firm. While family members may share a common bond and vision for the firm, 
they may differ in their features and justice perceptions. That is why Marler et al. (2019) argue 
that one useful approach is to conduct research by including various family respondents in our 




3.3.5. The effect of family Influence on Perceived Justice of PM  
As discussed before in Chapter 3.3.3, Kidwell et al. (2018) made propositions focusing on the 
genesis and how negative family influence is imprinted on the family subsystem as well as 
propositions related to entitlement and parental altruism that discussed how family influence 
might have an effect on HRM practices, including performance appraisal. Besides this, Kidwell 
et al. (2018) also highlighted how family influence might have an effect on the perceived justice 
of HRM practices through a sense of injustice in the family culture. According to this, Kidwell 
et al. (2018) proposed that families imprinted with a sense of injustice are likely to distort and 
reject HRM practices, thus promoting dysfunctional behaviors in the family firm (R. E. Kidwell 




In this chapter, I describe in detail the possible moderating and mediating effects of different 
types of family influence on perceived justice of performance management that are discussed 
in the family business literature.  
Moderating effect of controlling owner’s self-control 
Lubatkin et al. (2007) pinpoint a contingent role played by self-control of the controlling owners 
at family businesses by examining what the differential effects of the controlling owners’ self-
control are on the justice perceptions of the family and nonfamily employees. By doing so, 
Lubatkin et al. (2007) also highlighting how family firms’ owners’ justice decision-making for 
family and nonfamily employees provides a clearer understanding of family governance.  
They stated that violations of procedural and distributive justice are positively associated with 
the firm’s agency costs. 
Regarding procedural justice in the case of both family and nonfamily employees, they suggest 
that the level of family firm owners’ self-control moderates the relationship between their 
parental altruism and the probability that some employees will perceive a violation of any of 
the six procedural justice rules. Such that the relationship is positive at lower levels of self-
control and harmful at higher levels. In this proposition, however, they also underline that the 
family employees’ perceptions of procedural injustice are based on a different set of logic than 
non-family employees’ perceptions. Family members’ justice perceptions are open-ended and 
unmetered. That means that there is no exact standard and timing for reciprocity among family 
members. They accept that family member specific needs might bias procedural decisions in 
the given moment as the positive effect of parental altruism. This kind of reciprocity among 
family members represents a family norm and is viewed within limits as being both fair and 
just. Therefore, Lubatkin et al. (2007) suggest that family employees are likely to have a broad 
zone of indifference, and they will perceive cases as unfair when the controlling owner's 
behavior exceeds the boundaries of their zone.   
By contrast, nonfamily employees’ relationships with controlling owners are less characterized 
by altruism. Their perceptions of procedural injustice are more close-ended and metered. It is 
also more driven by the logic of equal treatment and by the duty to reciprocate in kind and/or 
in proportion to the value of their contribution to the family firm’s goal.  
However, they willingly joined a family-owned company, and thus, they expect family 
employees to receive preferential treatment. On the other hand, at some point, controlling 
owners’ behavior can also exceed their personal zone of indifference. As Lubatkin et al. (2007) 
stated, self-control could moderate this association. The more controlling owners are able to 
restrain their altruistic impulses, the less likely it is that their behavior will exceed the non-
family employees’ zone, and, thus, it is the more likely that these nonfamily employees perceive 
the procedures as fair. 
 
Regarding distributive justice, in the case of family employees, they propose that the level of 
controlling owners’ self-control moderates the relationship between their parental altruism and 
the probability that some family employees will perceive a violation of any of the three 
distribution rules. Such that the relationship is positive at lower levels of self-control and 
negative at higher levels.  
The reason behind this because three distributive justice rules (e.g., equity, equality, and need) 
are not entirely independent, and engaging in one rule will lead to the violation of the other two. 
In the absence of consistent self-control, parental altruism can effect family business owners to 
reject the adoption and application of a single allocation rule and instead vacillate between these 
three rules, depending on which need appears most salient to them in that given situation. Even 
a certain degree of vacillation is acceptable for family employees since they understand the 




difference of preferences among family members can cause jealousy and the violation of 
fairness.    
Regarding distributive justice, in the case of nonfamily employees, they propose that the level 
of controlling owners’ self-control moderates the relationship between their parental altruism 
and the probability that some nonfamily employees perceive a violation of the relative equality 
distribution rule. Such that the relationship is positive at lower levels of self-control and 
negative at higher levels. This is based on the argument of Lubatkin et al. (2007). That means 
those nonfamily employees working willingly for family firms somewhat possess different 
distributive justice expectations than those working for nonfamily firms. That is why Lubatkin 
et al. (2007) suggest that the rule of ‘relative equality’ is a better fit to family firms context 
since by accepting employment nonfamily, employees should accept the unequal treatment as 
fair, as long as the degree of the inequality does not exceed their zone of indifference.  
Figure 24 shows the moderating effect of the owner’s self-control on the relationship between 
parental altruism and distributive and procedural justice.  
 
Figure 24 - The moderating effect of controlling owner’s self-control on the relationship 




Fredo effect and the mediating effect of parental altruism 
As a consequence, when Fredos get away with behaviors that nonfamily employees cannot, 
nonfamily employees perceive injustice. That can cause withdrawal from the firm or 
engagement in similar types of damaging dysfunctional behavior. Ironically, the dysfunctional 
behavior of a Fredo can create additional feelings of guilt on the part of the leader and thus can 
foster even more parental altruism (see also in Figure 25). 
 
 







Effect of nepotism 
Firfiray et al. (2018) focus on why some owners are more likely to engage in nepotism than 
others. They also explain the contingencies under which nepotism may prove beneficial or 
harmful for firms, furthermore how specific human resources practices interact with 
environmental contingencies to influence the relationship between nepotism and performance.  
Their study is mainly built on contingency theory (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967), social-emotional 
wealth theory (SEW) (Cruz et al., 2011), nepotism (Jaskiewicz et al., 2013), and the recent 
concept of “mixed gambles” (Bromiley, 2009). However, the authors narrowed down the 
definition of nepotism to that it is the hiring of family managers within the top management 
teams (TMTs) at family businesses.  
The authors applied contingency theory and examined the effect of two environmental 
characteristics, such as environmental uncertainty and institutional environment, on the 
relationship between nepotism and firm performance.  
According to them, there are positive and negative outcomes associated with nepotism. So that 
family firm owners are most probably consider nepotism as a “mixed gamble” in which they 
would have to weigh the possible gains and losses of the practice of nepotism in financial and 
socioemotional terms in tandem. Firfiray et al. (2018) proposed that family involvement may 
have a positive effect on company performance in case it supports circumstances in which 
specific HR practices ensure fairness toward nonfamily employees. These practices contain 
fairer HR policies regarding employee development, employee participation, and motivation 
(including performance appraisals, performance-related payment, and other incentives). While 
these practices may still prefer family members, they would also make sure to include 
mechanisms that protect the interest of nonfamily employees at the same time. 
They argue that family owners who emphasize the “family influence and control” and “renewal 
of family bonds” dimensions of SEW will show a higher propensity to engage in nepotism. 
That is also in line with the single descriptive case study in a China-based family SME of Haslan 
et al. (2019). They found that nonfamily employees felt a sense of injustice stemmed from the 
owner’s involvement and nepotistic attitude. However, family owners who emphasize the 
“family identification” dimension of SEW will display a lower propensity to engage in 
nepotism (see also in Figure 26). 
 
Figure 26 - Effect of different dimensions of SEW on nepotism 
 
 
They also suggest that nepotism will be more positively related to performance in industries 
with a higher degree of environmental uncertainty and in countries with weak institutional 




Figure 27 - Effect of country-specific and industrial contextual factors on nepotism 
 
However, they also highlighted that the application of individual pay-for-performance would 
more strongly decrease the positive effect of nepotism on performance in family firms operating 
in industries with a higher degree of environmental uncertainty relative to industries with a 
lower degree of environmental uncertainty. (See also in Figure 28) 
Figure 28 - Moderating effect of individual pay for performance 
 
Incentive payments may be more dominant in uncertain environments, whereas in stable 
environments, it is easier for companies to allocate specific duties to their people and then 
monitor their efforts. In firms operating within uncertain environments, the management 
function of monitoring is highly challenging. Thus, employers are likely to transfer some of the 
risks they face to their employees. Firfiray et al. (2018) suggest that these practices will be 
perceived as more unfair within these family firms with a tendency of nepotism because the 
employees have little or no control over their performance.  
 
Effect of family vision on procedural justice climate 
Barnett, Long, and Marler (2012a) examined the impact of family vision and exchange systems 
on the procedural justice climate among nonfamily managers in the succession process by using 
two poles of the continuum of family influence, such as “weak” and “strong” family vision. 
They suggested that family involvement with a weak family vision will be associated with 
restricted exchanges in dominant coalitions, which will hurt the procedural justice climate 
among nonfamily managers. They argue that the weak family vision and restricted exchange 
systems of the dominant coalition probably promote decision processes that are inconsistent 
with procedural justice norms but instead reflect the short-term, direct, egoistic exchanges 




That means that unjust decision processes are more likely to occur, which are fraught with 
pitfalls of favoritism, asymmetric altruism, shirking, and free riding. That may be aggravated 
by the reluctance of family firms to establish formalized human resources decision processes 
that might protect procedurally just norms (Barnett and Kellermanns 2006a). On the contrary, 
family involvement with a strong family vision will be accompanied by generalized exchange, 
which should positively affect the procedural justice climate among nonfamily managers. In 
their study, the authors also assume that the extent to which nonfamily managers work to 
support or hinder succession in the family will be affected by their collective perception of a 
positive or negative procedural justice climate (Barnett, Long, and Marler 2012a). (See in 
Figure 29.) 
 
Figure 29 - Effect of family vision on procedural justice climate among nonfamily managers 
 
 
Although researchers have conceptualized individual-level justice constructs into agency-based 
or behavioral models of the family firm (Barnett and Kellermanns 2006a; Lubatkin, Ling, and 
Schulze 2007; Lubatkin et al. 2005), this is the first study, which considered the importance of 
the procedural justice climate in family firms. 
However, there is some limitation of this conceptual study. Firstly, the measurement of family 
vision, exchange systems, and procedural justice climate can be challenging in future related 
researches. Secondly, its implication is restricted to nonfamily managers, excluding many vital 
workforces of family firms. Larger family firms have multiple departments, managers, and 
work units, which could experience multiple justice climates, depending on the unique 
interactions of the dominant coalition and work unit members. 
 
 
3.3.6. Research gaps and future research questions 
In the past decades, human resource management has received increasing attention in family 
business literature. However, HRM remains understudied in the family business context. 
The study of Hoon et al. (2019) indicates a positive impact of HR practices on firm performance 
and identifies HR systems as a result of firm size or contextual conditions. Most of the studies 
are built on the assumption that positive performance implications in family firms are closely 
associated with the application of HRM, as well as with the need for professionalizing HR 
systems. Hoon et al. (2019) outline future directions for human resource management research 
in the family business, such as the influence of the owning family on human resource 
orientation, nonfamily employees as HR recipients, and the role of HR professionals in 
implementing human resource management.  
 
There is a lack of research on family influence on perceived justice in a process-based view; 
and how the presence of family influences the perceived justice through performance 
management and appraisal system. Both family business and HRM research have a lack of 




environment context. We have limited knowledge and understanding of how the different 
stakeholders interact with each other and how and why controlling families and their family 
members choose different ways to have an impact on perceived justice and fairness through PM 
processes.    
 
3.3.7. Conceptual Framework 
After this, I discuss the conceptual framework generated from the systematic literature review 
I completed. The conceptual framework stemmed from the adoption of two partly modified 
models:  1) the process model of PM (Farndale et al., 2011; Nishii & Wright, 2008) and 2) the 
model of Barnett and Kellermanns (2006) describing family influence on perceived justice 
directly and indirectly through HRM practices. However, I also banked the framework on the 
propositions made by Erdogan (2002). 
 
The presence of family can influence perceived justice and its employee’s reactions through the 
process of Performance Management in different ways. I discuss the conceptual framework 
with the propositions in the following structure. On the one hand, I highlight 1) the effect of 
family influence on PM (Proposition 1, 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d); 2) the effect of PM on perceived justice 
(Proposition 2); and 3) the effect of family influence on perceived justice of PM (Proposition 
3a, 3b,3c). Second, I point out that there is 4) an impact of the family business system on the 
family system as the consequence of family employees' and managers' perception of fairness 
through the performance management and appraisal processes (Proposition 4, 4a, 4b). Finally, 
I depict other elements of the framework, such as the inner cognitive processing of the 












1) The effect of Family influence on Performance Management 
 
Family business scholars have already identified many sources of family influence that have a 
direct effect on the perceived justice of PM. That includes the level of family involvement 
(Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006); weak” and “strong” family vision (Barnett et al., 2012); 
nepotism (Firfiray et al., 2018); entitlement  (R. E. Kidwell et al., 2018), injustice based on 
different distribution norms (Van der Heyden et al., 2005), parental altruism (R. E. Kidwell et 
al., 2013, 2013; Lubatkin, Ling, et al., 2007); parent-child relationship (R. E. Kidwell et al., 
2013); flexibility and cohesion of family (Daspit et al., 2018); boundary permeability of family 
owners (Jennings et al., 2018); controlling owners’ self-control (Lubatkin, Ling, et al., 2007) 
and biological discrimination of the family owners (Jennings et al., 2018); Fredo effect (R. 
Kidwell et al., 2012; R. E. Kidwell et al., 2013).  
There are three lenses of the PM process model applied by Farndale, Hope-Hailey, and Kelliher 
(2011), based on the SHRM framework of Nishii and Wright (2008): 
(1a) Intended PM practice as planned by family owners and embedded in written procedures 
and documents;  
(1b) Actual PM practice as enacted and implemented by different family and nonfamily 
managers; 
(1c) Family and nonfamily employee’s experience and perception of the PM practice regardless 
of the original intentions based on communication and social exchange with the line- and top 
management.  
Besides this, (1d) the presence of family influences the possible organizational outcome of 
perceived justice of performance management practice through coordination. 
Proposition 1 
The presence of family has an impact on the antecedents and consequences of perceived 
justice of performance management practice of family and nonfamily employees in four 
ways: planning, implementation, communication, and coordination.  
 
1a) The effect of family influence on intended PM practice 
Imprinting mechanism 
Based on the framework of Simsek et al. (2015), a negative manifestation of imprinting in the 
family subsystem may transfer to the family business to affect PM practices. Accordingly, the 
potentially negative behaviors and values, such as entitlement and parental altruism, may be 
imprinted on the family subsystem (genesis). Then, these learned behaviors and values transfer 
to the family firm subsystem and may permeate into the organizational culture in which the 
family values are imprinted on the organization, such as PM systems and the employees 
connected to it (metamorphosis). (R. E. Kidwell et al., 2018) Kidwell et al. (2018) proposed 
that families imprinted with a sense of entitlement are less likely to use formalized PM practices 
for family employees than for nonfamily employees. That could meanwhile, nonfamily 
employees are subject to the performance appraisals, family employees hardly participated in 
these practices. Additionally, families imprinted with strong parental altruism are likely to 




altruistic parents seldom give constructive feedbacks and reviews to monitor and discipline 
their children, causing them to misperception about their poor performance.  
 
Bifurcation  
Bifurcation bias as an effect of family firm professionalization arises when this kind of unequal 
treatment is economically inefficient for the family firm but remains uncorrected in the long 
run. Bifurcation bias occurs as an asymmetric treatment of family and nonfamily employees 
within PM that manifests through organizational-level HR managerial practices systematically 
and by default (Verbeke & Kano, 2012). The model of  Jennings, Dempsey, and James (2018) 
enrich the conceptualization of Barnett and Kellermanns (2006) by providing a set of more 
specific constructs, such as the concepts of weak versus strong family-favored bifurcation, weak 
versus strong nonfamily-favored bifurcation, and bivalent bifurcation PM practices. They also 
propose that owning family characteristics, such as biological discrimination by the owner and 
family boundaries, contribute to the various forms of bifurcation. Depending on the level of 
biological discrimination, PM practices are more likely to exhibit (strong or weak) family-
favored bifurcation than no bifurcation, bivalent bifurcation, or (strong or weak) nonfamily-
favored bifurcation. Family owners who exhibit greater selective attachment to their family 
employees tend to establish stronger family-favored bifurcated PM practices. Concerning 
family boundaries, PM practices are likely to show either bivalent or no bifurcation when the 
owners collectively have a more open than a closed view of the family boundary. (Jennings et 
al., 2018)  
In contrast to Verbeke and Kano (2012), Jennings, Dempsey, and James (2018) argue that PM 
practices likely cause some degree of resentment on behalf of both family and nonfamily 
employees due to being treated in a non-differentiated way. Thus, they propose that the 
elimination of bifurcated HR practices will cause attitudinal and behavioral reactions from 
family and nonfamily employees that are dysfunctional for the family business's performance. 
 
Formalization 
Many researchers highlighted the significance of formalization of both performance 
management processes (R. E. Kidwell et al., 2013; van der Merwe, 2009; van der Merwe et al., 
2012) and other management coordination mechanisms related to linking individual 
performance to performance at the organizational level (R. Kidwell et al., 2012; van der Merwe, 
2009).  
Kidwell et al. (2013) suggested that Fredos should be held to the same standards as nonfamily 
employees regarding performance appraisal practices to support formalization and hinder 
bifurcation bias. The work of family employees should be reviewed and monitored, and detailed 
performance review records should be kept. In the case of family leaders, they should not be 
the sole person to conduct performance appraisals. Instead, they should include nonfamily 
employees and consider anonymous 360-degree performance appraisals fostering objectivity in 
the review process. A formal appraisal process can foster a culture with merit and diminish any 
sense of entitlement that family members may feel. 
Some researchers emphasize that the interaction between formal and informal PM practices 
could cause additive, synergistic and substitutive effects, with one alternative excluding the 
other  (Delery, 1998; Pittino et al., 2016).  (Pittino et al., 2016). However, other scholars argue 
that effective HR practices should be balanced between formal and informal PM practices 
(Haslan et al., 2019; Mustafa et al., 2018). That also reflects the good balance between 
instrumental governance mechanisms focusing on a monitoring approach and normative 
mechanisms focusing on collaborative efforts among family and nonfamily employees 




formal PM management practices to reduce the perception of procedural injustice and nepotism 
(Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006), investments in formalized PM beyond a certain level would 
actually just be redundant, since there are informal mechanisms stemmed from the family 
influence can act as substitutes of various formal ones, such as strong family vision with 
generalized trust-based social exchange and leader-employees exchanges.    
Daspit et al. (2018) give more explanation of the family-related antecedents of formalization of 
PM-related practices by applying the family systems theory and Circumplex Model of Marital 
and Family System (D. H. Olson et al., 1979). 
Daspit et al. (2018) describe that the structure of a family system has an impact on the structure 
and effectiveness of the family business system. Thus, an unbalanced family structure 
characterized by two dimensions (i.e., cohesion and flexibility) can lead to a form of bifurcation 
bias or the asymmetric treatment of family and nonfamily employees via PM practices. The 
argument of Samara and Paul (2019) explains why family businesses operate based on many 
informal rules, procedures, and norms that form the fairness perception of their employees. 
(Lansberg, 1989) 
 
Proposition 1a  
The presence of family affects planned performance management in terms of the level 
of bifurcation and formalization.  
 
1b) The effect of family influence on actual PM practice  
Performance management systems are usually implemented differently from what has been 
planned initially (Haslan et al., 2019). 
Based on the process model by Nishii and Wright (2008), there is a difference between PM 
practice intended by top management and PM practice implemented later on by different family 
and nonfamily line managers. Consequently, I argue that the presence of the family can 
influence PM through its implementation and communication. Nonfamily and family line 
managers act as an interpreter of formal practices and influence informal PM processes 
(Schleicher et al., 2018). That offers the possibility that the execution may vary from what was 
intended by top management to what is experienced by employees (Nishii & Wright, 2008) 
since how they are implemented may be formed by line managers themselves.  
 
Family businesses may hire trusted nonfamily managers from their social network that may 
mitigate the assumed conflicts of interest among family and nonfamily employees. The pursuit 
of socioemotional goals at the family level fosters the quality of the social exchange with 
nonfamily managers. Thus, family-owned businesses are more likely to create a more robust 
reciprocal stewardship culture. Nonfamily managers may have pro-organizational behavior. 
Thus, their goals are not as divergent from the family firm owner’s goals compared to their non-
family counterparts. They may also prefer less formal and less bureaucratic structures that 
family firms can provide. Family firms may choose to establish less formalized PM systems 
with the possibility of more uncertainty and conflicts of interest rather than formalize their 
governance because of the negative impact formalization might have on their organizational 
culture (Stewart & Hitt, 2012). In case of coordination, they compensate their less formalized, 
bureaucratic system with a more robust organizational culture with focusing on long-term 
orientation and goal alignment and with a high level of social exchange and communications. 
Consequently, family businesses may put more emphasis on recruiting, selecting, and 




Besides the significance of the line manager-employee relationship, family businesses with 
high trust in controlling family owners and top management have both higher levels of 
commitment. They indicate a more reliable link between employee perceptions of fair treatment 
by their line managers during performance appraisal and organizational commitment  (Farndale 
& Kelliher, 2013). In line with this, Jennings, Dempsey, and James (2018) argue that 
dysfunctional implications for the work-related attitudes and behaviors of family and nonfamily 
employees can be diminished. Family owners can do this by open communication and flexible 
negotiation about the nature and rationale for asymmetric PM policies and practices planned 
and implemented previously. 
 
Proposition 1b 
The presence of family influences the actual performance management practice through 
line-managers’ implementation, leading to more efficient informal PM practices. 
 
 
1c) The effect of family influence on perceived/experienced PM practice 
As discussed before, Samara and Paul (2019) differentiate justice and fairness as two distinct 
ethical norms. Justice refers to “adherence to rules of conduct”; fairness refers to “individuals’ 
moral evaluations of this conduct” (Goldman & Cropanzano, 2015b, p. 313), and thus it is a 
subjective perception of whether rules of conduct are ethical and fair (Goldman & Cropanzano, 
2015b). From a socioemotional wealth perspective, family-owned businesses pursue not only 
economic goals but also noneconomic, socioemotional goals related to the family. That means 
if rules and regulations are implemented to evaluate and reward employees who contribute to 
economic goals while discriminating against employees who contribute to socio-emotional 
goals. Even adherence to these rules of conduct will improve justice. It will violate fairness 
perceptions among family employees at the same time. Thus, the scholars argue that the 
utilitarian conceptualization of justice may come into direct conflict with fairness perceptions 
in family businesses. Since justice measures will not automatically lead to fairness at family 
business, where socioemotional goals are also important and where in addition an employee or 
a manager can be a family member as well. Controlling family owners have to acknowledge 
and be vocal about that a family business is subject to significantly different context than a non‐
family business and thus they must establish justice measures that take into account both 
economic and socioemotional goals. 
 
Proposition 1c 
The presence of family influences the experienced/perceived performance management 
practice through its communication by top and line-managers that leads to more 
efficient informal PM practices.  
 
 
1d) The effect of family influence on the outcome of PM practice 
The formalization of other management mechanisms, including organizational structure, 
defining teams, delegating team tasks, the scope of authority, and division of responsibilities, 
are positively related to performance at the organization level by channeling individual work-
related attitudes and behaviors effectively to company performance. Researchers emphasize the 
importance of setting clear policies for family member employment, formal job description, 
and rules and expectations (R. Kidwell et al., 2012) and performance measurement and 
performance-based compensation before the family members join the family firm (van der 






The presence of family influences the possible outcome of perceived justice of 
performance management through coordination, such as defining organizational 




2) The effect of PM practice on perceived justice 
In family businesses, the different stakeholders have difficulty coming to an agreement on an 
entirely fair distributional outcome in the family business system. A possible solution may 
derive from principles of procedural justice that is from the degree of fairness of the process 
applied to resolve conflicting claims from various stakeholders in the family business system 
(Van der Heyden et al., 2005). According to Van der Heyden, Blondel, and Carlock (2005), a 
fair process in family firms as a dual construct including both a description of the steps 
explaining a decision-making process perceived as fair and five characteristics these steps must 
include. Firstly, the decision-making process consists of five iterative steps: (1) Framing and 
engaging, (2) Exploring and eliminating, (3) Deciding and explaining, (4) Implementing and 
executing, (5) Evaluating and learning. Secondly, there are five main criteria, which are 
essential to the effectiveness of the fair process in family firms, such as (1) communication and 
voice, (2) clarity of information, process, and expectations, (3) consistency across people, over 
time, and with agreed values and norms, (4) changeability of decisions, process, goals, and 
principles, (5) commitment to fairness. 
Samara et al. (2017) suggest that a combination of equality and equity should be in place in the 
family business in order to ensure fairness between family and nonfamily employees. 
Accordingly, they propose four steps and a prerequisite as a possible solution. In contrast to 
Van der Heyden et al. (2005), the authors pointed out that they understand the commitment to 
fairness to be a prerequisite rather than a final step.  
Additionally, Barnett, Long, and Marler (2012a) highlighted the relevance of the procedural 
justice climate in family firms by focusing on a shared justice perception by nonfamily 
employees group members. 
Regarding particularly interactional justice, which comprises two components: informational 




By differentiating between the two concepts of justice and fairness, family firm leaders 
pursue to achieve a high level of fairness rather than a high level of justice among family 
and nonfamily employees in the PM processes.      
 
 
3) The effect of family Influence on Perceived justice of PM  
Despite the significant amount of theoretical and empirical research about the different forms 
of family influence, the antecedence and consequences, as well as the nature of their 
relationship, remains unclear. The various forms of family influence may interact with each 
other in various ways. One type of family influence may have a mediator or moderator effect 
in the relationship between perceived justice and another type of family influence. By looking 
at the drivers of the Fredo effect, Fredos can occur for many reasons under numerous 




negative parent-child relationship, and permissive parenting style, rivalry among siblings, 
parental altruism, and the differing norms between the family and business domain.  (R. E. 
Kidwell et al., 2013) 
Lubatkin et al. (2007) propose the moderating effect of controlling the owner’s self-control on 
the relationship between parental altruism and distributive and procedural justice. When Fredos 
get away with behaviors that nonfamily employees cannot, nonfamily employees perceive 
injustice, which can cause withdrawal from the firm or engagement in similar types of 
damaging dysfunctional behavior. However, this dysfunctional behavior of a Fredo can create 
additional feelings of guilt on the part of the leader and thus can foster an even more parental 
altruistic attitude, which becomes a mediating effect of Fredo in this way. Barnett, Long, and 
Marler (2012a) suggested that family involvement with a weak family vision will be connected 
with restricted exchanges in dominant coalitions, which will harm the procedural justice climate 
among nonfamily managers. Family involvement with a strong family vision will go together 
with a generalized exchange, which should positively affect the procedural justice climate 
among nonfamily managers. Research also shows that family firms with “family influence and 
control” and “renewal of family bonds” dimensions of SEW will show a higher propensity to 
engage in nepotism (Firfiray et al., 2018; Haslan et al., 2019). Family owners who emphasize 
the “family identification” dimension of SEW will display a lower propensity to engage in 
nepotism (Firfiray et al., 2018). 
 
Proposition 3a  
Family Influence has a direct effect on the perceived justice of Performance 
Management. 
Proposition 3b 
The various sources of family influence may interact with each other so that one source 
of family influence may have a moderator effect in the relationship between another 
source of family influence and perceived justice of Performance Management. 
 
Proposition 3c 
The various sources of family influence may interact with each other so that one source 
of family influence may have a mediator effect in the relationship between another 
source of family influence and perceived justice of Performance Management. 
 
 
4) The impact of the family business system on the family system  
The structural features (such as the scope of authority and division of responsibilities) and the 
level of formalization and clarity of policies can determine the possible extent of the Fredo 
effect and paternal altruism later on in the next performance appraisal phase. That is why 
succession in management can have an impact on the family influence on the future of 
performance management and appraisal systems regarding all dimensions of SEW. The 
possible successors may take charge of implementation or modification of performance 
management and appraisal system, which also helps them to demonstrate their competence 
(Sundaramurthy, 2008). However, they may have their own experience about setting goals, 
monitoring performance, and receiving feedbacks and reviews both in the family business 
system and in the family. Successors and family members may initiate talks and discussions 
about the evaluation of performance both in the family and the family business systems. 




likely to initiate an effective re-imprinting process that can cause positive changes in HRM 
practices. That indicates that the change in management and ownership structure gives a 
possibility to create practices and behaviors that re-imprint the family firm with new cultural 
elements that lead to more effective performance appraisal practices, which are more 
formalized and transparent.  
 
Proposition 4 
A family business system has an impact on the family system as a consequence of family 
employees’ and managers’ perception of fairness through the performance management 




A family business system has an impact on the family system as a consequence of family 




A family business system has an impact on the family system as a consequence of family 
employees’ and managers’ perception of fairness through the performance management 
and appraisal processes indirectly by modification of coordination mechanisms (e.g., 




Other elements of the conceptual framework 
Cognitive processing of participants   
 
Employees’ perceptions of HR practices and processes are likely antecedents of employee 
reactions (attitudes and behaviors). Employees have different information processing schemas, 
motivations, values, attitudes, experiences, personality, and demographic backgrounds to bear 
on their perceptions and interpretations of, as well as reactions to organizational situations and 
experiences, such as the actual PM practices (Farndale et al., 2011; Farndale & Kelliher, 2013; 
Nishii & Wright, 2008). 
Professionalization may create two distinct groups of employees: family and nonfamily 
employees (Cruz et al., 2011). Family and nonfamily employees as recipients of performance 
management and appraisal practices, whose perceptions and responses to these practices are 
essential. (Combs et al., 2018; Gagné et al., 2014; Hoon et al., 2019). Because of the systemic 
nature of the family businesses, family and nonfamily employees are likely to assess the fairness 
of particular outcomes with very different criteria. Whereas families and their members tend to 
allocate resources based on need, nonfamily managers and employees tend to allocate firm 
resources based on merit and performance systems (Van der Heyden et al., 2005). However, 
there may be various distributional norms not just between family and nonfamily employees 
but among family employees based on their contributions.  Depending on their family firm 
position, it is also possible that some family employees may feel like being part of the outsider 
group, while other non-family employees may feel like being part of the more trusted insider 
group (Gatfield & Youseff, 2001; Lind & Tyler, 1988). Additionally, the relevance of the 
procedural justice climate in family firms as a shared justice perception by different groups can 




gives more insight into the inner cognitive process of nonfamily employees after the 
implementation and communication of PM practices and the interaction of their line managers 
during the performance appraisal interview. Sieger et al. (2011) pointed out that psychological 
ownership of nonfamily employees toward the family business mediates the relationships 
between affective commitment and job satisfaction, and distributive justice. On the other hand, 
fair process in the context of appraisal interviews is not able to generate ownership feelings 
shows that nonfamily employees rather regard the superior responsible for justice, and that this 
evaluation is not transmitted to the family firm organization overall. In line with the proposition 
of Erdogan (2002) rater procedural justice rather leads to Post-Appraisal LMX, which is less 
likely to have an effect on leader-related outcomes and performance-related behaviors than 
organizational outcomes.  
 
Overall, based on the literature review, we have limited knowledge about the Inner Cognitive 
Processes of family and nonfamily managers on the individual level regarding performance 
management systems. Fairness perception is one of the employees’ reactions to the PM system, 
and it has been recognized as an important criterion in judging the effectiveness and usefulness 
of performance appraisal since not just the validity and reliability of the measurement tools. 
However, the individual justice perceptions of these tools and practices affect employees’ 
attitudes and behavior (Ikramullah et al., 2016). Both nonfamily and family employees are the 
recipients of PM systems, and their performances are subjects to that (Farndale et al., 2011). 
That is why I argue that fairness of PM perceived by family employees can have a reflection 
on the presence of family in family businesses.  
 
Contextual factors 
Based on contingency theory, there is no universal or best way to manage all organizations; 
rather, each organization as an open system should fit with its situation created by its internal 
and external environment to achieve effectiveness and efficiency. The design of an organization 
and subsystems must have a proper fit with the environment, and its subsystems should also be 
consistent with one another (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). There is an interrelatedness among the 
HR systems. Thus, recruitment, selection, and socialization of nonfamily managers and 
employees play a key role in the implementation and their fairness perceptions of PM in case 
of the dominance of informal PM practices, whereas the level of significance of incentive-based 
payment in compensation system leads to more formalized PM systems.    
In the literature review, I identified several findings on the impact of various contextual 
findings.  
Regarding family influence, Firfiray et al. (2018) suggested that nepotism is more positively 
related to performance in industries with a higher degree of environmental uncertainty and 
countries with weak institutional protection mechanisms. Furthermore, there is a moderating 
effect of individual pay for performance. So its application more strongly decreases the positive 
effect of nepotism on performance in family firms operating in industries with a higher degree 
of environmental uncertainty relative to industries with a lower degree of environmental 
uncertainty (Firfiray et al., 2018). Kidwell et al. (2018) highlighted that the next generations of 
family firm leadership are more likely to initiate an effective re-imprinting process, while 
findings also show that harmful family influence on employment practices increases with both 
firm age and with heightened family involvement (Neckebrouck et al., 2018). 
Studies argue that formalization depends on small- and medium-sized firms (de Kok et al., 




al., 2018) and apply formal processes if they operate in industries with difficulty in monitoring 
(Fang et al., 2017), or in countries with weak legal structures (Lien & Li, 2014). Accordingly, 
Steijvers et al. (2017) pinpointed that family businesses with a family CEO have more formal 
HR processes than those managed by a nonfamily CEO owing to higher levels of goal alignment 
and intentional trust between the family and family CEO. Furthermore, family businesses 
managed by first-generation family CEOs and family CEOs with a higher education 
implemented more formal HR practices. However, Pittino et al. (2016) found that the 
implications of family businesses’ informal HR practices on retention depend on family 
involvement, regardless of the family status of the CEO. Family businesses may attract 
employees whose motivational profile is consistent with the culture and the value system of the 
family firm (Pittino et al., 2016) in line with the theory of person-organization fit (Memili & 
Barnett, 2008).  
There is an assumption that a more professional HR system leads to positive performance 
effects (Astrachan & Kolenko, 1994; Hoon et al., 2019). However, in the case of “reversed 
causality” (den Hartog et al., 2004), successful family businesses with high profitability might 
increase the willingness of the management to invest in formalized HR practices rather than 
vice versa. High firm performance can also affect employees’ commitment, trust, and 
motivation as much as the other way around. 
Regarding national culture, Samara et al. (2019) emphasize that in collectivist cultures, family 
businesses will attribute high importance to achieving goals of sustaining influence and control 
and enriching family members, causing bifurcated compensation that prefers more family 
employees. In contrast, in an individualist culture context, family businesses will attribute less 
importance to achieving socioemotional wealth goals of family enrichment and influence and 
control and more importance to family prominence, causing bifurcated compensation that 
prefers nonfamily employees. Furthermore, Power distance moderates the negative relationship 
between bifurcated compensation practices preferring Fredos and nonfamily employees' work 
inputs, such that this relationship will be stronger in countries with low power distance cultures. 
On the other hand, power distance moderates the negative relationship between bifurcated 
compensation preferring nonfamily employees and qualified family employees' work 
outcomes, such that this relationship will be stronger in countries with high power distance 









4.1. Case study research 
The chosen method of answering the research questions is case study research. A case study is 
an empirical study that “investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-
life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident”(Yin, 2009, p. 18). The existence and strength of the various factors appearing in the 
context and in the phenomenon cannot be predicted (Gerring, 2006; Yin, 2009). A case study 
research deals with the technically distinctive situation in which there are many more variables 
of interest than data points. It is based on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to 
converge in a triangulating fashion. The subject, direction, and process of data collection and 
analysis are determined by the prior development of the theoretical propositions. (Yin, 2009) 
There is very little research both in the field of Family Business and in Human Resource 
Management, which is conducted with managers and employees in real work settings (A. S. 
DeNisi & Pritchard, 2006; De Massis & Kotlar, 2014).  
The nature of the research questions by asking “how” points to this methodological instrument. 
It is not possible to realize the total control of participants, the characteristics of participants, 
and the behavior of the researchers. Contextual factors of the Performance Management process 
stemming from the family business and their social and natural environment can also not be 
controlled. Thus, an experimental design could not be applied in this case either. Case study 
research should be applied under these circumstances (Gerring, 2006; Yin, 2009).  
 
The chosen type of case study research is a Multiple Embedded Case Study, which means that 
I considered and investigated more than one case. The subject of the investigation was the 
family business system. At each family business system, I observed five levels: the employee 
level, the organizational level of the company, the individual level of family members actively 
engaged in the operation of the firm, the family system level, and the overarching family 
business level.  
    
4.2. Sampling 
In qualitative sampling, purposive sampling will be applied. There is a dispute about what 
qualifies as purposeful sampling in the qualitative research methods literature (Palinkas et al., 
2015). It consists of identifying and selecting individuals or groups of individuals that are 
especially knowledgeable about or experienced with a phenomenon of interest (Cresswell & 
Plano Clark, 2011); available and willing to take part in, and have the ability to communicate 
in a reflective manner (Spradley, 1979). 
 
Mainly because of the heterogeneity of family firms, there is no general consensus about the 
definition of family business among scholars. Family businesses cannot be characterized by a 
specific legal form, a certain size in terms of employees or turnover, and they can be found in 
almost every industry. I observe three factors as a filtering criterion for selecting family 
businesses with no exception: 1) a self-perception of being a family business, 2) presence of 
dominant family control at the firm, or 3) at least 50% family ownership of the firm.  
Finally, I selected cases for the research in which family businesses are in the implementation 
phase of the succession process (Decker et al., 2017), and the next generational family member 
is already part of the top management team. I assumed that the succession process could also 





The object of observation is family business. The goal is to observe how the process of 
Performance Management and Appraisal Systems of three or four family businesses in Hungary 
operate.  I inspected family businesses in which some kind of formal performance management 
processes are implemented, such as written rules and procedures. Formal PM shows the 
conscious management of the HR function by the management. That can work as a filter 
criterion. Since the existence of the performance management system indicates that there is a 
certain level of professionalism at the firm. As an implication, sole proprietorships and micro-
enterprises are not examined; only bigger small and medium-sized enterprises with more than 
100 employees can be included in the sample. I chose companies, which are not operating in 
the agriculture or service sector, have no piece production, have a headcount of over 100 
employees, and there is an ongoing family leadership succession process in the advanced state. 
To control the effect of macro-environmental factors as inputs of PM as much as possible, I 
examined the selected cases for my research, which located in the same quadrant of the model 
of Ikramullah et al. (2016), such as the rational goal model (control and external focus), which 
comprises planning, goal setting, and efficiency. This model tries to create a link between clear 
and certain organizational goals and performance improvement. To increase effectiveness, 
firms set goals, develop plans, and then take action to accomplish these goals.  
I sent out a call to participate in the research in October 2020 (with all the filtering criteria such 
as ongoing family leadership succession process in the advanced state; no piece production; not 
operating in agriculture and service sector; head quant of over 100 employees). I sent out 
general information to the board of Family Business Network Hungary (hereinafter FBN-H), 
the largest family firm organization in Hungary. As a result of my call, six companies showed 
interest in participating in the research. According to Yin (2009), in the case of multiple-case 
studies, each case must be carefully selected so that it is either a literal replication, which 
predicts similar results, or a theoretical replication that predicts contrasting results but for 
anticipatable reasons.    
After the first interviews conducted, two of the six family businesses, although being large 
company prove to be not fit all research criteria. And that is why I used these two companies 
as counter examples, while the other four cases are selected as literal replication.  
However, in this dissertation, I analyzed the four literal replications in detail, while both 
theoretical replications are subject to further research.     
In the first case, due to the size of the company with more than 500 employees, a formalized 
performance management and evaluation based on the management literature would already be 
justified. At the same time, the succession has not yet begun at the company.  Even the next 
generation has already been working there; the predecessor is in full control of the management 
and evaluation process by organizing the organization into smaller companies in a company 
group. There is market control over the leaders of the small or medium-sized companies, while 
within each company, clan control prevails. Therefore, there is no need for formal performance 
management and appraisal systems. (Interview_F_U1) 
In the second case, succession has begun; however, the company has piece production with 
more professionally trained people. It is difficult to formalize both the production process and 
the associated performance appraisal. The performance evaluation is subjective and person-






Table 8 shows the details of the four Family Business Cases. 
Family Business “A” and “B” produce in mass production, while the production size of Family 
Business “C” and “D” is small or medium. Company “A”, “B”, and “C” operate in the food 
processing industry, while Company “D” is committed to the metal industry. Company “A” is 
the biggest company with around 1500 employees, Company “D” is the second largest, while 
Company “B” and “C” have around the same size in the sample. All family business is led by 
a family CEO, while company “B” and “C” have family HR manager as well. 
Table 8 - Descriptive Table of the Family Business Cases 
 
 Analyzing the evidence 
My general analytic strategy relied on two strategies: relying on theoretical propositions and 
using both qualitative and quantitative data. The first and most preferred strategy is to follow 
the theoretical propositions stemming from my research question after the literature review. 
The propositions can shape my data collection plan and, therefore, can give priority to the 
relevant analytic strategies.  The qualitative data related to perceived justice may be critical in 
explaining my case study’s key propositions as well (Yin 2009). 
Related to the theoretical propositions, firstly, I use a pattern-matching logic to examine those 
models, which have been already discussed in the literature, such as the model of 
Sundaramurthy (2008) about the Sustaining Cycle of Trust at Family Businesses.  
Secondly, I apply an explanation-building analytic technique as well, which is a special type of 
pattern matching. In this case, my aim is to analyze the case study data by explaining the case 
and generating hypotheses and new ideas for further studies. These explanations could have 
reflected my theoretical propositions developed in the literature review process previously. 
According to Yin (2009), the explanation building technique is an iterative process, which 
includes the following activities during the analysis: 
- Making an initial proposition about the social behavior 
- Compering the findings of an initial case against such a proposition  
- Revising the propositions 
- Comparing other details of the case against the revision 
- Comparing the revision to the facts of a second, third, or more cases 
- Repeating this process as many times as is needed (Yin, 2009, p. 143) 
Characteristics Company "A" Company "B" Company "C" Company "D"
Family involvement in ownership 30% 100% 100% 100%
Family involvement in management 67% 16% 33% 25%
Family CEO Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of family owners 2 4 2 2
Number of family employees in management 4 4 4 1
Number of family employees 4 7 4 5
Number of generations 2 2 2 2
Founding generation in the operational level of management No Yes No Yes
Family HR manager No Yes Yes No
Size (number of employee) 1500 250 220 560
Industry Food industry Food industry Food industry Metal industry
Production-size Mass production Mass production Small or medium Small or medium
































A case study protocol is necessary in case of conducting a multiple case study. The case study 
protocol must be addressed to a single case within a multiple case study. It includes not just the 
instrument but also the procedures and general rules to be followed. The protocol is directed at 
an entirely different party than that of a survey questionnaire. The protocol can foster the 
reliability of the research and aims to guide the researcher in carrying out the data collection 
from a single case within a multiple case study (Yin, 2009).  
A case study protocol has the following sections: 1) An overview of the case study project, 2) 
Field procedures, 3) Case study questions, 4) A guide for the case study report. 
It is possible to use multiple methods in any study (e.g., a survey within a case study). In other 
words, case study research can go beyond being only qualitative research by using a mix of 
quantitative and qualitative evidence.  
 
4.3. Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis 
 
4.3.1. Semi-structured interviews – data collection and analysis of content  
Table 9 shows the details of the interviews. I conducted 18 interviews with ten family managers 
and eight non-family managers between 29 October 2020 and 12 April 2021. There was an 
equal number of male and female interviewees. Twelve Teams/Zoom interviews, five telephone 
interviews, and a personal interview were recorded.  
In every four cases, I conducted interviews with the predecessor and successors, family or 
nonfamily CEO or the member of the top management team, HR manager, and at least one non-
family manager, who can have a critical voice and/or relevant information about the PM. I also 
gathered information from employees and managers by using questionnaires of justice and 
fairness perception.  
In each case, I have at least 3-4 interviews. In the case of the Family Business Case “C” in 
agreement with the management, I interviewed more than one middle manager at different 
levels to learn about their roles and perceptions about the fairness of performance appraisal and 
the effect of the controlling family. In this case, only a few questionnaires were likely to be 
completed at the employee level since performance appraisal and performance-based payment 
was only introduced at the top and middle management levels. I interviewed two shift managers 




Table 9 - Descriptive Table of the Interviews 
 
 
Method of collecting and recording qualitative data 
First, I prepared the draft of the interviews, matched it with the research goals and 
propositions, and set the interview structure. A semi-structured interview offers flexibility 
because it is possible to clarify any misunderstandings (King, 2004) 
As a pilot, I conducted two test interviews, of which I used one in the final sample. I 
aimed to find out whether the research question and propositions are right to collect proper 
information to reach my research goals. During the interviews, I was also taking notes, and I 
used a voice/video recorder. I asked permission to record the interviews by asking them to sign 
the statement of consent (See in Appendix – Statement of Consent). I reassured each 
interviewee that the audio/video materials and the transcripts would be examined only for the 
purpose of this research. I wrote the first three transcripts; the rest of them were written by a 
stenographer, and I was reading through the transcripts while listening to the voice/video 
recordings. Previously I planned to conduct personal interviews; however, due to the second 
and third waves of the pandemic in Hungary, I ended up conducting all the interviews online 
or via telephone with one exception, which was personal at the request of the interviewees. The 
interviews were recorded in a single session. The online and telephone interviews were not only 
safe but by then, the interviewees and I had become accustomed to online/mobile 
communication. The quality of the zoom/teams videos was good.  I conducted the interviews 
from home or from my room at the university to have a calm and undisturbed atmosphere. 
I conducted the first interview with a family manager at each company, who was also 
the successor in each case. After the interview, we discussed the possible additional 
interviewees at the company and the possible order of interviews. I also asked for their help in 
establishing contact with the other interviewees. The limitation of this approach is that the line 
managers are mainly interviewed from the “inner circle” who have less critical voices about the 
controlling family and the top management.  
Qualitative Analysis of Content 
There are three approaches to qualitative content analysis formulated on the level of 
involvement of inductive reasoning: conventional qualitative content analysis, direct content 
Interview 
type
1 A_U1 A Personal 1 h 17 min 30-40 female Member of BoD Successor Family Daughter
2 A_E2 A Zoom/Teams 40 min 60-70 male Member of supervisory board Owner/Predecessor Family Father
3 A_HR3 A Zoom/Teams 1 h 6 min 50-60 female HR manager - Non-family
4 A_LM4 A Telephone 43 min 30-40 male Sector manager - Non-family
5 B_U1 B Zoom/Teams 1 h 46 min 20-30 female HR manager Owner/Successor Family Daughter
6 B_LM2 B Zoom/Teams 45 min 30-40 male CFO - Non-family
7 B_E3 B Zoom/Teams 1 h 50-60 female Executive manager Owner/Predecessor Family Mother
8 C_U1 C Zoom/Teams 1 h 30 min 40-50 female Executive manager Successor Family Daughter
9 C_HR2 C Zoom/Teams 1 h 39 min 40-50 female HR manager - Family Son's wife
10 C_LM1 C Telephone 43 min 30-40 male Plant manager - Non-family
11 C_LM2 C Telephone 47 min 50-60 female Shift manager - Non-family
12 C_LM3 C Telephone 1h 1 min 20-30 male Plant manager - Non-family
13 C_LM4 C Telephone 35 min 30-40 male Shift manager - Non-family
14 D_U1 D Zoom/Teams 2 h 23 min 20-30 female Executive manager/Advisor Owner/Successor Family Daughter
15 D_LM2 D Zoom/Teams 37 min 40-50 male CFO (incl. HR) - Non-family
16 D_E3 D Zoom/Teams 1 h 3 min 50-60 male Executive manager Owner/Predecessor Family Father
17 F_U1 F Zoom/Teams 1 h 40 min 40-50 male Deputy executive Successor Family Daughter














analysis, and summative content analysis. In conventional qualitative content analysis, coding 
categories emerge directly and inductively from the data. That is why it can apply to grounded 
theory development. In direct content analysis, initial coding begins with a theory or relevant 
research findings, and during the analysis, themes are able to emerge from the data. This 
approach can validate or extend a former conceptual framework or theory. In summative 
content analysis, first, researchers begin with the counting of words or manifest content; then 
they can also include latent meanings and themes. (Hsieh & Shannon 2005 in Zhang & 
Wildemuth, 2005) 
In order to validate or extend my conceptual framework, I apply the second approach, in which 
I begin my initial coding with my literature review findings. Later, in the data analysis phase, 
this method gives the opportunity to explore other themes emerging from the data. 
To support valid and reliable conclusions generated from directed content analysis, I follow the 
set of systematic and transparent procedures for processing data, which includes the following 
eight steps: 
Step 1: Beginning with preparing the data. The interviews were transcribed literally, and 
I also wrote my observations during the interview, such as smiles, pauses, and other audible 
behaviors. 
Step 2: Defining the unit of analysis. I applied individual themes as a coding unit, 
which may be expressed in a single word, phrase, sentence, paragraph, etc. I used NVivo 9 to 
support the coding process of qualitative content analysis.  
Step 3: Developing categories and a coding scheme. I made a list of coding categories 
from my conceptual framework, and I modified my model during the analysis as new categories 
emerged inductively (Miles & Huberman, 1994). I tried to outline the categories in the coding 
scheme internally as homogeneous as possible and externally as heterogeneous as possible. To 
make sure the consistency of coding, I made a coding manual with category names, definitions 
for assigning codes, and examples. (See in Appendix – Coding Manual) 
Step 4: Testing my coding scheme on a sample of text. In this first text, while I was 
coding, I was continuously checking coding consistency, and I tried to revise coding rules in an 
iterative process until I achieved sufficient coding consistency.  
Step 5: Coding all the text of every interview. I checked the coding constantly and made 
modifications if it was necessary.  
Step 6: Evaluating my coding consistency. I tried to code the text of every interview 
within a specified 2-week period in order to avoid greater inconsistency occurring over time. 
However, I rechecked the new codes that might have been added since the initial consistency 
check. 
Step 7: Drawing conclusions from the coded data. In this critical step, I tried to make 
sense of the themes and categories and make implications by identifying relationships between 
categories, uncovering patterns, and testing categories against the full range of data. 
Step 8: Reporting my methods and findings. In this stage, I attempted to reach a balance 





4.3.2. Documents – data collection and analysis of content  
I also planned to conduct document analysis to combine with interview analysis as a means of 
triangulation.  
Document analysis is a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents, both 
printed and electronic (computer-based and Internet-transmitted) material (Bowen, 2009).  
Skimming (superficial examination), reading (in-depth examination), and interpretation are all 
steps in the document analysis process. This iterative technique combines content and thematic 
analysis elements. The process of organizing information into categories linked to the central 
questions of the research is known as content analysis. Emerging themes become the categories 
for investigation in thematic analysis, which is a type of pattern detection within the data. The 
procedure entails a more thorough re-reading and examination of the data. (Bowen, 2009) 
 
4.3.3. Direct observation 
As another source of evidence, there are some relevant behavioral and situational conditions, 
which also can be observed. Direct observations can vary from formal to casual data collections. 
These pieces of evidence may provide additional information about the topic. Since there are 
questions derived from the propositions that cannot be answered directly by the interviewees 
but based on the impressions and observations, the interviewer is able to answer them after the 
interview. (Yin, 2009) 
  
4.3.4. Archival records  
Archival records can include annual public reports, and financial statements, homepages of the 
companies, published books and articles about the family and family businesses. Archival 
records can be applied together with other sources of evidence. However, it is difficult to 
ascertain their accuracy and the conditions under which these records were produced. (Yin, 
2009) 
 
4.4. Quantitative Data Collection and Analysis 
 
Quantitative research has three aims in this study. The first main goal is to measure the actual 
level of perceived justice in each company. The second main goal is to triangulate and bring an 
additional perspective to the data obtained from qualitative research (interview and document 
analysis). The third additional goal is to test the hypotheses derived from the propositions and 
so to evaluate the initial propositions of my research. This third goal does not belong to one of 
my main goals. I wanted to examine the answers of the questionnaires to be analyzed anyway 
from a new perspective as well. The findings, however, are only valid for the four companies 
examined. Although the statistical validity is valid for a pooled group of employees of the four 
companies in the sample, this is not the subject of the research. 
 
In this chapter, I introduced the measurement tools of perceived justice and fairness, the 
structure and underlying logic of the questionnaire, then the respondents and data collection of 
the quantitative research, and the overall results. Finally, I present my hypotheses. 
 
4.4.1. Measurement of perceived justice and fairness 
In this chapter, I give a brief overview of the various measurement approaches of justice and 




Colquitt et al. (2015) suggest a taxonomy that differentiates if measures underline descriptive 
perceptions of justice rule adherence or evaluative perceptions of fairness and if measures 
differentiate between multiple dimensions. 
In the vast majority of studies, the terms justice and fairness turned to be adopted 
interchangeably in the literature. One measure may imply a condition expected to induce 
fairness (such as consistency and truthfulness), while another implies perceptions of fairness 
themselves. However, in recent studies, more and more scholars operationalize justice and 
fairness as separate constructs.  Regardless of whether scholars focus on justice or fairness, a 
certain degree of “convertibility” is often needed when constructing measures (Greenberg, 
2010). 
Table 10 shows that the approaches can vary by a) whether they highlight justice versus fairness 
and b) whether they differentiate between procedural, distributive, interpersonal, and 
informational dimensions. The authors identify four approaches: faceted justice, latent justice, 
faceted fairness, and overall fairness. In the following, I discuss the four quadrants of the 
taxonomy in more detail.  

















Source: (Colquitt & Rodell, 2015, p. 190) 
Faceted Justice 
The advantage of the faceted justice approach is that its results can be turned into managerial 
actions more easily. For instance, procedural justice can be improved by providing more 
control, consistency, and mechanisms for correction, applying more accurate information, 
reducing sources of bias, stress representativeness, and ethicality during the process (Colquitt, 
2001; Leventhal, 1980; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975).   
The faceted approach has some disadvantages. Justice dimensions are very highly correlated, 
which causes significant levels of multicollinearity in statistic models. Moreover, findings also 
demonstrate that the different dimensions predict key outcomes differently. For instance, 
scholars argued that procedural justice is more significant to employees because systems stay, 
while other dimensions of justice are mutable (Lind & Tyler, 1988). 
Latent Justice 
In the case of latent justice, scholars create justice as a second-order latent variable, with 
procedural, distributive, interpersonal, and informational justice as lower-order indicators. This 
formulation is useful in case if the construct can be determined by the common variance shared 
by the multiple dimensions, if the dimensions are greatly correlated, and if the dimensions are 





Like latent justice, overall fairness does not recon with the distinctions among procedural, 
distributive, interpersonal, and informational facets either. However, overall fairness is 
considered with a single scale that concentrates on the overall perception of appropriateness.  
According to Colquitt et al. (2015), scholars encompass overall fairness, often in tandem with 
measures of the justice dimensions. Overall fairness scales are structured as “entity” measures 
that transcend exact contexts or events. However, suppose the research question requires a 
different structure, like in the case of this study. In that case, items can embed overall fairness 
in a performance appraisal situation such as “Overall, I was treated fairly by my company 
during my last performance appraisal” (Ambrose & Schminke, 2009, p. 493), and “Does your 
supervisor behave as a fair person would during performance appraisal?” (Colquitt et al., 2015). 
Faceted Fairness 
Faceted fairness is the fourth bracket in the taxonomy of measurement approaches. In this case, 
dimensional distinctions are studied. However, items rather concentrate on global perceptions 
of appropriateness than justice rules. Conversely, the application of the faceted fairness 
approach is limited because of its blurriness. The border between interactional/interpersonal 
fairness and overall fairness can be unclear. According to Colquitt et al. (2015), this vagueness 
results from the multiple meanings of the word “treat”.  Thus, scholars tend to choose the overall 
fairness approach in the literature over the faceted fairness approach.  
4.4.2. Content of the questionnaire  
The content of my questionnaire relies on validated questionnaires for justice and fairness based 
on the studies of Colquitt et al. (2015) and Ambrose and Schminke (2009). 
First, I applied Colquitt (2001)’s questionnaire of perceived justice, which belongs to the 
faceted justice in Colquitt et al. (2015)’s taxonomy. Colquitt (2001) performed a construct 
validation of a justice measure, which is based on the original explications laid out in previous 
studies (e.g., Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Leventhal, 1976, 1980; Bies & Moag, 1986). According 
to this, the questionnaire consists of questions about procedural justice (Question group II.1.1-
7), distributional justice (Question group II.2.1-4), interpersonal justice (Question group II.3.1-
4), and informational justice (Question group II.4.1-5) dimensions. Colquitt (2001)’s 
questionnaire of perceived justice is on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (to a very small extent) 
to 5 (to a very large extent). 
Second, I added the Perceived Overall Justice (POJ) scale of Ambrose and Schminke (2009). 
The POJ scale (Question group II.5.1-6) includes three questions to measure individuals’ 
personal fairness experiences (Question group II.5.1-3) and three questions assess the fairness 
of the organization generally (Question group II.5.4-6), in which individuals can apply 
information about the fairness experiences of others to shape their own impressions of fairness. 
The POJ statement is referred to the organization on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree); however, question II.5.4 is a reverse scale. 
 
Third, I also included measures of overall fairness (Question group II.6.1-3) and overall 
unfairness (Question group II.6.4-6) referred to the supervisor’s actions during decision-making 
events based on Colquitt et al. (2015). These questions are also on a 7-point scale ranging from 
1 (to an extremely small extent) to 7 (to an extremely large extent), in which questions about 





Besides the quantitative questions, I also put two exploratory questions about fairness at the 
end. These were not mandatory questions but rather gave people the opportunity to share their 
opinion in their own words. 
 
Other measurement issues 
  
To measure to what extent the respondent considers the company as a family business, I asked 
the following question: Q1.2: “The company I work for is a family business.” on a 5-point scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Besides this, I also asked questions to 
gather demographic information about the participants such as age (Q III.1), gender (Q III.2), 
education (Q III.3), position (manager/subordinate) (Q III.4), total work experience at the given 
company (Q III.5), total work experience (Q III.6). At the request of the HR manager, a 
question about age (Q III.1) was taken out at Company “B” to preserve anonymity.   
   
Regarding the questions about the work experience, Colquitt et al. (2015) discussed some 
measurement issues, including anticipations and expectations, within-person methodologies, 
the application of multiple sources, and the operationalization of injustice. In the following, I 
discuss these concerns to show how I developed my questionnaire for the case study.   
All the measurement approaches assess the past, and studies usually concentrate on past 
experiences or the accumulation of experiences with a supervisor or organization. To predict 
attitudes and behaviors, Shapiro and Kirkman (1999, 2001) also stressed that people might 
consider the justice and fairness of events before these events actually happen. That first 
concept is considered as “experienced” justice, while the latter is labeled “anticipatory justice” 
or “justice expectations” (Bell et al., 2004). Anticipatory justice describes the extent to which 
people “believe that they will or will not experience justice in some future situation” (Colquitt 
& Rodell, 2015, p. 196). Since employees do not have proper information about situations in 
the future, like “experience,” justice scholars also assume that employees create justice 
anticipations from information that they already have  (Shapiro & Kirkman, 2001). That is why 
in my study, I build on the “experience” justice of the employees while assuming that 
newcomers may answer based on what they expect to happen based on their previous 
experiences. Thus, I required from the respondents the information about working experience 
((less than a year, 1-2 years, 3-5 years, 6-10 years, 11-15 years, 15+ years)) and how many 
years he/she has spent at the given family business (less than a year, 1-2 years, 3-5 years, 6-10 
years, 11-15 years, 15+ years).  




Table 11 shows the propositions and the related hypothesis I tested.  
Table 11 - Propositions and Hypothesis testing 
Propositions Hypothesis testing 
 
Proposition 1b • There is a difference in perception of the company as family 




The presence of family 





to more efficient 
informal PM practices. 
• There is a difference in perception of justice between subordinates 
and managers. (H2) 
 
Proposition 3 
Family Influence has an 
effect on the perceived 
justice of Performance 
Management. 
 
• If a subordinate considers the company as a family business, he or 
she perceives performance management practices fairer. (H3) 
• If a subordinate considers the company as a family business, he or 
she perceives performance management practices more just. (H4) 
• If a manager considers the company as a family business, he or she 
perceives performance management practices fairer. (H5) 
• If a manager considers the company as a family business, he or she 




between the two 
concepts of justice and 
fairness, family firm 
leaders pursue to 
achieve a high level of 
fairness rather than a 
high level of justice 
among family and 
nonfamily employees in 
the PM processes.      
 
• Overall fairness – supervisor and Overall fairness – the organization 




In order to ensure the quality of a case study, I apply the four logical tests: construct validity, 
internal validity, external validity, and reliability (De Massis & Kotlar, 2014; Horváth & Mitev, 
2015; Yin, 2009).   
Construct validity 
Construct validity focuses on the operationalization of the study. The correct operational 
measurement tools for the concepts being studied need to be identified (Horváth & Mitev, 
2015). The measures must accurately represent the concepts in order to be able to validate the 
conclusions of the study. There are three tactics to foster construct validity: 1) using multiple 
sources of evidence, 2) establishing a chain of evidence during data collection, and 3) having 
key informants reviewing the draft report of the case study (De Massis & Kotlar, 2014; Yin, 
2009).   
Internal validity 
Internal validity focuses on establishing a causal relationship. The triangulation of the various 
evidence can explain how and why certain conditions lead to other conditions (Horváth & 




data analysis: doing pattern matching, defining explanation building, addressing rival 
explanations, and using logic models (Yin, 2009). 
External validity 
In the case of case study research, analytic generalization is applicable. I aim to generalize a 
particular set of results to a broader theory (Horváth & Mitev, 2015; Yin, 2009). In the case of 
multiple-case studies, the findings can be replicated at 3-4 companies that can provide strong 
support for the theory (De Massis & Kotlar, 2014). 
Reliability 
In order to ensure reliability, that means other researchers can repeat my work later with the 
same results, and the research procedures need to be adequately documented (Horváth & Mitev, 
2015). There are two particular tactics to manage this validity threat: using a case study protocol 
and developing a transparent case study database during data collection (Yin 2009) and also 
using techniques for data preparation  (De Massis & Kotlar, 2014). 
Based on the four tests, methodological and data triangulation is applied in the research to 
increase the credibility and validity of the outcomes. In Table 12, there is an overview of the 
methods, source of evidence, method of analysis, subject, and the targeted aspects of validity 
tests, which I used in the case of my proposals. Please find the general interview drafts in 
Appendix 3, 4, 5, the questionnaire for quantitative analysis in Appendix 7. 
 
 
Table 12 - Overview of the research design 
 













Goals of PM, org. structure, situational
factors, Planned PM system; family




Interviews and the interactions with participants
Goals of PM, Planned PM system; family




Documentation, policies, procedures, and formal
communication letters  
Content analysis Planned PM system and implementation
In-depth 
interviews
Interviews with predecessors/owners, CEOs, HR
managers, family, and non-family managers 
Direct content 
analysis
Perceived fairness and effectiveness of




Interviews and the interactions with participants
Perceived fairness and effectiveness of
actual PM; family values and FB values;
Family influence
Questionnaire 
Employee questionnaire of Colquitt (2001a)’s
questionnaire of perceived justice and Employee
questionnaire of fairness (Ambrose & Schminke, 2009;
Colquitt et al., 2015) (H1, H2)   
Statistical 
analysis 
Perceived justice of PM system at
employee level;




Documentation, policies, procedures, and formal
communication letters  
Content analysis Actual PM system and implementation
In-depth 
interviews
Interviews with predecessors/owners, CEOs, HR 
managers, family, and non-family managers
Direct content 
analysis
Experienced, perceived PM system;
family values and FB values; Family




Interviews and the interactions with participants
Experienced, perceived PM system;
family values and FB values; Family
influence, cognitive processing of
participants 
Archival records
Books and articles about the family and the family
members
Family values and FB values; Family




Interviews with predecessors/owners, CEOs, HR
managers, family, and non-family managers
Direct content 
analysis




Interviews and the interactions with participants
Archival records
Annual financial statements and annual reports.






























practice through its 
communication by the top and 
line managers that leads to 
more efficient informal PM 
practices. 
Proposition 1. The presence of family has an impact on the antecedents and consequences of perceived justice of performance management practice of family and nonfamily employees 
in four ways: planning, implementation, communication, and coordination. 
Proposition 1d
The presence of family 
influences the possible outcome 
of perceived justice of PM 
through coordination, such as 
defining organizational 
structure (a division of tasks, 
scope of authority, types of 
Proposition 1a 
The presence of family affects 
planned performance 
management in terms of the 
level of bifurcation and 
formalization. 
Proposition 1b
The presence of family 
influences the actual 
performance management 
practice through line managers’ 
implementation, leading to more 




















Employee questionnaire of Colquitt (2001a)’s 
questionnaire of perceived justice and Employee 
questionnaire of fairness (Ambrose & Schminke, 2009; 
Colquitt et al., 2015)
Statistical analysis 
Perceived justice of PM system at
employee level;




Interviews with predecessors/owners, CEOs, HR 
managers, family, and non-family managers 
Direct content 
analysis
Family values and FB values; Family
influence;
Perceived justice and fairness of PM
Direct 
observations
Interviews and the interactions with participants
Family values and FB values; Family
influence;
Perceived justice and fairness of PM
Document 
analysis 
Documentation, policies, procedures, and formal 
communication letters  
Content analysis Main criteria of justice
In-depth 
interviews
Interviews with predecessors/owners, CEOs, HR
managers, family, and non-family managers
Direct content 
analysis
Family influence, perceived justice and
perceived justice of  PM
Direct 
observations
Interviews and the interactions with participants
Family influence, perceived justice and
perceived justice of  PM
Questionnaire 
Employee questionnaire of Colquitt (2001a)’s
questionnaire of perceived justice and Employee
questionnaire of fairness (Ambrose & Schminke, 2009;
Colquitt et al., 2015) (H3-H6)
Statistical 
analysis 
Perceived justice of PM system at
employee level;




Interviews with predecessors/owners, CEOs, HR 
managers, family, and non-family managers
Direct content 
analysis
Family influence, perceived justice and
perceived justice of  PM
Direct 
observations
Interviews and the interactions with participants
Family influence, perceived justice and
perceived justice of  PM
In-depth 
interviews
Interviews with predecessors/owners, CEOs, HR 
managers, family, and non-family managers
Direct content 
analysis
Family influence, perceived justice and
perceived justice of  PM
Direct 
observations
Interviews and the interactions with participants
Family influence, perceived justice and
perceived justice of  PM
In-depth 
interviews




Family employees’ and managers’




Observe directly what is happening during the
interviews and the interactions with participants
Family employees’ and managers’




Interviews with family members such as 
predecessors/owners, successors, CEOs, HR managers 
Direct content 
analysis
Family employees’ and managers’




Interviews and the interactions with participants
Family employees’ and managers’




Documents of written formal documentation, policies,




Archival records Company homepages, books, and online articles
Modification of coordination
mechanisms
Proposition 4. A family business system has an impact on the family system as a consequence of family employees’ and managers’ perception of fairness through the PM and PA 























A family business system has an 
impact on the family system as a 
consequence of family 
employees’ and managers’ 
perception of fairness through 
the PM and PA processes 
indirectly by modification of 
coordination mechanisms.
Proposition 3a 
Family Influence has an effect 
on the perceived justice of PM.
Proposition 3b
Family Influence has a direct 
effect on the perceived justice of 
PM.
Proposition 2
By differentiating between the two 
concepts of justice and fairness, 
family firm leaders pursue to achieve 
a high level of fairness rather than a 
high level of justice among family 
and nonfamily employees in the PM 
processes.     
Proposition 3c
The various sources of family 
influence may interact with each 
other so that one source of 
family influence may have a 
moderator effect in the 
relationship between another 
source of family influence and 
perceived justice of PM.
Proposition 4a
A family business system has an 
impact on the family system as a 
consequence of family 
employees’ and managers’ 
















5. Research results 
In this chapter, I present the results of the document analysis, the quantitative analysis, and the 
qualitative analysis.  
5.1. Results of document analysis 
After the interviews, I asked HR managers or executive managers if they could send or show 
anonymized documents of PM and PA. The results of the document analysis were in line with 
the participants told in the interviews.  
Table 13 shows that companies have embarked on the path of professionalization. The 
processes are partially formalized, and the owners are committed to developing them further 
according to the current operational requirements of the organization. For production 
companies, KPI and controlling system development provide a good basis for measuring and 
evaluating performance in production. Due to labor retention and market pressure, companies 
are trying to adapt to the labor market situation by introducing a performance-based bonus. As 
a first step, the bonus is considered as feedbacks to employees. For two family businesses, there 
was formalized PM system focusing on development, career planning, and strengthening 
employee engagement. However, the outcomes of PMs do not serve as a basis for inputs of 
other systems, and the use of the outputs is rather ad hoc. For white-collar workers, retention is 
still mainly built on an organizational culture based on personal relationships. 
In this research, I analyzed documents to verify my findings or corroborate evidence from the 
interviews. In all four family business cases, there was a convergence of information from the 






Table 13 - Documents of PM and PA 









BoD's presentation to Supervisory Board
Sector managers' presentations to Top 
management
Daily evaluation sheets posted  for manual 
Monthly for manual 
workers
Quarterly for managers
Paper/Slides Yes NA Informal Yes
Implementing formal rules 
and policies and to define 
and standardize evaluation 
criteria. 
KPI system and 





Daily evaluation sheets posted  for manual 
workers
Bonus agreements
Monthly for manual 
workers
Annually for managers
Yes - Yes Yes





Annual Supporting Sheet for the discussions 













workflows and reports 
system should be 
implemented







Updated Job descriprions Automated Yes Yes Yes Yes
KPI system and 






(company and individual goals)
Automated/
Excel
Yes NA Yes Yes
Goal setting need to be 
improved to make goals 
more realistic and 
achievable












The development of the 
system is ongoing and based 
on the well-developed Job 








Assesment of Job categories Paper based Yes Yes Yes Yes
KPI system and 






Performance-based bonus policy and bonus 
agreements, KPIs in scorebored (target and actual 
figures in the database with background date)
Automated/
Excel
Yes - - Formalized
Performance-based bonus 
policy is not published yet; 





Annual Employee Performance evaluation sheet
Annual Manager Performance evaluation sheet
White Collar Employee Performance evaluation 
sheet





Lack of capacity of 
processing the results of the 
individual evaluations to 
support HR decisions
KPI system and 



















5.2. Results of Quantitative analysis 
 
5.2.1. Quantitative Data Collection 
Table 14 shows the data collection related to the quantitative questionnaire at each company. 
Table 14 - Data collection 
 
 
The survey was conducted between December 2020 and May 2021. Respondents were mainly 
unskilled or skilled workers in plants or livestock farms who do not work with a computer, and 
therefore, they favor paper-based questionnaires.  
However, the data collection occurred during the second and third waves of the global 
pandemic, so I asked each HR manager to choose between the paper or the web-based 
questionnaire. Only Company “A,” asked for a paper-based questionnaire to have enough 
answers.  The paper-based questionnaires were collected anonymously by the HR manager in 
a sealed envelope and sent to me for uploading to an excel sheet. At the same time, Company 
"D" also acknowledged that a paper-based questionnaire would have been more successful; 
however, the company aims to motivate its employees to get used to online applications and 
surveys that is why they insisted on the web-based form. 
After the data collection, I conducted a survey data cleaning, which involved identifying and 
removing responses from four individuals who did not answer the questions thoughtfully. Either 
they were straightliners who chose the same answer choice repeatedly or respondents who gave 
inconsistent responses.  
5.2.2. Quantitative Data Analysis 
Statistical data analyses were conducted with SPSS and Excel.  
Descriptive analyses  
Among 289 participants, 73.4% are men, and 23% are a woman. 79,2% of the respondents work 
as a subordinate, while 18% of them fill in the manager position. The majority of the 
respondents have secondary school/high school (23%), and vocational school (34%) diplomas 



























16 online Hungarian 03/2021-04/2021
Company „D” 39 35% (39/110) 39 online Hungarian 03/2021-04/2022
Sum 293 289




age groups: 26-35 years (19,7%), 36-45 years old (32,5%), 46-55 years old (22%). 86,7% of 
the employees have 6-10 years or less work experience at their current company.  
Skewness is a measure of the degree and direction of asymmetry. Positive skewness values 
imply a score pile-up on the left side of the distribution, whereas negative values suggest a score 
pile-up on the right. (Field, 2009) Since all the skewness values are negative, I can state that in 
the case of each measure of dimension and overall justice as well as overall fairness – 
supervisor, overall fairness – organization. 
. 
Based on Table 15 and Table 16 in Appendix 8, the distributions are negatively skewed in all 
dimensions. The mean values are less than the median values, except in the case of procedural 
justice.  In the case of a negative skewness score, the higher evaluation is more frequent in the 
distribution. In the case of overall fairness related to supervisor and informational justice and 
interpersonal justice dimensions, higher values dominate more strongly.  
Hypothesis testing 
Reverse Coding  
Since negatively worded items regarding unfairness (Questions II.5.4, II.6.4-6) have been 
applied, these were reverse-coded before proceeding. So, in the 7-point rating scale, the reverse 
coding proceeds as follows: strongly disagree (1 / 7), disagree (2 / 6), rather disagree (3 / 5), 
neither agree nor disagree (4 / 4), rather agree (5 / 3) agree (6 / 2) strongly agree (7 / 1). 
(Robinson, 2018) 
Score aggregation/mean  
Scale scores can be calculated in two ways. First, the mean rating of every item, including the 
scale, can be calculated. Second, the ratings of every item, including the scale, can be 
aggregated. I decided to calculate the mean item rating method because of two reasons. Firstly, 
the mean ratings are more comparable within the various concept structures (e.g., the four 
justice dimensions, overall fairness related to supervisor, overall fairness related to the 
organization).  Secondly, while if there are no missing data, either option produces identical 
inter-scale correlations, even though with different scale scores. In case of missing data, 
aggregating item ratings produces lower scale scores than appropriate for participants with 
missing data. (Robinson, 2018)  
Accordingly, when I estimate the scale score from the mean of its component items' ratings, I 
apply a conservative approach of Robinson (2018) to decide how many of the scale's items a 
respondent must answer to for this calculation to be valid: (1) Before calculating a scale score 
a threshold of responses to at least 50% of a scale's items should be reached. Unless (2) this 
method decreases the sample size to below-recommended levels for statistical analyses. In this 
case, scale scores should be defined from answers to one or more items provided the Cronbach's 
alpha internal reliability of the scale is high (α ≥ .75; (Cortina, 1993)).  
 
Cronbach's alpha  
I apply the psychometric scales of Colquitt (2001), Ambrose and Schminke (2009), and Colquitt 
et al. (2015). Psychometric scales of applying multiple items calculate the same focal variable, 
which means that the consistency or internal reliability of respondents' answers can be 
evaluated. Reliability is a precondition for validity, and both are crucial features of 




often applied statistic for internal consistency. Cortina (1993) suggested α ≥ .75 as the 
conventionally accepted level for psychometric scales.  
Cronbach's Alpha of the applied scales are above this conventionally accepted level as follows: 
Procedural justice (α= 0.818), Distributional justice (α=0.888), Informational justice (α=0.897), 
Interpersonal justice (α= 0.902), Overall fairness – organization (α= 0.9), Overall fairness – 
supervisor (α= 0.917). 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA)  
I conducted ANOVA analysis to assess the equality of variances for a variable calculated for 
two or more groups. However, ANOVA analysis is based on the presumptions that two or more 
samples are independent, the distributions of the residuals are normal, and there is homogeneity 
or equality of variances between groups (homoscedasticity). (Malhotra et al., 2017) That is why 
in each case, I ran Levene's tests to test homogeneity of variances as a first step. Besides this, I 
also conducted robust tests (Brown-Forsythe and Welch) to test whether there is a statistically 
meaningful difference in the groups' means when the homogeneity assumption variance is not 
met.(IBM SPSS Statistics 24.0.0 Documentation, 2021) 
Hypothesis 1: There is a difference in the perception of the company as a family business 
between subordinates and managers.  
Based on the descriptive analysis of the sample, I assumed that managers rather consider the 
company as a family business than subordinates (mean of sub.=3.81; mean of manager = 4.44). 
(See in Table 17 in Appendix 8) 
First, I ran the test of homogeneity of variances, in which the null hypothesis for Levene's test 
is that the variances are equal across the samples. Based on the Sig=0.024, I rejected the H0. 
(See in Table 18 and Table 19 in Appendix 8) 
I conducted the robust tests of Brown-Forsythe and Welch, in which cases the null hypothesis 
is that the group means are equal. (IBM SPSS Statistics 24.0.0 Documentation, 2021) Based on 
the results of Sig. value of Brown-Forsythe (Sig=0.000) and Welch (Sig=0.000), I rejected the 
H0 and accepted the alternative hypothesis that the means are not equal for subordinates and 
managers. (See in Table 20 in Appendix 8)   
According to the statistical analysis, I can state that the position will impact how much an 
employee considers the company as a family business. Based on the means, the managers 
consider the company more like a family business.  
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a difference in perception of justice between subordinates and 
managers 
Based on the descriptive analysis of the sample, we can see that the means of subordinates for 
each justice dimension and fairness scales are less than the means of managers. (See in Table 
Table 21 in Appendix 8) 
I ran the test of homogeneity of variances, in which the null hypothesis for Levene's test is that 
the variances are equal across the samples. Based on the results of the Sig value, I rejected the 
H0 for the two overall fairness scales (supervisors, organization) and all justice dimensions, 




in the case of interpersonal justice, I accepted the null hypothesis in ANOVA; that is, there is 
no difference in means. (See in Table 23 in Appendix 8) 
I conducted the robust tests of Brown-Forsythe and Welch, in which cases the null hypothesis 
is that the group means are equal. (IBM SPSS Statistics 24.0.0 Documentation, 2021) Based on 
the results of Sig value of Brown-Forsythe and Welch, I rejected the H0 and accepted the 
alternative hypothesis, that is the means are not equal in case of Procedural justice (Sig.=0.002), 
Informational justice (Sig.=0.004), Overall Perceived justice (Sig.=0.011) Overall fairness - 
organization (Sig.=0.018), Overall fairness - supervisor (Sig.=0.009). While I accepted the null 
hypothesis in the case of Distributional justice (Sig.= 0.188), Interpersonal justice (Sig.= 0.351) 
(See in Table 24 in Appendix 8)   
According to this statical analysis, based on the means, I can state that the position will 
positively impact how much an employee perceives the overall fairness referred to supervisor 
and organization, as well as the procedural, informational and overall justice of Performance 
Management. While the position will not impact how much an employee perceives the 
distributional and interpersonal justice of Performance Management.  
 
Before testing my H3, H4, H5, and H6, I coded a binary variable, in which b0= “rather not a 
family company”, which includes answers such as 1= “strongly disagree,” 2= “disagree”, 3 = 
“I cannot decide it”, while b1=“rather a family company”, which includes 4=“agree” and 5= 
“strongly agree” answers.  
 
Hypothesis 3: If a subordinate considers the company as a family business, he or she 
perceives performance management practices as fairer. (H3) 
 
Hypothesis 4: If a subordinate considers the company as a family business, he or she 
perceives performance management practices as more just. (H4) 
 
Based on the descriptive analysis of the sample, we can see that the means of those subordinates 
who consider the company as a family business are higher than those who do not. (See in  
Table 25 in Appendix 8) 
I ran the test of homogeneity of variances, in which the null hypothesis for Levene's test is that 
the variances are equal across the samples. Based on the results of the Sig value, I rejected the 
H0 for the two overall fairness scales (supervisor, organization) and procedural justice, 
distributional justice, and informational justice dimensions. In the case of interpersonal justice 
and latent justice, I could accept the null hypothesis.  interpersonal justice dimensions 
(sig=0.378). (See in Table 26 in Appendix 8). Moreover, in these two dimensions, I could reject 
the null hypothesis in ANOVA. That is, there is no difference in means. (See in Table 27 in 
Appendix 8) 
I conducted the robust tests of Brown-Forsythe and Welch, in which cases the null hypothesis 
is that the means are equal. Based on the results of the Sig value of Brown-Forsythe and Welch, 
I rejected the H0 and accepted the alternative hypothesis, that is, the means are not equal in the 
case of all fairness and justice dimensions (Procedural justice (Sig.=0.000), Distributional 
justice (Sig.= 0.000 Informational justice (Sig.=0.001), Interpersonal justice (Sig.= 0.003) 
Latent Perceived justice (Sig.=0.000) Overall fairness - organization (Sig.=0.000), Overall 




According to this statical analysis, I can confirm H3. I can state that that subordinate, who 
considers the company as a family business, perceives performance management practices 
as fairer, referring to supervisors as well as the organization.    
  
According to this statical analysis, I can confirm H4. I can state that that subordinate, who 
considers the company as a family business, perceives performance management practices 
more just regarding all dimensions.  
 
Hypothesis 5: If a manager considers the company as a family business, perceives 
performance management practices as fairer. (H5) 
 
Hypothesis 6: If a manager considers the company as a family business, perceives 
performance management practices as more just. (H6) 
 
Based on the descriptive analysis of the sample, we can see that the means of those managers 
who consider the company as a family business are higher than those who do not, except 
informational justice (See in Table 29 in Appendix 8) 
I ran the test of homogeneity of variances, in which the null hypothesis for Levene's test is that 
the variances are equal across the samples. Based on the results of the Sig value, I accepted the 
H0 for the two overall fairness scales (supervisor, organization) and all dimensions of justice, 
most probably due to smaller sample size (n=51). (See Table 30 in Appendix 8).  However, in 
the case of fairness and justice in all dimensions, I could accept the null hypothesis (See  
Table 31 in Appendix 8). Moreover, in these two dimensions, I could accept the null hypothesis 
in ANOVA. That is, there is no difference in means. (See in Table 32 in Appendix 8) 
According to this, I can not confirm H5. However, we can see that those managers who 
consider the company as a family business perceive performance management practices as 
fairer regarding to the supervisor as well as the organization.    
  
According to this, I can not confirm H6. However, we can see that those managers who 
consider the company as a family business perceive performance management practices 
more just regarding procedural, distributional, and interpersonal justice and latent justice. 
Moreover, managers have a lower std. deviation (0.85) than subordinates (1.156). 
In the case of managers, the results indicate that further research is needed, and it would be 
worthwhile to examine this in a larger sample. 
 
 
5.2.3. Limitations  
There is dynamic nature of justice. Scholars argue that employees have not only diverse 
perceptions of justice (between-individual variation), but their own perceptions of justice may 
differ from time to time within days or weeks (within-individual variation). As Greenberg 
(1993b) categorized the justice dimensions according to their structural and social natures, he 
argued that the more structural (distributive and procedural) dimensions are more stable over 
time, especially if they concentrate on the company. The significant variance within-individual 
of procedural and distributive justice was found over periods of 4 weeks (Holtz & Harold, 2009) 
and three months as well (Hausknecht et al., 2011). In contrast, more social dimensions 
(interpersonal, informational) are more mutable over time, especially if they concentrate on 
supervisors. The significant variance within-individual of these social dimensions changes 




& Harold, 2009), and daily (Loi et al., 2009). However, I did not apply a longitudinal design 
with two periods in two-three month time lag to capture possible variations in justice and 
fairness within employees over time (Colquitt & Rodell, 2015) due to the restriction of the 
pandemic, and it would have been too much of a burden for each company compared to the 
extra information gained.   
Some studies apply multiple sources while studying justice and fairness. Employees are asked 
to rate justice and report on relevant mediators, while their supervisors are asked to rate their 
team members’ outcome variables (e.g., task performance). However, scholars have limited 
knowledge of whether employees’ perceptions of justice and fairness match the view and self-
evaluation of their supervisors (Colquitt & Rodell, 2015).  
Some scholars argue that the study in justice (i.e., the degree to which the rules have adhered) 
must accompany injustice (i.e., the degree to which the rules are violated) since it is more salient 
to those who experience injustice. This intuition remained mainly uncovered by far (Colquitt et 
al., 2015; Colquitt & Rodell, 2015). Colquitt’s (2001) questionnaire asks the extent to which 
justice is adhered to and not the extent to which they are violated 
5.3. Cases  
In the next chapter, I present the four family business cases and the results of my research by 
the company. 
 
5.3.1. Family Business Case “A” 
Introduction 
Prior to establishing a company, the founder worked as a manager at a state-owned company, 
and 4-5 of his colleagues followed him and worked for him from the beginning “almost as 
family members” (Interview_A_E2). The Family Business „A” was established by the 
predecessor in 1990. Due to the ongoing investment, the company has been growing to a 
company group in the past 30 years. The founder is proud that they built the company from 
scratch, and they never privatized state property. The company has always been successful and 
profitable ever since its establishment, and it continues reinvesting into further developments. 
According to the predecessor, for a long time, it worked as a family business, even in thinking, 
because they have always counted and measured what they did (Interview_A_E2). 
It started with a livestock farm in a small village, and now they have more than 60 livestock 
farms, two slaughterhouses, three processing plants, two feed mixers, and a large waterfowl 
hatchery, which is the largest waterfowl hatchery in Europe (Interview_A_E2). The company 
group currently employs around 1.700 people. (Interview_A_U1). Its main business activities 
embrace the complete integration and processing of waterfowl ranging from breeding, hatching, 
feed mixing, raising, slaughtering, processing, and sales (Interview_A_E2).  
Since Hungary produces more in poultry (chicken, turkey, duck, and goose) than it consumes, 
especially in waterfowl species such as ducks and geese, the company plays a significant role 
in the international market. The main target areas of their exports include Europe, Far East (e.g., 
Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore), Canada, and South Africa overseas. By now, the company 




of volume in Hungary. It owns a 60% share in the volume of meat-type goose production, and 
it produces 30% of the amount in a roast duck in Hungary. (Interview_A_E2). 
The company has always been a big investor; they have reinvested all their profit. The family 
business has an appropriate credit facility. The predecessor is proud that they used normative 
subsidies, only which are available to everyone in agriculture. They are fully committed to the 
food industry, and they are considering not only the Hungarian market but also considering 
international investments. The joint venture with the French family business was also motivated 
by the expansion two years ago. The French company has Europe’s largest poultry business 
over the last 20 years with nearly 20,000 people. (Interview_A_E2). 
The family business decided to establish a joint venture with a French company aim to develop 
a more professionalized operation and management to expand its business. Even the third 
criterion of at least 50% family ownership of the firm is not fulfilled. The self-perception of 
being a family business and presence of dominant family control at the firm was confirmed by 
both qualitative and quantitative research. The interviewees all talked about the company as a 
family business, regardless of their positions. The identification of the owners with the company 
is very strong. In quantitative research, to the question that “The company, which I work for is 
a family business” employees also tended to give higher value (mean=3,7). 
Organizational and governance structure 
Regarding the firm's governance and management, the French owner did not involve in the 
management since the family business is operating effectively and profitably.  
Within the group, there is a holding firm, which owns three subsidiaries. Subsidiary A1 takes 
the agricultural spectrum of the business with 60 livestock farms, two feed mixers, and a large 
waterfowl hatchery. Subsidiary A2 is engaged in meat processing as an integrated producer and 
distributor of goose and duck products. It has three processing plants and a chicken and a goose-
duck slaughterhouse. Subsidiary A3 has been acquired at the beginning of 2020, which 
produces breaded products. The owners of the company group decided not to integrate this new 
subsidiary entirely, and they rather let its management operate it independently as a profit 
center. Subsidiary A1 and A2 have around 1500 employees, while Subsidiary A3 employees 
are circa 200 people. 
In the factory, team managers coordinate the work of the manual workers working on the 
conveyor belt. However, they coordinate the work of the team only. They do not have too many 
managerial rights such as performance appraisal etc. According to the HR director, these small 
managerial titles are given to employees easily only with a few responsibilities or rights at this 
level. Above the team leaders, there are still the shift managers, who can already approve 
holiday leave, and so on. In this sense, they are closer to the managerial position. The next level 
in the hierarchy is the site manager position, which has full authority and responsibility as a 
manager. In the supporting areas, there are white-collar employees in the office 
(Interview_A_HR3).   
The supervisory board is the supreme decision-making body of the company group. There are 
four members of the supervisory board: predecessor as the Hungarian member and three French 
members. There are three members of the board of directors, which consists of the two 
Hungarian successors (CEO/founder’s son and founder’s daughter) and a French colleague who 




Organizational performance and strategy 
Regarding the financial performance of the company, it showed stable Sales figures with some 
fluctuations in the last 3 years with a decrease 8% in 2020 while EBIT figures remained stable 
with 30% drop in Net profit in 2020 which was mainly the result of the Global pandemic hitting 
the Horeca sector . Margins are thin still considered to be in line with the very competitive 
poultry business (See also in Table 33).  
Regarding the non-financial performance of the company, the company had just finished a 15 
billion HUF program last year, and they have just started a 20 billion HUF program this year. 
(Interview_A_E2) Apart from that, the French had the capital to invest. Both the French and 
the Hungarian side were motivated to establish a joint venture together solely because of 
professional reasons to develop professionally and become a multinational corporation. 
According to the predecessor, the cooperation is very successful within the joint venture. The 
Hungarian family business can transfer and apply professional knowledge and work culture in 
their daily work from a more developed and larger company in Western Europe. Moreover, the 
company is interested in international investments and entering the international market even 
more. There are two directions of the development to support this strategic goal. First, they aim 
to invest in IT development, automation, development of processes, and management and 
control systems, since the organization grew very fast in a short period of time in the last years, 
and they have not been able to keep up with all the changes yet. (Interview_A_E2) This year 
they are planning to make improvements to the management and control system themselves 
under the direction of the owner’s daughter with the help of the French, who have already gone 
through this in their organization.  (Interview_A_U1) Secondly, in line with these 
improvements, they are planning to develop their human resources (Interview_A_E2). They 
provide English language training among the management as a first step. This will help 
implement the new technologies under the French support. It also fosters communication in the 
long run and helps transmit information between the Hungarian middle management and the 
French colleagues since technical managers can provide more exact information. Now, only the 
owners speak with the French experts, which means non-family managers often receive filtered 
information. (Interview_A_HR3) 
Nowadays, one of the biggest challenges for the company is that there is a lack of skilled people 
in crop production, animal husbandry, and the food industry in Hungary. That is why the 
company needs to pay more and more attention to recruit and select new employees and to 
retain and develop their existing colleagues (Interview_A_E2, Interview_A_U1, 
Interview_A_HR3) 
Introduction of Family ’A’ 
The predecessor has a degree in engineering and economics. He established the family business 
in 1990. His younger brother joined him right at the beginning, and they worked together. The 
predecessor/founder has an older son and a younger daughter, who already work in the company 
and are involved in the management. Both successors have a degree in economics. The son 
came voluntarily working as a university student and started work at the bottom of the ladder. 
He even got on the track for the night shift and stacked the duck at a slaughterhouse. According 
to the predecessor/owner, he did not need to encourage his son to join the company; however, 
“he could see an example at work, and the main directions in strategy” (Interview_A_E2). The 




started to work in one of the Big4s and later an American multinational conglomerate. In the 
beginning, the daughter also tried to get to know the company and work in all areas. Even the 
daughter joined the company more than five years ago, her tasks, responsibilities, and scope of 
authority are not clearly defined yet. “This is an interesting thing because I never defined 
myself, but obviously when I got there, I needed to join somewhere … I belong to the 
controlling team anyway.” (Interview_A_E2). When the company merged with a large French 
food company, she became a member of the board of directors.  Currently, four family members 
work in the company. The predecessor is a member of the four-member of the supervisory 
board. Both successors are members of the three-member board of directors. The older son 
works as a Chief Executive Director. The younger brother of the predecessor/founder works as 
a general manager at one of the three subsidiaries.  




Currently, the predecessor/founder and his son own the company. The ownership of the 
daughter will be formally settled later. The family acquires 30% of the family company group 
since it became a joint venture with a French family firm in 2018. The French family firm is 
not a financial investor, rather strategic. The son works as a Chief Executive Director. The 
family participation rate in the top management team is 67%, while family participation in the 
supervisory board representing the owners is 25%. All in all, there are four family members in 
management positions, including the predecessor/founder’s younger brother, who works as 
general manager of one of the subsidiaries. The owner family defines itself as an entrepreneurial 
actor, and its self-understanding is closer to „Family Business” rather than “Business Family”. 
The family firm governmental configuration type is a transition between the owner-manager 
and the sibling partnership. (Interview_A_U1). According to the argument of Zellweger 
(2017a) the family firm’s key challenges are dependency on owner-manager, distribution of 
responsibilities, and complementary competencies.  




The diversification of the portfolio is low. However, in line with their strategy, they are 
continuously trying to broaden it with various products both horizontally and vertically. 
Nowadays, they sell goose, duck, and chicken in breaded, roasted, and fired form.  
Currently, two generations work at the family business. They can relate more to the family first 
philosophy and prioritize family-related goals over business goals; however, they claim that 
their identification with the family business is high. The company describes a strong 
relationship with its stakeholders. The transgenerational intentions are very high. The 
predecessor has already passed the torch at the management level; however, the succession 
process is still ongoing in the dimension of ownership.  
 
Succession 
The transgenerational intentions in succession are strong within the family. There was no 
formalized succession plan.  
Regarding the ownership dimension of the succession, the French company bought 70% of the 
shares in 2018. The remaining 30% is shared by the predecessor/founder and his son. So, the 
daughter’s succession in ownership has not yet taken place. 
Regarding the management dimension of the succession, the predecessor passed the torch to 
his two children. His son became the CEO 6-8 years ago. His daughter joined the company 
later, and now she leads the accounting, finance, and controlling departments. When she joined 
the family business, she started to get to know all the areas, and then she could choose any tasks 
that she feels like. Then she was entrusted with all sorts of tasks more and more slowly. First, 
the daughter was hesitant to join the family business. On the one hand, because she wanted to 
get to know and learn something else somewhere else. On the other hand, she also thought that 
they are very different from her father in temperament. However, it turned out that the family 
values are the same. There are “never such family quarrels that used to be at the dining table on 
Sundays” (Interview_A_U1). In the family business, they are all rational economists who can 
make rational and economic decisions based on those common family values: “We operate 
along with family values”. (Interview_A_U1). 
The daughter emphasized that the support of the CEO is strong within the controlling family. 
(Interview_A_U1). The predecessors also underlined the same: “I handed it over the leadership 
to my son by saying from now on, you’re the CEO, I won’t put my oar in anything, and I was 
able to keep my promise when I saw that he would be able to do it anyway because he had 
already worked for the company here for years. It cannot be, and there is no such thing to have 
too many cooks spoil the broth or two bellwethers in one bed.” (Interview_A_E2) 
The French owner is not involved in the management at the operational level. The HR director 
also argues that she and other non-family managers do not notice so much the presence of the 
French owner in their daily operation. „There are more data provisions in the administration 
area… but they basically do not get involved in the processes.” (Interview_A_HR3) 
However, based on the interviews with nonfamily managers, there may be some ambiguity 
regarding the delegation of responsibilities and scope of authority, mainly because of the 




The younger brother of the predecessor, who works as a general manager, tries to step back 
slowly and gradually from the management, which is part of the agreement with the French 
partner (Interview_A_HR3).  
The predecessor still goes to work every day at 7 am.  He is not involved in day-to-day 
operational decisions. He is like an “invisible hand,” according to his daughter. He is only 
involved in the big decisions and big investments. (Interview_A_U1). 
 
Human Resource Management  
The HR director is a non-family manager who joined the company about a year ago. Prior to 
this, she worked for other companies in similar positions. She had no contact with any 
controlling family members before, and she applied for a job advertisement and was selected 
in a formal recruitment and selection process.     
The HR director reports directly to the CEO formally, however, the CEO is very busy, and he 
usually claims that he has no time and directs her to his sister or to the factory manager to 
discuss HR issues. “To tell the truth, at first, I didn’t even know how to relate to her (the 
daughter) because even there is an organizational structure, somehow I feel like we really don’t 
apply these hierarchies and other things.” (Interview_A_HR3). She adds that this is also a 
problem in other supporting areas.  
HR is in its infancy, but there are good initiatives and practices, which are operated satisfactorily 
and even the top management is not aware or conscious about that. “When I asked whether 
there is performance evaluation in place, they said no, we do not have, but we actually have 
them.” (Interview_A_HR3). However, managers do not always follow the rules, and they do 
not always act consistently. 
 
Performance Management System 
The successor stressed that they have a lot to do in the field of HR and “Performance 
Management is a partially effective area that needs to be improved” (Interview_A_U1). The 
aim of the performance management system is to motivate and incentivize people to pay 
attention to their work and sanction if someone does not comply. The PM focuses more on the 
past performance and accountability of the employees. That is why it supports mainly the 
decisions of distribution of bonuses and annual salary increase and dismissal, while it is only 
weakly connected to other HR systems.  (Interview_A_U1). 
According to the successor, performance management represents different values for different 
levels of employees. For blue-collar workers, the goal is to increase efficiency and quality and 
hold people accountable. That is why wages for them are the most important incentive. 
For white-collar workers, the goal is to have a long-term mindset, loyalty to the company, and 
to strengthen commitment. This should be in line with training, development needs, and future 
career goals. If there is someone who strives to find new challenges, she/he gets the opportunity 
to develop. PM should focus on the present and future performance by supporting decisions in 




example, if a farm manager, a sector manager, or a deputy sector manager in the Subsidiary A1 
wants to move up in the corporate ladder. (Interview_A_U1). 
In the following, I describe the performance management practices of different employee 
groups such as white-collar employees, manual workers at the factory, manual workers, 
sites/farm managers and sector managers at sites/farms, and finally, family managers. In the 
description, I will focus on the performance management at the sites since I conducted an 
interview with one of the sector managers, and questionnaires were also sent out to the sites.   
 
White-collar employees in the office 
There is no performance management practice such as goal settings and performance 
evaluations for white-collar workers working in the supporting areas. Performance management 
is not linked to the compensation system for them either. The salary increases were varied from 
5 to 10 % for employees last year, but the staff did not get any feedback on their performance 
and what directions they should develop in the future to explain the differences. However, this 
would help to foster perceived justice among white-collar employees. HR director already 
raised the issue to the daughter. (Interview_A_HR3), who also confirmed that key performance 
indicators (KPIs) and policies had not been introduced yet, but they consider introducing them. 
(Interview_A_U1). 
Manual Workers at the factory  
The basis of variable payment differs between the factory and the sites.  
In the factory, employees receive an increasing variable payment if they havenreceivedgot an 
unjustified absence from work for a month and thor three months. Factory managers and shift 
managers evaluate manual workers in factories. The managers did not receive any training in 
performance appraisals. According to the HR managers, there aren’t usually performance 
appraisal talks among managers and their subordinates. People usually assume the managers’ 
satisfaction of their performance through their annual bonuses, monthly variable payments, and 
salary increase. (Interview_A_HR3) 
 
Manual Workers at sites/farms 
In the site, manual workers received variable payments based on their performance evaluation 
monthly. There is a scoring system for manual employees. The site managers evaluate and rate 
employees 1 to 5 day by day based on how they performed. “In fact, it’s a performance 
appraisal, even if they didn’t put it that way.” (Interview_A_HR3) 
There are two main goals of performance management from the point of view of the sector 
manager of Subsidiary A1. Firstly, performance management ensures that the technical 
regulations and standards are complied with because if they are not, this usually leads to 
economic damages and worsening the company's efficiency and effectiveness. Secondly, the 
site managers can signal employees that their work has been checked back and held accountably 
through PM. So, they know that the assigned tasks need to be done and to the best of their 




and quantities that can be accomplished; however, there must also be a certain work rhythm. 
(Interview_A_LM4) 
The sector manager considered open communication and feedback important and paid attention 
to transparent performance appraisal processes. There is a pre-defined list of criteria, which 
manual workers must meet in each shift. Based on this, the site manager classifies the workers 
on a scale from 1 to 5 every day after each shift based on their own judgment and experience. 
At the end of the day, the farm manager posts the evaluation on a sheet so that everyone can 
see how satisfied the site manager was with each employee that day. If an employee has any 
question regarding his/her evaluation, the site manager will always answer, explain with 
him/her in person. According to the sector manager, people do not usually like criticism, but 
farm managers try to articulate these criticisms with a constructive and incentive intent. The 
sector manager emphasized that manual workers are not downgraded unjustifiably, only if the 
employee makes a mistake, does not follow, and executes the issued instructions related to 
technology or the maintenance of the site order. These omissions and mistakes have distinct 
weights and degrees in the appraisal.  (Interview_A_LM4) 
The sector manager argued that the company has a unified compensation and remuneration 
system for manual workers, which includes base salary and variable payment. In his branch, 
the variable payment is roughly 25% of the base salary. However, the variable payment amount 
varies from site to site, and it can also differ among manual workers. Skilled workers receive 
more than unskilled workers. (Interview_A_HR3) 
The site managers define the amount of the monthly variable pay of the workers based on the 
performance appraisal system. (Interview_A_LM4) 
There is a monthly closing each month when the site manager sums up the attendance sheets 
and the daily grades of each employee.  Based on this, the employee receives the variable salary 
for the current month. The sector manager approves these assessments by reviewing the site 
managers’ suggestions. Since he is in contact with his site managers daily, he usually aware of 
the glaring cases, but sometimes even the little things have happened that day. However, if he 
sees a significant deduction, which he cannot remember the reason for, he discusses it with the 
site manager. He usually does not get involved in it more since he is not the one who works 
with the site team on a daily basis. The only exception is when the sector manager needs to 
replace one of his site managers; then, he evaluates the manual workers himself that week. He 
found this practice useful since he can also check the intensity and efficiency of the work, such 
as how much time and effort are needed for each technological process. (Interview_A_LM4) 
He also argues that PM fulfills its goal and effectively works since it enhances performance and 
fosters accountability of the manual workers. In case of bigger damage caused by an employee, 
up to 50-100% of his/her monthly variable salary may be deducted, which is a sensitive loss for 
the workers. So next month, he/she will pay closer attention and handles his/her work much 
more carefully. But this is equally true also when a minimal deduction is made when someone 
had only a weaker day or two. Especially if it can be explained to him/her why his omission or 
minor mistake is not good and what the consequences may be for either the herd or the 
efficiency of the farm. “My site managers handled, communicated, and managed this well and 
usually an employee, who has one or two lower grades in a month, then the experience usually 





According to the management, this monthly time frame is the most efficient since manual 
people are less likely to be motivated by rewards, which are delayed more than a month. 
(Interview_A_LM4)  
Regarding the development of the PM, the sector manager argues that the most important thing 
is to adhere to the technological standards, rules, and regulations to the maximum. In addition, 
there are things that manual workers have no influence on, such as technical failure or bad 
weather. The main tasks for the management are to try to reduce and mitigate these effects. 
(Interview_A_LM4) 
The technology can be constantly improved in the poultry industry since there are always newer 
and newer technological elements, guidelines, tools, and equipment to achieve higher 
productivity. However, these investments and developments in technology must be made based 
on a cost-benefit analysis. The farm managers receive training on the new technological 
processes. For manual workers, there is no need for this kind of training. So, performance 
management is not linked to the training at the employment level. (Interview_A_LM4) 
 
Site managers / Farm managers 
In production, manual workers and farm managers have goals and measurable performance 
indicators on livestock farms, so a formalized and regulated performance management system 
is implemented.  (Interview_A_HR3) 
Besides this, they are also considering revising the performance appraisal and indicators for site 
managers after the development of the controlling system next year.  (Interview_A_U1) 
The sector manager shares his annual goals with his site managers. The evaluation of the site 
managers is based on the sector managers' judgment and the site's effectiveness (performance 
indicators). The site managers are evaluated quarterly. (Interview_A_LM4) 
However, the productivity of the site also depends on external factors such as bad weather, 
storm damage, or animal health problems. That is why the sector managers try to consider these 
external factors to minimize the impact on the individual performance appraisal. When the 
sector leaders evaluate their site managers, they also present the performance of the sites to the 
production director, deputy director, and owners. These presentations are just after the end of 
the quarter, so the financial closing numbers are usually not available yet. (Interview_A_LM4) 
The bonuses for site managers are based on a four-quarter assessment and depend on the 
profitability of the company at the end of the year. The budget for the end-year bonuses is set 
by the owners for the site managers each year. The sector managers decide the distribution 
among their site managers in their own competence.  
 
Sector manager 
The sector manager’s goals are set based on the previous year’s figures while keeping the 
economic numbers at an optimal level as well. The sector manager argues that he usually sets 
goals as close as possible to the limits defined in the technology handbook. These goals can be 




The performance of their site managers determines the sector managers’ performance. So, they 
need to work effectively with them. This also supports both their professional development and 
the development of the company. 
The sector managers present the quarterly performances to the founder owner’s brother, who is 
the general manager. Based on the performance evaluation, there is bonus and incentive pay for 
the sector managers as well at the end of the year. However, they don't know the possible 
amount they are eligible for. It depends on the company results, which are influenced by the 
market and the economic situation related to coronavirus. The sector manager argued that “it's 
in everyone's interest that the owners are satisfied with both professional and economic numbers 
and myself and my team have that attitude that strives for that goals.” (InterviewA_LM4) 
HR managers also confirmed that in addition to the monthly salary, the management tries to 
honor and recognize the annual performance of shift managers, site managers, and sector 
managers by giving year-end rewards. Specifically, at the end of the year, everyone got a 
monthly reward, and after the annual closing in April of next year, they also received a certain 
amount of reward which were differed individually. Three family members made the decision 
subjectively on the extent of the rewards, such as the CEO successor, the predecessor, and the 
predecessor’s brother. „It is completely subjective and different. It is up to the owners to decide 
how much they want to give.” (Interview_A_HR3) 
“The boy offspring, I know his father doesn't work here anymore, but he does, too, and the 
owner's brother, so they actually decide it. So, here, as a multinational company, it is still mixed 
with the family business.” (Interview_A_HR3) 
There are not any regulations and policies. HR director suggested writing down a corporate 
remuneration rule, but the owners think differently, and for the time being, they would like to 
keep the decision in their hands. This means that if the corporate results allow giving rewards 
and the owners want to, then they will reward. In practice, at the end of the year, they met, and 
the HR manager gave them a list of the eligible managers and how much benefit these managers 
received last year. The three of them went through the list and made the decisions based on 
different aspects, which is in their heads and unknown to the HR professional. 
(Interview_A_HR3) I would like to highlight that this practice was only described by the HR 
manager, while neither the predecessor nor the successor did not mention it in the interviews.  
 
Communication 
The daughter stressed that direct communication within the family and with colleagues is very 
important (Interview_A_U1). This principle also seems to help resolve conflicts, based on the 
following example.  
Sector managers on the production line are those who are still in contact with both the manual 
workers and the CEO and foster top-down and bottom-up communication. Interview_A_HR3) 
The company faces some challenges in both top-down and bottom-up communication. The 
owners were dissatisfied with the communication flow because it turned out that the middle 
management did not transmit the required information to their subordinates at the lower level. 




The employees may receive filtered information or do not receive those who they should be. 
The biggest gap has been between the CEO and sector managers. The CEO is overwhelmed 
and very busy dealing with many things and managing many direct reports, so it was difficult 
for the managers to reach him. (Interview_A_HR3) 
It would be necessary to delegate certain tasks, and decision-making rights to the lower level 
since the CEO do not have enough time to deal with that many managers as his direct lines at 
the three companies even though the middle managers would often need a more in-depth 
conversation about certain issues to give a cleared picture in the decision-making. 
The CEO has already appointed his deputy, who will manage the branch leaders to bridge the 
gap between the top and the middle management level. This was already planned before the 
dissatisfaction of the middle management turned out. The duties and responsibilities of the 
deputy still need to be clarified; however, he will have more time to keep in touch with sector 
managers, even give them feedback more frequently. 
 
Further development 
According to the HR manager, the performance management system needs to be developed by 
creating and implementing formal rules and policies to define and standardize evaluation 
criteria. The practice is not used consistently and varies across sites. Workers who work on a 
site also know that they get more or less than workers at other sites. According to the HR 
manager, this has already caused tension among the colleagues. (Interview_A_HR3) 
In 2021, the controlling system will be improved. Not only because they need this information, 
but there are also expectations from the French owner, so this cannot be postponed any longer. 
The controlling system can be the basis for formulating the expectations of the sector managers 
and factory managers. So, following the development of the controlling, information will also 
be available for HR to develop the performance management system. The leaders of each area 
will be involved in this with the cooperation of HR.  (Interview_A_U1) 
In connection with the preparation, they want to define more specific performance expectations 
(KPIs) such as cost per egg and hatching. When the management reviews the performance of 
the sector managers, they already view more or less these kinds of production indicators. 
Although it is not regulated in reward policy, it still helps top managers differentiate to some 
degree among sector managers. Meanwhile, the founder's brother looks at how the cost per egg 
is changing quarterly and every half of the year. He is interested in why the cost is so high, what 
they did not pay attention to. They want to clarify these indicators and upload more information 
to the controlling system for that. (Interview_A_HR3) 
Furthermore, performance management is only linked to the compensation system for manual 
workers in sites and factories. At higher levels, this still needs to be developed. During the 
COVID crisis at the end of summer, there have been more tensions, which highlighted that this 
issue needs to be addressed. At the level of sector managers, there was a high degree of 
dissatisfaction and despair. They became less loyal and started to burn out. Therefore, they did 
not communicate the information and instructions properly, which the top management wanted 




Sector managers on the production line are those who are still in contact with both the manual 
workers and the CEO and foster top-down and bottom-up communication.   
Dissatisfaction was also linked to the fact that while manual workers received a salary increase 
in line with the statutory minimum wage, the usual salary increase for site managers and shift 
managers was postponed in April due to the pandemic. This meant that these managers working 
closely with manual workers did not receive their salary increase. In many cases, these 
managers did not earn much more than their subordinates. Later the salary increase has been 
implemented retroactively from 1 August. However, the HR director argues that the company 
needs to pay attention to avoid this internal injustice next time (Interview_A_HR3).   
The CEO recognized the need for change and called for external HR consultancy to assess 
sector managers' needs, skills, and motivations by interviewing them and later providing 
training and development for them. The sector managers were able to express their opinions 
and voice their dissatisfaction during these meetings. Besides this, the predecessor’s brother 
visited the sites, told what he wanted, and listened to the middle management’s problems. The 
consultant has also given feedback to the CEO, and the positions are starting to converge 
noticeably. (Interview_A_HR3) 
 
Performance Management of Family employees 
The predecessor/founder tries to avoid giving suggestions. He was rather asked to share his 
opinion about the strategy. „I never put it this way that I would do this… and they do not require 
this.” (Interview_A_E2) 
The predecessor considers his successors as very determined, strong individuals - and more and 
more other non-family managers are also like this -, who can defend their decisions, opinions 
regarding strategy, but the principle is that every decision should be backed and proved based 
on figures and numbers. 
Before establishing the joint venture with the French partner, the predecessor with his children 
started to sit down in his office and discussed the current issues regularly (e.g., every two days 
or weekly) in the mornings, when it was necessary. During these meetings, the predecessor does 
not evaluate or give feedbacks to her children. The aim of these meetings is to discuss more the 
goal setting, strategy making and what’s happening in the market, how the external environment 
changes, and whether the development direction is good. So, the predecessor plays a role in 
showing the direction (Interiew_A_U1), and he tries to avoid giving suggestions in anyhow: „I 
almost say I avoid counseling as well” (Interiew_A_E2). The predecessor and the two 
successors do not evaluate each other’s performance either. According to the daughter, it is 
because they all know if somebody made a mistake or did something wrong. They get together 
frequently and discuss the tasks and the problems. But they do not give feedbacks by explicitly 
saying that you did this well etc. These informal discussions remained after the change of 
ownership. However, a new formal governmental mechanism is also developed when the new 
ownership structure is established.    
The two successors with a French member constitute the board of directors. The board of 
directors reports to the Supervisory Board, which meets quarterly. This is usually a half-day 




participate. The daughter makes the presentations, which the son presents to the Supervisory 
Board. Their report is about the status of the strategic goals and investments, monitoring of the 
plan, and actual data of the recent period. The formal governmental mechanism strengthens the 
informal processes, and it makes decisions made in the informal process visible. “This is an 
informal conversation with large numbers, possibly but not with a presentation and not with 
such specific prepared materials. While this quarterly supervisory board is a formal thing.” 
(Interview_A_U1) 
The principles have always been that everything must be calculated and decided based on 
profitability. However, the decision-making became more regulated and prepared as at a 
multinational company. So, they consider it as a positive development in the decision-making 
processes. Moreover, the changes in the governance add only one extra step in the hierarchy, 
so the decision-making remained fast and flexible that the colleagues could also learn and adapt 
to it (Interview_A_U1). The Supervisory Board has accepted the report every time since the 
suggestions were well-prepared, professional every time (Interview_A_E2).  
There is also an evaluation in detail every month based on the accounting report of the corporate 
governance system. The supervisory board evaluates the performance quarterly and annually 
based on the actual figures compared to the annual production plans and development 
investment plans. It also defines the task of the BoD quarterly. The BoD can make a suggestion 
on modifying the plans. (Interview_A_E2). 
There are definite development investment plans, production plans, and how they stand 
compared to the plans every year. The Board of Directors can propose changes to the plans if 
the circumstances change (e.g., COVID or birth flu), and the BoD and the Supervisory Board 
members make strategic decisions together. The Supervisory Board has always accepted the 
board of directors' proposal so far because it was prepared, professional, and there was always 
a consensus in their cooperation so far. (Interview_A_E2). 
 
Other HR  
There is leadership development training related to the compensation for sector managers. 
Besides this, the company provides mainly mandatory training.  
The company won around a HUF 100 million governmental support as a large company to 
invest in corporate training, but the HR manager faced great managerial resistance against it 
because the managers could not allocate time for dealing with it, so the company finally 
canceled their application and did not get the support. According to the HR manager, the owners 
might not be open enough towards this training since they could not see how it will pay off later 
as a long-term investment for the company. (Interview_A_HR3) 
HR manager argued that management training would be useful for team managers and shift 
managers in both the factories and the sites to retain employees and reduce fluctuations. Dealing 
with unskilled manual workers can sometimes be challenging. However, the managers also 
need to learn how to handle conflicts even if it is a stressful day. So, the conflict management 
skills of the management need to be improved. HR manager adds that management training 
would improve working conditions and environment a lot as well. In addition to that, there is 




to talk and provide information directly to the French experts, and there is no need for the direct 
involvement of the owners. (Interview_A_HR3) 
There is also excel-word training in business administration. These trainings are not channeled 
to performance appraisal; however, the successor considers it as a good idea to motivate 
personal developments for the future. (Interview_A_U1) 
 
The effect of PM practice on perceived justice 
Consistency and clarity of information, process, and expectations 
According to the successor for the blue-collar workers, the PM and PA processes work as fair 
and just. Goal setting is transparent and understandable. The strengths of the PM practice are 
that those processes and elements, which have already been in place, works well in the 
production. The goals are clearly set, the performance indicators in the livestock farms are 
understandable. The performance can be accurately measured and evaluated accordingly. The 
colleagues know the goals, and the expectations towards them are well-defined.  
In the business administration field, informational practices could work as well without 
formalized processes because of open communication, which plays a key role in the 
organizational culture. If an error occurs, it is openly discussed with the colleagues, and they 
receive feedback immediately.   
“It is from a family business or from this family nature that these communications are open to 
everyone at all levels. We do not have a formalized operation or a formalized office world.” 
(Interview_A_U1)  
The PM and PA are not so tightly controlled for the white-collar workers, and this should be 
improved to be just. (Interview_A_U1)  
Accordingly, further steps should be taken to ensure that expectations are clear and evaluation 
criteria defined and communicated properly, such as developing more accurate evaluation 
metrics. 
Communication and voice 
Based on the interview with the sector manager, the manual workers can raise their voices they 
receive a proper explanation about the assessment, but this can depend heavily on the 
personality of the sector manager. 
According to the sector manager, “the people are always prone to be more dissatisfied and 
expect more. But on the other hand, when they are confronted with real numbers, there are those 
who see after them, there are those who do not, but since the evaluation is based on professional 
and economic numbers, I think this is an exact system. After that, we, the leaders, have to 
communicate downwards and justify it based on common sense, and there is no problem with 
these” (Interview_A_LM4). If somebody complains about his grade and deduction, it is 
important for the sector manager to take the time and explain the reasons behind it. However, 
the people are different, and there is someone who accepts the explanation immediately, and 




sector manager argued that the performance management system is sensible, fair, motivating, 
and transparent. (Interview_A_LM4). 
In the case of the middle management, the complaints of the managers were listened to, and 
further measures were introduced soon to reduce their dissatisfaction. (Interview_A_HR3). 
 
The Effect of the Family 
The presence of family affects planned performance management 
Bifurcation – No bifurcation bias 
Based on the interviews, there is no bifurcation bias at the company. Family managers also need 
to meet formalized performance expectations and play a role model based on the common 
values of the family. (Interview_A_E2). They see no difference in the HR employment 
procedures. The daughter also mentioned as an example that employment is equally flexible for 
family and non-family workers. Family managers take their leave in the same way as everyone 
else. (Interview_A_U1). 
Formalization 
 Informal processes still play a major role in the management structure. 
The low level of formalization of the management structure is particularly striking compared 
to the high level of formalization of the governance mechanisms. Compared to the size and 
continuous growth of the organization, the performance management system and its processes 
and the controlling system are not formalized enough, and the management argued that 
formalized processes should be expanding to other areas as well. (Interview_A_U1; 
Interview_A_HR3). “Compared to this big size of the company, this is still a drop in the 
ocean… there is little room for maneuver.” (Interview_A_HR3) 
 Formal systems are being introduced gradually and only where it is necessary. 
Where performance can be measured directly in production areas, objective performance 
evaluation is used for manual workers. Formal systems are being introduced gradually and only 
in areas where it is necessary (e.g., size, mass-production, quality assurance). Where a strong 
organizational culture and personal relationships can replace formal management processes, 
they keep engaging in the informal practice. 
The HR manager even argued that when it is already very necessary, and there is a lot of tension 
and dissatisfaction, the management reacts and takes steps. „We won’t deal with it until it starts 
to get very tense” (Interview_A_HR3)  
 CEO as a driving force in formalization and professionalization. 
The HR manager emphasized that first, the owner-managers need to accept the need for 
formalized systems. They need to realize they must introduce formalized processes to retain the 
workforce. (Interview_A_HR3) According to the HR manager, the importance and attitude of 
the leader are much more important in the current situation than whether the company is a 




force if he gets into something and decides on something, and the company must do it, and there 
is no going back.” (Interview_A_HR3) 
 
The effect of family influence on actual PM practice 
The family controls the appraisal processes of managers and office workers 
While the predecessor is a supervisory board member, he stated that he is no longer involved 
in operational management. The successor daughter also confirmed that the predecessor gives 
only guidelines, but he is no longer involved in the decisions. 
At the same time, non-family managers perceive like the predecessor is still present in the 
performance appraisal. The CEO, the predecessor’s brother, and the predecessor decide on the 
year-end bonuses and salary increases, while the HR manager's evaluation mechanisms and 
criteria are unknown. The family has complete control over the process. 
 
Predecessors support formal processes informally and help develop and design them 
even as part of the succession  
The sector managers present the quarterly performances to the founder owner’s brother, who is 
the general manager. „We are mainly used to present quarterly to him because he supervises 
and controls the production side from the owner family. But of course, he also informs the 
founder-owner or predecessor owner may ask it directly from the sector managers. What is the 
situation in our area? Is there a problem? How do the sites perform? So, it varies. So, this is 
such a family company, the roles are divided according to which area of the company is 
supervised by which family member in the first place, but because it is a family, another family 
member sometimes asks us. This is completely natural because everyone in the family belongs 
to the circle of owners.” (Interview_A_LM4) 
When I asked about the two successors' role in the sites' evaluation process, the line manager 
argued that both are more looking at the company’s economic numbers. “They ask about 
professional numbers less often than the founder’s brother or the founder himself, but they are 
still interested in it. They prefer to look at the economics side because, if I am right, they both 
have a degree in economics. So, they tend to oversee that area.” (Interview_A_LM4) 
The presence of the predecessor provides extra motivation for employees during regular 
evaluations 
Besides formal processes, the predecessor also takes advantage of the motivation that comes 
from personal relationships. Owner predecessors may participate in evaluations next to the 
superior managers, which is motivating for all participants.  
 
The effect of family influence on perceived PM practice 
Family managers’ ownership approach can strengthen employees’ perceptions of 




According to the predecessor, there is a difference between family and non-family firms. As 
long as the owner is also active in the family businesses, there is an ownership approach. Non-
family employees “no matter how well they are working, they may not be able to practice the 
ownership thinking day by day as the owners do” (Interview_A_E2). He always had a sense of 
responsibility or an obligation for the nearly 2,000 people working there. “I'm not motivated to 
make a profit ... I add that I don't have anything 50-50% outside of our family house, so I don't 
have a house abroad, I don't have a holiday home, neither at Lake Balaton, unfortunately, or 
not. So, the main motivation has always been to build the company from scratch, so this is a 
very big success, a very big experience for us, so this company needs to develop.” 
(Interview_A_E2). 
Based on the ownership approach, family members are motivated intrinsically to set an example 
for the other non-family employees. To the question of whether there is a difference between 
the performance expectations and evaluations of family members and other non-family leaders, 
the predecessor answered the following: “They have already known that without me ever telling 
them. The task is to come after me. It’s not that you order others to go and do it, but rather you 
say come after me, and we’ll do it. That has always been the case… my brother got up at 4 am 
and called me at 6 am from the livestock farm. My daughter came from Budapest today. She 
was here at 8:30 am after more than a two-hour-long drive... in the afternoon, she closes the 
company. So, I didn’t have to; it wasn’t like that, there’s no difference.” (Interview_A_E2) This 
indicates that common values serve as guidelines for family members in case of performance 
and work. Family members should act as role models and work harder, not because they must 
but because they are intrinsically motivated to do so.  
According to the predecessor/founder, both successors have a similar attitude to work. They 
work a lot, and even they need to be held back. They had to gain knowledge in order for their 
colleagues to accept them, especially those who had been working there for 15-30 years. He 
argues that the leader must have the knowledge to conduct professional conversations 
effectively (Interview_A_E2). The daughter also confirmed that it was important for them that 
they did not immediately sit in the boss's chair. Thus, they could gain the recognition of their 
colleagues during that time (Interview_A_U1). 
In their family, performance is always linked to the requirement of setting goals, which are 
measurable and achievable. It is also important that it is rewarded or acknowledged if it is 
achieved, so it is a good thing. In her childhood, she learned that “it's always something we're 
heading for… something that one set, not just one is floating in space. And then fight to work 
hard. Well, I think it’s such a general family principle that work should bear fruit; you just must 
be persistent.” This value is reflected in the family business so that if one works fairly then, the 
company recognizes him/her. (Interview_A_U1) 
The effect of family influence on the outcome of PM practice 
Loyalty is an important evaluation aspect in performance management, as those who 
have worked there in the past know the strategic goals better, and thus, they are more committed 
to them. In the long run, this can foster both individual and organizational performance. 
Regarding the evaluation, the daughter argues that loyalty is also a performance indicator in a 
family business, so “this is also an aspect of performance, how loyal someone is to the company, 




Family values are also interwoven with the performance appraisal. In their case, they value 
loyalty as a plus in performance appraisal. That means the family firm values trustworthy 
colleagues, work for the company’s interest, and think long-term. “So, when we talk about the 
salary increase at the end of the year and then it’s okay to bring the numbers and okay how 
much you can deliver for the company’s sake along with its values. But will he/she be here still 
in the long term for sure? Can we account for him still working here for years?” 
(Interview_A_U1) 
Based on this judgment, the family firm can give a colleague the opportunity to move up the 
corporate ladder and can build a career if he/she wants to. The successor argues that valuing 
loyal people pays off for the company in the long run since the colleague can understand better 
what, why, and how the company works. He/she understands the goals, the strategy of the 
family firm. In contrast, it is not effective for a large non-family multinational company if 
someone wants to know other areas because it costs extra time, energy, and money. She also 
adds that this opportunity is open for white-collar people and blue-collar people, especially now 
when it is very difficult to find and keep an employee. 
 
The family CEO is able to respond immediately and effectively to dissatisfaction with 
the system with the support of the family. 
Due to the dissatisfaction of middle management, the management did not transmit and 
communicate the messages of the owners to the lower levels properly. The reason for 
dissatisfaction was the lack of salary increases at management levels due to the pandemic. 
The CEO took action immediately and effectively as follows. The wages were increased. They 
assessed the situation to get to the bottom of the problem with the involvement of an 
independent consultant. As a result, they were planning to start leadership training for 
managers. The founder’s brother, as general manager, also visited the sites to communicate the 
messages of the top management properly. Finally, a deputy director has been hired and 
appointed under the CEO, who can control the area more intensively and also ease the CEO 
from managing the production area. 
The impact of the family business system on the family system 
During my analysis, I did not find any effect of the family business system on the family system.  
The power structure has not been reflected in a formal governance structure. As a member of 
the board, the daughter controls the support areas at the operational level, but this is not reflected 
in the formal structure with a corresponding leadership position. Yet informally, she is 
considered as the leader of the given fields more and more. Non-family managers adapt to that.  
 
Other elements of the conceptual framework 
Contextual factors  
Internal fairness is achieved within each site; however, external unfairness between sites exists. 




sector managers know the differences, as they manage not only one but usually several sites. 
This can be traced back to two reasons.  
Different labor market situations cause inequalities between sites 
The sites are in different regions, where the prices and income levels are different. 
(Interview_A_HR3). 
Due to different levels of technology, the requirements for the workforce are different 
 
Each site has different technological capabilities and requires different technical skills from the 
workers. So, in one place, a worker must do more physical work; in the other place, he/she must 
understand more about how different ventilation systems work. These affect the extent of the 
basis of the bonuses significantly. The manual workers are mainly unaware of these differences 
between sites. At the same time, it has happened that this information has leaked, and the 
workers in less-earning farms found out and complained that they are earning less compared to 
others. While the managers agree with the differences, it is untraceable from an HR perspective, 
and it also makes management support difficult for HR (Interview_A_HR3). 
While manual workers received a salary increase in compliance with the law, salary 
increases of the management were delayed due to COVID. That caused dissatisfaction at 
management levels. 
The company has grown drastically within a short period of time, and the management 





5.3.2. Family Business Case “B” 
 
Introduction 
The company is located in East-Central Hungary, which is part of Northern Great Plain. The 
family firm employs around 250 people. The company was founded in the early '90s, and it has 
been growing steadily ever since. It is engaged in vegetable and fruit processing and quick-
freezing in two plants in Hungary. It has two subsidiaries. The Hungarian subsidiary provides 
fruit and vegetable raw materials for production. The other subsidiary is engaged in the 
packaging and sale of quick-frozen fruit and retail vegetable products in Romania. The vast 
majority of its sale is intended for export.  
Regarding the basic process technology of the main company activity: Vegetables require such 
as corn and beans high volume and high technology, while the fruits need low volume and 
technology since at one time the processed amount of fruit is small. 
The vegetable and fruit processing and quick-freezing industry is a large capital-intensive 
industry. 
The biggest challenge of the industry is that fruit and vegetables cannot be processed during the 
whole year. In the beginning, the company must achieve a one-year sales volume in a 7-month 
original processing cycle. Later, they could increase their proceeding period for 8-9 months a 
year by investing in their storage capacity and adding new plants to their production structure. 
However, their biggest Belgian competitor is about to achieve ten month-long proceedings 
period by including other additional plants in the production structure.  
There are high barriers to entry into the market. That is why newcomers rarely appear in 
Hungary, and their main competitors are mainly from other countries. The competition is 
expected to be sharpened more and more in the upcoming years because of growing competitors 
in Ukraine and Russian.  
In 2008, they bought a plant with a storage capacity of 1,800 tons, which they extended to 
32,000 tons. Its production capacity increased from 4-5 thousand to 12-13 thousand in the first 
year. 
The Romanian subsidiary has been profitable for years, and the owners were able to find 
management there who is loyal to them, and they can trust the management to manage the 
company with great autonomy. The company has embarked on significant developments over 
the past year, which will last until 2024 in the coming years.  
Their first plant is in a village, where the family lives. They consider themselves local patriots, 
and they aim to maintain the operation in their first plant. However, they know from the 
beginning that the old plan is unsustainable in the long run because of its limited capacity. That 
is why they bought their second plant in 2008. Until the successors joined and it became a little 
easier to manage the company, the parents were reluctant to have a go at the investment and 
development of its second plant due to its complexity, including biological wastewater 
treatment, replenishing wetland areas, etc. They started the investment project last year, which 
they planned to last from 2020 to 2024 until the new plant can operate in full capacity. The 
family business has outstanding performance indicators due to the company controlling system 




controlling system is maintained to raise the money needed for developments. However, this is 
unsustainable and cannot be maintained in the long run since it means people are required to 
work under a lot of pressure due to measuring them on a strict schedule. After the investment 
projects finish, the owners retire, and the company can follow a much looser and sustainable 
business operation (Interjú_B_E3). 
The company is very successful with excellent financial and efficiency indicators. The business 
is characterized by continuous development that meets the security needs of its employees. 
(Interjú_B_LM2). The company showed significant growth in the last three years in all key 
financial metrics. Sales increased with a CAGR of 20%, while profitability increased even with 
a higher growth rate showing a CAGR of 42% in EBITDA and 35% in Net Profit. As a result, 
both EBITDA and Net Profit margin increased from 12.4% to 17.6% and 8.5% to 10.9%, 
respectively. This performance is quite remarkable and ranks well in industry comparison. (See 
also in Table 34) 
 
Introduction of Family ‘B’ 
The company was founded by the two parents in the early ‘90s. Nowadays, seven family 
members work at the family business. The parents still lead the company group as executives. 
The mother is responsible for the production and finances. The father is responsible for the so-
called “business”: the supply of raw materials, keeping contact with farmers, defining sales 
directions, and implementing daily operational developments. The two parents make decisions 
jointly in strategy and development. However, the father already has shared the duties related 
to commercial activities with their son. While the father is engaged in domestic trade, the son 
is responsible for the export trade and Romanian subsidiary from 2021 as part of the succession. 
Their son started to work at the family business eight years ago. Their daughter has been 
working there since 2015 after she graduated from the university. (Interview_B_E3) 
The daughter started working in the marketing department and dealing with product packaging. 
These tasks and areas did not exist previously at the company, so she had to figure it out by 
herself without a mentor or a manager (Interview_B_U1). During this time, she had the 
opportunity to get to know the company and its daily operation better as an employee. Through 
employer branding, which is an overlap area of marketing and HR, she became more and more 
involved in HR. She became an HR manager a year ago after the HR manager at the time had 
to leave the company due to health concerns. Currently, she is responsible for marketing and 
HR. The two sisters of the mother are part of the top management team. For 10-15 years, the 
eldest sister of the owner (mother) was the third person in the company and worked as a 
Production Director. She has retired now, but she is still a board member and the deputy of the 
current director of production. The mother’s brother-in-law also works as a non-manager 









Currently, four family members own the company. The family acquires 100% of the company 
group. The successors own 95% of a family business with 20% of the voting rights and dividend 
rights, while the parents own 5% of the family business with 80% of the voting rights and 
dividend rights. The family participation rate in the top management team is almost 25%. There 
are six family members out of 25. The executive is a family member. The family firm 
governmental configuration type is a transition between the owner-manager and the sibling 
partnership. Their family rather prioritizes family first than business. According to this, in line 
with the argument of Zellweger (2017a) the family firm’s key challenge is the dependency on 
owner-manager and succession.  
The owners still manage the company, and two generations work at the family business. The 
owner family defines itself as an entrepreneurial actor, and its self-understanding is closer to 
„Family Business” rather than “Business Family.” The diversification of its product portfolio 
is low. The company group includes four company including a non-operational subsidiary. 
They can relate more to the family first philosophy and prioritize family-related goals over 
business goals. The company has a strong relationship with its stakeholders. The family 
member’s identification with the company is high. When I asked about the values, which PM 
can represent at the company, the successor answered this way: “It’s a knotty question, 
especially as a person whose company is like his/her sibling. We used to say with my brother 
that it is our third sibling because we are three… the firm is the youngest. We are the two 
seniors, my brother and I, and then the company comes.” (Interview_B_U1) 
 
Succession 
The parents started to pass the torch on to their two children. The two successors have already 
taken over some part of the management. The owners/parents want to carry out the investment 
under their supervision and control to help to start the plant, create the production structure, and 
the final organizational structure. They want to hand over an independent, functioning, long-




The owners are planning to engage loyal non-family senior executives by involving them in 
ownership after the major investments and developments are over. The predecessors have built 
the company as owner-managers together by supporting each other from the beginning. They 
have the necessary knowledge and background to lead the company group. However, they 
worked a lot, and their children do not want that, and they also do not intend that for their 
children (Interjú_B_E3). The priority of their daughter is to establish a family and have a child 
in the coming years (Interjú_B_U1). It would place a huge burden on their son alone, who has 
also got his own family. That is why the predecessors want to give ownership stake to their 
loyal managers to provide the same support to their children in management in the future when 
they pass the torch. (Interjú_B_E3). This means that the owners think of mixed succession both 
in management and ownership later.  
 
Human Resource Management 
As part of the professionalization, the HR position was formed at the company three years ago. 
Nowadays, it is under the control of the daughter as an acting HR manager, and the HR 
department consists of two HR colleagues and the labor team besides her. (Interjú_B_U1)   
The HR strategy consists of four elements: 1) a corporate culture that recognizes performance; 
2) training and qualifications, 3) employee involvement, 4) external-internal communication. 
All other HR practices and measures were built upon and in line with these four elements. They 
have tried to implement practices that, on the one hand, the company can handle, so it can be 
undertaken in both financial and human resources, and on the other hand, they foster employee 
retention in the short, medium, and long term based on them. The impact of each measure on 
motivation is examined not by organizational departments but by company level.  
The hierarchy of the organization is high, and it consists of 7-8 organizational levels. 
At the bottom of the hierarchy, there are skilled workers and manual workers. Most of them 
have whether eight classes or graduated from a vocational high school. At a higher level of the 
hierarchy, there are middle managers who usually have also graduated from a vocational high 
school as some of their subordinates. At the top management level, there are senior executives 
and directors. There is a huge gap between middle management and top management in 
expertise, work experience, and qualifications. That is why team leaders are between the two 
levels mentioned above as an intermediary level. (Interview_B_U1) 
 
Performance management and appraisal system 
Performance management aims to give feedback, show appreciation to the employees, and 
foster commitment as a stable company.  It is key that employees are asked about their own 
development needs and career path, while financial benefits are less important from year to 
year. The performance appraisal system and its related performance appraisal form is rather a 
„performance measurement system,” and it is strongly linked to their remuneration and 
premium system, the so-called “incentive system” at the company. “There is still a confusion 
about what is considered a performance appraisal and what is an incentive system” even among 




a performance appraisal system. This means that the achievement of numerical annual targets 
is mainly evaluated, and job-related competencies are not taken into account.  
There are annual performance appraisal discussions, which are part of the company culture 
at all levels, such as senior executive, middle management, and factory worker level. 
Employees are asked about their opinions and suggestions about the improvements regarding 
their jobs, their supervisors, and the company for many years to increase employee 
involvement. (Interview_B_U1) 
 
At the factory worker’s level 
There is an appraisal discussion at the factory worker’s level as well, in which the supervisor, 
the worker, and an HR generalist participate. At one point, the supervisors are asked to leave 
by HR to openly give feedback about their supervisors.   (Interview_B_U1).   
At the middle management level 
Performance appraisal discussions have a long history in the family business at every level, 
from the middle management level. HR employee, the middle manager as appraisee, and his/her 
direct supervisor as an appraiser participate in the discussion. They went through a supporting 
sheet focuses on questions like “how you feel at the company?”, “tell us about the past year?”, 
“what are your suggestions to help your work?” (Interview_B_U1). During these discussions, 
they did not give direct feedback and did not discuss the assessment of the objectives, which 
was set previously. Since last year these discussions and the related sheets were redesigned and 
shift from collecting narrative answers to numeric feedbacks and scales to support statistical 
metrics more.  
At the top management level 
The two owner-managers define the family business’s vision and strategy. The board of 
directors is involved in the development of the strategy. That is why they can identify with 
strategic goals. Besides the individual discussions at every level, there is a 2-day-long 
leadership meeting with family and non-family senior executives once a year. In addition to 
this, there is another leadership meeting with senior executives and middle managers in which 
each department's vision and strategic goals are communicated and discussed openly, including 
the successor’s individual goals.   
Currently, the four owners participate in the appraisal discussions with the top management.  
There are 25 managers in the senior executive team, including the four owners. Previously, only 
the two parents sat down with each top manager together or separately, either just the mother 
or just the father. Two years ago, the son joined the performance reviews, then a year later, the 
daughter also joined them. 
According to the non-family manager, the family members are very impulsive people, so they 
tell it immediately if there is a problem. So, the year-end evaluation conversation is usually 
always an extremely positive, motivating, or performance-recognizing conversation. 
He also adds that “in my opinion, this is one of the most valuable forums… you can talk much 




Top managers who do not contact the owners daily and have had performance or other people 
management problems during the year will discuss them with the owners there, but the senior 
manager argued that these discussions are always about the future and find ways to correct 
them. (Interview_B_LM2) 
Family employees 
Performance evaluations and discussions among family members are usually not formalized. 
There is not necessary since they often talk about work in family lunches or dinners as well. 
(Interview_B_E3) However, they set individual goal settings currently (Interview_B_U1)  
First, there was no specific performance evaluation for both successors in the beginning. They 
mainly relied on external feedbacks of the partners as main indicators. As the parents trust more 
and more in their capabilities, they have been entrusted with tasks with more and more 
responsibilities. For example, one of the successors dealt with packaging and organizing events 
in the marketing departments in the beginning. The external partners gave positive feedbacks.  
Later, she got the product innovation, and several products have won international awards at 
world food exhibitions. She had no performance evaluations, and it was not said out loud, but 
she knew that she “brought something to the table in that year.” (Interview_B_U1) 
That year was a turning point for not just her but for both siblings, even though her brother had 
worked for the company there longer than her. The family started to formally set annual goals 
for both successors, which linked to the compensation system. They agreed to review and 
evaluate the achievement of the goals twice a year.  
Formal goal setting and performance evaluation were preceded by three conditions here. First, 
the successors have already got to know the family business and developed a more substantial 
work identity. Second, they both established their own families; thus, financial incentives 
became more critical than their earlier stage at the company. Third, the parents also were 
satisfied with their work and attitude: “Our commitment to the company, to our job itself, and 
our diligence matter a lot for my parents. For us, that is very important. You must take an exam 
about these first. Obviously, they look at us exponentially more rigorously than other top 
managers, but that is the way of life; it is normal.”  (Interview_B_U1) 
The discussions about the individual annual goals and performance reviews took place at the 
mother’s office on weekdays and in the family house with their parents during the weekends 
when all four worked. That is why both siblings know each other’s individual annual goal 
settings and the process of how they got there.    
The formal performance goal settings had a positive impact on the development of the 
successors. The goal-setting entailed more responsibilities and accountabilities for them.  “You 
have to perform, and the goals must be completed on time, you must meet by deadlines. But I 
think it was absolutely constructive for both of us.” (Interview_B_U1) Later, there was open 
communication about the annual individual goals of the successors and the leadership meetings 
with non-family senior and middle management. 
During the performance reviews, the parents also gave feedback on their work attitudes and 
personalities, what kind of career opportunities, development path, and roles they see in them 
in the future. “What kind of vision they see in us. Actually, this is the point of performance 




they are assigned to us in the company…”(Interview_B_U1). During these reviews, they also 
talked about succession. One of the successor’s future roles as a mother is also considered in 
the planning. Do they discuss who will be those key people who support the son while their 
daughter is on maternity leave for years? Goal settings and reviews are strongly linked to 
succession planning. The future involvement of non-family managers in succession in 
management and ownership also leads to formalization. 
 
Other HR 
The results of performance appraisal are linked to other HR subsystems as well. In the 
following, I discuss this by each system to show that PM is an integral part of HR and develops 
organically with the other subsystems at the Family Business “B.”   
Training and development 
First, the line managers fill in a development form with their strengths and areas for 
improvements regarding competencies for managing change, collaboration, quality of work, 
professional knowledge.  And what kind of specific training or support they need to achieve 
these goals. Second, individual development discussions take place in which the line managers 
and their supervisors discuss the individual development goals in the short, medium, and long 
term based on the expectations of both sides. The company has had a positive experience with 
this practice since around nine out of ten line managers could articulate their need for 
improvement last year (Interview_B_U1).  
Compensation 
The non-family manager argued that at a lower level, almost only money motivates people 
effectively, while at a middle-upper level, other motivators can have more effects (e.g., working 
environment) (Interiew_B_LM2).  
The business cycle is from June 1 to May 31 of the following year. At the beginning of the 
business year, the company sets the premium targets for each employee in the factories from 
directors to middle management levels, so office workers and manual workers are omitted. The 
individual premium target setting includes three main indicators: efficiency, cost reduction, 
quality improvement with different weights. The weights of the three categories must add up to 
100%. Efficiency indicator usually gets the highest weight. The company also set general 
principles for the payment of the premium (e.g., production volume, sale of stocks, etc.). In line 
with this, the premium payments are in May, October, and December. If the production 
minimum is met regarding the whole company, an advance premium will be paid in October, 
which is 30% of the premium. The 30% of the premium is paid as a second payment in 
December. It is linked to the result of the given plant and individual performance, while the 
production maximum of the whole company must also be met. The remained 40% of the 
premium is paid as a third payment in May, and it is only connected to individual performance. 
The base of the premium payment ranges around two- and three-month salary at the middle 
management level (Interview_B_U1).  




The updating of job descriptions preceded the development of performance management. 
However, the job descriptions were updated, particularly not for the PM system but for two 
other reasons. First, the company launched a leadership development program last year and to 
evaluate the skills and effectiveness of management. HR applied a leadership assessment tool, 
which required up-to-date job descriptions at the management level. Second, the job 
descriptions of skilled workers must have been actualized as a result of a labor inspection as 
well (Interview_B_U1). 
Recruitment and selection 
Both the leadership development program and the performance appraisals pointed out that 
several shift managers were underperformed since they did not have the required management 
skills and competencies. This caused inefficiency of their works and stress. “The question arose 
automatically, how did we select these people?” (Interviuew_B_U1) In conclusion, the 
company reviewed its recruitment and selection program.   
HR controlling 
In 2020 the company started to develop an HR controlling and reporting system, which enables 
the company to track manual workers’ work history. Before that, it had happened that a worker 
hadn’t shown up for work for weeks without any notice. In addition to costing a lot of resources 
to fill the missing workforce for the company, these kinds of destructive behaviors are left 
without consequences. Now, the HR controlling system can monitor workers weekly and 
monthly in terms of working hours, holidays, and sick leaves. So, the supervisors can take 
immediate action, such as giving discipline and dismissal if it is necessary. Owing to these 
quick wins, the company determined to keep developing the HR controlling system.   
 
Further developments 
The goals set and the amount of work to be done are more than they can achieve or accomplish. 
Goals need to be improved to make them more realistic and achievable. (Interview_B_LM2). 
The interviewees identified the following areas for improvement in the case of the performance 
appraisal system. Online performance reviews, automated workflows, and reports systems 
should be implemented in the future. Since in the current system, supervisors cannot tell 
whether the targets of the middle managers have been met and, if so, by what percentage. The 
top management delegates the goals to the middle management level. However, the middle 
management does not receive feedback on the fulfillment of these goals quarterly or semi-
annually. Moreover, they do not receive feedback on their skills and competencies to be 
developed related to their jobs. As a result, several middle managers performed under 
expectations (Interview_B_U1).  
Currently, they receive feedback, emails, and thoughts from the performance appraisal 
discussions, but these are mainly random, ad-hoc, and intuition-based. They have no well-
documented information about the performance of the middle management. According to the 
daughter/HR manager at this size of the company, this current system cannot support the HR 
strategy effectively. Or only if the top management takes efficient time to keep asking their co-





The successor argues that “there is probably a problem with communication” 
(Interview_B_U1). There seems to be a communication gap between directors and the middle 
management, and the owners find inefficient the way how the directors communicate and 
delegate the goals to their senior executives. To foster communication, they organize director 
forums and middle management forums every month. However, one of the supervisors should 
always be there to control the work of the middle managers. Middle managers need to 
communicate the company’s vision and strategic goals to employees by strengthening top-down 
communication. However, they often cannot delegate tasks, organize work, and treat people 
properly. (Interview_B_U1). 
Training for senior management is necessary to develop people management skills, treat people 
properly, and adapt to change constantly. (Interview_B_LM2) Middle managers, who currently 
left the company, can't with the change management at the company  
The successor daughter also confirmed that those middle managers who currently resigned left 
because they couldn’t handle the changes at the company. (Interview_B_U1) 
 
The effect of PM practice on perceived justice 
Communication and voice 
There is intense top-down and bottom-up communication to transfer vision and strategic goals 
and get employees involved in the developments at all levels.  
Employees are asked about their opinions and suggestions about the improvements regarding 
their jobs, their supervisors, and the company for many years to increase employee 
involvement. (Interview_B_U1; Interview_B_E3) 
According to the predecessor, a company works well if it has good communication. They 
organized the tasks by involving the people, forming different working groups, and giving them 
feedback on the development they suggest previously (Interview_B_E3) 
Consistency and clarity of information, process, and expectations 
The owners strive for consistency and clarity to establish a shared understanding of goals at 
the top management level. However, due to the differences in the middle management skills, 
the consistency and clarity of information at the manual worker level may differ up to the 
managers.  
The changeability of decisions, processes, goals, and principles 
Deadlines for meeting goals are not set by consensus, so the needs of individuals and groups 
are not always considered. (Interview_B_LM2) That indicates that the top and middle managers 
avoid conflicts to set realistic goals. Leadership training would support the development of this 
process.   
 
The Effect of the Family 




No bifurcation bias, but expectations are higher toward successors  
According to the predecessors, there is no difference between family and non-family employees 
regarding the evaluation of one’s performance. There is no privilege and entitlement; everybody 
is judged based on their work and performance: “There can be no difference because I forbid it 
to a great extent.” (Interview_B_E3) 
The goal setting and the performance evaluation of the successors are perceived as transparent. 
And both the successors and predecessors agree that there is no bifurcation practice in favor of 
the family employees. In fact, the successor claims that “Obviously, they look at us 
exponentially more rigorously than other top managers, but that is the way of life, it is normal.”  
(Interview_B_U1). The senior manager also confirmed that: “The parents are even stricter with 
them (ed. successors) than with the others, since they are both maximalists… and thus they 
obviously expect the same from their own children… they have the same goal-setting, the same 
expectations, and even that, when it comes, they get the same downfall, so there is no exception 
to this.” (Interview_B_LM2). So, there is not any bifurcation practice, which is in favor of the 
family employees. That fosters fairness among non-family employees. The stricter treatment 
toward family employees has not caused any unfairness because of the same values they all 
share.  
Equal treatment and transparency of goal settings and performance reviews are viewed as the 
family firm operating in a professional way. „It is also visible, but it is also transparent, and the 
company cannot be operated otherwise. Now, if serious people are working somewhere, this 
cannot be done in contrast to other serious people.” (Interview_B_LM2). 
Bifurcation bias favoring a family member who is identified as the “extended hand” of 
the owner 
If a family member is identified with the owners fully and acts as an “extended hand” of the 
owner can be eligible for privileges.  
While in the case of the younger sisters of the mother, the year-end performance evaluation is 
also carried out due to her job; the owner acknowledged that her older sister had privileges 
because she was the second person in the company for 10-15 years and had a close relationship 
with her until she retired. The owner communicated to the workers in that way “she is my 
extended hand in the factories.” (Interview_B_E3) 
Identification with the owner was so great that the employees probably did not perceive the lack 
of formalized performance assessment in her case as unfair. It would be like the owner would 
have assessed herself.  
Formalization 
They introduce a formal PM system by relying on informal processes to incorporate 
main principles (e.g., credibility, efficiency). 
They assess the situation first before the policy-making. For example, in housing support for 
middle managers, the owners assessed through superior managers who deserve to be included, 
what criteria they meet, and what impact it would have on employees’ motivation and 




that the policy is sufficiently motivating and, at the same time, the management remains 
credible during its application. 
Formalized performance management practices for successors  
There is a formalized performance management and assessment for successors, which leads to 
equal treatment and transparency of goal settings. According to Sundaramurthy (2008)  
transparent performance appraisal and compensation policies provide opportunities to build 
system-related trust to help the family firm manage the expectations of future generations. 
Ambiguity in the roles, expectations, and obligations is also a critical source of conflict, which 
can lower interpersonal trust levels. Consistency and transparency foster process-based justice 
or procedural justice. 
When the successors got to know the company and proved their competence, diligence, 
commitment and were about to start their own family, they felt the need to establish financial 
independence by setting a performance-based bonus system with transparent goals.  
Evaluation is carried out jointly with parents and children (transparency) and started 
at the same time regardless of how long they worked for the company (equality).  
The importance of personal relationships is incorporated in the performance appraisal 
system 
In a family business, directness with employees and a family atmosphere is very important. The 
controlling family places great emphasis on open communication and personal relationship in 
the family business. There are annual performance appraisal discussions, which are part of the 
company culture at all levels (senior executive, middle management, and factory worker level). 
 
The effect of family influence on actual PM practice 
Owners as family conduct performance appraisal reviews with the top management 
team  
The four owners conduct performance appraisal reviews with the 25 non-family managers in 
the top management team. As the successor stressed that her parents care a lot about their senior 
executive team, and they feel that it is also crucial for the people: „These people appreciate a 
lot if we show interest in how they feel and what kind of conflicts they have…” 
(Interview_B_U1). The owners did not participate or show up in the annual discussions at the 
middle management and worker level, but the reason behind this, according to the owner not 
because they do not want to but because they cannot get there anymore because of their other 
duties (Interview_B_E3). 
 
The effect of family Influence on Perceived PM practice 
Personal relationship – management by walking around 
The owner always goes around the factory, and she claims that she knows 80% of people by 
name. She is convinced that people need a personal conversation. That strengthens the 




“I stop by to talk to this and that people, so they also know my family, my current situation, so 
I also know the situations of many. I ask what about them, how they feel, what’s going on. So, 
I think it’s good for the people too. I also usually stop by to talk to the last manual worker… I 
talk 5-8-10 people for sure every week at different levels, so I don’t sit in a management office. 
No-no. So anyway I go down to the factory, they work three shifts, it's not too late, anytime, 
even if I go home at 6 in the evening, I go around for an hour to see whom I can meet, whom I 
can talk to, so I finish my day there.” (Interview_B_E3) 
However, as the company develops year by year, the company’s culture also must change. The 
family atmosphere, the directness with the employees, are difficult to be maintained at the same 
level. The successor argued that it might not be suitable to bring emotions into the workplace 
that much. (Interview_B_U1) 
Family managers’ ownership approach can strengthen loyalty and employees’ 
perceptions of fairness through setting an example of a hard-working work ethic.  
Loyalty is very high in the family business. Employees can see that the owners work the most; 
even though they could do that, they don’t. They are held in respect and esteem, which also 
increases commitment and a more robust perception of fairness in the company. 
“After all, if you see that the owners work themselves from morning till night, and the 
owner/mother is the last to go home every weekday and on weekends and she works, works, 
works, then one always pulls off one's hat. And it also compels respect from the workers 
unawares.” (Interview_B_LM2) 
 
The effect of family influence on the outcome of PM practice 
Non-family manager with ownership promoted to higher leadership positions and got 
involved in the strategy  
The family managers take ownership and responsibility for the family, the company, and those 
who work there. Though there are also employees who want to develop and learn and have an 
ownership approach, and they are committed to the strategy and work accordingly. Family 
owners reward these employees with a leadership position and involvement in strategy creation. 
These employees belong to the internal circle. (Interview_B_U1) 
Incorporating experiences and suggestions of employees increases individual 
performance through engagement in the future.  
The owner stressed that their decision-making processes and giving feedbacks (e.g., praise) are 
faster than other non-family businesses. Moreover, they can also incorporate the experience and 
suggestions of the employees at all levels much more efficiently and faster than a non-family 
business. “I do require that after these performance management discussions take place, their 
evaluations must also be processed in the short term.” (Interview_B_E3) The owners also argue 
that incorporating suggestions helps engage employees, which has a performance-enhancing 





Maximalist atmosphere stemming from the owners may lead to a lower level of procedural and 
distributive justice.  
Strategic and annual goals are very tight year after year, which results in a maximalist 
atmosphere stemming from the owners. At the same time, the regular non-fulfilment of goals 
will not be reviewed next year, but the goals will remain just as challenging to achieve, resulting 
in tension at the employee and middle management levels. (Interview_B_LM2) 
 
The impact of the family business system on the family system 
The capability of the offspring to continue the business is evaluated by the parents based 
on feedback from external partners through informal processes 
Initially, there was no formalized performance appraisal for successors, but informal 
evaluations relied on feedbacks from external partners (suppliers, international awards at world 
exhibitions). The successors became competent, and their self-confidence was strengthened. “I 
put something on the table then that year.” (Interview_B_U1) 
Based on the feedback about the performance of the successors, the parents also were able to 
assess the capability of the offspring to take over the business. So, the informal process and 
evaluation could have been replaced by a formalized process. 
The formal performance evaluation is also linked to succession, the development and 
career goals are set, as well as the succession-related company goals and tasks are also 
formulated (substitution in case of the daughter having children). 
Succession 
The predecessor and successor may evaluate non-family managers together to develop 
and prepare the successor for the succession by ensuring the transfer of core values and people 
management skills through generations and building trust between the successors and the non-
family managers.  
The four owners participate in the appraisal discussions with the top management. The 
predecessor, the successor, and one of the senior executives also mentioned this practice and 
gave insights into their experiences. 
The successor argued that as they became more and more involved in the company and the 
strategic decisions and worked more and more with the top management team, it came naturally 
that they all would be present during the reviews. She also emphasized that it took time for 
them as successors to earn this with their performance and work. 
The parents are solicitous for their senior executive team. Their key people are mainly among 
these 21 senior executives, and there are a few middle managers as well. These key managers 
are acknowledged as exemplary in loyalty, commitment, and work ethic. (Interview_B_U1) 
The drawback of this practice is that these senior executives are usually older than the next 
generation. They may feel uncomfortable in this new situation, and they may be less open to 




However, this practice can be an effective way to retain their key people in the management. 
“These people appreciate a lot if we show interest in how they feel and what kind of conflicts 
they have…” (Interview_B_U1). She also pointed out that building trust across generations is 
a crucial factor during this practice. The senior executives might be less open and 
straightforward first than before. However, this practice can enable them as the next generation 
to start to build a stronger bond with non-family managers in the presence of their predecessors. 
The family can transfer trust over generations by bridging the gap between the next generation 
of the family and the senior non-family managers. “The key is the process itself… my parents 
transfer/delegate trust to us. Can you say this? They delegate? You can also feel it.” 
(Interview_B_U1). 
According to the predecessor, the successors must have specific work experience and work with 
people to learn how to lead, manage and treat them, and evaluate their performances. It is 
essential to share the same values as their predecessors. They should stand up for the truth, but 
they should also be able to negotiate and make people align with the family business goals. 
They must have a team spirit to make the management team accept them and follow them. They 
should understand human behavior, recognize the qualities of everyone, knowing what and how 
to motivate people. It takes time to become a leader of the company. The successors are at 
different levels of this development due to their age and work experiences but on this path.  
(Interview_B_E3) 
The predecessor argues that that is why these personal conversations are critical. Personal and 
honest communication can help to learn what the employees’ individual goals are and how they 
can manage to align these individual goals with the corporate goals. She stressed that it is never 
about fear to lose a position contrary to non-family firms. If they have the right values, family 
business leaders make decisions based on performance and human characteristics. Since 
someone can have an outstanding performance if he/she is unreliable, not sympathetic, not 
loyal, and driven by only money, she/he won’t fit in the family firm. (Interview_B_E3).  
 Striving for consensus and affirming and representing the same family values 
After the personal discussions with each senior executive, the family discusses what happened 
in the meeting later. It is possible for the offspring to understand the background of decisions 
and reactions and for parents to learn about their children’s way of thinking. These 
conversations are neither regular nor formalized, and they usually happen out of work, on the 
weekends, when the family members are together.  The predecessor explains the aim of this in 
this way:  
“…they can hear the colleagues’ opinion about the given year, what they think of their 
performances. So, then we can talk about what we (parents) thought and what they (successors) 
can see. So, then we all can have a common consensus. Let them see our opinion, our thought 
of what we say or what we respond to within ourselves, or what we respond to the colleagues 
and their suggestions. So be eyewitness and ear witness of our thoughts and developments.” 
(Interview_B_E3) 
Physical closeness helps to set an example and give opportunity for the parents to help 
their children in the work if needed (mentoring) 
Moreover, this physical closeness can be observed in other cases as well. They also work 




daughter’s office is next to her mother’s office. According to the predecessor, the reason behind 
that is also similar. The children can hear and see the parents’ actions, reactions, and behaviors 
with certain people. Consequently, the successors can learn these things from the predecessors 
at close quarters. (Interview_B_E3) 
The effect of family Influence on Perceived justice of PM  
Reciprocal nepotism 
I could not see any sign of parental altruism or the Fredo effect. However, some characteristics 
of reciprocal nepotism can be observed. The mother’s brother-in-law works as a non-manager 
employee at a factory worker level. His direct line manager is satisfied with his work; however, 
he does not have the ability and motivation to be promoted to the next level, so he remained in 
a non-manager position. However, when the owners are busy and have other family-related 
duties and tasks outside of the office, they ask him for help to act in their name. In this case, 
they ask permission from his line manager in line with the hierarchy first. When the line 
manager gives permission, the family employee proudly helps them out during the working 
time. The predecessor admitted, “he is very well satisfied with his job, he is proud to belong to 
the family, he knows he has privileges within the family as well.” 
 
Other elements of the conceptual framework 
External situation – management studies foster preconception about family businesses 
that they are unprofessional 
When I asked about these performance reviews of the top management team, where the four 
owners participate in the appraisal discussions with the top management, the acting HR 
manager as one of the successors answered this way: “That's what I wanted to tell you, I just 
didn't want to drop the bomb. Senior executives used to have a performance review with my 
parents. So now, we all four sit down and talk with each senior executive… I think this is not 
the case for every company. I don’t think it’s typical to have four owners who own the company, 
my parents as founders plus we, so four of us as a family participate in the performance 
reviews.” (Interview_B_U1) 
This showed as if she does not or hardly talk about it as she considers it unprofessional for 
outsiders. It raises a question: What does professionalism mean when talking about 
performance appraisals of the top management team, especially during succession at a family 
business? Since family business management does not belong to the mainstream management 
studies in the academy, familiness and HR practices influenced by the presence of the 
controlling family can be viewed as unprofessional and something which is better to hide. This 
may undermine the reliability of quantitative researches. These differences between academy 
and business can be grasped in the interview with Interview_B_LM2: “…we don’t learn a lot 
about life in the university. This is not necessarily the university's fault, but life will be decided 
here in the labor market anyway. But I think what is described in management books is good 
for having a starting point, but you need to know that it should only be applied with the right 
flexibility and tailored to the organization by taking into account the exceptions accordingly… 





5.3.3. Family Business Case “C” 
Introduction 
In the following, I present the basic profile, activities, key players, and brief history of the 
Family Business “C.”  
The history of the company originates from cheese and butter production in the 19th century. 
A cheese factory owned by workers after privatization became close to bankruptcy in the early 
’90s. It was then that the current owner was approached to buy out the ownership as a financial 
investor. Since then, the family business has not just remained in the Family’s ownership, but 
their members of the family have continued to participate actively in the operational 
management as well. The family business has been growing gradually to a company group. The 
company has four main activities organized into thirteen companies due to the market and 
institutional environment. First, they purchased a dairy to have their own raw milk, then they 
bought land to engaged in farming and started to grow fodder in an agricultural company. In 
the mid-2010s, the company group also expanded with a meat and milk wholesale company, in 
which there is non-family management. Thus, the family companies are vertically integrated.  
In the following, I will focus on my research only on performance management and processes 
for non-family and family employees at the milk factory, while I examine PM practices for 
family employees at both company and company group level since the interviewees reflected 
that in this way.    
The milk market is quite saturated, and there are many milk producers and dairies in Hungary. 
The market has become consolidated a lot, but many small plants have recently reopened due 
to state aid to strengthen artisanal and backyard processing. In addition, a new dairy was built 
by one of their competitors within a significant investment. Therefore, the company instead 
aims to achieve growth in exports, but there is also a lot of competition across Europe. Their 
primary customer is one of the leading discount food retail chains. Their milk 2.8% is one of 
their main competing products, which is a first-priced commodity product. The milk and milk 
products sector is affected by the Hungarian, Slovak, and German markets, in which even a 
cheese factory can process as much as Hungarian milk production. Besides the commercial 
commodity products, they also would like to grow in the less commodity product market.  
The food industry was less affected by the pandemic; however, their profit could have been 
better by HUF 100 million if they hadn’t been forced to sell raw milk at a loss because of the 
closing borders toward Italy and Croatia. Regarding financial performance, the company 
showed significant growth in the last three years in all key financial metrics. Sales increased 
with a CAGR of 13%, while profitability also improved, showing a CAGR of 89% in EBITDA 
and turning the Net Profit positive after being loss-making in 2018. As a result both EBITDA 
and Net Profit margin improved in the review period showing that management managed to 
bring the Company back to a healthy operational and financial track. (See also in Table 35) 
The company is the 5th largest milk processor in Hungary in terms of the amount of processed 
milk. The Family Business ‘C’ produces ca. 40 million liters of milk yearly in the region of 
Southern Transdanubia. It employs more than 200 employees, excluding ca. 50 temporary 
workers outsourced from temporary work agencies. Most of their workers are manual workers, 




In 2019, the Family firm participated in the industry 4.0 digitalization state program in the food 
industry. Within the program, they started a Lean organizational development. CEO argues that 
this contributed a lot to the company's profitability last year through the developments and the 
attitude formation.  They started introducing 5S and increased the efficiency of cheese labeling 
by process mapping. As a result, they have also launched several ongoing investments to 
reorganize and expand their warehouse capacity and start the development of a semi-automatic 
cheese line and an experiment with a cheese slicer. Recently a project has been launched in 
their quality management system. In connection with the whole organization is changing and 
evolving, and the colleagues are receiving ongoing training and support regarding the 
developments. (Interview_C_U1) However, Strategic HR developments have slowed down 
since the pandemic outburst. HR could not support the current KPI developments with 
management developments, training, or workshops on giving feedback, discussing experiences, 
etc. The HR manager and her colleagues with small children were overwhelmed due to the 
closure of kindergartens and primary schools. In addition, late-night emails and hectic working 
hours hindered work-life balance. They had to work from home and manage homeschooling in 
the family at the same time. However, the positive effect of the pandemic is that they have been 
developing a lot in online communication in the top and middle management levels. 
(Interview_C_HR2) 
There is a lack of skilled labor with qualifications in the labor market. In 2020, the fluctuation 
was 39%, which is very high and related to specific areas where there is a lot of unskilled 
workers. That is why the company has already started to focus on their „in-house” quasi-
vocational training for various professions (e.g., cheesemaker, pasteurizer) and production 
areas (e.g., dairy machine operator. During the recruitment and selection processes, they are 
looking for affinity, attitude, and soft skills. During the socialization and onboarding training, 
they introduce the profession such as dairy production and cheese production. The family firms 
would like to put even more emphasis on is onboarding training for newcomers because of the 
relatively high staff turnover. Furthermore, the training of newcomers and the development of 
stewardship, the achievement of goals (KPIs), and thus the formation of the organizational 
culture depend to a large extent on the middle management (i.e., shift managers). Therefore, 
their development will play a vital role in the future. (Interview_C_U1) As a family business, 
the owners and siblings have formulated their vision: 
“Care for generations. We look at each other with care and responsibility across generations. 
We value diligence, care, and a good stewardship not only in words but also in deeds.” 
(Interview_C_U1). 
While this vision is more a description of the mission, the family business stands out of the four 
businesses it has already had.  
In line with the family business’s mission, the company aims to develop higher value-added 
products, innovative products. First, they aim to improve energy efficiency and foster 
automatization, so even in that small or medium-production size, they can achieve the level of 
efficiency that a German plant is capable of. While in the same time, they strive to take 
advantage of their flexibility. Second, they also aim to produce their labor-intensive products 





Introduction of Family ’C’ 
The founder/father and his wife own 100% of the family business. His eldest daughter first 
joined the company in the mid-2000s, and soon after, his younger daughter and her husband 
also joined. 
Finally, his son and his wife have joined the company in the early 2010s. 
The son manages the agricultural companies; all the other family members work in the milk 
factory. The youngest daughter works as the managing director in the milk factory. While the 
son’s wife manages the HR department, and the oldest daughter is the CFO not just for the milk 
factory but for the family company group. The youngest daughter’s husband works as Director 
of Sales.  
Figure 33 - Genogram of the controlling family of Family Business „C” 
 
 
Family Involvement  
Currently, the father/founder and his wife own 100% of the company group, including the 
examined cheese factory. In the cheese factory, there are four family members out of ten in the 
top management team, including the younger daughter as an executive, the older daughter as 
CFO, the son’s wife as an HR manager, the younger daughter’s husband as sales director. At 
the same time, the son manages the agricultural company in the company group.  
Nowadays, the family firm governmental configuration type is closer to the sibling partnership. 
The three siblings have a trusted relationship, and all the three children play an essential part in 
operational management. Their family instead prioritizes family first, than business.  
Their guiding principle is that every family member can have a place and make a living from 
the company regardless of one’s performance. (Interview_C_U1) 
There are two generations at the family business.  
Even though the founder was first a financial investor, nowadays, the owner family defines 




a “Business Family.” However, their goal is that professional management will take over the 
company group in the long run instead of the family.  
The diversification of its product portfolio is low, but the family firms integrated vertically in 
the company group.  
The company has four main activities organized into thirteen companies; however, I only 
focused on the cheese factory in my research. They can relate more to the family first 
philosophy and prioritize family-related goals over business goals. They also claim that their 
identification with the family business is high  
The company has a strong relationship with its stakeholders. The executive stressed that they 
“strive for fair and long-term cooperation back and forth in everything, so we are as partners, 
and it is not a “customer-supplier” relationship.” (Interview_C_U1) 
 
Succession  
The transgenerational intensions in succession are very high for the second generation. The 
predecessor has already passed the torch at the operational management level.  
The father sometimes participates in counseling and consultations; however, they are still 
constantly working on its formalized structure and form. 
In addition, the family is currently working on the next steps for succession in formalized 
meetings and workshops with a family business consultant to prepare the handover of the 
ownership as well from the parents to their three children.  
They all agreed that the three siblings would own the family business equally; however, they 
are still working on its practical implementation. 
They aim to establish a holding company and outsource the shared services of the company 
group (e.g., financial accounting, controlling, HR, etc.) there. All three siblings will be members 
of the board at that holding company. 
The succession intentions of the third generation are questionable as they are between 5 and 18 
years old. (Interview_C_U1) 
 
Human Resource Management  
The basis of Performance Management and performance-based Compensation System is to set 
strategic goals and establish KPI systems and develop a related monitoring and controlling 
system first. Accordingly, the company has just finished a 2-year professionalization and 
development process. 
In 2019, they already looked at the ratio of productive to unproductive working hours in 
production and machine efficiency in relation to the controlling system. At the same time, 
Industry 4.0 has brought a change of attitude as well. Industry 4.0. helped the company establish 
a structured KPI system with an optimal number of indicators, leading to corporate results. They 




were put together with the top managers, for which metrics were added, and these were 
cascaded down. 
The final KPI system was established in 7-8 months. The strategy goals were set in a one-day 
workshop with ten top senior managers. Each senior manager had his/her own area of 
responsibility and key performance indicators, and they discussed what action plans were 
needed to do so. (Interview_C_U1) They also talked about individual and corporate values and 
how they fit together. Individual and organizational goals were tried to be explored and how 
they could be aligned. According to the HR manager, that could be the basis of performance 
management at a later stage. (Interview_C_HR2) 
The CEO leads the implementation of the KPI system and the change.  
"I did a lot for this and sat down next to them and talked to them. When I saw that there was an 
obstruction, I asked back why it is, what they couldn't identify with, how to modify it?" 
(Interview_C_U1) Last year, cost and efficiency indicators were developed and monitored 
continuously. This means that data related to the indicators have been collected, and top 
management, together with the plant management, was monitoring and clearing these data for 
more than a year. 
In 2020, they introduced a bonus system, which they just want to change.  
Last year, the shift managers, plant managers, and senior managers received a performance-
based bonus; however, they did not receive a performance appraisal review.  
From 2021, they want to base the compensation system on new KPIs as well as expand it. The 
reason behind this is that the existing system was launched in parallel with the strategic goal 
setting. That is why they would like to make changes within a year to merge the goals set for 
managers and the KPIs of shift managers and skilled workforce. During the development, they 
have already aimed to have not only two but all three types of indicators in each area: cost 
indicator, efficiency indicator, and quality indicator.  
The executive manager emphasizes that the bonus and incentive system are tied to valid goals. 
However, it is questionable whether this information reaches the shift manager level. Do they 
monitor these indicators daily or not? She believes that they still need to develop in this, and 
that is why she also wants to involve the skilled worker level so that everyone pursues the 
common goals and interests. That is why skilled workers will also receive a bonus in 2021. 
Skilled workers consist of assembly line workers, the operators of the machines, the skilled 
workers in the production of dairy products, the cheesemakers who do the skilled work in the 
given shift. Regarding the frequency of the payments, while the bonus payments of the team 
manager are paid every two months, top senior managers have a bonus payment every six 
months, which they also would like to standardize in the future. 
Because of the pandemic, they were unable to support the implementation and communication 
of the KPI and bonus system through training and development and workshops, as they would 
have liked, due in part to the workload of HR staff. Since many HR colleagues have families, 
they had to put extra effort to manage kids and home office and homeschooling in parallel. 
Therefore, strategic HR development has also slowed down significantly in performance 





Performance management and appraisal system 
According to the executive manager, the goal of performance management is to provide 
employees competitive benefits when they meet performance goals so that they work together 
to achieve them. It aims to motivate employees to achieve a common goal. (Interview_C_U1) 
According to this, the goal-setting clearly reinforces the past focus and accountability approach 
and is based on the controlling system.  According to the HR manager, the PM aims to align 
individual and corporate goals. It also gives senior executives empowerment, increases their 
commitment, and provides a sufficient challenge for them. In the long run, PM will change the 
corporate culture, the way of communication, and the leadership mindset, which will bring 
teams together and which will foster efficiency. The HR managers argue that the PM system 
should establish the basis for fair performance-based pay for colleagues. (Interview_C_HR2) 
The HR manager stated that she would not consider the existing system as a performance 
management system. As a basis of the PM system, they have worked on the strategic goals and 
controlling system a lot in the last year. That was a critical learning process at the individual as 
well as the organizational level. As a first step, the CEO, HR manager, and each senior manager 
sat down to talk about the aim of their jobs, the key areas affected by their work, and how these 
connected to the larger corporate goals. The company goals were set in the short, medium, and 
long term on the one-day workshop. The KPI system was put together with the strong 
involvement of senior management. The three types of indicators were assigned to each area in 
consultation with them. (Interview_C_HR2) 
However, the indicators are not cascaded down to the team leader level. 
Nonetheless, the bonus system was introduced with payouts every two months. The HR 
managers argued that this was because it was necessary to increase employee incomes due to 
market pressures even before the development of the KPI system. The top management decided 
that they would rather increase the variable payments than the basic salaries to increase 
efficiency and effectiveness. This variable bonus payment is also linked to indicators but does 
not fully cover the KPI system. That is why this needs to be further harmonized so that the 
bonus depends on the performance of their area, which they can influence. The goal is to 
standardize this soon and adequately communicate and introduce formal evaluations and 
regular feedback on performance. 
The shift managers, plant managers, and senior managers received a performance-based bonus 
without a formal performance appraisal review. (Interview_C_U1)  
Currently, the feedbacks related to performance are problem-focused and ad hoc, so the one-
day workshop also provided an opportunity for that ten senior managers to receive and give 
feedback to each other. According to the HR manager, this will be a good basis for individual 
goal setting, which has not happened yet. She emphasizes that during this learning process, the 
corporate culture is slowly changing as well. Feedback is not subjective but provides an 
objective basis for operating a formal PM and evaluation system. The PM system also allows 
for the development of other areas of HR, e.g., competence development later. 
(Interview_C_HR2) 
As there isn’t any formal and standardized performance appraisal, the senior managers are 




team. Therefore, the intensity and depth of the communication vary among departments and are 
not standardized across the company.  
Top and middle management 
Few questionnaires were likely to be completed at the employee level since performance 
appraisal and performance-based payment was only introduced at the top and middle 
management level. Therefore, in agreement with the management, I interviewed more than one 
middle manager at different levels to learn about their role and perceptions about the fairness 
of performance appraisal and the effect of the controlling family in contrast to the top 
management. I interviewed two shift managers and two plant managers from different areas.  
According to the HR manager, the role of senior management is to actively participate in setting 
goals and represent these goals to their own team. The HR managers argue that setting goals 
were fair and equitable by providing senior managers a forum to make decisions based on full 
consensus and transparency. Everyone could see everyone’s goals, and they could ask questions 
and have the opportunity to debate. The HR managers were convinced that all this resulted in 
their commitment to the goals set there. (Interview_C_HR2)   
The plant managers know the company goals, the expectations are clear in their direction, i.e., 
to achieve the set goals by their team, to eliminate the problems that arise, to suggest 
improvements to the superior manager in connection with these. (Interview_C_LM1). The 
managers agree upon that the CEO and the owners are always open to suggestions from middle 
managers and are also willing to change their own decision as a result of rational arguments 
(Interview_C_LM2) and it has a motivating effect.  (Interview_C_LM3) 
In the course of their work, they negotiate a great deal, requesting and collecting information 
and communicating it further to their team or to their superior manager. 
Every day there is a production meeting where the managers of all the areas come together in 
production and consult, sharing information with each other, what the current challenges or 
tasks are. In addition, they have a meeting separately with their superior manager about their 
own area weekly. These meetings rather focus on the operation and further developments. 
Individual evaluation and feedbacks are not usually discussed during these occasions.  
(Interview_C_LM1; Interview_C_LM2; Interview_C_LM3) 
According to the HR manager, the task of middle managers (shift managers, plant managers) is 
to convey the goals to the lower levels, and during the implementation, they should find the 
areas and tasks where people can effectively contribute to the realization of these goals. 
Furthermore, they are responsible for giving feedback to employees during day-to-day 
operations. (Interview_C_HR2) The HR manager believes that the skilled workers are not 
aware of the goals and performance of the field. In the case of the shift managers, “it also 
depends on their proactivity, whether they can fight for the information from their managers” 
(Interview_C_HR2). Even in the case of plant managers, she thinks that it is up to the person 
how much they look after the performance of their own area. 
Based on the interviews, the middle management is aware of the KPI goals; they collect 
efficiency data and information to convey them to the top management. They communicate job 




“In any case, we have to make the expectations clear to the workers, so they can meet them.”  
(Interview_C_LM2) 
„The role is to represent both sides and to ensure the achievement of corporate goals while 
listening to employee complaints, problems, possible suggestions.” (Interview_C_LM2) 
It is the plant manager's responsibility to involve shift managers in the design of the KPI and 
bonus system. It depends on the plant manager, to what extent they get their shift manager and 
skilled workers involved in decisions. A plant manager involves shift managers 
(Interview_C_LM3), while other managers argue that it is not the case in his field. 
Plant managers claimed that employee involvement in development is ongoing. One formal 
form was the “box of ideas” to simplify processes. Many of the ideas that came in have been 
implemented; however, the idea box no longer works. Instead, it is an everyday expectation 
towards colleagues to come up with ideas (Interview_C_LM1). 
However, shift managers experience differently, and it seems that shift managers and skilled 
workers could be more involved in the change and development processes related to their jobs. 
“There are a couple of questions that we (ed. shift managers) or skilled workers could be 
involved in and asked about… we might have an idea, not just about efficiency, but anything 
else.” (Interview_C_LM4) 
Although the company has not yet developed a performance appraisal process, a plant manager 
stated that the bonus system designed for plant managers and shift managers can be considered 
a kind of performance appraisal in its field. (Interview_C_LM1) 
In line with the KPI goals, the manager agreed that the goal of Performance management is also 
to increase efficiency and make the customers satisfied. (Interview_C_LM2; 
(Interview_C_LM4). A manager also adds to create order and a good work environment. 
(Interview_C_LM3). Based on the interviews, the goals are adequately communicated by senior 
management. (Interview_C_LM4)  
Related to the performance management practices, a shift manager did not know whether his 
or her opinion regarding the work of the employees has an impact on the evaluation by the plant 
manager later. They will not receive any information about whether their feedback will be 
considered in case of a salary increase. (Interview_C_LM4) 
Plant managers are satisfied with their own bonus, and they argue that it is well designed. It 
supports continuous communication and collaboration between different areas. They were 
involved in the design, and a review of the system is also ongoing in parallel with the KPI and 
controlling system. (Interview_C_LM1; Interview_C_LM3) 
At the level of shift managers, not everyone is satisfied with it. The bonus consists of several 
elements, which encourage shift managers and team managers to work together. However, there 
are managers who do not think it is fair because everyone on the team gets the same bonus 
while they do not perform equally. The middle manager voiced this opinion to his superior 
manager, but he does not know whether to review the bonus system. (Interview_C_LM4) 
During an interview, a manager also confirmed that when the bonus system was introduced, the 
middle managers were invited to a meeting, where the production director had informed them 




However, there hasn’t been any communication about the further modification or the expansion 
of the system to their team in their area yet. The shift managers are not involved in the 
development of the system. They and their subordinates are informed about changes after the 
decision is made.  (Interview_C_LM4) 
The introduction of the bonus system to skilled workers has already been promised by the top 
management years ago, which the middle management also communicated with great pride to 
their subordinates then. However, it has not happened yet. According to the managers, the 
performance-based bonus could be a real motivation; however, unkept promise also has its 
danger.  (Interview_C_LM1; Interview_C_LM2)    
It is still uncertain for the management when and in which area the bonus will be introduced. It 
seems that they refrain from making any specific statements regarding it because of the previous 
bad experience.  
“Next year probably, but of course I wouldn’t write this down now” (Interview_C_LM2) 
 “Let me not answer that, already than last year.” (Interview_C_LM1)  
However, in some areas, improvements and new investments will result in new standards and 
indicators in processes, which will also affect the development of the performance appraisal 
system and the performance-based bonus system. (Interview_C_LM2) 
Top management expects middle managers to communicate the results to their team; however, 
that also puts the middle management in a difficult position. Employees experience injustice by 
not having performance appraisal and the performance-based bonus system, while the KPI and 
controlling system is working due to transparency and intensive communication. So, employees 
see that the systems are already capable of measuring performance at the group and individual 
level, and still, the bonus system is not in place. (Interview_C_LM1) 
However, in case of any problem, the subordinates can raise their voice, and they could 
experience that they were listened to, and their superior managers and owners heard their voice.  
“My bosses always acted fairly. If something happened, they listened to everyone, even those, 
who might not have been in it, but heard it, saw it too.” (Interview_C_LM4) 
A manager also gave an example: When someone experienced unfairness because he/she was 
not nominated for the employee excellence award, the manager gave an opportunity to voice 
his/her dissatisfaction, and they discussed the background of the decision. (Interview_C_LM2) 
Each year, at the year-end party, outstanding employees are rewarded with an employee 
excellence award, to which middle managers can make suggestions. The honorees receive a 
non-cash benefit and a diploma, and the top management and owners congratulate them. Some 
managers believe that it does not have a motivating power because this recognition is not 
associated with a cash reward. (Interview_C_LM4) Other managers believe that it is important 
for their outstanding subordinates that management thanks to their work in this way. 
(Interview_C_LM2) Like in other cases, shift managers are not necessarily involved in this 
decision. While this could be motivating, and it could strengthen them in their position. Next 





Middle managers have no formal tool in their hands other than the year-end nomination in the 
absence of performance management and compensation system, so they can have less impact 
on people’s attitudes at the non-management level. (Interview_C_LM4) It is also not clear 
whether all managers are involved in the development of performance appraisal. Some are 
involved (Interview_C_LM2); some say this is not the case, which can also demotivate the shift 
management level.  (Interview_C_LM4) 
Besides the performance management and compensation system, all managers talked about one 
crucial element related to motivation and increasing individual performance. It is essential for 
managers to have the executive or senior executives appear among the workers from time to 
time. At the same time, top managers and owners are less likely to come up to employees and 
talk with them these days. (Interview_C_LM3) So, with growth and improvements, the 
organization has become noticeably more significant in size and more impersonal. Yet middle 
managers say people would demand and motivate them if the top senior managers and/or 
owners come and talk to people informally. 
“In the past, senior executives came up to the workers several times, asking how they were. I 
think it also has a bit of an effect on their performance to see that they are paying attention. This 
is what has been missing lately.” (Interview_C_LM4) 
“For example, for me, it would be good for my soul and for my own efficiency, my 
performance, that the owner, the boss came down, they ask me how I was, and it would be good 
that I talked to them. I also used to tell my mother that the big boss came to me, we talked, and 
it was good for me.” (Interview_C_LM4) 
At the initiative of the manager directly under the executive manager, the executive sits in threes 
with the manager and another subordinate for a personal conversation about how the employee 
is doing. The goal of a manager with this is to make employees feel that the top management 
and owners care about them and pay attention to them. The conversations are ad hoc in nature 
and last for about fifteen minutes. For the subordinates with whom they had spoken so far, the 
conversation was very positive. 
“One of the older subordinates was so touched, he fell so well, that he cried like a small child… 
there in front of us that it fell so well for him.” (Interview_C_LM3)  
At the same time, shift managers and plant managers miss the personal conversations and the 
feedback and performance evaluations of their superior managers, which has not happened so 
far. Managers see that their superiors work a lot and don’t have time for giving feedback 
personally beyond discussing tasks. (Interview_C_LM3; Interview_C_LM4) “It’s good for a 
person to get feedback.” (Interview_C_LM4)   
 
Formalization 
Indicators are kept in the so-called “scoreboard,” and there is a performance evaluation of the 
areas every two months. The target and actual figures for each area are described in the 




There is an internal written bonus policy, which is an appendix to the bonus contract and shows 
the goals and associated bonus objectives. At the same time, the policy has not been published 
yet, and they already need to modify it in line with the improvements.  
They were planning to sign bonus contracts with managers as well; however, they did not 
finalize it because it took them a long time to have all the indicators for every area. 
 
Further developments 
One of the positives is the learning process and how openly managers were able to talk about 
designing the system. Still, there is room for improvement in monitoring the indicators, which 
should be part of the daily routine. However, managers are not constantly informed about the 
development of their areas. (Interview_C_HR2)   
According to the CEO, they need to develop the three types of indicators for each area, but the 
structure of the system is already appropriate. The frequency of evaluation (every two months) 
is also appropriate. However, the evaluation and feedback phase need to be improved. They 
want to provide a forum for the management team of forty people to present the performance 
of the plant, what the goals are, and how they have accomplished according to these indicators, 
which impact their bonuses. They want to create an opportunity for bilateral or multilateral 
communication to have people discuss the results with each other because one plant affects the 
other. The bonus system has not yet been announced in terms of communication, which also 
must be done. (Interview_C_U1)   
 
Other HR 
The PM system also will allow for the development of other areas of HR, e.g., competence 
development. Jobs were assessed and categorized based on the abilities and skills to fill a 
particular job. But HR managers argued that the career management and development and 
recruitment plans have not yet been built on this. Smaller training has been implemented, but 
we cannot talk about a structured system based on needs. In connection with recruitment and 
selection, the collected job expectations can be used already well. (Interview_C_HR2) 
The design of KPIs has an impact on training, dismissal and recruitment, and selection. Since 
it indicates what type of employees they should look for when they select applicants. 
Some training projects will be launched soon. Mentoring program and leadership development 
for shift managers is needed. They are also planning to change their onboarding training.  
During the process engineering and efficiency improvements, the employees were trained to 
perform several tasks so that they could replace each other, and thus the production could go 
efficiently even then. (Interview_C_U1) 
 
Performance Management of Family Employees 
There is no formalized evaluation and feedback among family member employees. In practice, 




head of the farm companies (i.e., the younger brother). At the same time, the other family 
managers would receive feedback from the family executive.  
Family executives 
At the executive level, they evaluate each other based on the current situation or organizational 
effectiveness, which leads to conflicts among the family managers, but this even affects the 
non-family executive at the wholesale company. 
“There can be conflicts because one sees it this way, the other sees it that way, and if we don’t 
talk about goals set objectively based on numbers, then we take it personally and rely on 
personal judgment. And we often fall into this trap too, so there is no formal, well-established 
system for giving feedback to each other.” (Interview_C_U1) 
Regarding the performance management among family members, the HR manager also 
admitted that it is difficult to handle.  “Well, that's a terribly difficult question. We can’t talk 
about this, so we can’t talk about salaries, we can’t talk about performance, we can’t talk about 
expectations. But we keep trying. (Interview_C_HR2) 
The family executive admits that they should work to create a forum and framework for the 
performance evaluation based on shared goals and objective data. That is why they decided that 
a non-family member should provide the performance management and evaluation data. This 
is also to ensure that the older siblings, as the current CFO, do not end up in a situation where 
she presents the results based on her valid accounting data, and the other siblings may not 
believe her and question the figures. They have been just recruiting a family-independent CFO, 
who will provide the figures.  
Moreover, they also build a formal governance framework to support this process. From next 
year, by establishing the holding structure, the three siblings in the service company will form 
the board of directors, where the CFO will bring the results, so the goal is to “all three be on 
the same side” (Interview_C_U1) 
The HR manager also confirmed that even there are ups and downs in the relationship among 
family members, but now they “are in a rising phase,” and it is starting to get better with the 
decision of establishing a holding structure and recruitment of a non-family CFO. She adds that 
the values represented by the founder, such as a sense of belonging and ownership, help them 
through the problems and conflicts. (Interview_C_HR2) 
According to the HR manager, the underlying cause of the conflicts was that the production and 
farming companies had two different organizational cultures. The leading cause of the 
cultural difference is that the location, the sector, and the background of senior managers and 
employees are different. The farming companies operate next to the villages, and the cultural 
values of their employees can be characterized by closeness to nature and the attachment to the 
traditional peasant way of life. The majority of the workforce is men, and the fluctuation is less 
than 10% compared to the 40% fluctuation rate of the production company.  
According to the family executive in the controlling family, hardworking and diligence were 
considered as “performance.” So, the produced value or the money was not necessarily 
important, but everyone worked and was active. This value appeared less in the family business 
because the previous corporate culture was different. There was such an expectation for non-




if there was a task that was necessary to be done that day. However, as a result of the current 
strategy and value set, and the work invested in change, this began to transform after 10-20 
years. 
However, it seems there hasn’t been a consensus on the common corporate culture at the group 
level yet. According to the family executive, they are working to develop a PM and bonus 
system to make this type of organizational culture more consistent across different companies 
so that the evaluation of senior managers does not depend on which family member is the leader 
as reviewers at various family companies. In contrast, the HR manager emphasized that it is 
unclear whether they want to have a unified organizational culture or to bring organizational 
cultures closer together. 
Family managers 
In the examined family business, the younger daughter will evaluate the other family managers. 
The director of sales (the executive manager’s husband) and the HR manager also took part in 
job screening. They defined their KPIs for the next performance evaluation. Both of them report 
in the same way at the leadership meetings. However, the HR manager argues that “it’s a little 
difficult to imagine this conversation among the three of us, but that it has to happen the same 
way because we have experience of how confusing it can be to have a different opinion or 
position between any of the two family members.” (Interview_C_HR2). She also adds that the 
organization cannot understand this, and it creates uncertainty among the managers.  
The HR managers highlighted that the situation is special for family employees who did not 
come from the owner's family but joined the family through marriage and work for the family 
business. They may experience that employees perceive them as members of the controlling 
family while they do not consider themselves owners even though their spouse and their 
children will inherit. They need to accept this situation and be prepared for that employees may 
try to use them as intermediaries in informal communication.  
“If they want to send some message to my husband, they started to tell me… They prepared the 
ground a little, but they didn't… (ed. tell it directly to him). At first, it was so awfully confusing, 
and then I learned to let go.” (Interview_C_HR2) 
As an HR manager, she may not be able to build the same trust with managers at the farming 
companies, where she is perceived as the wife of the owner’s son. However, in the other family-
owned companies, she does not face these problems as she is perceived as only a family 
employee.      
 
The effect of PM practice on perceived justice 
Goal setting is transparent, understandable, and simple 
According to the executive manager, the performance-based compensation system is just and 
transparent. She argues that great care was taken to make the goals transparent, understandable, 
and simple. It is essential that a given area does not have more than three indicators. 
(Interview_C_U1)  




The top management sent mixed messages through the middle management about the 
introduction of the performance-based compensation system to skilled labor level for years.  
Broken promises may erode the credibility of the management in the eyes of non-manager 
employees.   
“Next year probably, but of course I wouldn’t write this down now” (Interview_C_LM2) 
 “Let me not answer that, already than last year.” (Interview_C_LM1)  
Moreover, top management expects middle managers to communicate the performance results 
to their team, which also puts the middle management in a difficult position. Employees 
experience injustice by not having performance appraisal and the performance-based bonus 
system, while the KPI and controlling system is working due to transparency and intensive 
communication. (Interview_C_LM1) 
The existing systems were communicated well for the middle managers. They were invited to 
a meeting, where they had been informed about everything. (Interview_C_LM4) But individual 
evaluation and feedbacks are not usually discussed. (Interview_C_LM1; Interview_C_LM2; 
Interview_C_LM3) 
In case of any problem, the subordinates can raise their voice, and they experience that their 
superior managers and owners heard their voice. “My bosses always acted fairly. If something 
happened, they listened to everyone, even those, who might not have been in it, but heard it, 
saw it too.” (Interview_C_LM4) 
Consistency  
HR manager argues that the system is fair and equitable because it is consistent. They do not 
change indicators on a weekly basis and do not falsify numbers. Goals are designed to be 
achievable. For senior executives, targets have not yet been set, but they plan to be equally 
transparent and jointly developed with the management. Since accurate and timely data is the 
basis of the system, there has been a situation where a manager has not received a bonus because 
he/she did not provide data on time and did not indicate that he/she could not perform this task 
due to other tasks. This decision was critical for the consistency and reliability of the system. 
The decision was also accepted by the manager. (Interview_C_HR2) 
The changeability of decisions, processes, goals, and principles 
The goal-setting was fair and equitable by providing senior managers a forum in which 
decisions were made based on full consensus and transparency. They could ask questions and 
had the opportunity to debate. (Interview_C_HR2)   
The interviews show that the CEO and the owners are always open to suggestions from middle 
managers and are also willing to change their own decision due to rational arguments 
(Interview_C_LM2), which has a motivating effect. (Interview_C_LM3) 
Effect of the Family  
The presence of family affects planned performance management 




There used to be negative discrimination towards family members in salary, bonus, and 
performance indicators. So, the family employees used to earn less compared to the market 
wages. The family executive argues that they used to be more lenient with non-family members, 
but they also recognized this and started to change it. (Interview_C_U1) 
As part of the no-bifurcation policy, the family managers also took part in the same job 
screening process. Their KPIs were defined for the next performance evaluation. Both report in 
the same way at the leadership meetings. 
They also aim to create a PM system for family members, which will be transparent for non-
family employees in other positions. They are planning the PM process with no bifurcation 
bias. The expectations need to be transparent and what good performance is and what is not. 
The goal is that the position held by a family member can also be filled by a non-family member 
at any time. Otherwise, it may expose the company. (Interview_C_U1) 
In order to avoid bifurcation biased favoring either family or non-family employees, the senior 
management positions were assessed, such as the added value and substitutability of the job. 
Based on this, they made the salaries of family members clarified relative to each other. Since 
they decided to have their salaries and bonuses on a market basis. (Interview_C_HR2) 
However, the executive added that things might not be clear in every case. "The employees may 
have a feeling that there is a bias (ed. favoring family employees), which I don’t even notice." 
(Interview_C_U1) She provides an example as well. During the year, the bonus was partly paid 
only to non-family managers, but then it was raised that the company would pay all the annual 
bonus to the family members at the end of the year, while the non-family members would be 
paid fully later after the year-end accounting closure.  
 
The effect of family influence on actual PM practice 
The successor leader leads changing process and systems implementation, so people 
feel that these are important and, therefore, the implementations are more effective. 
The CEO stands for the change, which can happen faster because of that. 
“If we change something, I will be there for the first meeting and then, if not for the first time, 
but the employees themselves will feel that it is important.” (Interview_C_U1) 
The people’s feedback and satisfaction measurements show that a family CEO is more credible 
for the employees. That is why they are much more likely to follow and accept the changes and 
the initiative, which he/she wants to make. Because they know for sure that the leader will not 
go anywhere, he/she will stay. The CEO puts it this way: 
“The presence of the family gives them a sense of importance. If we are there, they feel more 
important… If we are there, their commitment and their commitment to change, their speed 
may be better.” "They know I'll be here in 5 years and in 10 years anyway"(Interview_C_U1) 
On the one hand, the family CEO argues that although the vocation of the CEO does not 
necessarily depend on whether someone is a family member or not, she still believes that the 
vocation of a family CEO is unquestionable, while a non-family member may establish a 




Creating a common position on performance standards and evaluation 
During the performance appraisals, the executive manager will evaluate the other two family 
managers: her husband as director of sales and her sister-in-law as HR manager. They are 
planning to have the performance review in the same way. 
HR manager argued that “it’s a little difficult to imagine this conversation among the three of 
us, but that it has to happen the same way because we have experience of how confusing it can 
be to have a different opinion or position between any of the two family members.” 
(Interview_C_HR2). She also added that the organization could not understand this, and it 
creates uncertainty among the managers. In this case, here it is not the point to avoid bifurcation 
bias. 
They aim to have a common position on performance standards, to be able to send the same 
messages to the other members of the organization. 
Family members may violate the formal hierarchy unconsciously and send confusing 
messages to subordinates 
During the succession, in one of the family training workshops, the family members recognized 
that they were sometimes confused and acted in the family business system as they were in the 
family system. They crossed the formal hierarchy in the company.  
“We all love to manual control sometimes and have a say in areas that are totally not our 
business anyway.” (Interview_C_HR2) 
They have been paying close attention to this ever since. However, it is a learning process. 
Nowadays, it also happens that they cross the formal hierarchy but corrects themself in the 
middle of their actions.  
The controlling family feels the need for formalized systems but still fears that they are 
not flexible enough. 
The performance management system is implemented differently. The family business aims to 
make its formalized systems reliable, valid, fair, and applicable. At the same time, it is also 
crucial for the CEO and the other family managers that the system is flexible and able to adapt 
to changes and developments. Compared to a non-family business, the HR manager argues that 
they instead want a functional and transparent system. “Just to have a system, the family 
business does not want one.” (Interview_C_HR2) 
As a result, the bonus agreements were not signed because it refers to the well-designed bonus 
policy as an appendix, which has not been published yet. That is because they could not follow 
the quick changes and update them. However, the company applied the policy as a framework 
informally, and the bonuses are paid accordingly. The management made sure that the bonuses 
system was well communicated, the middle managers were invited to a meeting, where they 
had been informed about everything. (Interview_C_LM4) 
 
The effect of family influence on perceived PM practice 




In the controlling family, hardworking and diligence were considered as “performance.” So, 
the produced value or the money was not necessarily significant, but everyone worked and was 
active.  
The family executive complained that his value appeared less in the family business because 
the previous corporate culture was different. The expectation was to let non-family workers 
have a work-life balance. At 4 pm, employees went home even if there was a task that needed 
to be done. However, as a result of the current strategy and value set, and the work invested in 
change, this began to transform after 10-20 years.  
At the same time, line managers told of an organizational culture, where one could make 
mistakes without severe consequences and punishment (deduction from salary), and managers 
rather focus on the improvement and solving the problems. That is a good reflection of the 
controlling family’s values. One of the line managers argued that if there are no results, people 
are replaced immediately, or in case of damage, there is a deduction from their salary at other 
non-family companies. Here, the family or the CEO has a basic trust toward the people.  
“There were problems here, there were damages… they were not treated as like, let’s see how 
much was the price and we deduct it from everyone's salary, but first of all the feedback was 
thank you for telling us. What was surprising to me was that we didn’t lie ... so it was important 
to them that they can trust us, so they got the information from us even when we screwed up… 
and how to avoid this next time.” (Interview_C_LM1) 
Importance of personal relationship in goal setting, forming expectations, and their 
communications 
The HR manager and line managers highlighted the importance of a personal relationship with 
the controlling family and managers. The HR manager argues that if the company was a non-
family business, the PM system would be more impersonal and dysfunctional. “Just to have a 
system, the family business does not want one.”(Interview_C_HR2) In the case of the family 
business, the owners are present in the company, and the vision and strategy planning takes 
place locally by the management, which fosters commitment since everything is more personal 
than otherwise. The company values can be transferred directly by managers and owners in the 
form of expectations and behavior patterns. The HR manager also argues that you need 
challenging but achievable goals that allow you to continually develop together with the 
organization and its leaders and its owner-managers. This personal commitment to the leader 
and the common goals can build an essential bond of trust in the family business, which has an 
impact on individual performance.    
 
Participating in company programs and leadership and vocational training with 
employees shows that the owners are accessible and open for communication.  
Some managers also argued that there are programs such as family days and year-end parties, 
where employees can talk with the family managers completely relaxed. “They’re not those 
managers at multinational companies who don’t actually participate in the lives of the workers 
because they do participate.” (Interview_C_LM2) Other managers also emphasized the 
presence of the family and the CEO. Someone may just be behind the desk, but the CEO herself 




line manager stated that it makes him feel like “they are all in the same boat.” 
(Interview_C_LM1) 
 
As the organization grows, the frequency of personal relationships decreases, which 
may negatively affect middle management’s commitment  
However, the frequency of personal relationships seems to decrease as the company increase in 
size. Line managers are missing those “old days,” and there is a strong need for managers to 
have the executive or senior executives appear among the workers from time to time and talk 
to them informally to motivate them. 
“The executive manager used to come to the plant rarely, but other senior managers do not so. 
In the old days, even the owner went to the plant every week. He came, shook hands with us, 
he talked to us for a few sentences, but it fell so well for us, and I think it is very missing.” 
Interview_C_LM4) 
“For example, for me, it would be good for my soul and for my own efficiency, my 
performance, that the owner, the boss came down, they ask me how I was, and it would be good 
that I talked to them. I also used to tell my mother that the big boss came to me, we talked, and 
it was good for me.” (Interview_C_LM4) 
However, a manager also adds it would make a difference if this company were not a family 
business. “It would definitely be different because it’s okay that I don’t feel like it’s a family 
business right now, but after all, it is because a family still controls the whole thing.” 
(Interview_C_LM4) The managers can also see that the family works a lot and deals with things 
even in the middle of the night. So, they feel the company is their own. However, a manager 
adds that it would be better if the employees themselves felt the same way as before. 
(Interview_C_LM4) 
Despite the growing organizational size, a personal, informal conversation with 
subordinates at the request of the middle manager has a motivating effect on the subordinates 
A new initiative of a middle manager also aims that the family executive can have a personal 
conversation with one of his team members about how the employees are doing. For the 
subordinates, the conversation was very positive. 
“One of the older subordinates was so touched, he fell so well, that he cried like a small child… 
there in front of us that it fell so well for him.” (Interview_C_LM3)  
 
The effect of family influence on the outcome of PM practice 
Formalization: to eliminate conflicts between family members non-family CFO was 
appointed, and a formal governance structure was built 
First, to eliminate conflicts, the family decided to create a forum and framework for the 
performance evaluation based on shared goals and objective data. In line with this, they decided 
that a non-family CFO should be recruited to provide the performance management and 




Second, they are also about to build a formal governance framework to support this process. 
They will establish the holding structure, and the three siblings in the service company will 
form the board of directors, where the non-family CFO will bring the results, so “all three be 
on the same side” (Interview_C_U1) 
Development outcomes of PM may be applied less effectively because the manager may 
perceive the family HR manager as a family member rather than an HR manager.   
In a supportive, developmental role, the family HR manager can be less proactive and effective 
since she may not be able to build the same trust with managers in every case. The senior 
managers may perceive her primarily as the wife of the manager executive and the owner’s son, 
not the HR manager. So, she can only help if the managers decide to trust her and ask for help. 
In relation to leadership development, the development outcomes of PM can be more difficult 
to explore. In this case, at the company group level, the PM may be less effective compared to 
managers at other companies. 
“I should go into situations where a top manager won’t necessarily share his shortcomings with 
me because I’m the wife of the owner’s son. And then I don’t want to force this anymore, so 
there are issues that if they ask for help, I help, but I don’t sit down with managers on a weekly 
or monthly basis about this.” (Interview_C_HR2) 
Managers also try to use the HR manager as intermediaries in informal communication to send 
messages to her husband (leader), thus preparing the formal information. That also proves that 
managers perceive her more like a family member than an HR manager in some cases. 
“If they want to send some message to my husband, they started to tell me… They prepared the 
ground a little, but they didn't… (ed. tell it directly to him). At first, it was so awfully confusing, 
and then I learned to let go.” (Interview_C_HR2) 
A family business may emphasize recruiting, selecting, retaining, and promoting those 
non-family managers who are in line with their values.  
The line managers whom I interviewed were managers who worked for a long time for the 
company in various positions, and they usually started from the bottom, or the family business 
was their first workplace even. In contrast to a nonfamily firm, these managers argue that only 
those employees get promoted who meet the expectations from time to time. 
(Interview_C_LM2)  
 
The impact of the family business system on the family system 
Lack of formalization leads to conflicts  
There is no formal, established performance appraisal system for family managers along with 
objective numbers, and there is no formalized way of giving feedback to each other. That leads 
to conflicts within the family and criticism on personal grounds. 
Conflict in assessing family firms’ performance has led to changing the management 
structure and the positions of family members at a group level  
The family CFO was replaced by a non-family CFO, while the three siblings pointed to a 




does not end up in a situation where she presents the results and the other siblings may not 
believe her and question the figures. 
 
The effect of family Influence on Perceived justice of PM  
Family manager’s self-control and common values lead to more formalized systems to 
eliminate injustice and unfairness. 
The former PMS was not perceived as fair by the family executive and other family managers 
at the family group level. Due to different organizational cultures, they were more lenient with 
non-family managers of companies run by the younger brother in case of underperformance. 
This was not fair to other non-family managers at the examined company. In addition, family 
members were less lenient with each other either in the event of non-compliance than in the 
case of non-family managers.  
The common values stemming from the founder, such as a sense of belonging and ownership, 
help the family members through the problems, and this conflict with the solutions of 
establishing a holding structure and recruitment of a non-family CFO (Interview_C_HR2).   
The self-control of the family executive also appears as a family effect to reduce the family 
impact on appraisal. That led to a more formalized system (assessment of job categories) so 
that it won’t depend on which family or non-family manager someone works for during 
performance evaluation. The attitude, the value system, the organizational culture should be 
uniform in all organizations. 
“I can be more lenient with certain managers, looking at other companies than, say, my 
brother’s performance.” (Interview_C_U1) 
“I think we are more lenient with non-family members… But we are working on that now so 
that the approach is uniform for each company and does not depend on which family member 
is running the company, but the same values and attitudes develop everywhere.” 
(Interview_C_U1) 
It is important for managers to have the executive or senior executives appear among the 
workers from time to time. At the same time, top managers and owners are less likely to come 
up to employees and talk with them these days. (Interview_C_LM3) So, with growth and 
improvements, the organization has become noticeably bigger in size and more impersonal. Yet 
middle managers say people would demand and motivate them if the top senior managers and/or 
owners come and talk to people informally. 
“In the past, senior executives came up to the workers several times, asking how they were. I 
think it also has a bit of an effect on their performance to see that they are paying attention. This 
is what has been missing lately.” (Interview_C_LM4) 
“For example, for me, it would be good for my soul and for my own efficiency, my 
performance, that the owner, the boss came down, they ask me how I was, and it would be good 
that I talked to them. I also used to tell my mother that the big boss came to me, we talked, and 




At the initiative of the manager directly under the executive manager, the executive sits in threes 
with the manager and another subordinate for a personal conversation about how the employee 
is doing. The goal of a manager with this is to make employees feel that the top management 
and owners care about them and pays attention to them. The conversations are ad hoc in nature 
and last for about fifteen minutes. For the subordinates with whom they had spoken so far, the 
conversation was very positive. 
“One of the older subordinates was so touched, he fell so well, that he cried like a small child… 
there in front of us that it fell so well for him.” (Interview_C_LM3)  
At the same time, shift managers and plant managers miss the personal conversations and the 
feedback and performance evaluations of their superior managers, which has not happened so 
far. Managers see that their superiors work a lot and don’t have time for giving feedback 
personally beyond discussing tasks. (Interview_C_LM3; Interview_C_LM4) “It’s good for a 
person to get feedback.” (Interview_C_LM4)   
 
Other elements of the conceptual framework 
Contextual factors  
Due to the shortage of skilled labor and market pressure to raise wages, Performance 
management practices rather aim to support the establishment of the performance-based 
compensation system.  
Due to the pandemic, the introduction of the performance management system with 
proper communication and training for middle management is delayed.  
Due to different organizational cultures, the performance management system aims to 
change and integrate the different cultures and unify the expectations regardless of the top 
management at different firms. 
Due to Industry 4.0, the company could develop a professional KPI and controlling 
system, which can be a basis of the performance management system.  
 
Cognitive processing of participants 
Non-family employee's personality, experience, and trust may affect how they perceive the 





5.3.4. Family Business Case “D” 
 
Introduction 
The Family Business D is present in the field of metal processing, and it has been engaged in 
sheet metal fabrication in the region of Central Hungary since 1990. During this time, the family 
business has grown from a sole proprietorship to a company that employs more than 600 people, 
and it is recognized in its field.  
They produce parts and components in small and medium batches. The Family Business D 
supplies large multinational companies around the world in the banking sector, the agricultural 
machinery industry, and the heating and cooling industry. The company does not produce end 
products; they are only incorporated into other products by other multinational companies. We 
can meet their products in smart cash registers, self-service cash registers in hypermarkets, as 
well as in ATM’s and parcel lockers (Interview_D_U1).   
As a result of continuous technological and territorial expansions in recent years, the family 
business became a large company based on its size and revenue in 2019. They tried to remain 
in a medium-sized enterprise for years due to the more favorable tender conditions and 
possibilities; however, the time had come to become a large company. In line with this, they 
have finally taken over those colleagues who were employed by temporary work agencies 
before. Nowadays, they employ around 600 people, including 130 white-collar workers, in two 
sites. 
Although the company was constantly evolving, it was difficult to meet customer needs due to 
capacity problems mainly caused by labor shortages. To eliminate capacity problems and 
expand capacity in terms of labor and production, the family purchased a new site in the West-
Transdanubia region in 2020. The site was taken over with workers, ordering stock assets, 
property, and inventory by their back then dormant company owned by the CEO’s two 
daughters (hereinafter Family Business D2).  
Since Family Business D2 became a medium-sized company with its ca. 100 employees located 
in a different region under the name of the two daughters can take advantage of the favorable 
tender opportunities again. In Family Business D2, the younger daughter is formally an 
executive, but the factory manager manages the operation in practice, which is also 
communicated to the employees. The daughter commutes and spends 2-3 days there to assist in 
HR-related tasks and oversee financial referrals and ensure communication and proper 
information flow between his father and the management of Family Business D2. Later, they 
are planning to merge the two companies and become a company group in a holding structure. 
(Interview_D_E3) In my research, I mainly focused on the original family business. 
Since the company has capacity problems due to a lack of human resources, the continuous 
improvement of HR is essential for them to retain workforces. The HR priorities are recruitment 
and selection as well as retention. The fluctuation was 28% at the corporate level last year. It 
was more than 50% four years ago, and they were able to improve by 5-10% points every year. 
According to the interviewees, the corporate culture in the original family business is 
characterized by a family atmosphere, trust, and the importance of human relationships. The 




30 years (Interview_D_U1, Interview_D_LM2, Interview_D_E3). In contrast, the 
organizational culture of Family Business D2 is different. The name and presence of the family 
do not mean the same thing to the workers there from a one-year perspective. That is why they 
try to apply greater involvement and empowerment in the management. 
Regarding the long-term strategy, the CEO sees the future development of the company in two 
directions. First, he would like to expand their product range and their activities in the metal 
processing field by producing not just parts and components but finished goods and their own 
complete products as well in the future. Furthermore, they also want to provide complete 
services to their customers and partners later. Second, he wants to launch new businesses in 
other sectors such as the private health sector to stand on several legs. (Interview_D_E3) 
 
Organizational Performance  
This year will be handed over a greenfield investment. They also have made tremendous 
progress in the field of training and development since the company had the opportunity to train 
their employees within the framework of a tender. They could organize internal and external 
training in leadership and foreign language and in the field of forklift and painting. They are 
also planning to build up and further develop their corporate brand, including their employment 
brand. 
They hold various events locally, which were canceled completely in 2020 due to the COVID 
restrictions. They usually organize open days, family days, and every December, they organize 
a Santa Claus celebration for the children of the employees. Moreover, they usually have a 
shutdown in December, so they have an annual end-year party for all colleagues. Before the 
event, there is a management briefing about company results and achievements as well as the 
plans of the company. Later they have dinner and a party that lasts until dawn, where all the 
600 colleagues can meet. Every interviewee highlighted that this event is extremely popular 
among their colleagues as a wedding or city party that no one wants to miss, everyone is 
preparing for it, and the absence rate is very low. They consider it an investment that will pay 
off later, or it may not be measurable at all.  
Regarding the financial performance, the company showed significant growth in the last three 
years in all key financial metrics. Sales increased with a CAGR of 30%, while profitability also 
improved, showing a CAGR of 18% in EBITDA and 24% in Net Profit. As a result of that, both 
EBITDA and Net Profit margin healthy between 21% and 18% and 13% and 12%, respectively. 
This performance is quite remarkable and ranks well in industry comparison. (See in Table 36) 
 
Introduction of Family ’D’ 
Six family members and three generations work together in the family business: the 
founder/owner/CEO, his father, his wife, his sister, and his two daughters.   
In 1975 the funder/owner’s father became a craftsman in a second job. The business grew out 
of a garage. Prior to joining his father’s business, the CEO graduated from a secondary technical 
school as a toolmaker; later he gained experience in the machine tool industry. Finally, in 1990 




funder/owner’s father has worked as an employee in the family business in the field of material 
procurement, maintenance, and freight transport. The CEO was responsible for managing the 
business, and he was always more involved in partner communication, networking, and 
business acquisition.   
The founder/owner is in his 50s, and he and his wife have two adult daughters.  
His wife works as a non-manager employee in the field of finance under the control of the CFO. 
She has been responsible for the money transfers and the banking administration to a certain 
extent for almost 30 years.  
The two daughters are owners of Family Business D2. 
His older daughter is currently on maternity leave. She had her first degree in logistics, her 
second degree in economics. She started to work in the warehouse at the family business. Back 
then, nobody dealt with packaging at the company so. She was entrusted with packaging, which 
led to many good ideas and innovations that resulted in the most effective packaging solution 
for paper, plastic, and wood packaging materials. Later she joined the HR department. 
His younger daughter has a college degree in the field of logistics. She started to work with the 
internal logistics of the biggest products at the family business. She completed her internship 
and wrote her dissertation in that field. When the HR colleague resigned unexpectedly, she 
decided to apply for the labor relations position with the purpose of helping. She went through 
the same formal process of recruitment as anyone else (Interview_D_LM2, Interview_D_U1).  
Later, she was also promoted to HR team leader a few years later. Currently, she is a consultant 
at the original family business and acts as an executive at Family Business D2. She is 
responsible for the approval of the money transfers as her mother at the original family business. 
The daughter argues that it belongs to the value of the family that “we like to handle the “money 
bag”” (Interview_D_U1). 
The CEO’s sister is also an owner of the company after his father handed over his share. First, 
she worked there in the operations department for a while. Later she has been away from the 
company for about four years due to several illnesses. She returned to the family business, and 
now she works as a team leader for the receptionists, gardeners, and cleaners.  
The grandfather is in his late 70s; however, he is still active in the company’s life. “He lives his 




Figure 34 - Genogram of the controlling family of Family Business „D” 
 
Family Involvement  
Currently, the family acquires 100% of the two companies. The Family Business D1 is 65% 
owned by the founder/CEO and 35% by his sister. The Family Business D2 is 50-50% owned 
by the two daughters of the CEO. In the four-member top management team, the CEO is the 
only family member. The family firm governmental configuration type is still more like the 
owner-manager type since the founder is still the executive, while his sister is slightly involved 
in the management. However, the two daughters have already begun to work for the family 
business, and the CEO has started to involve them more and more in the strategy. Their family 
rather prioritizes family first than business. Their guiding principle is that every family member 
can have a place and make a living from the company regardless of one’s performance. 
Nowadays, the family firm’s key governmental challenges are dependency on the owner-
manager and succession.  
The owners still manage the company, and three generations work at the family business. The 
owner family defines itself as an entrepreneurial actor, and its self-understanding is closer to 
„Family Business” rather than “Business Family.” The diversification of its product portfolio 
is also low. However, they are now starting to look for new business directions. Thus, both 
horizontal and vertical expansion of the portfolio is possible in the future. The company group 
includes two companies; however, I only focused on the Family Business D1 in my research. 
They can relate more to the family first philosophy and prioritize family-related goals over 
business goals. Since the daughter argued that “if knowledge and experience are yours…you 
have relationships, it’s much easier for you to restart either a business with either a new or the 
same portfolio.” 
As they work as suppliers to multinational companies, it is important for them that they find a 
niche market and make their products essential for the partners to have a greater bargaining 
position. They have all kinds of business relationships, those they’ve been working with for a 





It is very important to the CEO that employees feel comfortable in their workplace besides they 
get paid based on their knowledge and performance. The corporate year-end dinner and ball 
have always been held since the company was founded. In the first year, it was held with five 
more colleagues; in 2019, more than 500 people came to the ball. Last year, the event was 
missed due to the Covid. Although the family atmosphere is becoming increasingly difficult to 
maintain at this size of the company, the owners are still striving for it. The corporate culture 
of Family Business D2 is completely different, so they hope that this will change more and 
more with their management.  
Based on the interviews with family members, the family member’s identification with the 
company is very high. The transgenerational intentions are also high. The predecessor has 
started to plan to pass the torch at the management level. There is no designated successor yet.    
 
Succession 
According to a family agreement, the CEO’s father handed over his stake to his daughter. So, 
the CEO and his sister are the owners of Family Business D1. CEO got the 65% of the 
ownership, and his sister owned 35%. Regarding the ownership dimension of the succession, 
the CEO is planning to pass the torch to his two daughters.  
The two daughters own 50-50% of the Family Business D2. The younger daughter acts as an 
executive there.  
CEO is planning to retire within five years to be involved in strategy making. They attended 
the Family Business Club events. However, he let them decide whether they will only play a 
role as owners or get involved in the company at the operational or strategic level. If so, he 
stressed they should find a position where they feel good, fight for it and bring results. 
The CEO and his daughters hold a meeting once a month, where they discuss the affairs and 
strategic directions of the company.  According to the CEO, these monthly discussions have 
several purposes: First, his oldest daughter has been on maternity leave for more than two years, 
and a continuous information flow can help her come back to work more effectively. Second, 
the CEO wants to involve them more and more in strategy making. Before that, he let them 
prove in their own field without his help. But now, as his retirement has begun, he is ready to 
share information with them about the family business as future owners.  The goal is that they 
will be able to think together, and the generational change takes place. He does not just want to 
ask for his daughters’ opinions, but he also wants them to come up with suggestions and new 
ideas, so the predecessor also sees this as a mutual learning process. Thirdly, they are also 
planning to write the family constitution later. These meetings are currently held in-house but 
are planned to be held outside the company where they are not disturbed. They did not 
communicate the purpose of these discussions, but the successor said it is kind of an open secret. 
He is also open to involving his son-in-law more in the family business by giving them an 
opportunity in the company or creating a new business. As a first step, one of them will join the 
company soon, and according to the CEO, if he gets to know the company and stands his 
ground, he could join even the strategic meetings as well later. The other son-in-law is a doctor, 





Human Resource Management 
The Chief Financial Officer is responsible for managing HR. Previously both daughters of the 
CEO worked here, and even the younger daughter was promoted to HR team manager, which 
also shows the importance of the field.  
According to the CFO, HR has evolved a lot in recent years, but it still needs to develop a lot. 
Currently, the HR team consists of six colleagues. The department deals with HR and payroll, 
as well as training and development. An HR specialist organizes the dual education program 
but also provides in-house training (e.g., onboarding) and vocational training.  
Recruitment and selection are very important due to the shortage of labor. While the fluctuation 
is very high during the probation period, it is very low among those employees who have been 
working there for 2-3 years or more. They call those employees who go from company to 
company „eternal migratory birds” (Interview_D_U1). From time to time, they leave, then 
come back again and submit their application to the company, spend some time here and leave 
even for a slightly better monthly salary again. (Interview_D_U1) 
Accordingly, they also try to focus more and more on reducing fluctuation and retaining the 
employees. That is why they are planning to develop an incentive system for which they will 
also hire additional staff.  
But smaller measures are also included to foster job satisfaction. ‘Office hours’ service was 
introduced in the HR admin area for employees to ask for help or ask questions.  
In addition, the family business has a company bus and a canteen. They organize various social 
events such as family days, Santa Claus Day for worker’s children, and open days, on which 
they can introduce the company to workers ’family members and other residents from nearby 
villages. They also like joining large public local events such as village days and the “pálinka” 
festival. There, the company invites employees and their family members to lunch. There is the 
end-year dinner and party, in which the family business rewards those colleagues (around ten 
colleagues each year) who have worked there for ten years. 
A few years ago, HR introduced an employee satisfaction survey. Since then, they have 
repeated it annually. As a family business, it was important for them to involve employees in 
the development of HR. Based on these employee surveys, they define the priority and focus 
areas of HRM. The CFO argued that in contrast to multinational firms, the design of processes 
and programs is also based on management creativity, professional knowledge, and experience. 
The CFO stressed that they also pay attention to the measurement of the efficiency of the 
implemented processes and programs for further possible improvements.  
 
Performance Management and Performance Appraisal System 
The Family Business has a formalized performance management and appraisal system and 
processes introduced a few years ago. The Performance Management System has several goals.  
Firstly, it aims to support the training and development and career management plans and 
decisions. As part of the PM system, they have also introduced three annual performance 




management. These questionnaires help managers to structure the discussion with their 
subordinates. (Interview_D_LM2) 
The manual and clerical workers questionnaire includes topics such as personal characteristics, 
competencies, development and training needs, and areas for improvement 
(Company_Document_D1 and Company_Document_D2). The questionnaire for managers 
includes topics such as personal characteristics, leadership, and general competencies, 
development needs, areas for improvement, the level of execution of the tasks. 
(Company_Document_D3) The managers and employees sign the annual performance 
evaluation sheets on paper, which can be printed out on paper, and then they hand it over to 
HR. 
Secondly, it provides a tool for the manager to sit down and think about the colleagues and give 
feedback to them at least once a year face to face.  If they work well, praise them. If something 
needs to be changed, try to support them by setting an individual development plan.  
The CFO argues that it is important that this process supports employees’ retention. The 
managers can uncover how the employees feel about their work and whether they have any 
career aspirations by going through the questionnaire. A few years ago, they started to conduct 
exit interviews with employees who left the company. It turned out that many people liked 
working there, but they could not see their career development even though the opportunity was 
there. The CFO argues that there was a lack of communication between the direct manager and 
the individual.   
Even though the performance management systems have a competence development and career 
management focus, the annual salary increase is also based on performance appraisals. 
(Interview_D_U1)  
In the case of managers and white-collar workers, the superior manager evaluates their goal 
achievements; however, in its current form, the annual performance evaluation sheets cannot 
support the decision that much because of lack of SMART goals Company_Document_D1-D2-
D3).  
In addition to the legal obligation, in the case of manual employees, performance data, i.e., 
quality, work performed, presence, is filtered from the corporate management system. Based 
on this, the attitude of employees can be deduced, and the managers can suggest salary raise to 
their team within the given budget and in line with the different job categories.  
Employees have a monthly bonus based on the number of hours worked and the quality of their 
work. The advantage of the bonus system is that it favors colleagues who want to work for the 
company in the long run, not those who stay for a short time. (Interview_D_U1) 
 
Implementation and further developments  
They strongly rely on the employee survey result to improve their performance management 
and assessment system (Interview_D_LM2).  
Until now, the performance review of managers and white-collar workers was mandatory, and 




CFO argues that they decided to make the evaluation of manual workers mandatory this year 
as well.  
Furthermore, they want not just the manager to assess their subordinates, but rather there should 
be multiple raters for everyone. The CFO has already started a pilot project in his department, 
in which employees can give feedback to him, but they might develop the evaluation to 360 
degree-feedback method later.    
Even though HR organized training for management to support the implementation, the 
effectiveness could be improved according to the interviewees. The plan and the actual process 
differ: "I think it's 35-40% different, which is not exploited, I think" (Interview_D_U1)  
The ineffectiveness and difference between planned and actual processes are caused by 1) the 
shortcomings of the manager’s personal management skills; 2) the lack of capacity of 
processing the result of the individual evaluations at the individual and organizational level; 3) 
lack of CEO’s communication to middle management regarding PM goals and setting a good 
example.    
Hereinafter, I present the three problems in more detail in the following. 
First, the managers conduct the mandatory performance management reviews with their clerical 
colleagues annually; however, many of them fail to give feedback continuously, and it is 
difficult for them to give negative feedback. There are no semi-annual evaluations, so the 
achievement of the targets is not monitored during the year either. „There are areas, where I 
know, the manager prefers to put this aside so quickly… they don't feel the weight of it and 
how good this thing is for us.” (Interview_D_U1)     
Secondly, they find it challenging to manage the performance management processes and 
evaluate its results at the company level to support further decisions. 
HR collects, summarizes, and evaluates the education and training needs centrally and prepares 
an annual training and development plan. HR had already made an annual plan last year, but 
the interviewees admitted that there is still room for development in its implementation. 
(Interview_D_U1, Interview_D_LM2) The processing of the questionnaires and the 
preparation of career and development plans at the individual and organizational level is lagging 
due to the lack of capacity in HR. The evaluation of the questionnaires is rather contingent than 
systematic. “We rather look at quantity so that if there are many recurring demands, we get a 
quick fix.” (Interview_D_U1) 
In the case of a multinational company, best-in-class processes can be introduced easily. That 
is why the CFO admitted that the performance management processes would be different in 
that case. They design and develop their own HR processes, which certainly requires extra effort 
from HR. That is why they cannot provide as much capacity for supporting the implementation 
and processing the outputs for further actions.  
Within the high-potential program, they have already mapped the most important positions to 
ensure succession by developing individual development and career management plans for their 
high-potential colleagues. However, the CFO admitted that this high-potential program had not 
been implemented yet after the mapping phase. At the same time, the aspiration and purpose of 
HR are clear, and there are already good examples. The company provides career opportunities 




to move forward. For example, one of their plant managers started working as an edge bending 
machine operator. During his last performance review, they will discuss his next career step as 
site manager if he is willing to study further under a study contract. 
Thirdly, it seems that CEO does not set a good example for middle managers and does not 
communicate the goal of PM to them properly, so they could not see how PM can support the 
achievement of family business goals 
     
Performance management of non-family top management 
The CEO/owner graduated from a secondary technical school as a toolmaker, and he hasn’t got 
higher education in management. From a sole proprietorship, he built a family business with 
more than 700 employees. He keeps learning constantly and trying to learn from others how to 
manage people and delegate tasks. He argues that he has managed to learn a lot, but he still has 
to deal with many tasks related to operational management.  
There is iterative strategic planning in which subordinate managers play a significant role, but 
the CEO makes sure the goals are always challenging enough. He currently manages five people 
directly, but he usually doesn’t hold performance evaluations with them annually. His 
subordinate has recalled only one occasion in the last few years. The CEO rather gives brief 
evaluations and feedbacks, and he also expresses his gratitude for the work, but it is not in a 
structured form, which would also be in demand. (Interview_D_LM2) 
The family CEO gives a free hand in the implementation; however, he is often asked to help 
make and communicate decisions.  
 
Performance management of Family Employees 
Bifurcation appears in the planning phase of PM regarding family employees. The CEO seems 
to consider two things. First, he tried to find tasks and positions for every family member, in 
which one feels good and feels at home. They are only given a challenge that they can meet and 
succeed in, and they are comfortable with it. From the interviews, you can see that he relies on 
strong feedback from external and internal stakeholders on family employees’ activity and 
behavior in the evaluation of family employees. (Interview_D_E3)  
Second, in the case of an underachiever family employee, he tries to find a field where he 
reduces or eliminates the possible negative effects of the bad performance on the company’s 
performance. 
While in case of most family members, he doesn’t need to manage this since they are good 
performers (two daughters and his wife), or he could manage this successfully (his sister), in 
the case of his father, he still has to face with many conflicts (Interview_D_E3). The daughter 
describes the situation in this way. “The company is located in a large enough area that there is 





The younger daughter started working for the company under a non-family manager during her 
internship. She put it that it depends on the manager whether he/she can take over the 
management of a family member or not.  
"There is a leader who can take on this and manage that you are the boss's daughter, child, and 
he or she will not be able to treat you 100% like any other outsider... while the other manager 
was afraid to assign me a job…" According to her manager was afraid that his/her position 
would be taken away by her: “he was jokingly remarked by the other managers that “hey, what’s 
up? Here's the owner's daughter, she'll take your job from you soon, you won’t need you, will 
you?” (Interview_D_U1)  
The daughter highlighted that the manager’s fear was completely baseless. If someone knows 
her father, he/she would know that he wouldn’t put a 21-22-year-old person in a chair who 
came out of college in vain for his child. She did not complain to his father about the manager. 
She also stressed, “to be recognized you have to work for it. It can be given, but it is not good 
for the child or family member, nor for the company. You will not be able to hold that 
position…” (Interview_D_U1) 
Since the manager did not dare to give her challenging tasks from which she could have learned, 
she decided to move to the HR field to find opportunities for professional development and 
personal growth. She felt that under the CFO, who manages the area, she could learn more. She 
knew his leadership style since he was already the manager of other family members as well. 
(Interview_D_U1) 
When the daughter wanted to apply for a vacant HR position, she mentioned it to his father, 
who directed her to the CFO in line with the hierarchy. 
“She talks more, and she has more open communication than the other (daughter), and I say 
okay, no problem, you know whom it belongs to, go there, submit your resume then try to get 
the job, then she was hired.” (Intreview_D_E3) 
The daughter spoke to the manager and applied for the vacant HR position following the formal 
processes as anyone else.  
After a few years, the daughter decided to apply for a vacant HR team leader position. The CEO 
did not interfere in the formal application process either, he said that he “expected the direct 
manager to treat her even harder than any outsider" (Interview_D_E3), but as a father, he 
supported his daughter from the background and like a mentor he provided advice on the 
application since he knew the leader and her daughter's strengths and abilities. 
The CEO was informed about his younger daughter’s performance by the CFO. 
(Interview_D_E1), but the CFO confirms that the CEO did not want to have a say in the 
management and evaluation of the successor. At the same time, the CFO assumes that 
everything is discussed in the family. (Interview_D_LM2). In line with the offspring’s 
experience, the CFO showed the image of an autonomous personality, who was not frightened 
that the owner’s daughter and wife were his subordinates. 
"I wasn't afraid at all that they would say anything about me because I know I'm doing my job; 
it's appreciated." (Interview_D_LM2) He argues that the CEO instructed him that he had to 
decide “just as if it were another employee, of course, with the interests of the company in 




However, it also seems important that the CFO, although he did not know the controlling family 
prior to joining the company, he describes their relationship as friendly. So, the non-family 
leader also belongs to the inner circle.  
According to the CFO, managing family members is relatively easy, but he thinks it also 
depends more on their open, positive attitude. They can talk to each other openly and honestly, 
no matter if it is a positive or a negative thing, or it is about him as the manager or them, or 
about others. 
However, the manager stressed that he does not differentiate between family and non-family 
subordinates.  
At the team leader level, other employees also worked for the company for a very long time, 
and they also have nice career progress.  He tried to mentor and coach the daughter in the same 
way as his other subordinates. They always discussed the situations and the background of the 
decisions. He considers it important to be fair to everyone in the evaluation. He argues that if 
someone makes a mistake, you need to look at how serious the mistake is and how many times 
someone made it since everyone makes mistakes. First, you need to be helpful and discuss the 
principles. It is important to see if it is a personal omission or there is a problem at the system 
level, which must be handled at the top management level. 
The CEO also mentioned that he could see that her daughter felt proud and valued by the 
colleagues in this team leader position. “She was proud of herself because no matter how many 
times she went through the plant, those new colleagues whom she hired greeted and waved her 
even from far away, and they also liked turning to her with their problems.” (Interview_D_E3) 
When the CEO could see that her daughter stood her ground as a team leader and also learned 
how to delegate, she appointed her daughter as an executive of Family Business D2. 
Now, the father/CEO manages her daughter and gives feedback to her.  Performance 
management and an appraisal are not currently formalized and written. In everyday life, they 
often give feedbacks and praise each other even. They make sure that problems and 
misunderstandings are not discussed in front of others. In the monthly strategic meetings, where 
they also discuss operative issues, the daughter also receives feedback from her work and how 
she could improve it next time.  However, the daughter argues that based on her experiences, a 
family member must work much more to get recognition than a non-family member employee. 
She also adds that she has even remorse when she is not working. She also thinks that non-
family employees don’t even know how much she is working and how much responsibility she 
takes to make a decision. There is also a desire for compliance in the family, which a non-
family employee cannot see. 
The wife 
His wife works as a non-manager employee in the field of finance under the control of the CFO. 
She has been responsible for the money transfers and the banking administration for almost 30 
years. The CFO evaluates her performance as he does for all other non-family employees. There 
is not any difference. However, the CEO stressed that it is easy to evaluate his wife’s 
performance because she has been in the same position and responsible for this job for almost 
30 years.  According to him, his wife “controls the money in the same way as she controls the 




There are no negative feedbacks about her job from both the accounting and the external 
partners. Everyone gets their payments on time. “She is the type that if we entrust something to 
her, she does it with heart and soul.” Delegating tasks is not your strong point, so they are trying 
to relieve her since she works even too much.  
The sister 
The CEO’s sister is one of the company owners; however, I was told that she only works when 
she feels like doing something. “She works here ‘theoretically’” (Interview_D_U1)  
The CEO described his sister as not being an entrepreneur type. She has a commercial degree 
in catering, and she operated a pension and restaurant next to the family business; however, it 
was not profitable, and she had to close it down. He offered her a position as a team leader for 
the receptionists, gardeners, and cleaners. So, she can manage people; however, the area does 
not impact the company’s performance. “Well, she needs a task that she’s not completely 
committed to, and if she doesn’t do it, the field still works, and if she does it, she adds something 
extra, and there are successes. Finding that task for her is not easy. To make her feel good, to 
feel like a useful member of the company and even her colleagues feel that her work has a 
positive impact.” (Interview_D_E3) The successor also claims that she cannot be entrusted with 
a task that is important or time-bound. So, if she doesn't feel like working for months, it doesn't 
matter if she doesn't do her job. (Interview_D_U1) 
Parental altruism can be observed in the act of the CEO’s father handing over the ownership to 
the CEO’s sister. The CEO also respected that and even consciously took care of his sibling 
regardless of her performance. 
“If I don’t grab her and don’t embrace her, she can’t prevail; which one is better for me? Can I 
tolerate the hurting – sorry – humiliating, commenting on these and not giving up or saying I 
don’t care about you, go to work where you want? So, I think we always have to fight to keep 
the best possible relationship ...” (Interview_D_E3) 
The successor highlighted that it is part of the family philosophy that every family member can 
have a place and make a living from the company too, but those probably won't be able to take 
out so much from it either on a knowledge level or on another level if they don't give themself 
for the future of the company. (Interview_D_U1) However, it seems that for the next 
generation, meritocracy seems to be more important than their predecessors. The successor 
claims that if a family member holds a manager position, he/she should look at the company's 
interest. “It should be set aside that someone is a family member. If you do not prove it, you 
will unfortunately not be entitled to even that position because the company has an interest in 
it.” (Interview_D_U1) 
The CEO argues that it is important to have a formal structure and an appointed leader who 
makes the decisions to avoid disputes and conflicts between family members as well as multiple 
co-owners. However, in the case of the family business, the designated leader should also be 
loyal and understanding to family members as well as co-owners. At the same time, it is also 





“It is very, very important in my eyes that the leader should be loyal and understanding, that he 
also needs that man who only accomplishes half of it… So, we must not let either the family 
member or the co-owner, so neither should abuse the rights they have.” (Interview_D_E3) 
The CEO’s father 
The CEO’s father acts as an operational leader for which he does not have a formal position. 
He disregards the formal hierarchy, directs subordinates based on seniority, bypassing the direct 
manager sometimes. He starts at 3 a.m. in the company, he has good and useful insights, but in 
many cases, there is a problem with his style and manners. (Interview_D_U1). Moreover, he 
cannot keep up with IT developments and today’s solutions. “He lives his everyday life here; 
he likes to take actions. In many cases today, it is no longer certain that his way of thinking will 
take us forward.” (Interview_D_U1) They try to teach him not to act himself, as there are 
already other solutions in the digital world. For example, he went abroad for components, 
although he could also order them abroad. They also try to teach him that if he sees something 
in the plant, he should signal it to the manager in charge of the area without humiliating the 
managers in front of their subordinates. 
The non-family colleagues respect him; however, they can handle this ambiguity differently, 
so sometimes, the family must handle these in the background. 
“There are colleagues, who can handle him very well, and there are those who can handle him 
less. Usually, you must nod yes, it is okay. They do it for him. If they can’t get it done, they 
come to higher levels, even to my dad, to ask for help.” (Interview_D_U1)  
“Everyone respects and understands what he’s doing here and takes action, and then we try to 
handle these in the background.” (Interview_D_U1) 
 
The effect of PM practice on perceived justice 
Communication and voice  
A few years ago, HR introduced an employee satisfaction survey. Since then, they have 
repeated it annually. As a family business, it was important for them to involve employees in 
the development of HR. Based on these employee surveys, they define the priority and focus 
areas of HRM.  
Clarity of information, process, and expectations   
The role of line managers is critical in the performance evaluation process, and the company 
seems to recognize this; however, the top management struggles to keep line managers 
committed to performance management. 
Even though the daughter first argued that in terms of fairness and justice, most of the manual 
workers “do not deal with these things.” (Interview_D_U1) Those few who do care about 
having goals and getting feedback move up the corporate ladder. She also admitted that the 
middle manager impacts employees’ perceptions of fairness and justice. If the leader can 
authentically represent the goals and guidelines of the leader or the family. (Interview_D_U1). 
The first employee satisfaction survey also showed that employees felt that managers did not 




“If you have a good manager and you accept him/her, and he/she can present the things, and 
what is often lacking in that the manager communicates in a way, that employee feels that 
he/she is loyal to the company and the manager fully represents that direction which the 
executive or the family gives then I think you feel fair. However, if there is a problem in 
communication and you say something but your gesticulation describes something completely 
different, then from then on it is already crumb of comfort, then you can say anything but your 
body will show the truth.” (Interview_D_U1)     
Nowadays, many line managers fail to give feedback continuously, and it is difficult for them 
to give negative feedback. There are no semi-annual evaluations, so the achievement of the 
targets is not monitored during the year either. „There are areas, where I know, the manager 
prefers to put this aside so quickly… they don't feel the weight of it and how good this thing is 
for us.” (Interview_D_U1)     
To improve the shortcomings of personal management, HR introduced a practice: When the 
managers hand over the payroll paper to their subordinates, they should talk with them about 
their previous month’s performance. (Interview_D_LM2)  
All in all, the interviewees admitted that the role of middle managers needs to be strengthened. 
Consistency across people, over time, and with agreed values and norms 
The CFO argued that a good manager-subordinate relationship could make employees most 
committed. However, now, it mainly depends on the managers, such as shift managers and plant 
managers, how important the goals of performance management and an appraisal are for them. 
(Interview_D_LM2) Furthermore, the successor also highlighted that it might not be clear for 
the managers what value the PM processes represent.  (Interview_D_U1) 
The changeability of decisions, processes, goals, and principles 
The CEO argued that there is iterative strategic planning in which subordinate managers play a 
significant role; furthermore, he gives a free hand in the implementation to the top management 
team. (Interview_D_E3) 
Commitment to fairness:  
Family owners prefer fairness over perceive justice. Good performer family employees can 
perceive performance evaluation as fair since they allocate resources based on need. They care 
for every family member and provide them a job, but in case of poor performance, a family 
member is not entitled to positions with high salaries and more responsibility.  
 
The Effect of the Family 
The presence of family affects planned performance management 
Bifurcation toward family employees 
Bifurcation toward family employees influences the planning phase of PM. The CEO and his 
family have two considerations as guiding principles.  
First, the family CEO tries to find tasks and positions for every family member, in which one 




in, and they are comfortable with it. The evaluation of all family members is strongly based on 
feedback from external and internal stakeholders on family employees’ activity and behavior. 
(Interview_D_E3)  
Second, in the case of an underachiever family employee, the CEO tries to find a field where 
he decreases or eliminates the possible negative effects of the bad performance on the 
company’s performance. 
“Well, she needs a task that she’s not completely committed to, and if she doesn’t do it, the 
field still works, and if she does it, she adds something extra, and there are successes. Finding 
that task for her is not easy. To make her feel good, to feel like a useful member of the company 
and even her colleagues feel that her work has a positive impact.” (Interview_D_E3) 
While in case of most family members, he doesn’t need to manage this since they are good 
performers (two daughters and his wife), or he could manage this successfully (his sister), in 
the case of his father, the family CEO still has to face with many conflicts (Interview_D_E3), 
That may affect perceived justice of the employees and has a negative impact on the familial 
relationships.  
If the CEO’s father saw a problem in the plant, he does not respect the formal hierarchy, and he 
addresses it directly to the workers and not to the manager in charge of the area, or he humiliates 
the managers in front of their subordinates. The non-family colleagues respect him. However, 
they can handle this ambiguity differently, and the family sometimes must handle these 
situations in the background. (Interview_D_U1) 
The daughter describes the situation this way. “The company is located in a large enough area 
that there is room for everyone, and we can avoid each other.” (Interview_D_U1) 
In line with these two considerations, there is a minimum expectation towards family members. 
In contrast to underperformance, the family CEO is much less tolerant of the inappropriate 
behavior of family employees. Family members are expected to treat employees with respect 
and humility, not to feel superior. As family managers, they should be open to suggestions from 
others and be persuasive along with common-sense arguments. (Interview_D_E3) 
Formalization  
The controlling family is committed to establish and maintain formalized management systems. 
They develop the system gradually, considering the needs of the employees and the specifics 
of the company. (Interview_D_LM2) At top management levels among family managers, the 
performance management and appraisal are not currently formalized and written yet. In 
everyday life, they often give feedbacks and praise each other. (Interview_D_U1) 
 
The effect of family influence on actual PM practice 
Importance of personal relationships over formalized structure - an organizational 
culture based on personal relationships not only complements but also replaces formal systems 
The family and the family CEO need to maintain personal connections and a family atmosphere. 
The family members are very open, and they take an active part in the employees’ life. All the 




is very important and popular among the employees. At the same time, at this size, the need to 
introduce various formalized management systems has also been recognized, and several 
management systems have been introduced.  
After the goals are set, the CEO gives a free hand in the implementation to the top management 
team; however, he is frequently asked for his help in making and communicating decisions. 
Most of the employees were hired by the CEO, so they are attached to him, and therefore they 
find it difficult to transfer the actual direct control of them despite the existing formal structure. 
He often encounters the need to motivate and support the decision of his middle managers with 
his presence as the owner/CEO. He feels an increasing burden on the executive position, which 
takes a lot of time for him. He argues that professional management would be necessary for this 
size of the company. He wants to hand over the operational management to someone else to 
deal with strategic management in the following years. (Interview_D_E3) 
The ineffectiveness and difference between planned and actual processes may be caused 
by the shortcomings of the family manager’s personal management skills and the lack of setting 
a good example 
Due to his personal abilities (lack of high education in management) and interest, the family 
CEO has less insight into the operation of the management systems at such a large number of 
employees. Therefore, he argues that he is less able to support the introduction, operation, and 
revision of the systems from his leadership position.   
“So, these are the tasks that I find increasingly difficult to identify with, so it has outgrown me, 
so I should be replaced by someone, whom I sit next to and learn not to intervene in, but to lead 
the company with a more multinational approach.” (Interview_D_E3) 
This effect causes a lack of communication with middle managers. The interviewees claimed 
that middle management is less aware of PM’s goals and sees its benefits in achieving corporate 
goals. (Interview_D_U1)  
„There are areas, where I know, the manager prefers to put this aside so quickly… they don't 
feel the weight of it and how good this thing is for us.” (Interview_D_U1)     
The CFO argues that the processes are most influenced by the leader in charge regardless of 
whether the owner is a controlling family. In that sense, there is no difference between a family 
firm and a multinational company. (Interview_D_LM2) 
Based on this, the family CEO does not set a good example either since he does not conduct 
annual performance evaluations with his manager subordinates. His subordinate has recalled 
only one occasion in the last few years. The CEO rather gives brief evaluations and feedbacks, 
and he also expresses his gratitude for the work, but it is not in a structured form, which would 
also be in demand. (Interview_D_LM2) 
 
According to the interviewees, this leads that the potential of the existing management systems 






The effect of family influence on the outcome of PM practice 
Underperformers are appointed to positions with less responsibility and authority, 
where they can have a less negative impact on organizational performance (sister and father). 
Good performers may be appointed to positions with more responsibility and authority and are 
involved in the strategic planning process (daughters). 
Family workers who provided good or balanced performance may have a non-family 
leader. 
 
The impact of the family business system on the family system  
Due to the perceived unfairness of the family member, she decided to make a horizontal career 
move where she could develop under a different manager. 
 
The effect of family influence on Perceived justice of PM  
Familial altruism, Fredo effect, and both types of nepotism 
The effect of familial altruism and the “Fredo effect” can be observed in the family business. 
Parental altruism originally comes from the CEO’s father, but later the CEO took over the 
responsibility of taking care of his younger sibling regardless of her performance.  
“If I don’t grab her and don’t embrace her, she can’t prevail; which one is better for me? Can I 
tolerate the hurting – sorry – humiliating, commenting on these and not giving up or saying I 
don’t care about you, go to work where you want? So, I think we always have to fight to keep 
the best possible relationship ...” (Interview_D_E3) 
Both types of nepotism (reciprocal and entitlement nepotism) are present in the family business. 
While reciprocal nepotism may have a positive impact, entitlement nepotism may negatively 
impact the perceived justice of PM among family and nonfamily employees. 
The self-control of family members can affect the perceived fairness of the non-family 
manager during the performance management process.  
The family CEO respected the formal hierarchy and formal performance appraisal processes 
for family members working under the non-family manager. Although the family CEO asked 
for information about their performance, he did not comment on their evaluation and even 
expected the manager to treat them harder than others (Interview_D_E3). In addition, of course, 
the CEO also relied on feedback from other external and internal stakeholders regarding the 
performance of family members. (Interview_D_E3) Although the non-family manager was 
convinced that family members might discuss everything about him and his work in the family, 
he felt fully empowered, and therefore, he perceived the process as fair as an evaluator manager. 
That also could affect the perception of other non-family members of his team. 
(Interview_D_LM2) 
Moreover, the nonfamily manager also confirmed that the openness and attitude of family 




The ability to differentiate between familial and company roles (as being a father and a 
CEO)  
While the family CEO respected the formal hierarchy as a father, he supported his daughter 
from the background, and like a mentor, he provided advice to her since he knew the leader 
and her daughter's strengths and abilities. (Interview_D_E3) In this way, the daughter also 
experienced the process as fair, during which her performance is judged based on her own 
work and behavior. (Interview_D_U1) 
 
Other elements of the conceptual framework 
Cognitive processing of participants - The non-family manager's personality, 
experience, and trust in the family may affect the perceived justice of his/her family 
subordinates. 
The younger daughter argues that it depends on the manager whether he/she can take over the 
management of a family member or not. (Interview_D_U1) 
Those non-family managers, who have autonomous personalities, positive self-image, and a 
basic trust toward the family CEO and preferably belongs to the inner circle, are less likely to 
be frightened that a family member is his/her subordinates. 
Otherwise, the non-family manager may be afraid that his/her position will be taken away by 
the family subordinate, so fewer challenging tasks were assigned to him/her from which the 
family member could have learned less.   
Contextual factors  
Shortage of skilled labor 
Due to a shortage of skilled labor, the goal of PM is to retain employees, so a development-




5.4. Conclusion  
 
Below I summarize the most important findings of my research according to the propositions 
generated from the literature review previously.  
 
The effect of Family influence on Performance Management 
 
Proposition 1 
The presence of family has an impact on the antecedents and consequences of perceived 
justice of performance management practice of family and nonfamily employees in four 
ways: planning, implementation, communication, and coordination.  
 
1a) The effect of family influence on intended PM practice 
 
Proposition 1a  
The presence of family affects planned performance management in terms of the level 
of bifurcation and formalization.  
The companies differ greatly in whether there is bifurcation bias in their management processes 
and, if yes, which employee group they favor. I examined a family business in which controlling 
family has bifurcation bias toward family employees, which may decrease the perception of 
fairness among both family employees and non-family employees. Other families believe in no 
bifurcation bias; however, they hold successors to higher expectations. At the same time, a 
family may have bifurcation bias favoring an older family member identified as the owner's 
“extended hand”. However, identification with the owner was so great that the employees 
probably did not perceive the lack of formalized performance assessment as unfair in that case.  
Another owner's family was about to change their management practices from bifurcation bias 
favoring non-family employees to no bifurcation bias to reduce unfairness since they used to 
be more lenient with non-family employees depending on which family manager managed 
them.    
 
In family businesses, family executives can be a driving force in formalization and 
professionalization. Informal processes still play a major role in the management structure. 
Formal systems maybe being introduced gradually and only where it is necessary. They 
introduce a formal PM system by relying on informal processes to incorporate main principles 
(e.g., credibility, efficiency). 
 
In one case, a family business had already operating formalized performance management 
practices for successors. When the successors got to know the business and proved their 
competence, diligence, commitment and were about to start their own family, they felt the need 
to establish financial independence by setting a performance-based bonus system with 
transparent goals. The evaluation is carried out jointly with parents and children, which 
strengthens transparency among family employees. It was established for the siblings at the 
same time regardless of how long the two worked for the company. That rather reinforces the 
principle of equality. 
A family also incorporated the importance of personal relationships to the PM system by 
establishing annual performance appraisal discussions at all levels (senior executive, middle 





Based on my findings, I rather confirm Proposition 1a. I argue that it can presumably be 
generalized to all family companies internationally as well and not only in the case of the 
examined enterprises under Hungarian conditions. At the same time, I would add that 
presence of family may influence the planned PM processes through incorporating 
personal relationships into the system. 
 
 
1b) The effect of family influence on actual PM practice  
Proposition 1b 
The presence of family influences the actual performance management practice through 
line-managers implementation, leading to more efficient informal PM practices. 
 
In a family business, in the case of informal or partly formal appraisal processes, family 
members controlled the process and assessed the management together, while the evaluation 
mechanisms and criteria were unknown to the non-family HR manager. Predecessors also 
supported formal processes informally and helped develop and design them even as part of the 
succession. As a positive effect, the presence of the predecessor might provide extra motivation 
for employees during regular evaluations. 
In another case, the four owners as a family conducted performance appraisal reviews with each 
member of the top management team, which fosters goal alignments, consistency and builds 
trust through generations.     
In the third family business, the family executive led changing process and systems 
implementation, so people felt that these changes were important and, therefore, the 
implementations were more effective. During the appraisal discussion among family managers, 
the family members also found it important to create a common position on performance 
standards and evaluation to be able to convey the same messages to the organization. 
Since family members can still violate the formal hierarchy unconsciously and send confusing 
messages to subordinates, in that case, I also found that even controlling family feels the need 
for formalized systems. They still fear that the company won’t be flexible enough. 
In the fourth company, personal relationships not only complement but often replace formal 
systems. The CEO also recognizes the importance of formal systems and applies them, but a 
culture based on personal relationships prevents this from happening. The ineffectiveness and 
difference between planned and actual processes may be caused by the shortcomings of the 
family manager’s personal management education and skills and the lack of setting a good 
example for the management team. 
 
Based on the statistical analysis of my sample, the position has an impact on how much an 
employee considers the company as a family business. Based on the means, the managers 
consider the company more like a family business. While the position may have an impact on 
how much an employee perceives the overall fairness referred to supervisor and organization, 
as well as the procedural, informational, and overall justice of Performance Management, the 
position will not have an impact on how much an employee perceives the distributional and 
interpersonal justice of Performance Management. 
 
Based on my findings, I rather confirm Proposition 1b. I argue that it can presumably be 
generalized to all family companies internationally as well and not only in the case of the 
examined enterprises under Hungarian conditions.  
  
 






The presence of family influences the experienced/perceived performance management 
practice through its communication by top and line-managers that leads to more 
efficient informal PM practices.  
 
Based on the interviews, family managers’ ownership approach can strengthen loyalty and 
employees’ perceptions of fairness through setting an example of a hard-working work ethic.  
Reciprocal nepotism appeared in one family business, but according to the interviews, this does 
not affect perceived justice among non-family managers, as the family respects the formal 
hierarchy, while this leads to generalized trust-based exchanges that aim to strengthen the 
relationship between family members.  
The owner’s management strengthens the personal relationship by walking around the factory 
to talk to employees at all levels regularly. Furthermore, owner’s and family employees’ 
participation in company programs and leadership and vocational training with employees also 
strengthens the perceptions that the owners are accessible and open for communication.  
As the organization grows, the frequency of personal relationships decreases, which may 
negatively affect middle management’s commitment. However, when the family executive has 
a personal, informal conversation with subordinates at the request of the middle manager 
despite the growing organizational size, it has a motivating effect on the subordinate and the 
manager as well.  
The personal relationship is also important in goal setting, forming expectations, and their 
communications. If the management conducts the strategy planning locally, that can foster 
commitment since everything is more personal. The company values can be transferred directly 
by managers and owners in the form of expectations and behavior patterns. The personal 
commitment to the leader and the common goals can build an important bond of trust with the 
management in the family business, which has an influence on individual performance.    
Family value is imprinted to the given organizational culture. In the controlling family, 
hardworking and diligence were considered as “performance” regardless of the produced value 
or the money. The organizational culture reflects on this family value. Someone could make 
mistakes without serious consequences and punishment. In the case of a line manager reporting 
damage, first, the feedback was “thank you for telling us,” and managers focused on improving 
and solving the problems.   
 
Based on my findings, I rather confirm Proposition 1c. I argue that it can presumably be 
generalized to all family companies internationally as well and not only in the case of the 
examined enterprises under Hungarian conditions. At the same time, I would add that 
presence of family influences the experienced/perceived PM processes through personal 
relationships, ownership approach, and family values. 
 
1d) The effect of family influence on the outcome of PM practice 
 
Proposition 1d 
The presence of family influences the possible outcome of perceived justice of 
performance management through coordination, such as defining organizational 
structure (a division of tasks, scope of authority, types of coordination, and 
configuration).  
 
The family CEO can respond immediately and effectively to dissatisfaction with the system 




increases individual performance through engagement in the future.  
However, a maximalist atmosphere stemming from the owners may lead to a lower procedural 
and distributive justice level. When annual strategic goals are set too tightly in a maximalist 
atmosphere and the planning process is not revised, but the goals will remain just as difficult to 
achieve next year, which may cause tension at the employee and middle management level.  
Loyalty is an important evaluation aspect in performance management, as those who have 
worked there in the past know the strategic goals better, and thus, they are more committed to 
them. In the long run, this can foster both individual and organizational performance. 
A family business may emphasize recruiting, selecting, retaining, and promoting those non-
family managers who are in line with their values. As an important outcome of PM practice, 
non-family managers with an ownership attitude are promoted to higher leadership positions 
and got involved in the strategy. However, the development outcomes of PM may be applied 
less effectively because the non-family manager may perceive the family HR manager as a 
family member rather than an HR manager. 
Regarding performance management of family employees, a non-family CFO was appointed in 
a case study, and a formal governance structure was built to eliminate conflicts and strengthen 
justice perception among family members.  
In another case, family underperformers are appointed to positions with less responsibility and 
authority, where they can have a less negative impact on organizational performance. Good 
family performers may be appointed to positions with more responsibility and authority and are 
involved in the strategic planning process. Family workers who provided good or balanced 
performance are more likely to have a non-family leader. 
 
Based on my findings, I rather confirm Proposition 1a. I argue that it can presumably be 
generalized to all family companies internationally as well and not only in the case of the 
examined enterprises under Hungarian conditions.  
 
2) The effect of PM practice on perceived justice 
 
Proposition 2 
By differentiating between the two concepts of justice and fairness, family firm leaders 
pursue to achieve a high level of fairness rather than a high level of justice among family 
and nonfamily employees in the PM processes.      
 
Based on the statistical analysis of the sample, the distributions are negatively skewed in all 
dimensions.  In the case of negative skewness higher number of data points have higher values. 
Higher values dominate more strongly in terms of overall fairness related to supervisor and 
informational justice and interpersonal justice dimensions. Procedural justice has the lowest 
mean value and is less skewed negatively, which stems from less formalization of the family 
business. However, the results indicate that further research is needed. 
Based on the interviews, family firm leaders are committed to fairness, and they strive for 
fairness among non-family employees not only in performance management decisions but also 
in compensation and promotions. They talked about their employees in a very respectful 
manner. The importance of personal relationships and trust in the company culture indicates a 
high level of interpersonal justice in every case. The companies are constantly improving their 
PM processes; however, requirements of accuracy and free of bias are not always met. Family 
leaders can ensure consistency over time and over people more easily in the top and middle 
management levels. It is also important for family leaders that employees can raise their voice 









3) The effect of family Influence on Perceived justice of PM  
 
Proposition 3 
Family Influence has an effect on the perceived justice of Performance Management. 
Proposition 3a 
Family Influence has a direct effect on the perceived justice of Performance 
Management. 
Proposition 3b 
The various sources of family influence may interact with each other so that one source 
of family influence may have a moderator effect in the relationship between another 
source of family influence and perceived justice of Performance Management. 
Proposition 3c 
The various sources of family influence may interact with each other so that one source 
of family influence may have a mediator effect in the relationship between another 
source of family influence and perceived justice of Performance Management. 
 
During my qualitative analysis, I found signs of reciprocal nepotism in a family business case.  
A family employee works as a manual worker. His direct line manager is satisfied with his 
work, and the family member is also proud that he belongs to the family. If the family executives 
have other family-related duties and tasks outside of the office, they tend to ask him for help to 
act in their name. In this case, the family executive asks permission from the line manager in 
line with the hierarchy first. That rather has a positive impact on justice perception since it leads 
to generalized trust-based exchanges that aim to strengthen the relationship between family 
members. At the same time, the family shows strong self-control by respecting the formal 
hierarchy, which may have less effect on the perceived fairness of the non-family manager and 
other subordinates as well. 
In another case, the effect of familial altruism and the “Fredo effect” can be observed in the 
family business. Parental altruism originally comes from the CEO’s father, but later, the CEO 
took over the responsibility of taking care of his younger sibling regardless of her performance. 
Both reciprocal and entitlement nepotism are also present in the family business. While 
reciprocal nepotism may have a positive impact, entitlement nepotism may negatively impact 
the perceived justice of PM among family and nonfamily employees. 
However, at the same time, the self-control of family members and the ability to differentiate 
between familial and company roles (as being a father and a CEO) can affect the perceived 
fairness of the non-family manager positively during the performance management process.  
While the family CEO respected the formal hierarchy, he supported his daughter from the 
background by mentoring her as a father. In this way, the non-family manager and the daughter 
also experienced the process as fair, during which her performance is judged based on her own 
work and behavior by the line manager. 
In the third case family manager’s self-control and common values of belonging and ownership 
stemming from the founder help the family members solve their conflicts by establishing more 
formalized systems to eliminate injustice and unfairness. That we can see as a family effect to 
reduce the family impact on appraisal 
According to the statistical analysis of questionnaires, those subordinates, who consider the 




to the supervisor and the organization and more just regarding all justice dimensions. However, 
in the case of managers, the statistical analysis cannot confirm that, and the results rather 
indicate that further research is needed, and it would be worthwhile to examine this in a larger 
sample. 
 
Based on the above, I would rather confirm Proposition 3a and deny my Proposition 3b 
and 3c. Presumably, these two propositions are not valid; they should be deleted in this 
form.   
 
4) The impact of the family business system on the family system  
 
Proposition 4 
A family business system has an impact on the family system as a consequence of family 
employees’ and managers’ perception of fairness through the PM and PA processes 
directly and later on indirectly by the modification of coordination mechanisms. 
 
Proposition 4a 
A family business system has an impact on the family system as a consequence of family 
employees’ and managers’ perception of fairness of the PM and PA processes. 
 
Proposition 4b 
A family business system has an impact on the family system as a consequence of family 
employees’ and managers’ perception of fairness through the PM and PA processes 
indirectly by modification of coordination mechanisms (e.g., modifying division of tasks 
and scope of authority by appointing family or nonfamily managers). 
 
In one case, I did not find any effect of the family business system on the family system because 
the power structure has not been reflected on a formal governance structure with a 
corresponding leadership position. Yet informally, the family member is considered as the 
leader of the given fields more and more, and non-family managers adapt to that. Moreover, 
the successor is also fine with the situation, and she does not claim another position for herself. 
It is a common phenomenon that the capability of the offspring to continue the business is 
evaluated by the parents based on feedback from external partners through informal processes 
at work, especially in the beginning. 
The formal performance evaluation is also linked to succession. During the performance 
review, the development and career goals are set, as well as the succession-related company 
goals and tasks are also formulated (substitution in case of having children of the daughter). 
The predecessors and successors may carry out the performance review of non-family managers 
together to develop and prepare the successors for the succession by ensuring the transfer of 
core values and people management skills through generations and build trust between the 
successors and the non-family managers.  
During these PM practices, the family also strives for consensus and affirming and representing 
the same family values. Next to this, physical closeness helps to set an example and give 
opportunity for the parents to help their children in the work if needed (mentoring.) 
In another case, I found a lack of a formal performance appraisal system for family managers 
along with objective numbers without a formalized way of giving feedback to each other, which 
leads to conflicts within the family and criticism on personal grounds. These conflicts in 
assessing family firms’ performance have led to changing the management structure and the 




I also observed a case where a family member perceived unfairness because of her non-family 
manager, so she decided to make a horizontal career move to develop under a different manager. 
Based on my findings, I rather confirm Proposition 4a and 4b. However, I would add that 
this effect is presumably significantly stronger during the succession process. 
 
Other elements of the conceptual framework 
Contextual factors  
Due to the favorable institutional environment within Industry 4.0, a family company could 
develop a professional KPI and controlling system, which can be the basis of a more consistent 
and transparent performance management system.  
In one case, different labor market situations caused inequalities between sites. A family 
business has different sites in different regions, where the prices and income levels are different. 
Moreover, due to different levels of technology, the requirements for the workforce are 
different. Based on these differences, we can argue that internal fairness is achieved within each 
site; however, external unfairness between sites exists. Due to the shortage of skilled labor and 
market pressure to raise wages, the family management decided to establish performance 
management practices, which rather aim to support the establishment of a performance-based 
compensation system.  
Pandemic also influenced perceived justice indirectly in one case. While manual workers 
received a salary increase in compliance with the law, salary increases of the management were 
delayed due to COVID. That caused dissatisfaction at management levels until they received a 
retroactive salary increase. An HR manager argued that also due to the pandemic, the 
introduction of the performance management system with proper communication and training 
for middle management is delayed in another case.  
As an internal situation factor, the company has grown drastically within a short period of time, 
and the management could not catch up with this by implementing new rules and policies and 
formalized processes. As the family business grows, there are more and more companies in a 
family business group. Due to different organizational cultures, the performance management 
system aims to change and integrate the different cultures and unify the expectations regardless 
of the top management at different firms. 
Another interesting element of the external situation can be observed in some interviews. 
Management studies foster preconceptions about family businesses that they are 
unprofessional. When four owners as family conducted performance appraisal reviews or 
family members controlled the PM process and assessed the management together, family 
members did not or hardly talked about it. Since family business management does not belong 
to the mainstream management studies in the academy, familiness and HR practices influenced 
by the presence of the controlling family can be viewed as unprofessional and something which 
is better to hide. This may undermine the reliability of quantitative researches. 
 
Cognitive processing of participants  
The non-family manager's personality, experience, and trust in the family may affect the 
perceived justice of his/her family subordinates. It depends on the manager whether he/she can 
take over the management of a family member or not. Those non-family managers, who have 
autonomous personalities, positive self-image, and a basic trust toward the family CEO and 
preferably belongs to the inner circle, are less likely to be frightened that a family member is 
his/her subordinates. Otherwise, non-family managers may be anxious that the family 
subordinate will take their positions away, so they assign fewer challenging tasks to him/her 




6. Conclusion of the conceptual framework 
My theoretical framework was banked on three central studies introducing leading models. 
First, the model of Barnett and Kellermans (2006) proposed the relationships among family 
influence, HR practices, and justice perceptions among non-family employees at family 
businesses. They suggested that the involvement of the family in the business may affect the 
non-family employees' perceptions of justice directly, but its effect may be largely mediated by 
family firms’ HR practices. However, Barnett and Kellermans (2006) focused only on non-
family employees and generalized their assumptions on HR practices as a whole. They also 
have not clarified how family influence occurs during a specific HR process. Furthermore, their 
model represents family influence as a sole effect without considering the mediating and 
moderating effect of different types of family influences. Second, the Process Model of 
Strategic Human Resources Management framework by Nishii and Wright (2008) was 
extended to the Process of Performance Management by Farndale, Hope-Hailey, and Kelliher 
(2011). That can emphasize the three lenses (intended, enacted, and experienced) of formal and 
informal HR practices. This model missed discussing the effect of the controlling family and 
said little about the dynamics of perceived justice during the HR process and practices. Third, 
Erdogan’s model (2002) emphasizes the antecedents and consequences of formal PA practices, 
including distributional, procedural, and interactional justice. This model focuses on formal 
processes of performance appraisal practice, and it does not describe informal processes or other 
PM elements. It does not consider the presence of the controlling family either.   
The main contributions of my research are the following. First, I suggested a conceptual 
framework based on a systematic literature review (Fink, 2010), which I investigated by 
conducting a Multiple Embedded Case Study with the involvement of four family businesses 
in Hungary. Second, in contrast to Barnett and Kellermans (2006), I focused on only one HR 
subsystem, namely the Performance Management and Appraisal system, and its formal and 
informal processes. Second, I concentrated on the processes through three lenses (intended, 
actual, and perceived) influenced by the controlling family through planning, implementation, 
communication, and coordination. Third, I indicated external and internal contextual factors of 
FB system. Fourth, I suggested that PM subsystem has an impact on the relationship between 
the family and the company system as well. Finally,  
Based on my study, I argue that it is important to examine formal and informal processes 
together. However, formal and informal processes cannot be sharply separated, as I suggested 
previously in the Conceptual Framework. Since formal PM systems usually rely on informal 
processes to incorporate main principles. Informal processes can also weaken and strengthen 
formal processes; however, I have found that informal processes rather strengthen formal ones. 
Formal systems are also being introduced gradually and only in areas where it is necessary (e.g., 
size, mass-production, quality assurance). Where a strong organizational culture and personal 
relationships can replace formal management processes, they keep engaging in the informal 
practice. 
In the case of the performance management process, I can confirm the main statement of the 
model of Barnett and Kellermans (2006),  which suggested that the involvement of the family 
in the business may affect the non-family employees' perceptions of justice directly, but its 
effect may be largely mediated by family firms’ HR practices. 
The Process of Performance Management by Farndale, Hope-Hailey, and Kelliher (2011), also 
helps well to interpret the different family effects at each lens (intended, enacted, and 




presumably be generalized to family companies internationally of the same size as the examined 
enterprises. 
I cannot deny or confirm my Proposition 2, and further research is needed. However, I indicate 
that fairness and justice are not sharply separated concepts in everyday life. Family managers 
do not try to make a conscious choice between the two concepts in their decisions related to 
PM.   
In contrast to Barnett and Kellermans (2006) model, I proposed that family influence is not a 
sole effect, and the mediating and moderating effects of different types of family influences 
should also be considered. However, I could not find the validity of these propositions in my 
research. I would modify my conceptual framework by deleting Proposition 3b and 3c and only 
keep Proposition 3a in line with Barnett and Kellermans (2006) model. 
In line with Proposition 4a and 4b of my conceptual framework, I found that a family business 
system has an impact on the family system in the examined cases. While I confirmed these 
propositions, I add that this effect is presumably significantly stronger during the succession 
process. Formal PM and PA processes may serve as an appropriate framework for the 
participants during the succession process. The predecessors and successors may carry out the 
performance review of non-family managers together to develop and prepare the successor for 
the succession by ensuring the transfer of core values and people management skills through 
generations and build trust between the successors and the non-family managers. Furthermore, 
I found that formal goal setting and evaluation of the successors can play a key role in 
professionalization. It is good for the company since it makes the family business more 
independent from the family. And it is good for the family since it strengthens the commitment 
of the successors. However, further qualitative research is required to understand more the 
impact of the family business system on the family system. Nevertheless, future research may 
be limited because the family members tend to cover up the family influence from outsiders 
since they fear that the presence of the controlling family can be viewed as unprofessional. I 
presume that the impact of the family business system on the family system mainly appears in 
PM, and it may be less significant in other HR processes, such as recruitment and selection.     
 
In line with the process model, I also argue that cognitive processing of participants and 
contingency variables, such as national culture, family firm size, industry (Ikramullah et al., 
2016), can have a significant impact on the perceived justice of PM practices in which further 
research is needed to understand their dynamics more.  
 
The limitation of my research is that I only examined Hungarian small and medium-sized 
enterprises with more than 100 employees, which are not operating in the agriculture or service 
sector, have no piece production, and there is an ongoing family leadership succession process 
in the advanced state.  To control the effect of macro-environmental factors as inputs of PM as 
much as possible, I studied the selected cases for my research, which are located in the same 
quadrant of the model of Ikramullah et al. (2016). Based on the examination of the propositions, 
the proposition 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 4a, and 4b are rather acceptable as valid propositions. 






1. Appendix – Cover story 
 
Tisztelt Cím! 
A Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem Gazdálkodástudományi Karának doktor jelöltje vagyok és jelenleg a 
disszertációmat írom, amely során azt kutatom, hogy hogyan befolyásolja a teljesítménymenedzsment 
és értékelési rendszer az észlelt igazságosságot a családi vállalkozásokban? Hogyan jelenhet meg a 
családi hatás az adott HR folyamatban?   
A kutatás a családi vállalatok erős kis- és középvállalattá való fejlődését és professzionalizálódásának 
sajátosságait segíti feltárni 3-4 családi vállalat teljesítménymenedzsment és –értékelési rendszerének, 
folyamatának vizsgálata által.   
Az elemzésem során olyan családi kis- és középvállalatokat keresek, amelyeknél van formális 
teljesítményértékelési rendszer, és ahol már végbement az utódlási folyamat vagy még részben előtte 
állnak. A kutatás során a teljesítménymenedzsment gyakorlatával és az észlelt igazságossággal 
összefüggésben dokumentumelemzést folytatnék, mélyinterjúkat készítenék vezetőkkel, valamint 
kérdőíves felmérést végeznék a családi és nem családi munkavállalókkal.   
Betartva a szigorú kutatásetikai elvárásokat szintén mellékelem a kutatásban való önkéntes részvételre 
vonatkozó rövid egyetértési nyilatkozatot, mely biztosítja, hogy a beszélgetés és a kapott 
dokumentumok tartalma kizárólag kutatási célokat szolgál, s minden rögzített információt bizalmasan 
kezelek a kutatásom során. 
Természetesen szívesen küldök bővebb információkat a kutatásról és a készülő disszertációmról, 









2. Appendix – Statement of Consent 
 
„A teljesítménymenedzsment hatása az észlelt igazságosságra a magyarországi családi 
vállalkozások esetén” c. PhD disszertáció   
Hozzájárulási nyilatkozat 
 
Önkéntesen veszek részt a fenti címben megjelölt PhD kutatásban, mint interjúalany, amelyet Vajda 
Éva, a Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem Gazdálkodástani Doktori Iskola doktorjelöltje végez. Megértettem, 
hogy részvételemre az alábbi feltételek érvényesülnek: 
1. Megértettem, hogy a projektben történő részvételem önkéntes. Megértettem, hogy a részvételért 
díjazást nem kapok. Bármikor dönthetek úgy, hogy visszalépek a részvételtől és nem folytatom tovább. 
2. Megértettem, hogy ha az interjú során bármilyen okból kényelmetlenül érzem magamat, jogom van 
megtagadni a választ vagy véget vetni az interjúnak. 
3. Megértettem, hogy részvételem részét képezi, hogy a Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem kutatója interjút 
készít velem. Az interjú maximum 90 percet fog igénybe venni. Továbbá elfogadom, hogy az interjú 
alatt a kutató beleegyezésemmel jegyzeteket és hangfelvételt készíthet az utólagos szó szerinti átirathoz. 
4. Megértettem, hogy a kutató nem használja fel a nevemet és más adataimat semmilyen beszámolóban 
és a résztvevőként felém tanúsított titoktartás biztosítva van. A felvételek és adatok utólagos használata 
az általános adatvédelmi szabályok betartásával zajlik, ami védi az egyének és intézmények 
névtelenségét. 
5. Megértettem, hogy ez a kutatás és minden hozzá tartozó adat kizárólag akadémiai kutatás célját 
szolgálja. 
6. Elolvastam és megértettem a számomra szolgáltatott magyarázatot. Minden kérdésemre kielégítő 
választ kaptam, és önkéntesen elfogadom, hogy részt veszek ebben a kutatásban. 
7. A kutató 5 munkanapon belül elküldi számomra a rögzített hanganyagot, ezt követően 7 napom van 
jelezni, ha az interjú valamely része szó szerinti idézetként nem használható fel.  
8. Másolatot kaptam erről a nyilatkozatról. 
Aláírásommal elfogadom, hogy részt veszek ebben a kutatásban, a fentebb olvasható feltételekkel. 
















3. Appendix  – General interview with the CEO/incumbent/successor  
 
I. Questions about the Interviewee/ Kérdések az interjúalanyról: 
• Milyen pozícióban dolgozik és mióta a cégnél? Hogyan került a céghez? 
• Milyen végzettsége van?  
• Családtag vagy nem családtag?  (Ha igen, ha nem…) hogyan jellemezné a kapcsolatát a 
családdal? 
 
II. Questions about the Family Business/Kérdések a családi vállalkozásról: 
Kérem, hogy mutassa be a családi vállalkozás alapvető profilját, tevékenységét, legfontosabb 
szereplőit és rövid történetét! (P1) 
• Hogyan jellemezné a vállalat külső környezetét?  
• Melyek a szervezet belső adottságai?  
• Mi a vállalat víziója, missziója és vállalati stratégiája 
• Milyen a vállalat pénzügyi és nem pénzügyi teljesítménye? 
 
III. Genogram (P1a,b,c,d,P3a,b,c,P4a,b) 
• A genogramra felkerülnek a családi vállalattal kapcsolatos információk is (Kik a 
munkavállalók/vezetők, ki az ügyvezető, kik a felügyelőbizottság tagjai, kik vesznek részt a 
családi tanácsban, kik a tulajdonosok és tulajdonrészeik nagysága). 
 
IV. Questions about the impact of family in Family Business/ Kérdések a családi hatásról a 
családi vállalkozásban: (P1a,b,c,d,P3a,b,c,P4a,b) 
 
• Components of involvement: 
• Milyen a családi tulajdonrész aránya (százalékban)? 
• Milyen a családi részvétel aránya (a felsővezetésben részt vevő családtagok a felsővezetés 
százalékában)? 
• Mennyi a tulajdonos családtagok száma? 
• Mennyi a vezetőként dolgozó családtagok száma? 
• Az ügyvezető családtag-e? 
• Melyik jellegzetes konfigurációs típushoz tartozik leginkább a családi vállalat? (tulajdonos-
menedzser – testvéri partnerség – unokatestvéri konzorcium – vállalkozó család) 
• Mi az üzleti filozófia (családi vállalkozás/vállalkozói filozófia – vállalkozó család/befektetői 
filozófia)? 
• Mennyi a családi kézben lévő cégek száma? 
• Milyen a családi cég/cégek termék-, illetve szolgáltatásportfóliójának diverzifikáltsága (magas 
– alacsony)? 
• Essence of involvement: 
• Mi a „tulajdonosi” filozófia („első a család” – „első az üzlet”)? 
• Milyen a céggel való családi identifikáció (magas - alacsony)? 
• Milyen a vállalat stakeholderekkel való társas kapcsolat (erős - gyenge)? 
• Milyenek az utódlási intenciók (erős - gyenge)? 
• Mennyi a cégben részt vevő generációk száma? 
• Az alapító vezeti-e a céget? Ha nem, az alapítótól számított hányadik generáció? 
 
• Mennyire ért Ön egyet az alábbi állításokkal (felteendő az elődnek, utódnak, CEO, vezető 

















a,  A családi vállalkozásunkhoz való tartozás érzése 
erős a családtagjaim közt. 
1 2 3 4 5 
b,  A családi vállalkozásunknak erős személyes 
jelentősége van a családtagok számára. 
1 2 3 4 5 
c,  A családtagok büszkén osztják meg másokkal, 
hogy a családi vállalkozás részei. 
1 2 3 4 5 
d,  A családtagok közti erős érzelmi szálak segítenek 
a pozitív énkép fenntartásában. 
1 2 3 4 5 
e,  Az én családi vállalkozásomban a családtagok 
közti érzelmi kötelékek nagyon erősek. 
1 2 3 4 5 
f,  Az én családi vállalkozásomban a családtagok 
melegséggel éreznek egymás iránt. 
1 2 3 4 5 
g,  A családi örökség és tradíció folytatása fontos cél 
a családi vállalkozásom számára. 
1 2 3 4 5 
h,  Családi tulajdonosaink inkább hosszútávon 
értékelik a befektetésüket, mintsem rövid távon. 
1 2 3 4 5 
i,  A családtagok fontos célja, hogy az üzlet sikeresen 
öröklődjön a következő generációra. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
V. Questions about succession / Kérdések az utódlásról: (P4a,b) 
• Milyen kimenetet terveznek és időben mikor? 
• Van-e már potenciális vagy kijelölt utód? 
• Volt-e már korábban utódlás? 
• Van-e utódlási terv (írott vagy íratlan)? 
• Tulajdonátadás hogyan történik?  
• Mikor veszi át a HR-t az utód (utódlás előtt vagy után)? Tervez valamilyen módosítást ezzel 
kapcsolatban? 
• Milyen a kijelölt utód családi támogatása? 
• Mi lesz a régi vezető szerepe az utódlás során? 
 
VI. Questions about the HRM and PMS/Kérdések a HR-ről és a 
Teljesítménymenedzsmentről: 
• Mit gondol vagy hogyan mutatnád be a munkavállalókat, akik Önöknél dolgoznak?  
• Ki foglalkozik az emberi erőforrás menedzsmenttel a cégnél és milyen képzettséggel és 
tapasztalattal rendelkezik? (VEZETŐTŐL) 
• Hány fő dolgozik a cégnél? Milyen a munkavállalók eloszlása (végzettség, tapasztalat, kor, 
nemek, támogató-termelői funkció, vezető-beosztott szerint)? 
• Mekkora a fluktuáció mértéke? 
• Milyen HR rendszerek vannak a cégnél? Mikor vezették be a TM rendszert és hogyan történt a 
TM megalkotása és bevezetése? 
• Milyen célkitűzései vannak a TM rendszernek? Mire használják a TM-et? 
• Milyen értékeket képvisel a TM?  
• Hogyan illeszkedik a TM a többi (HR) rendszerhez?  A TM kialakításakor milyen szempontok 
játszottak szerepet  
• A TM eredményeit, tanulságait milyen más menedzsment döntés kapcsán használják fel. Tudna, 
konkrét példát mondani? 
• Kérem, hogy mutassa be a jelenlegi TM folyamatot!  Milyen dokumentumok támogatják a TM 




• Kérem, hogy mutassa be a teljesítményértékelés folyamatát! Milyen szerepelt vállalt a vezető a 
rendszerbevezetésében és működtetésében? / Milyen szerepet vállalt/vállal Ön a 
rendszerbevezetésében és működtetésében (HR-es, CEO, munkavállalóm, középvezetőtől)? 
• Mennyire érzi a TM rendszert hatékonynak? (VEZETŐ IS) 
o Mennyire valósult meg a kitűzött cél a TÉR-rel kapcsolatban? (szándékolt-megvalósult 
folyamat) 
o Milyen fejesztendő területeket lát?  
o Mi az, ami Ön szerint jól működik és miért?   
• Mennyire tartja igazságosnak? Mennyire tartja méltányosnak? (Mit gondol, hogy mi a 
különbség a kettő között, elmondom neki.) 
• Mit gondol mennyire tartják mások igazságosnak?  
• Mit gondol mennyire tartják mások méltányosnak? 
• A TM folyamatának felülvizsgálata hogyan történik?  
 
VII. Questions about PM and family influence/Kérdések a TM és a family influence-ről 
CSAK CSALÁDTAG ESETÉN   
• Hogyan történik a családtagok esetén a családi vállalatban végzett munka, teljesítmény 
értékelése, megítélése? Hogyan szoktak erről beszélgetni cégen belül vagy kívül? 
• Milyen nehézségei voltak és/vagy előnyei vannak ennek? 
• Változott-e ez a gyakorlat, miért és mennyiben?  
• Mi a teljesítmény? Milyen teljesítményről beszélhetünk egy családi cégben? Családi 
munkavállaló és nem családi munkavállaló esetén?  
• Mit tekintettek teljesítménynek a családban? Van, ami ebből a család cégben is megjelenik érték 
szintjén? Illetve, ami a teljesítménymenedzsment rendszerben is megjelenik? 
• Egy nem családtag munkavállaló és vezető mit gondolhat erről?  
• Van-e vagy érezhetnek-e a munkavállalók bármilyen megkülönböztetést családtag és nem 
családtag munkavállalók között, illetve a családtagok között a TM vagy más HR menedzsment 
gyakorlat/szabály kapcsán?  
• A formalizáltságra, informalizáltságra, kommunikáció: Családi teljesítményértékelések 
mennyire írásosak vagy inkább szóbani megállapodásra vonatkoznak?  Ezeket hogyan 
kommunikálják, ismertetik-e másokkal? 
• Milyen hatással van a TM-re, hogy a szervezet családi cég? Ha a cég nem családi vállalat lenne, 
más lenne-e a teljesítménymenedzsment és értékelés és annak megítélése? És, ha igen, miért és 
miben lenne más? Ha, nem miért nem?   
• Az emberek irányításával kapcsolatban célkitűzés, visszajelzés, értékelés milyen útravalót 
kapott az utód: 
 
VIII. Szervezeti felépítés elkérni és ott a vezető jelölje be, hogy ki családtag és ki nem és 




4. Appendix – A general interview draft with HR 
 
I. Questions about the Interviewee/ Kérdések az interjúalanyról: 
• Milyen pozícióban dolgozik és mióta a cégnél? Hogyan került a céghez? 
• Milyen végzettsége van?  
• Családtag vagy nem családtag?  Milyen kapcsolatban van a családdal? 
 
II. Questions about the succession 
• Mikor veszi át a HR-t az utód (utódlás előtt vagy után)? Tervez valamilyen módosítást ezzel 
kapcsolatban? 
 
III. Questions about the HRM and PMS/Kérdések a HR-ről és a 
Teljesítménymenedzsmentről: 
• Ki foglalkozik az EEM-tel a cégnél és milyen képzettséggel és tapasztalattal rendelkezik? 
• Hány fő dolgozik a cégnél? Milyen a munkavállalók eloszlása (végzettség, tapasztalat, kor, 
nemek, támogató-termelői funkció, vezető-beosztott szerint)? 
• Mekkora a fluktuáció mértéke? 
• Milyen HR rendszerek vannak a cégnél? Mikor vezették be a TM rendszert és hogyan történt a 
TM megalkotása és bevezetése? 
• Milyen célkitűzései vannak a TM rendszernek? Milyen értékeket képvisel a TM? Hogyan 
illeszkedik a TM a többi (HR) rendszerhez?  
• Kérem, hogy mutassa be a jelenlegi TM és teljesítményértékelés folyamatát? 
Segítő kérdések: Hogyan tűzik ki a célokat? Teljesítmény mérés szintje: egyén vs. csoport, 
javadalmazás szintje: egyén vs. csoport? Hogyan figyelik meg a magatartást? Kik az értékelők? 
Hogyan történik az értékelés (sztenderdek vagy egymáshoz való viszonyítás) és az értékelő 
beszélgetés? Kaptak-e tréninget a vezetők a teljesítmény megfigyeléssel, értékelőbeszélgetéssel 
kapcsolatban? 
• Milyen dokumentumok támogatják a TM rendszert? Mi a szerepe a közép és felsővezetésnek a 
TM folyamat során? 
• Mennyire érzi a TM rendszert hatékonynak a mindennapokban? (praktikusság, elfogadottság, 
idő, döntéstámogatás) 
o Milyen fejesztendő területeket lát?  
o Mi az, ami Ön szerint jól működik és miért?   
IV. Questions about the perceived justice and fairness 
o /Mennyire éli meg igazságosnak a TM-et mint vezető és mint beosztott?  
o Mennyire tartja igazságosnak a TM eredményét? A beosztottak TM eredményei 
mennyire tükrözik a munkájukba tett erőfeszítéseket? 
o Mennyire tartja igazságosnak a TM folyamatát? (elfogulatlan, konzisztens, pontos 
információkra alapszik, meghallgatták a véleményt) Hogyan fejtheti ki véleményüket a 
beosztottak a TM eljárása során? Milyen ráhatásuk van a beosztottaknak a TM folyamat 
során hozott döntésekre? Mennyire elfogulatlanok a folyamatok? Mennyire 
konzisztensek a folyamatok? Mennyire alapulnak pontos információkon? Milyen 
fellebbezési lehetőségük van a beosztottaknak a megszületett döntések ellen? Mik az 
eljárások etikai és erkölcsi normái és azt mennyire tartják be? 
o Mit gondol a vezető által nyújtott információkról, kommunikációról a TM kapcsán? 
Hogy zajlik a TM és az értékelési folyamat kommunikációja, döntési folyamatok 
magyarázata hogyan történik? Ezek mikor kerülnek kommunikálásra? Mennyire veszik 
figyelembe az egyes egyének igényeit?  
o Hogyan jellemezné beosztottakkal való viszonyát, bálásmódját vezetőként a TM 




o Élt már meg olyant, amikor igazságtalanságot tapasztalt a TM kapcsán, mi ennek a 
története?  
• Mennyire éli meg méltányosnak a TM-et a vállalatban mind a vezetők, mind a szervezet 
kapcsán? Élt már meg olyat, amikor méltánytalanság érte, mi ennek a története? Mit gondol 
mennyire tartják mások méltányosnak a szervezetet és a vezetőket? 
• Mit gondol mennyire tartják mások igazságosnak?  
• Mit gondol mennyire tartják mások méltányosnak? 
• A TM folyamatának felülvizsgálata hogyan történik?  
• A TM eredményeit, tanulságait milyen más menedzsment döntés kapcsán használják fel. Tudna, 
konkrét példát mondani? 
 
V. Questions about PM and family influence/Kérdések a TM és a FI-ről 
• Mennyire van hatással a TM-re, hogy a szervezet családi cég? Ha a cég nem családi vállalat 
lenne, más lenne-e a teljesítménymenedzsment és értékelés és annak megítélése? És, ha igen, 
miért és miben lenne más? Ha, nem miért nem?   
• Mi a teljesítmény? Milyen teljesítményről beszélhetünk egy családi cégben? Családi 
munkavállaló és nem családi munkavállaló esetén?  
• Mit tekintettek teljesítménynek a családban? Van, ami ebből a család cégben is megjelenik érték 
szintjén? Illetve ami a teljesítménymenedzsment rendszerben is megjelenik? 





5. Appendix – A interview draft with line manager   
• Kérem, hogy mutassa be a jelenlegi TM és teljesítményértékelés folyamatát? 
• Milyen dokumentumok támogatják a TM rendszert? Segítő kérdések: Hogyan tűzik ki a 
célokat? Teljesítmény mérés szintje: egyén vs. csoport, javadalmazás szintje: egyén vs. csoport? 
Hogyan figyelik meg a magatartást? Kik az értékelők? Hogyan történik az értékelés 
(sztenderdek vagy egymáshoz való viszonyítás) és az értékelő beszélgetés? Kaptak-e tréninget 
a vezetők a teljesítmény megfigyeléssel, értékelőbeszélgetéssel kapcsolatban? 
• Milyen dokumentumok támogatják a TM rendszert? Mi a szerepe Önnek a TM folyamatban? 
• Mi a felső vezetés célja a TM-mel kapcsolatban? Hogyan kommunikálta a felsővezetés a TM 
céljait és szerepét a szervezetben? A középvezetők felé való elvárásokat? 
• Mi a célja a TM-nek az Ön számára? 
• Mennyire segíti a TM ezeknek a céloknak a megvalósulását?  
• Mennyire érzi a TM rendszert hatékonynak a mindennapokban? (praktikusság, elfogadottság, 
idő, döntéstámogatás) 
o Milyen fejesztendő területeket lát?  
o Mi az, ami Ön szerint jól működik és miért?   
Questions about the perceived justice and fairness 
• Mennyire éli meg igazságosnak a TM-et mint vezető és mint beosztott?  
o Mennyire tartja igazságosnak a TM eredményét? A TM eredményei mennyire tükrözik 
a munkájába tett erőfeszítéseket? 
o Mennyire tartja igazságosnak a TM folyamatát? (elfogulatlan, konzisztens, pontos 
információkra alapszik, meghallgatták a véleményt) Hogyan fejtheti ki véleményüket a 
beosztottak a TM eljárása során? Milyen ráhatásuk a beosztottaknak a TM folyamat 
során hozott döntésekre? Mennyire elfogulatlanok a folyamatok? Mennyire 
konzisztensek a folyamatok? Mennyire alapulnak pontos információkon? Milyen 
fellebbezési lehetőségük van a beosztottaknak a megszületett döntések ellen? Mik az 
eljárások etikai és erkölcsi normái és azt mennyire tartják be? 
o Mit gondol a vezető által nyújtott információkról, kommunikációról a TM kapcsán? 
Hogy zajlik a TM és az értékelési folyamat kommunikációja, döntési folyamatok 
magyarázata hogyan történik? Ezek mikor kerülnek kommunikálásra? Mennyire veszik 
figyelembe az egyes egyének igényeit?  
o Hogyan jellemezné beosztottakkal való viszonyát, bálásmódját a TM kapcsán?   
o Élt már meg olyant, amikor igazságtalanságot tapasztalt a TM kapcsán, mi ennek a 
története?  
• Mennyire éli meg méltányosnak a TM-et a vállalatban mind a vezetők, mind a szervezet 
kapcsán? Élt már meg olyat, amikor méltánytalanság érte, mi ennek a története? Mit gondol 
mennyire tartják mások méltányosnak a szervezetet és a vezetőket? 
• Hogyan illeszkedik a TM a többi (HR) rendszerhez?  
• A TM folyamatának felülvizsgálata hogyan történik? 
• A TM eredményeit, tanulságait milyen más menedzsment döntés kapcsán használják fel. Tudna, 
konkrét példát mondani? 
• Ha a cég nem családi vállalat lenne, más lenne-e a teljesítménymenedzsment és értékelés és 




6. Appendix – Coding Manual 
 
 
Code nr. Main code Subcodes Examples
1 Vision, Mission, Strategy
2 Structure
3 Org. Performance
4 External Contextual Factors
5 Internal Contextual Factors
5.1 Business activity and technology
5.2 Culture
6 Family involvement
6.1 Introduction of family, genogram
6.2 Components of Family involvement
6.3 Essence of Family involvement
6.4 Performance and family values
7 Succession
8 HR systems
9 PM system and processes




9.5 Family employees 




The presence of family affects planned 
performance management 
The presence of family affects planned performance management in terms of the level of 
bifurcation and formalization. 
10.1 Bifurcation bias
10.1.1 No bifurcation bias, but expectations are higher toward successors 
10.1.2 Bifurcation bias favoring a family member who is identified as the “extended hand” of the owner
10.1.3 From bifurcation bias favoring non-family employees to no bifurcation bias 
10.1.4 No bifurcation bias
10.1.5 Bifurcation toward family employees
10.2 Formalization
10.2.1 Formal systems introduced gradually and only where it is necessary.
10.2.2 Informal processes still play a major role in the management structure
10.2.3 CEO as a driving force in formalization
10.2.4
Introducing formal system by relying on informal processes to incorporate main principles (e.g., 
credibility, efficiency).
10.2.5 Formalized performance management practices for successors
10.3 Personal Relationship 





Code nr. Main code Subcodes Examples
11
The effect of family influence on actual 
PM practice 
The presence of family influences the actual performance management practice through line-
managers’ implementation, leading to more efficient informal PM practices.
11.1 Implementation 
11.1.1 Family CEO leading the change and implementation
11.1.2 Family HR manager perceived as family member rather than HR 
11.1.3 Family CEO setting a good example or not
11.1.4 Shortcomings of family manager’s personal management skills
11.2 Communication
11.2 Goal alignment
11.2.1 Sending confusing messages
11.2.2 Creating a common position on performance standards and evaluation
11.3 Informal processes
11.3.1 Presence of family manager, predecessor informally in evaluation, design, development
11.3.2 Owners concact performance reviews together as family 
11.4 Organizational cultures
11.4.1 Organizational culture based on personal relationships replaces formal systems
12
The effect of family influence on 
perceived/experienced PM practice
The presence of family influences the experienced/perceived performance management 
practice through its communication by top and line-managers that leads to more efficient 
informal PM practices. 
12.1 Ownership approach
12.1.1 Setting an example of hard-working work ethic. 
12.2 Personal Relationship 
12.2.1 Management by walking around and participate in trainings and employee programs
12.2.2 Participating in goal setting, forming expectations and their communications. 
12.3 Imprinting family values in culture
13
The effect of family influence on the 
outcome of PM practice
The presence of family influences the possible outcome of perceived justice of performance 
management through coordination, such as defining organizational structure (a division of 
tasks, scope of authority, types of coordination, and configuration). 
13.1 Formalization
13.1.1 Changing govermental structure
13.1.2 Appointing non-family CFO
13.2 Review of the PM system
13.2.1 Respond immediately and effectively to dissatisfaction with the system 
13.2.2 Planning process is not revised because of the maximalism of the controlling family
13.2.3 Incorporating experiences and suggestions of employees
13.3 Promotion/demotion
13.3.1 Non-family employee with ownership approach are promoted
13.3.2 Family underperformers are appointed to positions with less responsibility and authority
13.4 Evaluation




Code nr. Main code Subcodes Examples
14
The effect of family Influence on 
Perceived justice of PM 
Family Influence has a direct and indirect effect on the perceived justice of Performance 
Management.
14.1 Familial altruism / Parental altruism
14.2 Fredo effect
14.3 Nepotism (reciprocal, entitlement)
14.4 Self-control
14.5 The ability of differentiating between familial and organizational roles
15
The impact of family business system on 
the family system 
A family business system has an impact on the family system as a consequence of family 
employees’ and managers’ perception of fairness of the performance management and 
appraisal processes.
15.1 Formalization to eliminate conflicts
15.1.1 Lack of formalization leads to conflicts 
15.1.2
Conflict in assessing family firms’ performance led to changing the management structure and the 
positions of family members in a group level 
15.1.3
Succession related company goals and tasks are also formulated (substitution in case of the daughter 
having children) during the development and career goal setting of the formal performance evaluation
15.2 Perceived unfairness leads to career move
15.2.1
Perceived unfairness under the supervision of a non-family manager leads to career move of family 
member 
15.3 Informal evaluation of the capability of successor to continue the business (SUCCESSION)
15.3.1 Evaluation by the parents based on feedbacks from external partners through informal processes
15.4 Transfer of core values and people management skills (SUCCESSION)
15.4.1 Carrying out evaluation of non-family managers together as family
15.4.2 Striving for consensus and affirming and representing the same family values
15.4.3 Physical closeness helps to set an example and mentoring
16 Cognitive processing of participants 
16.1
Non-family manager's personality, experience, and trust in the family may affect the perceived justice of 
his/her family subordinates
16.2
Non-family employee's personality, experience, and trust may affect how they perceive the family HR 
manager as a family member or a professional
17 External contextual factors of PM
17.1 Pandemic
17.1.1
Introduction of the performance management system with a proper communication and training is 
delayed
17.1.2
Manual workers received a salary increase in compliance with the law, salary increases of the 
management were delayed due to COVID.
17.2 Labour market
17.2.1 Lack of workers
17.2.2 Market pressure for salary raise
17.3 Institutional environment
17.3.1 Industry 4.0
17.4 Management studies 
17.4.1 Management studies foster preconception about family businesses
18 Internal contextual factors of PM
18.1 Different level of technology (the requirements for the workforce are different)
18.2 Different organizational cultures
18.3 Different labor market situations cause inequalities between sites in different regions




7. Appendix – Questionnaire 
 
As the respondents has received Hungarian questionnaires, the Appendix is also in Hungarian 
Kedves Munkatársunk! 
Bizonyára az Ön számára is fontos, hogy teljesítményének értékelése igazságos és méltányos legyen. A 
……………………. mint felelős munkáltató is elkötelezett a teljesítményértékelési folyamatainak 
fejlesztésére. Ezért úgy döntött, hogy részt vesz egy kutatásban, amely a vállalat teljesítményértékelési 
folyamatait vizsgálja. Ennek kapcsán egy kérdőív kitöltésére kérjük Önt annak érdekében, hogy minél 
jobban megismerhessük munkatársaink véleményét a vállalat jelenlegi teljesítményértékelési 
folyamatával kapcsolatban. 
Kérjük, az alábbi útmutató figyelmes elolvasása után, a leírásoknak megfelelően töltse ki a 
kérdőívet. 
Hasznos tudnivalók: 
• A felmérés teljes mértékben névtelen. Kérjük, sehol se tüntesse fel nevét a kérdőíven! Az 
adatok felvételét és elemzését Vajda Éva, a Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem kutatója végzi, aki 
nem gyűjt személyes adatokat, a véleményeket nem osztja meg senkivel, kizárólag összesítve 
elemzi a beérkezett információkat. A kitöltött kérdőíveket az üzletágvezetők zárt 
dobozban/borítékban gyűjtik be és juttatják el a HR-en keresztül a kutatónak, aki ezt követően 
feldolgozza a válaszokat.  
• Kérjük, hogy a kérdőívet őszintén és nyíltan, a valós véleményének és tapasztalatainak 
megfelelően töltse ki, hiszen ezzel szolgálja a teljesítményértékelési folyamat fejlődését. 
Törekedjen arra, hogy egy-egy konkrét esemény, tapasztalat súlyát megfelelő mértékben vegye 
figyelembe, például az értékelés független legyen a jelenlegi hangulatától.  
 
Köszönjük, hogy véleményével hozzájárul a kutatáshoz! 
I.1 Kérjük, válassza ki, melyik szervezeti egységben dolgozik! (Jelölje X-szel) 
Az alábbi adatokra feltétlenül szükségünk van a minél pontosabb fejlesztésekhez. 
 
     …………………………………………      ……………………………………… 
     …………………………………………              ……………………………………… 
     …………………………………………      ……………………………………… 
Kérjük, értékelje az alábbi állítást aszerint, hogy mennyire ért egyet 
vele! (Jelölje X-szel) 
1 - Egyáltalán nem értek egyet, 2 - Kevésbé értek egyet, 3 - Nem tudom eldönteni, 





























































































I. Kérjük, válaszoljon az alábbi kérdéscsoportokra, amelyek a vállalatánál lévő 
teljesítményértékelési rendszerre vonatkoznak. (Válaszait jelölje X-szel) 
II.1.  Az alábbi kérdések azokra a teljesítményértékelési folyamatokra vonatkoznak, amelyeket a 
felettese alkalmaz, amikor az Ön munkáját értékeli. 
 




II.3. Az alábbi kérdések a vezető bánásmódjára vonatkoznak a teljesítményértékelés során.  
 
 
Kérjük, válaszoljon az alábbi kérdésekre! (Válaszait jelölje X-szel) 







































































II.1.1 Mennyire fejezheti ki a véleményét az értékelés során? o o o o o 
II.1.2 Mennyire befolyásolhatja a teljesítményértékelés során hozott döntéseket? o o o o o 
II.1.3 Mennyire alkalmazzák ezeket a folyamatokat következetesen? o o o o o 
II.1.4 Mennyire elfogulatlanok ezek a folyamatok? o o o o o 
II.1.5 Mennyire alapulnak ezek a folyamatok pontos információkon? o o o o o 
II.1.6 Mennyire tud fellebbezni a folyamatok során hozott döntések kapcsán? o o o o o 
II.1.7 Mennyire tartják be ezek a folyamatok az etikai és erkölcsi normákat? o o o o o 
Kérjük, válaszoljon az alábbi kérdésekre! (Válaszait jelölje X-szel) 
1 - Rendkívül kis mértékben, 2 - Kis mértékben, 3 - Mérsékelten, 4 – 







































































II.2.1 Milyen mértékben tükrözik az eredmények a munkájába tett erőfeszítéseket? o o o o o 
II.2.2 Milyen mértékben felelnek meg az eredmények az Ön által végzett munkának? o o o o o 
II.2.3 Mennyire tükrözik ezek az eredmények, hogy mivel járult hozzá a munkájához? o o o o o 
II.2.4 Mennyire indokoltak ezek az értékelési eredmények az adott teljesítménye 
alapján? 









II.5. Az alábbi kérdések a vállalatnál tapasztalt teljesítményértékelés méltányosságára vonatkoznak? 
Kérjük, válaszoljon az alábbi kérdésekre! (Válaszait jelölje X-szel) 
1 - Rendkívül kis mértékben, 2 - Kis mértékben, 3 - Mérsékelten, 4 – 







































































II.3.1 Mennyire bánik Önnel udvariasan? o o o o o 
II.3.2 Mennyire bánik Önnel méltósággal? o o o o o 
II.3.3 Mennyire bánik Önnel tisztelettel? o o o o o 
II.3.4 Mennyire tartózkodik a nem odavaló megjegyzésektől vagy észrevételektől? o o o o o 
Kérjük, válaszoljon az alábbi kérdésekre! (Válaszait jelölje X-szel) 
1 - Rendkívül kis mértékben, 2 - Kis mértékben, 3 - Mérsékelten, 4 – 







































































II.4.1 Mennyire őszinte, amikor kommunikál Önnel? o o o o o 
II.4.2 Mennyire magyarázza el alaposan a döntéshozatali eljárásokat? o o o o o 
II.4.3 Mennyire észszerűek az eljárásokkal kapcsolatos magyarázatai? o o o o o 
II.4.4 Mennyire tájékoztat időben a részletekről? o o o o o 
II.4.5 Mennyire szabja a tájékoztatást az egyéni igényeknek megfelelően? o o o o o 
Kérjük, értékelje az alábbi állításokat aszerint, hogy mennyire ért egyet velük! 
(Jelölje X-szel) 
1 -  Egyáltalán nem értek egyet, 2 - Nem értek egyet, 3 - Inkább nem értek egyet,  
4 - Egyet is értek meg nem is, 5 - Inkább egyetértek, 6 – Egyetértek,  
































































































II.5.1 Összességében a szervezet méltányosan bánt velem a legutóbbi 
teljesítményértékelés során. 





II.6. Az alábbi kérdések a felettese magatartására vonatkoznak a teljesítményértékelés során.  
 
Előfordult-e, hogy Ön azt élte meg, hogy rendkívül méltányosan bántak Önnel a munkája, illetve 
teljesítményértékelése során a vállalatnál? Mi ennek a rövid története?  (A VÁLASZ NEM KÖTELEZŐ) 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Előfordult-e, hogy Ön méltánytalanságot tapasztalt a saját munkája, illetve teljesítményértékelése 
során a vállalatnál? Mi ennek a rövid története?  (A VÁLASZ NEM KÖTELEZŐ)  
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
II. Az alábbi kérdések segítenek az eredmények elemzésekor abban, hogy minél 
pontosabb képet kapjunk munkatársaink véleményéről. Ezáltal 
II.5.2 Általánosságban elmondhatom, hogy korábbi teljesítményértékelésem során 
számíthattam arra, hogy ez a szervezet méltányos. 
o o o o o o o 
II.5.3 Általánosságban elmondhatom, hogy az a bánásmód, amelyet itt kaptam a 
legutóbbi teljesítményértékelésem során, méltányos volt. 
o o o o o o o 
II.5.4 Általában ebben a szervezetben a dolgok működése nem méltányos a 
teljesítményértékelés során. 
o o o o o o o 
II.5.5 Többnyire ez a szervezet méltányosan bánik az alkalmazottjaival a 
teljesítményértékelés során. 
o o o o o o o 
II.5.6 Az itt dolgozó emberek többsége azt mondaná, hogy gyakran bánnak velük 
méltánytalanul a teljesítményértékelés során. 
o o o o o o o 
Kérjük, értékelje az alábbi állításokat aszerint, hogy mennyire ért egyet 
velük! (Jelölje X-szel) 
 
1 -  Egyáltalán nem értek egyet, 2 - Nem értek egyet, 3 - Inkább nem értek egyet,  
4 - Egyet is értek meg nem is, 5 - Inkább egyetértek, 6 – Egyetértek,  
































































































II.6.1 A felettese méltányosan jár el a teljesítményértékelés során. o o o o o o o 
II.6.2 A felettese olyan dolgokat tesz, amelyek méltányosak a teljesítményértékelés 
során. 
o o o o o o o 
II.6.3 A felettese úgy viselkedik, mint ahogy egy tisztességes ember tenné a 
teljesítményértékelés során. 
o o o o o o o 
II.6.4 A felettese méltánytalanul jár el a teljesítményértékelés során. o o o o o o o 
II.6.5 A felettese olyan dolgokat tesz, amelyek méltánytalanok a 
teljesítményértékelés során. 
o o o o o o o 
II.6.6 A felettese úgy viselkedik, mint ahogy egy tisztességtelen ember tenné a 
teljesítményértékelés során. 




testreszabottabb fejlesztési lépéseket tehessünk. Az adatokat csak összevontan 
elemezzük. 
 
III.1 Kérjük, jelölje be az életkorát! (Jelölje X-szel)1 
 25 éves vagy fiatalabb 
 26 – 35 éves 
 36 – 45 éves 
 46 – 55 éves 
 56 éves vagy idősebb 
 
III.2 Kérjük, jelölje be a nemét! (Jelölje X-szel) 
 Férfi   Nő 
 
III.3 Kérjük, adja meg legmagasabb iskolai végzettségét! (Jelölje X-szel) 
 
  Kevesebb, mint 8 általános 
  Általános iskola 8 osztály 
  Szakiskola, szakmunkásképző 
  Középiskola (érettségivel) 
  Főiskola, egyetem 
 
III.4 Milyen beosztásban dolgozik? (Jelölje X-szel) 
 
 Beosztott   Vezető 
 
III.5 Kérjük, válassza ki, hogy hány éve dolgozik a ………………..-nél! (Jelölje X-szel) 
  Kevesebb, mint 1 év 
  1-2 év 
  3-5 év 
  6-10 év 
  11-15 év 
  Több, mint 15 év 
 
III.6 Kérjük, válassza ki, hogy hány éves munkatapasztalata van összességében? (Jelölje 
X-szel) 
  Kevesebb, mint 1 év 
  1-2 év 
  3-5 év 
  6-10 év 
  11-15 év 
  Több, mint 15 év 
 
Köszönjük válaszait! Kérjük, a kérdőívet adja le a zárt dobozban/borítékban. 
 




8. Appendix – Tables in SSPS 
 
Table 15 - Values of mean, skewness, and kurtosis in case of all employees 
 
Table 16 - Values of mean, skewness, and kurtosis in case of both managers and subordinates 
 


















Valid 288 287 288 287 288 288 289
Missing 1 2 1 2 1 1 0
3,2888 3,6908 3,9939 3,8680 5,4262 5,8247 3,7076
3,2857 3,7500 4,0000 4,0000 5,6667 6,0000 3,8357
3,00 4,00 5,00 4,00 6,00 6,00 4,00
0,79384 0,84285 0,90547 0,83751 1,08590 1,01776 0,69684
0,630 0,710 0,820 0,701 1,179 1,036 0,486
Skewness  All employees -0,163 -0,575 -0,831 -0,655 -0,500 -0,658 -0,610
0,144 0,144 0,144 0,144 0,144 0,144 0,143
0,144 0,430 0,399 0,187 -0,733 -0,759 0,215


























Valid 228 228 229 227 228 228 229
Missing 1 1 0 2 1 1 0
3,2359 3,6689 3,9563 3,8604 5,3775 5,7712 3,6810
3,143 3,750 4,000 4,000 5,667 6,000 3,768
3,00 4,00 5,00 4,00 6,00 6,00 4,00
0,82047 0,88347 0,92109 0,84357 1,12586 1,04167 0,71367
0,673 0,781 0,848 0,712 1,268 1,085 0,509
-0,077 -0,584 -0,763 -0,647 -0,424 -0,555 -0,557
0,161 0,161 0,161 0,162 0,161 0,161 0,161
0,081 0,320 0,238 0,283 -0,875 -0,946 0,162
0,321 0,321 0,320 0,322 0,321 0,321 0,320
Valid 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3,5714 3,8125 4,2740 3,9731 5,7051 6,1314 3,9078
3,571 4,000 4,375 4,000 6,000 6,167 3,990
3,57a 4,00 5,00 4,00a 6,00 7,00 3,93a
0,63005 0,65656 0,64218 0,76597 0,82487 0,83909 0,52944
0,397 0,431 0,412 0,587 0,680 0,704 0,280
-0,451 -0,263 -0,392 -0,718 -0,752 -1,319 -0,589
0,330 0,330 0,330 0,330 0,330 0,330 0,330
1,045 -0,119 -0,997 0,196 0,468 1,619 0,397









a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown
Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Kurtosis








Std. Error of Skewness
Kurtosis





Subordinate 224 3,81 1,156 0,077 3,66 3,96 1 5
Manager 52 4,44 0,850 0,118 4,21 4,68 1 5
Total 276 3,93 1,131 0,068 3,80 4,07 1 5
Descriptives











Table 18 - Test of Homogeneity of Variances (H1) 
 
Table 19 - ANOVA (H1) 
 
Table 20 - Robust Test of Equality of Means (H1) 
 
Table 21 - Descriptives (H2) 
 
Table 22 - Test of Homogeneity of Variances (H2) 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig.
Based on 
Mean
5,165 1 274 0,024
Based on 
Median









4,236 1 274 0,041
Test of Homogeneity of Variances
I.2 The 
company I 















I.2 The company I work for is a family business.
Statistica df1 df2 Sig.
Welch 19,978 1 100,033 0,000
Brown-
Forsythe
19,978 1 100,033 0,000
Robust Tests of Equality of Means
I.2 The company I work for is a family business.





subordinate 228 3,2359 0,82047 0,05434 3,1288 3,3429 1,00 5,00
manager 52 3,5714 0,63005 0,08737 3,3960 3,7468 1,57 4,86
Total 280 3,2982 0,79835 0,04771 3,2043 3,3921 1,00 5,00
subordinate 228 3,6689 0,88347 0,05851 3,5536 3,7842 1,00 5,00
manager 52 3,8125 0,65656 0,09105 3,6297 3,9953 2,25 5,00
Total 280 3,6955 0,84675 0,05060 3,5959 3,7951 1,00 5,00
subordinate 229 3,9563 0,92109 0,06087 3,8364 4,0763 1,00 5,00
manager 52 4,2740 0,64218 0,08905 4,0953 4,4528 3,00 5,00
Total 281 4,0151 0,88388 0,05273 3,9113 4,1189 1,00 5,00
subordinate 227 3,8604 0,84357 0,05599 3,7501 3,9708 1,00 5,00
manager 52 3,9731 0,76597 0,10622 3,7598 4,1863 1,80 5,00
Total 279 3,8814 0,82950 0,04966 3,7837 3,9792 1,00 5,00
subordinate 228 5,3775 1,12586 0,07456 5,2306 5,5244 2,50 7,00
manager 52 5,7051 0,82487 0,11439 5,4755 5,9348 3,33 7,00
Total 280 5,4383 1,08258 0,06470 5,3110 5,5657 2,50 7,00
subordinate 228 5,7712 1,04167 0,06899 5,6353 5,9071 3,50 7,00
manager 52 6,1314 0,83909 0,11636 5,8978 6,3650 3,50 7,00
Total 280 5,8381 1,01550 0,06069 5,7186 5,9576 3,50 7,00
subordinate 229 3,6810 0,71367 0,04716 3,5881 3,7739 1,23 5,00
manager 52 3,9078 0,52944 0,07342 3,7604 4,0552 2,41 4,93





























Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Procedural 
justice 
Based on Mean 5,009 1 278 0,026 
Based on Median 4,557 1 278 0,034 
Based on Median and 
with adjusted df 
4,557 1 271,214 0,034 
Based on trimmed mean 4,871 1 278 0,028 
Distributional 
justice 
Based on Mean 6,115 1 278 0,014 
Based on Median 6,805 1 278 0,010 
Based on Median and 
with adjusted df 
6,805 1 275,849 0,010 
Based on trimmed mean 5,530 1 278 0,019 
Informational 
justice 
Based on Mean 4,337 1 279 0,038 
Based on Median 3,553 1 279 0,060 
Based on Median and 
with adjusted df 
3,553 1 254,628 0,061 
Based on trimmed mean 3,813 1 279 0,052 
Interpersonal 
justice 
Based on Mean 0,819 1 277 0,366 
Based on Median 0,473 1 277 0,492 
Based on Median and 
with adjusted df 
0,473 1 274,003 0,492 
Based on trimmed mean 0,761 1 277 0,384 
Overall fairness 
organization 
Based on Mean 14,402 1 278 0,000 
Based on Median 11,238 1 278 0,001 
Based on Median and 
with adjusted df 
11,238 1 277,371 0,001 
Based on trimmed mean 14,231 1 278 0,000 
Overall fairness 
supervisor 
Based on Mean 10,846 1 278 0,001 
Based on Median 5,544 1 278 0,019 
Based on Median and 
with adjusted df 
5,544 1 275,772 0,019 
Based on trimmed mean 9,728 1 278 0,002 
Perceived 
justice 
Based on Mean 7,458 1 279 0,007 
Based on Median 7,137 1 279 0,008 
Based on Median and 
with adjusted df 
7,137 1 273,407 0,008 
Based on trimmed mean 7,408 1 279 0,007 






Square F Sig. 
Procedural 
justice 
Between Groups 4,768 1 4,768 7,660 0,006 
Within Groups 173,054 278 0,622     
Total 177,822 279       
Distributional 
justice 
Between Groups 0,874 1 0,874 1,219 0,270 
Within Groups 199,164 278 0,716     
Total 200,037 279       
Informational 
justice 
Between Groups 4,277 1 4,277 5,564 0,019 
Within Groups 214,471 279 0,769     
Total 218,748 280       
Interpersonal 
justice 
Between Groups 0,537 1 0,537 0,780 0,378 
Within Groups 190,747 277 0,689     




Between Groups 4,545 1 4,545 3,919 0,049 
Within Groups 322,439 278 1,160     




Between Groups 5,494 1 5,494 5,412 0,021 
Within Groups 282,222 278 1,015     
Total 287,716 279       
Perceived 
justice 
Between Groups 2,179 1 2,179 4,661 0,032 
Within Groups 130,423 279 0,467     





Table 24 - Robust Test of Equality of Means (H2) 
Robust Tests of Equality of Means 
  Statistica df1 df2 Sig. 
Procedural 
justice 
Welch 10,638 1 94,890 0,002 
Brown-Forsythe 10,638 1 94,890 0,002 
Distributional 
justice 
Welch 1,761 1 98,063 0,188 
Brown-Forsythe 1,761 1 98,063 0,188 
Informational 
justice 
Welch 8,675 1 104,670 0,004 
Brown-Forsythe 8,675 1 104,670 0,004 
Interpersonal 
justice 
Welch 0,880 1 81,851 0,351 
Brown-Forsythe 0,880 1 81,851 0,351 
Overall fairness 
organization 
Welch 5,758 1 99,509 0,018 
Brown-Forsythe 5,758 1 99,509 0,018 
Overall fairness 
supervisor 
Welch 7,091 1 90,637 0,009 
Brown-Forsythe 7,091 1 90,637 0,009 
Perceived 
justice 
Welch 6,752 1 98,035 0,011 
Brown-Forsythe 6,752 1 98,035 0,011 
a. Asymptotically F distributed. 
 
Table 25 - Descriptives (H3 and H4) 
Descriptivesa 














rather not a family comp. 60 2,9071 0,71105 0,09180 2,7235 3,0908 1,29 5,00 
rahter a family company 149 3,4363 0,78585 0,06438 3,3091 3,5635 1,00 5,00 
Total 209 3,2844 0,80026 0,05536 3,1753 3,3935 1,00 5,00 
Distributional 
justice 
rather not a family comp. 59 3,2881 0,89877 0,11701 3,0539 3,5224 1,00 5,00 
rahter a family company 149 3,8736 0,73589 0,06029 3,7545 3,9927 1,00 5,00 
Total 208 3,7075 0,82674 0,05732 3,5945 3,8205 1,00 5,00 
Informational 
justice 
rather not a family comp. 60 3,6458 0,95369 0,12312 3,3995 3,8922 1,25 5,00 
rahter a family company 149 4,1359 0,82634 0,06770 4,0021 4,2697 1,00 5,00 
Total 209 3,9952 0,89064 0,06161 3,8738 4,1167 1,00 5,00 
Interpersonal 
justice 
rather not a family comp. 60 3,6208 0,81777 0,10557 3,4096 3,8321 1,40 5,00 
rahter a family company 147 3,9991 0,80803 0,06664 3,8674 4,1308 1,00 5,00 




rather not a family comp. 60 4,8528 1,10856 0,14311 4,5664 5,1391 3,00 7,00 
rahter a family company 148 5,6615 0,97181 0,07988 5,5036 5,8194 3,33 7,00 




rather not a family comp. 59 5,4040 1,20392 0,15674 5,0902 5,7177 3,83 7,00 
rahter a family company 149 5,9575 0,91084 0,07462 5,8100 6,1050 3,50 7,00 
Total 208 5,8005 1,03046 0,07145 5,6596 5,9413 3,50 7,00 
Perceived 
justice 
rather not a family comp. 60 3,3682 0,68734 0,08873 3,1907 3,5458 1,27 4,93 
rahter a family company 149 3,8618 0,62661 0,05133 3,7604 3,9633 2,04 5,00 
Total 209 3,7201 0,68080 0,04709 3,6273 3,8130 1,27 5,00 
a. D.4 Job position = subordinate 
 
Table 26 - Test of Homogeneity of Variances (H3 and H4) 
Test of Homogeneity of Variancesa 
  
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Procedural justice Based on Mean 2,887 1 207 0,091 
Based on Median 2,972 1 207 0,086 
Based on Median and with adjusted df 2,972 1 205,959 0,086 
Based on trimmed mean 2,893 1 207 0,090 




Based on Median 2,990 1 206 0,085 
Based on Median and with adjusted df 2,990 1 196,736 0,085 
Based on trimmed mean 4,196 1 206 0,042 
Informational justice Based on Mean 4,521 1 207 0,035 
Based on Median 4,534 1 207 0,034 
Based on Median and with adjusted df 4,534 1 205,747 0,034 
Based on trimmed mean 4,321 1 207 0,039 
Interpersonal justice Based on Mean 1,520 1 205 0,219 
Based on Median 1,459 1 205 0,229 
Based on Median and with adjusted df 1,459 1 198,040 0,229 
Based on trimmed mean 1,316 1 205 0,253 
Overall fairness 
organization 
Based on Mean 4,408 1 206 0,037 
Based on Median 4,300 1 206 0,039 
Based on Median and with adjusted df 4,300 1 199,775 0,039 
Based on trimmed mean 4,554 1 206 0,034 
Overall fairness supervisor Based on Mean 21,462 1 206 0,000 
Based on Median 21,489 1 206 0,000 
Based on Median and with adjusted df 21,489 1 201,445 0,000 
Based on trimmed mean 21,829 1 206 0,000 
Perceived justice Based on Mean 2,396 1 207 0,123 
Based on Median 2,112 1 207 0,148 
Based on Median and with adjusted df 2,112 1 206,918 0,148 
Based on trimmed mean 2,555 1 207 0,111 
a. D.4 Job position = subordinate 
 




Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Procedural justice Between Groups 11,978 1 11,978 20,453 0,000 
Within Groups 121,228 207 0,586     
Total 133,207 208       
Distributional justice Between Groups 14,487 1 14,487 23,499 0,000 
Within Groups 126,999 206 0,616     
Total 141,486 207       
Informational justice Between Groups 10,273 1 10,273 13,745 0,000 
Within Groups 154,722 207 0,747     
Total 164,995 208       
Interpersonal justice Between Groups 6,096 1 6,096 9,273 0,003 
Within Groups 134,781 205 0,657     
Total 140,877 206       
Overall fairness 
organization 
Between Groups 27,921 1 27,921 27,217 0,000 
Within Groups 211,333 206 1,026     
Total 239,255 207       
Overall fairness 
supervisor 
Between Groups 12,950 1 12,950 12,897 0,000 
Within Groups 206,853 206 1,004     
Total 219,803 207       
Perceived justice Between Groups 10,422 1 10,422 25,090 0,000 
Within Groups 85,984 207 0,415     
Total 96,407 208       
a. D.4 Job position = subordinate 
 
Table 28 - Robust Test of Equality of Means (H3 and H4) 




  Statisticb df1 df2 Sig. 
Procedural 
justice 
Welch 22,276 1 119,764 0,000 
Brown-Forsythe 22,276 1 119,764 0,000 
Distributional 
justice 
Welch 19,784 1 90,384 0,000 
Brown-Forsythe 19,784 1 90,384 0,000 
Informational 
justice 
Welch 12,166 1 96,549 0,001 
Brown-Forsythe 12,166 1 96,549 0,001 
Interpersonal 
justice 
Welch 9,179 1 108,433 0,003 




Welch 24,346 1 97,685 0,000 




Welch 10,168 1 85,549 0,002 
Brown-Forsythe 10,168 1 85,549 0,002 
Perceived 
justice 
Welch 23,185 1 100,608 0,000 
Brown-Forsythe 23,185 1 100,608 0,000 
a. D.4 Job position = subordinate 
b. Asymptotically F distributed. 
 
Table 29 - Descriptives (H5 and H6) 
Descriptivesa 

















rather not a family comp. 6 3,3571 0,62434 0,25488 2,7019 4,0123 2,86 4,57 
rahter a family company 45 3,6063 0,63754 0,09504 3,4148 3,7979 1,57 4,86 
Total 51 3,5770 0,63501 0,08892 3,3984 3,7556 1,57 4,86 
Distributio
nal justice 
rather not a family 
company 
6 3,6250 0,87678 0,35795 2,7049 4,5451 2,75 5,00 
rahter a family comp. 45 3,8278 0,63475 0,09462 3,6371 4,0185 2,25 5,00 
Total 51 3,8039 0,66014 0,09244 3,6183 3,9896 2,25 5,00 
Informatio
nal justice 
rather not a family 
company 
6 4,5833 0,56273 0,22973 3,9928 5,1739 3,50 5,00 
rahter a family company 45 4,2278 0,65240 0,09725 4,0318 4,4238 3,00 5,00 
Total 51 4,2696 0,64777 0,09071 4,0874 4,4518 3,00 5,00 
Interperso
nal justice 
rather not a family 
company 
6 3,6667 0,95219 0,38873 2,6674 4,6659 2,40 4,80 
rahter a family company 45 4,0178 0,74933 0,11170 3,7927 4,2429 1,80 5,00 





rather not a family 
company 
6 5,2778 0,68853 0,28109 4,5552 6,0003 4,33 6,00 
rahter a family company 45 5,7556 0,83982 0,12519 5,5032 6,0079 3,33 7,00 




rather not a family 
company 
6 5,9167 0,88663 0,36196 4,9862 6,8471 4,50 7,00 
rahter a family company 45 6,1444 0,84208 0,12553 5,8915 6,3974 3,50 7,00 
Total 51 6,1176 0,84149 0,11783 5,8810 6,3543 3,50 7,00 
Perceived 
justice 
rather not a family 
company 
6 3,8080 0,59754 0,24394 3,1810 4,4351 3,23 4,69 
rahter a family company 45 3,9199 0,53175 0,07927 3,7602 4,0797 2,41 4,93 
Total 51 3,9068 0,53466 0,07487 3,7564 4,0571 2,41 4,93 





Table 30 - Test of Homogeneity of Variances (H5 and H6) 
Test of Homogeneity of Variancesa 
  
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Procedural justice Based on Mean 0,048 1 49 0,828 
Based on Median 0,324 1 49 0,572 
Based on Median and with adjusted df 0,324 1 47,699 0,572 
Based on trimmed mean 0,090 1 49 0,766 
Distributional 
justice 
Based on Mean 1,690 1 49 0,200 
Based on Median 1,677 1 49 0,201 
Based on Median and with adjusted df 1,677 1 48,590 0,201 
Based on trimmed mean 1,697 1 49 0,199 
Informational 
justice 
Based on Mean 1,603 1 49 0,211 
Based on Median 1,427 1 49 0,238 
Based on Median and with adjusted df 1,427 1 48,670 0,238 
Based on trimmed mean 1,871 1 49 0,178 
Interpersonal 
justice 
Based on Mean 1,233 1 49 0,272 
Based on Median 1,220 1 49 0,275 
Based on Median and with adjusted df 1,220 1 48,646 0,275 
Based on trimmed mean 1,215 1 49 0,276 
Overall fairness 
organization 
Based on Mean 0,070 1 49 0,792 
Based on Median 0,137 1 49 0,713 
Based on Median and with adjusted df 0,137 1 48,626 0,713 
Based on trimmed mean 0,057 1 49 0,812 
Overall fairness 
supervisor 
Based on Mean 0,094 1 49 0,761 
Based on Median 0,043 1 49 0,837 
Based on Median and with adjusted df 0,043 1 48,969 0,837 
Based on trimmed mean 0,072 1 49 0,790 
Perceived justice Based on Mean 0,525 1 49 0,472 
Based on Median 0,537 1 49 0,467 
Based on Median and with adjusted df 0,537 1 47,156 0,467 
Based on trimmed mean 0,543 1 49 0,465 
a. D.4 Job position = manager 
 






Square F Sig. 
Procedural 
justice 
Between Groups 0,329 1 0,329 0,812 0,372 
Within Groups 19,833 49 0,405     
Total 20,162 50       
Distributional 
justice 
Between Groups 0,218 1 0,218 0,494 0,485 
Within Groups 21,572 49 0,440     
Total 21,789 50       
Informational 
justice 
Between Groups 0,669 1 0,669 1,615 0,210 
Within Groups 20,311 49 0,415     
Total 20,980 50       
Interpersonal 
justice 
Between Groups 0,653 1 0,653 1,094 0,301 
Within Groups 29,239 49 0,597     




Between Groups 1,208 1 1,208 1,773 0,189 
Within Groups 33,404 49 0,682     




Between Groups 0,275 1 0,275 0,383 0,539 
Within Groups 35,131 49 0,717     
Total 35,405 50       
Perceived 
justice 
Between Groups 0,066 1 0,066 0,228 0,635 
Within Groups 14,227 49 0,290     
Total 14,293 50       





Table 32 - Robust Test of Equality of Means (H5 and H6) 
Robust Tests of Equality of Meansa 
  Statisticb df1 df2 Sig. 
Procedural 
justice 
Welch 0,839 1 6,473 0,392 
Brown-Forsythe 0,839 1 6,473 0,392 
Distributional 
justice 
Welch 0,300 1 5,720 0,605 
Brown-Forsythe 0,300 1 5,720 0,605 
Informational 
justice 
Welch 2,031 1 6,927 0,198 
Brown-Forsythe 2,031 1 6,927 0,198 
Interpersonal 
justice 
Welch 0,754 1 5,855 0,419 




Welch 2,411 1 7,148 0,164 




Welch 0,353 1 6,265 0,573 
Brown-Forsythe 0,353 1 6,265 0,573 
Perceived 
justice 
Welch 0,190 1 6,104 0,678 
Brown-Forsythe 0,190 1 6,104 0,678 
a. D.4 Job position = manager 




9. Appendix – Tables of Financial Performance  
Table 33 - Financial Performance of Family Business “A” 
 
Table 34 - Financial Performance of Family Business “B” 
 
Table 35 - Financial Performance of Family Business “C” 
 
 
HUF mn 2018 2019 2020 CAGR 18-
20
P&L key figures
Sales 26 020            27 393       25 136       -2%
EBIT 890                  848            823            -4%
Net Profit 712                  700            481            -18%
EBITDA margin % 3,4% 3,1% 3,3%
Net Profit margin % 2,7% 2,6% 1,9%
BS key figures
Current assets 7 120               8 677         8 058         6%
Non-current assets 12 692            13 798       13 898       5%
Total Assets 19 835            23 041       21 979       5%
Total Debt 2 695               2 071         2 246         -9%
Total Equity 13 508            14 062       14 539       4%
Debt to Equity 0,20                 0,15           0,15           
Debt to EBIT 3,03                 2,44           2,73           
HUF mn 2018 2019 2020 CAGR 18-
20
P&L key figures
Sales 11 395            14 371       16 316       20%
EBITDA 1 418               2 277         2 877         42%
Net Profit 969                  1 495         1 772         35%
EBITDA margin % 12,4% 15,8% 17,6%
Net Profit margin % 8,5% 10,4% 10,9%
BS key figures
Current assets 9 009               9 843         12 257       17%
Non-current assets 7 859               10 252       12 119       24%
Total Assets 16 875            20 144       24 393       20%
Total Debt 5 859               6 057         7 693         15%
Total Equity 9 448               11 445       12 926       17%
Debt to Equity 0,62                 0,53           0,60           
Debt to EBITDA 4,13                 2,66           2,67           
HUF mn 2018 2019 2020 CAGR 18-
20
P&L key figures
Sales 9 129               10 448       11 708       13%
EBITDA 228                  627            812            89%
Net Profit (141)                203            61               
EBITDA margin % 2,5% 6,0% 6,9%
Net Profit margin % -1,5% 1,9% 0,5%
BS key figures
Current assets 3 832               3 448         3 683         -2%
Non-current assets 2 690               2 633         3 088         7%
Total Assets 6 826               6 191         7 005         1%
Total Debt 3 013               2 309         2 480         -9%
Total Equity 1 816               1 308         1 333         -14%
Debt to Equity 1,66                 1,77           1,86           




Table 36 - Financial Performance of Family Business “D” 
  
HUF mn 2018 2019 2020 CAGR 18-
20
P&L key figures
Sales 7 780               9 783         13 184       30%
EBITDA 1 664               1 551         2 329         18%
Net Profit 1 056               829            1 633         24%
EBITDA margin % 21,4% 15,9% 17,7%
Net Profit margin % 13,6% 8,5% 12,4%
BS key figures
Current assets 4 580               5 765         5 991         14%
Non-current assets 4 323               3 857         6 992         27%
Total Assets 8 915               9 637         13 034       21%
Total Debt 325                  280            1 431         110%
Total Equity 7 194               7 903         9 418         14%
Debt to Equity 0,05                 0,04           0,15           
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